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STATEMENT 
To the best of my knowledge and belief the work presented in this thesis is original ,  except as 
acknowledged in the text. The material has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, for 
a degree at this or any other university. 
ABSTRACT 
The three decades prior to the First World War witnessed, in Queensland, a significant change 
in the basis and rate of economic growth. The long boom based on the development of the 
pastoral industry gave way in the 1890s to a period of depression and stagnation. This was 
followed,  however, by a new phase of prosperity after the early 1900s underpinned by the 
development of new rural industries involving the more intensive use of land. The period was 
also one of important changes in the structure of politics as the rise of the Labour Party led to 
the merging of the former liberal/ conservative division. 
In this context there were significant developments in the role played by governments in 
influencing economic development. In respect of three of the major categories of government 
involvement in the process of development - the management of land; public investment, 
particularly in railways; and the encouragement of population growth through immigration -
there was a degree of continuity: these elements of ' colonial socialism '  were all present in 
earlier decades. But the particular policies pursued in these areas underwent some major 
changes. Governments came also to involve themselves in the industrial process in a variety 
of ways that were novel: this intervention was directed particularly, though not exclusively, 
at encouraging new bases of economic growth, especially agricultural industries. 
Land policy involved three major categories of decisions: how to manage the extensive 
pastoral use of land; how to arrange for the conversion of such land to more intensive use to 
accommodate a larger population; and how, and to what extent, to intervene in instances 
where the freehold title of large areas of land had been allowed to pass into private hands so as 
to encourage and provide for its more intensive use. In each case policy had to balance often 
competing goals: maximisation of the revenue which the government as landlord should 
obtain from its most valuable natural resource and achievement of a rapid rate of settlement 
of people on the land. 
Decision making with respect to investment in railway communication also presented 
difficulties of principle. Railways were seen in large part as means of shaping as well as merely 
serving development in a new and still imperfectly understood environment. 'Rational ' 
decision making was accordingly very difficult. Yet, particularly because expenditure was 
reliant on borrowing and thus created fixed financial commitments, the narrow economic and 
financial implications of railway investment were inevitably a major consideration. 
In their role of encouraging population growth by subsidising immigration governments were 
also confronted with a dilemma. A high level of immigration implied benefits in terms of 
economic expansion; but to a section of the community at least it also implied a cost in terms 
of increased competition in the labour market. The issue of the immigration of coloured 
labourers also revolved around a conflict: that between economic and social goals. 
Finally, the new range of policies aimed particularly at assisting the development of specific 
industries - the provision of general technical and financial aid to agricultural industries, 
assistance with the production of meat and dairy produce for export, assistance to the sugar 
and mining industries, subsidisation of the cost of controlling the rabbit pest and protection of 
industries by way of tariffs - raised questions about the appropriate nature and extent of 
government 's role in economic activity and the process of economic development. 
No simple pattern or trend emerges from the complex of policies in these areas as they were 
pursued during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The period has been 
characterised for Australia as a whole as one where governments came increasingly to 
intervene in economic activity in a way which emphasised social and political goals at the 
expense of more purely economic considerations. Such a phenomenon can be clearly discerned 
in the policies of Queensland governments. But there is also a pervasive element of 'economic 
rationalism': governments hesitated to distort the process of development too heavily away 
from the paths along which economic forces pointed, either in the name of social/political 
goals or the more particularly economic end of growth. 
This characteristic of policy became more strongly evident in the 1890s in the context of 
economic depression and stagnation. It remained so in the early part of the twentieth century 
even as prosperity returned. 
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PREFACE 
It is a commonplace that governments have played a major role in the process of Australian 
economic development.. In the period before the First World War economic policy was 
characterised principally by three functions: the management of the vast estate of which 
governments found themselves in control ; the encouragement and assistance of immigrants; 
and the provision of social capital , the most important category of which was railways. 
Towards the end of this period governments also came increasingly to influence the process of 
development by intervening in the operation of a number of industries, or industry groups, 
typically to provide assistance to private enterprise. Policies pursued within the first three 
functions have been described as 'colonial socialism' and the term 'industry policy ' can be used 
to describe the last. They are grouped here under the rubric of 'development policy ' .  
The pursuit of 'economic development' was not of course a simple, one-dimensional activity. 
The concept both as it has been used by economic historians and as it was held in the minds of 
policy makers implies at the simplest level increases in aggregate output, or economic 
expansion. Typically it also requires such increases to exceed the rate of population growth so 
that there are increases in aggregate output per capita, or economic growth in the sense in 
which this term is strictly used. The extent to which such gains are distributed among the 
, people making up the society in question is a further aspect. Finally the concept of economic 
development also frequently embodies the notion of structural change in economic activity 
either as a means to economic ends or for more particularly social or political reasons. 
Accordingly the aims, and rationale, of the various elements of 'development policy ' varied. 
The need to 'manage the estate' devolved upon colonial governments unavoidably : those in 
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power were virtually forced to make decisions about the terms and conditions on which land 
could be occupied and utilised. These conditions were clearly of significance for the 
productivity with which land was utilised and thus for economic expansion and growth but 
land policy was also seen as a means of effecting structural change and hence shaping the 
social and political nature of new societies. The encouragement of immigration and provision 
of social capital were undertaken in the absence (except under s'pecial circumstances) of the 
economic incentives necessary to encourage private action, at least to the extent necessary to 
achieve the rate of economic expansion which was universally sought: on the one hand the 
cost and uncertainties of transfer to a distant and unknown land formed a barrier to would-be 
immigrants and, on the other, the competing demands on domestic savings and the 
unprofitable nature of railway investment in a large and sparsely settled country limited the 
possibilities of private investment. Both functions were driven primarily by economic motives 
but were also considerably influenced by structural considerations (often related to land use) 
and social and political aspirations and motives. Intervention to assist the expansion of 
certain industries (notably agriculture) evolved in the context of the collapse of the long boom 
based on the growth of the pastoral industry and the need to find new sources of economic 
expansion; though again some such intervention was motivated also by the desire to make the 
process of economic development conform to certain social goals. 
The broad outline of policies pursued within these areas has been sketched.1 This study -
intended as a contribution both to the history of economic policy and to Queensland economic 
and political history - presents a detailed analysis of these policies as they were pursued within 
the distinctive set of economic and political circumstances in Queensland. It focuses 
1 N.G. Butlin, 'Colonial Socialism in Australia, 1860- 1900', in Hugh G.J. Aitken (ed.) , The State and Economic 
Growth, Social Science Research Council, 1959; and N.G. Butlin et al., GotJernment and Capitali&m: Public and 
PritJate Choice in Twentieth Century Au,,tralia, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, esp. pp. 13-28, 49-73. 
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particularly on the ideas which underlay policy and, especially, the extent to which 
governments, through their development policy measures, felt bound by or alternatively 
sought to transcend or override economic forces. The main chapters (2-5) trace the evolution 
of policy within the four principal areas. Each of these is organised on somewhat different 
lines according to the way in which it seemed the subject matter was most appropriately 
treated. Within major themes and sub-themes the approach is, however, essentially 
chronological in order to demonstrate how policy evolved over time. Analysis of policy with 
respect to Melanesian immigration has been included with the discussion of European 
immigration in chapter 3 even though the aims of policy in each case differed funda�entally. 
Nevertheless the former had clear implications for development and for policy with respect to 
European immigration . An overview of the nature of development policy in general , as it 
evolved in the changing economic and political circumstances, is then presented in the 
concluding chapter. Chapter one . contains a brief descriptive account of the economic and 
political characteristics of the period under review in order to provide a context for the 
discussion of policy. 
The period in which policy is reviewed was in fact one of considerable change in both economic 
and political terms. A period of prosperity in the 1880s, representing the last phase of the 
long period of economic expansion based on the pastoral industry, gave way to more than a 
decade of depression or, at best, slow growth. The development of other rural industries after 
the early 1 900s constituted the basis for a new phase of expansion in the closing years of the 
period. In this context, attitudes and action with respect to both government intervention in 
industry and the traditional forms of colonial socialism underwent considerable change. The 
period is also characterised by complex changes in politics and the political nature of 
governments, themselves in part a consequence of changing attitudes towards development 
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policy. The inter-relationship between economic and political change and the aims and 
characteristics of development policy is thus a major theme of the study. 
The summary of policy that is presented and the analysis of the ideas and ideology underlying 
it has been constructed primarily on the basis of three sources: official reports and papers; 
parliamentary debates; and extra-parliamentary speeches and statements of those influential in 
formulating policy. The last of these has been obtained from an exhaustive consultation of the 
Brisbane Courier, the leading journal, which provided a comprehensive coverage of ministerial 
utterances. The Courier 's reports on policy measures and policy issues also provided a 
valuable supplement to these sources as did its own commentary on policy matters, due 
cognisance being taken of the liberal but business-oriented viewpoint which underlay this 
commentary. 
Extra-parliamentary speeches, often ranging broadly over the leading policy issues, were made 
by members of governments on ministerial tours, at major events such as the opening of 
shows, Chamber of Commerce luncheons etc. and at political meetings particularly at election 
times. Statements, generally on more specific issues, were made to deputations and to 
journalists as, increasingly over the period, ministerial views on leading issues were specifically 
sought and reported. These were generally reported verbatim and have been quoted 
extensively as if they were direct statements; the journalistic practice of converting the first 
person present tense to third person past accounts for the grammatical oddities which 
sometimes occur as a result. Parliamentary speeches and statements were also made in a 
variety of contexts including debates on bills, financial statements and the estimates as well as 
formal parliamentary motions and address-in-reply debates. Together, the views expressed -
with varying degrees of coherence - in these sources reveal the ideological and analytical basis 
of policy. 
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The question arises as to whether publicly made statements tell the whole story. The relevant 
parts of the personal papers available for some of the leading political figures during the period 
have been examined but these shed very little additional light on the formulation of the 
policies under review. Departmental records were not reviewed mainly because of the 
enormity of the task given the time period and number of relevant departments. It is argued, 
however, that while evidence therein might add to the explanation of particular policy 
decisions the public record constitutes an accurate manifestation of the aspirations, motives 
and reasoning underlying the broad thrust of policy pursued. 
Finally, it should be noted that the scope of the study is explicitly limited in two ways. It 
does not extend the analysis to the range of measures which come within a broader definition 
of economic policy. Foremost among these are the several policies which were developed in the 
1890s and particularly after 1903 to influence the terms and conditions on which labour was 
employed; these included measures to provide for the arbitration and conciliation of industrial 
disputes, the determination of wages and the hours and physical conditions of work, and 
workmen 's compensation. ' Industry policy ' is thus confined to measures designed primarily to 
influence the process of economic expansion rather than the distributive and more purely social 
implications of that process - though the line is not always easy to draw and some such 
measures were often more or less influenced by social rather than purely economic 
considerations. Nor does the study attempt to provide a survey of the range of ideas on 
different policy issues except where these were of some significance in understanding the way in 
which a policy was (or was not) implemented. In particular the ideology of the Labour Party
is given relatively little attention. The focus is rather on the policies pursued by those in 
power and the ideas and analysis underlying those policies. 
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CHAP TER 1 
EC ONOMIC AND P OLITICAL C ONTEXT: 1883-1914 
The three decades prior to the First World War were for Queensland, as for Australia as a 
whole, a time of considerable economic and political change. At the end of the 1880s a period 
of economic expansion and prosperity gave way to depression and a decade of stagnation. At 
the same time the emergence of the Labour Party and the coalition of the previously opposed 
liberal and conservative forces created new political divisions. As the process of economic 
recovery started after the end of the great drought, stimulated particularly by the 
development of agriculture, a new period of political instability was initiated: liberals 
reasserted themselves and joined with representatives of labour to form a government, flanked 
on one side by the conservatives and on the other by the formal Labour Party. After a short 
time, however, the non-Labour forces again coalesced to establish a new and firm political 
system. For the last seven or so years before 1914  a reformed Liberal Party governed with the 
Labour Party in opposition in the context of sustained and rapid economic progress. 
The 1880s were years of substantial economic expansion though it proceeded on an 
increasingly unstable base. The economy was based heavily on the pastoral industry (exports 
of wool and live-stock accounting for over half of the total exports of the. colony) together with 
mining (mainly of gold) and the sugar industry which had expanded rapidly in the early 
'eighties. Other agricultural industries remained relatively undeveloped; production of wheat 
for example remained well below the colony 's requirements and expenditure on imports was 
substantial , approaching in some years the revenue received from sugar exports. 1
1 Table 1 . 1 ,  at the end of the chapter, summarises the data for the value of exports of major commodities.
The pastoral industry received a severe set-back in mid-decade. Wool prices fell markedly 
after 1883 continuing a long-term downward trend evident since the early 1870s though one 
which had been broken by rises in the early 1880s. On top of this, drought conditions set in 
towards the end of 1883. In May 1886 it was observed that " the pastoral industry has 
undoubtedly reached a stage of depression equal to, if not worse than, that culminating in 
1868-9 . Properties are at present unsaleable except at ruinous sacrifices, and transactions in 
stock are almost at a standstill . . . . No price can be quoted for sheep, the heavy 
depreciations in wool upsetting all calculation" .  2
Both weather conditions and wool prices improved after 1886 though drought conditions 
returned in 1888 and indeed the Queensland correspondent of the Australasian Insurance and 
Banking Record wrote in March 1889: "We are yet in one of the worst droughts ever 
experienced, which has now lasted, with one or two tantalising appearances of a break-up since 
the middle of 1883 11 • 3 It was during this period that many pastoralists had to borrow heavily.
The sugar industry had also been plunged into crisis as a result of a sudden fall in sugar prices 
in 1884 due to the subsidisation of producers in Europe and the U.S.A. by their governments. 
Planters' incomes fell and many were forced to sell their plantations at considerable loss.4
Mining, however, provided a consistent bright spot as gold production and exports grew 
steadily over t.he decade, increasing dramatically in 1889 as the riches of Mt Morgan became 
apparent. For a short time exports of gold actually exceeded those of wool. 
High levels of public expenditure, following a large loan of nearly/, lOm. passed in 1884, were 
also maintained during the period. These provided a major stimulus to economic activity and 
2 The Queenalander, 22/5/86, p. 831 . 
3 Auatrala1ian lnaurance and Banking Record, 1889, p. 208. 
4 R. Shlomowih, 'The search for institutional equilibrium in the sugar industry 1884- 19 13' ,  Au1tralian
Economic Hiatory Review, XIX, 2 ,  1979, p. 101 . 
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exerted a significant influence over other industries, though not always to their advantage. As 
the Courier put it in 1887 :  " The standard of value is now arbitrarily fixed by the Government 
which has become the principal employer of labour; and if wool-growing, sugar-planting, or 
agriculture generally will not afford the artificially raised current rates, so much the worse for 
those engaged in and dependent upon these industries" .  5 The level of immigration had also
been very high in the early part of the decade and was maintained throughout the 'eighties, 
though at progressively lower levels. While serving as a stimulus to certain types of economic 
activity, partfoularly building and construction, and to economic expansion in general, the 
check to the growth of the major producing industries meant that the increase in the demand 
for labour was insufficient to absorb the immigrants (even in the context of the increased
demand for labour by the public sector) .
Economic trends during the 'eighties were therefore complex. From the boom conditions which 
prevailed in the early years of the decade the economy moved into recession after 1884. By 
1886 unemployment had become widespread throughout the colony: a report at one of many 
meetings of the unemployed, at Thargomindah, noting for example that "Hundreds of working 
men are looking for employment in this district: numbers offering to work for almost nothing. 
It is thought that the agitation will spread throughout the back country" .6 Unemployment
was also high in Brisbane. 7
The trough of the recession was reached by mid- 1887 and a recovery was evident by the latter 
half of that year.8 The recovery in fact developed into a minor boom in the latter part of 1888
and was fuelled by a speculative boom in sales of urban and suburban land and in gold shares. 
6 BC 22/2/87, p. 4. 
6 The Queenalander, 22/5/86, p. 805. 
7 QPD 60, 13/10/86, p. 1 192ff. 
8 E.A. Boehm, Proaperity and Depreuion in Auatralia 1887-1897, Clarendon Press, 1971 , p. 54. 
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Funds for speculative investment came from several sources, important among which was the 
government's action in raising a large proportion of a l 10m. loan sanctioned in 1884 over a
short period between 1885 and 1887.9 But a downturn quickly followed, in early 1889, as the
combined effects of the return to drought conditions the previous year, an easing in the level of 
public investment and the weakening of the speculative urban boom were felt. Increased 
unemployment, especially among construction workers and in manufacturing industries, was 
apparent. At the same time, however, the drought ended and there was some strengthening in 
wool prices also. 
In general the 1880s has been seen as a period of reduced productivity and profitability in the 
pastoral industry, where overall economic expansion was maintained by high levels of both 
private and public expenditure mainly on construction. Much of this was inherently less 
productive and much of it was based on unduly optimistic expectations. 10  The scene was thus
being set for a curtailment of investment, a revaluation of assets and factor prices and a 
downward spiral in the economy generally. In Queensland the underlying trends were 
complicated by the drought, developments in the mining and sugar industries, the speculative 
elements i� the boom towards the end of the decade and by the high rate of increase in 
population through immigration. By the end of the decade the situation was difficult for 
contemporary observers to interpret. 
The trends in the public finances present, at first sight, a clearer view of the mounting 
problems in the second half of the decade. There was an almost continual decline in the 
government's financial position over the period . Large surpluses achieved in the early 1880s 
were replaced by mounting deficits from 1884-85 onwards. 1 1  The situation was relieved
9 A.L. Lougheed, The Briabane Stock Ez.change 1884-1984, Boolarong Publications, 1984, pp. 31-4. 
10 W.A. Sinclair, The Proceu of Economic DetJelopment in A udralia, Cheshire, 1976, pp. 1 26-36. 
11 See Table 1 .3. 
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temporarily in the short period following the recovery in 1887, though a general increase in 
tariffs introduced in the 1888 budget was responsible for some of this improvement. Relief was 
short-lived, however, and by the end of the decade the accumulated deficit was 
approaching /, lm. ,  nearly one-third of annual revenue for 1 889-90. The deficit in that year
alone was £ 483,000. Care should be taken in relating this trend too closely to broader
economic developments for it arose largely as a result of two specific policies initiated by the 
Griffith government. The first was the greatly expanded program of borrowing and 
expenditure, particularly on railway construction. The poor return yielded by much of the 
investment caused payments of interest to become increasingly burdensome: net of returns 
directly attributable to borrowings (the net return from the railways, interest from local 
authorities and interest on public balances) the cost of interest as a percentage of revenue rose 
from 13  per cent in 1883-84 to 25 per cent in 1889-90. 1 2  The second factor was a decline in
land revenue following changes implemented by the 1884 land act. Both of these results were, 
however, due in part to the underlying economic problems. 
The following decade and a half was a period of considerably constrained expansion and 
subdued expectations. As has been well documented it was a time of particular difficulty for 
the colony 's leading industry. The output of wool rose dramatically at the beginning of the 
period, nearly doubling between 1890 and 1892, and remained at high levels until the effects of 
drought at the end of the decade cut output to about one-half that of most of the 'nineties. 
While this was reflected in a higher value of wool exports, which rose to constitute nearly fifty 
per cent of total exports in 1892, declining wool prices, particularly after 1 893,  pushed the 
value of exports down after this time (though still to levels above those of most years of the 
1880s) . Prices for stock were also depressed following a build up in stock numbers to record 
12 Tables Relating to the Colonial Treasurer's Financial Statement, QVP 1891 II, p. 631. 
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levels as a result of a run of good seasons since the late 1880s, although the development of a 
meat export trade alleviated this problem and there was a corresponding increase in the export 
of tallow, hides and skins. The main problems facing the industry, however, were monetary. 
These arose as a result of the level of debt acquired by many pastoralists in the 1880s either as 
a result of low prices combined with adverse seasons or through having acquired properties at 
prices inflated unrealistically by the speculative mood of the later part of that decade. 
Pastoral incomes in the 'nineties were insufficient to service this debt and the first half of the 
decade saw widespread foreclosures by financial institutions in the context of a downward 
adjustment in the value of pastoral properties. A recent study has suggested, however, (albeit
on the basis o-: a small sample of pastoral properties) that efforts to reduce working expenses
and improve productivity of flocks permitted a recovery in profitability after mid-decade, a 
recovery aided by a modest increase in wool prices. Accordingly, as these factors strengthened 
later in the decade " a  very successful adjustment to the problems of the early 1890s "  was in 
prospect by the end of the decade. 13 Unfortunately seasons became increasingly patchy during
these years. From 1899 until 1902 drought conditions prevailed with increasing and 
unprecedented severity. The output of wool fell , to be in 1902 one-third of its amount three 
years earlier and the value of wool exports declined sharply also, though not to quite the same 
extent. 
The mining industry, where gold still accounted for around ninety per cent of mineral output, 
remained buo} ant throughout the period. The value of gold exports fluctuated around levels 
reached at the end of the 1880s and were consistently high during the drought years when they 
exceeded the value of wool exports. 
1 3  H.M. Boot, 'The profitability of pastoral activities in Queensland 1890-1903', Working Papers in Economic
Hiatory, no. 31 , Australian National University, 1 984, p. 22. 
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Among agricultural industries the production of sugar, after the early 'nineties reorganised 
primarily on a small-farming basis, came to constitute a more stable part of the economy. But 
the industry was beset, particularly in the second half of the decade, by problems of patchy 
seasons, fluctuating prices, diseases in the crop and declining yields. Exports (to southern 
colonies) came to account more reliably for a substantial proportion of total export income, 
though this rarely exceeded 10 per cent and was typically only slightly more significant than 
the proportion accounted for by the combined categories of tallow and hides and skins. The 
reorganisation of the industry did, however, lead to considerable investment in sugar mills 
both by private capital and by co-operative groups with the aid of government loans. The 
years 1 898 and 1899 were particularly prosperous ones for the industry though it was affected 
to some degree by the drought in those immediately following. The major development was in 
the dairy industry (conventionally included under the heading of agriculture). Butter 
production {for which statistics had not even been collected prior to 1892) increased steadily; 
exports wel'.e begun in 1 894 and grew rapidly though the industry was affected in varying 
degrees by drought to 1 903 and the level of exports remained insignificant in aggregate. 
Wheat production increased through the period though it fluctuated widely. Record crops in 
1900 and 1 901 were followed by almost total failure in the drought year that followed. 
Agricultural areas were less uniformly affected by drought until 1902 and for some time 
farmers benefited considerably by selling fodder for stock further west. 
Compared to the 1880s considerably less stimulus was provided by public investment 
expenditure. Aggregate expenditure from the loan fund was curtailed sharply in 1 892 .  Higher 
levels of expenditure were resumed in 1896 and maintained through to 1903 although average 
annual expenditure during these years remained at little more than half that of the peak years 
of the 1 880s. 
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The slide into depression at the beginning of the period was somewhat erratic. The 
uncertainties of the first part of 1890 and the disastrous decline in the state of the public 
finances gave way to a slightly more optimistic outlook later in the year.  Boehm indeed 
identifies a recovery and at the end of the year the Courier was confidently foreshadowing " an 
era of material , political and social progress " . 14 From virtually the beginning of 1891 ,
however, a decline i n  the general level of economic activity set in, accelerating rapidly during 
1892 and reaching a trough about mid-1893. Throughout this time there were large numbers 
of unemployed, especially in Brisbane, and frequent public meetings and deputations on their 
behalf seeking some form of relief. An "unmistakeable rift in the cloud of depression " 15
towards the end of 1892 was aborted by the disastrous floods and the bank crashes of 1893 
which reflected the downward adjustment in values that had taken place in response to the 
excessive optimism of the 1880s. Despite the sharp fall in both private and public investment 
which took pie.Ce (the latter stemming from the failure of the government loan on the London 
market in May 1891 and more generally from the need to cut back the burden of interest on 
the public fina.nces) and the absence of any new growth sector in the economy, signs of
recovery were evident from as early as the end of 1893. It has been argued that there was a 
" strong recovery " from virtually the end of the banking crisis until a mild set back occurred 
during 1896-98. 16  Qualitative evidence suggests, however, that recovery was more gradual and
tentative. Contemporary assessments of the situation were sober: even by the beginning of 
1 895,  the view of the Courier was that "There is little running to and fro: there is little 
excitement: there are few big expectations: there is not much desperate doubt or fanatical 
faith: but there is a great deal of intelligent confidence and patient endurance and steady 
14 Boehm, Pro1p1�rity and depreuion, p. 56; BC 31/ 12/90, p. 4. 
1 5 BC 20/10/92, p. 4. 
16 Boehm, Pro1p<'rity and depre11ion, p. 57. 
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work " . 17
A stronger recovery and a greater degree of optimism became evident during 1 895 and lasted 
until the end of the decade with only a mild setback around 1897 when there was again 
evidence of general unemployment. 18 By August 1898 the treasurer was speaking of the "now
generally admitted fact that the colony has actually entered upon a new epoch of prosperity, 
and is making rapid strides forward" . 19 The period from 1898 to 1900 was indeed one of
strong recovery based on developments in both agriculture and the pastoral industry though 
drought conditions were beginning to affect the latter, particularly in the far western part of 
the colony. The modest revival in public investment reflected, and further stimulated, this 
prosperity. The effects of the drought were not generally felt until 1902 but every rural 
industry was t hen affected. Production and incomes fell across the board and unemployment 
again became a general problem in the second half of that year. 20
This pattern is again reflected in the government's financial position . Reduced receipts in the 
early years of the decade meant that the revenue level of the late 1880s was not exceeded until 
the middle of the 1890s. The very high deficit of 1889-90 was followed by deficits in the 
following four years though these were progressively reduced. A substantial surplus was 
achieved in 1E94-95 though the accumulated deficit of the previous five years was over.tl m.
and as treasur�r Hugh Nelson noted in his Financial Statement in July 1895, " We are not yet 
so far out of the wood that we can begin to holla" .  2 1  After six years of increasing revenue and
financial returns showing a surplus, a marked fall in revenue and increases in certain items of 
17 BC 1 / 1 /95 ,  p. 4. 
1 8  Reports of deputations from the unemployed, BC 7 /8/97, p. 5; 27 /9/97, p. 6. 
19 Philp, QPD 7g, 18/8/98, p. 271 . 
20 Reports of deputations from the unemployed, BC 30/7 /02, p. 4; 19/9/02, p. 4; parliamentary debate on
'The Unemployed Difficulty', QPD 89, 23/9/02, p. 612ff. 
21  QPD 73, 25/7/95, p. 335. 
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expenditure (to do partly with the drought, especially as it affected railway finances) caused a
deficit for 1900-01 of over half a million pounds: this was followed by smaller though still large 
deficits in the next two years accumulating to over �lm. A significant part of the difficulty in 
managing the public finances when revenue declined was the relatively . fixed commitment of 
interest payments on borrowed money. Between 1900-01  and 1 902-03 this exceeded 40 per 
cent of revenue and even net of returns directly attributable to borrowings the charge still 
accounted for nearly 30 per cent of revenue. 22 This problem was even greater than it had been
in the early 1 890s. 
The decade after 1903 was one of sustained progress and increasing prosperity despite 
occasional fluctuations in some industries caused mainly by seasonal variations. All major 
primary industries, except mining, showed significant advances. 23 The dairy industry showed
particularly rapid growth. The sugar industry successfully undertook the transition to white 
labour necessitated by commonwealth legislation and also expanded considerably, if somewhat 
erratically; particularly rapid growth was experienced at the end of the period_. Production of 
other agricultural products also increased markedly over the period though that of wheat 
fluctuated considerably and the state still had to import at about the same level as in the 
1890s .  The pastoral industry recovered quickly from the drought. Production of wool had 
returned to pre-drought levels by 1 907 and the recovery of profitability in the industry has 
been described as "spectacular " .24 The meat export industry was depressed until 1 909 while
pastoralists re3tocked but then entered a new boom period and the value of meat exports 
climbed above those of the 1895- 1902 boom. Exports of livestock were also high during these 
years constituting a source of export income which rivalled that of the sugar industry. The 
22 Tables Relating to the Colonial Treasurer's Financial Statement, QPP 1903 I, p. 438. 
23 See Tables 1 . 1  and 1 .2. Data for exports after 1909 include only direct overseas exports and are not 
comparable. 
24 Boot, 'The profitability of pastoral activities', p. 29. 
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mining industry was the only significant sector to show a decline, as a result principally of a 
fall in gold production which in 1 9 14 was less than 40 per cent that of 1 903. This decline was 
offset to a large extent by increases in the production of coal, copper and other minerals (the 
share of gold in total mineral production falling over the decade from nearly 80 to around 30 
per cent of mining production) .  Manufacturing industry also suffered a reversal in the 
immediate post-federation years but recovered strongly in the second half of the period 
remaining, however, heavily based on primary produce and food processing industries.26 The
major structural shift in the economy was therefore towards agriculture (especially dairying), 
though this was at the expense mainly of mining. Data cited by Lougheed suggest that the 
share of industrial production accounted for by the agriculture grew from 19 per cent in the 
1890s to 25 per cent in the two year period 19 13- 1 9 14 while that of mining declined from 16  
per cent to  9 per cent i n  the same period. The pastoral sector actually enlarged its share 
marginally from 39 to 40 per cent while that of manufacturing fell from 23 to 2 1  per cent. 26
Similar trends are indicated by data for exports which emphasise in particular how the 
pastoral industry held its place and remained the most important sector of the economy. 
Wool even came to account for a slightly larger percentage of total exports (30 per cent in the
years 1 907- 1909 compared to 28 per cent for 1897- 1899 ) and wool, meat and livestock
combined accounted in both these periods for 47 per cent of total exports. 
Despite the st.rong growth of the maJor rural industries from 1903 general recovery was, 
however, somewhat lagged. In August 1904 it could still be claimed that " severe industrial 
depression 11 sti ll existed and that there was a 11 greater number of unemployed than at any time 
in our history" .27 Reports of unemployment continued throughout the year, the problem being
26 J.R. Laverty, 'The Queensland economy 1860-19 15 ' in D.J. Murphy et al. (eds.), Prelude to Power: the Rise
of the Labour Par1·y in Queensland 1885-1915, Jacaranda Press, 1970, pp. 41-2. 
26 Lougheed, The Brisbane Stock Ezchange, p. 68. The nature of the data and fluctuations from year to year
mean that these figures can only be regarded as approximate. 
27 Letter by J. Leahy, an opposition member of parliament, BC 25/8/04, p. 2. 
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exacerbated by the severe cut-back in public expenditure made by the new Morgan-Kidston 
government in response to the financial situation it had inherited.28 By 1906, however, the
treasurer could claim, with some confidence, that " after a period of financial difficulty and 
depression, Queensland is now enjoying the glow of returning prosperity " .  29 That state of
prosperity continued until 19 14, a year in which incoming Labour treasurer Edward Theodore 
subsequently remarked, " the state of prosperity in Queensland was probably greater than at 
any previous time " .  30 By the end of that year, however, the war and the onset of drought had
materially altered the framework in which development proceeded. 
After 1 906, economic expansion was given a major boost by increasing levels of public 
expenditure particularly on railways. By 1907-08 expenditure had returned to levels typical of 
the 1890s and then grew to be more than three times this amount five years later. After this 
it was eased back though to levels which were still historically high. While interest charges 
increased along with the high levels of borrowing necessary to sustain this expenditure, 
increasing returns from the r�ilways progressively lowered the absolute level of the net charge 
of interest on revenue which, as a percentage of revenue, fell from 27 per cent in 1902-03 to 
under 6 per cent in 1913-14.31 It had taken until 1 905 to bring the finances back into balance;
in the context of general prosperity successive treasurers had little difficulty in producing 
surpluses in each of the following years.32
The nature of politics also underwent a major transformation during this period. The 1880s 
were characterised by an apparently stable two-party system. Two well-defined political 
groupings had emerged during the later 1870s: the Liberal Party and a somewhat less clearly 
28 Reports of deputations from the unemployed, BC 19/3/04, p. 16; 6/9/04, p. 6. 
29 QPD 97, 28/8/06, p. 452. 
30 QPD 12 1 ,  13/10/15 ,  p. 1265. 
31 Tables Relating to the Colonial Treasurer;s Financial Statement, QPP 1915-16 I, p. 486. 
32 See Table 1 .3. 
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defined group of conservatives. By the beginning of the 1880s they were under the undisputed 
leadership of lawyer Samuel Griffith on the one hand and engineer ,  pastoralist and 
businessman Thomas Mcilwraith on the other. The former party was identified with, and 
drew its support particularly from urban, professional and working men and farmers; the 
latter was oriented more towards the entrepreneurial classes. They differed from each other 
not in their commitment to development nor in their acceptance of the fact that government 
had a major role to play in promoting development. But the Liberals were concerned with the 
form of development and its implications for the nature of society whereas the conservatives 
were content to let the direction of development be determined by commercial principles and 
the actions of profit-seeking individuals. Liberals thus saw government as having a 
responsibility to guide and shape development; conservatives saw it rather more simply as the 
handmaiden of business. Mcilwraith had led the conservatives in government from 1879 to 
1883 during which time the Liberal Party under Griffith served as opposition. After a decisive 
win in the 1883 election Griffith then led a Liberal government over a distinctive five year 
term of government which marks the beginning of the period under review. Griffith 's pursuit 
of a set of policies designed to reform the process of development led quickly to financial 
problems; by 1887 the government was suffering considerable public criticism and declining 
popularity. In 1888 Mcilwraith came out of a short retirement from politics to lead the 
conservatives t.o victory in the election of that year after which he and Griffith again changed 
roles. 
Within two years, however,  there was to be a fundamental political realignment. On the 
grounds of his failing health Mcilwraith resigned as premier towards the end of 1888 to be 
replaced by Boyd Morehead, a wealthy and successful stock and station agent who had also 
served in Mcilwraith 's first government. Identifying particularly with the pastoral industry he 
was regarded as something of an extremist. Other members of the government held divergent 
views on key political issues and instability within the government soon became apparent. 
While having retained a nominal position in the government, Mcilwraith was no longer able to 
exert the unifying force of his personality and indeed it was " the realisation that he had 
apparently lost his weight and influence" ,  as the Courier put it, that caused him to resign 
from the government altogether in 1889.33 A year later the Morehead government was
defeated in parliament over financial proposals and Mcilwraith and Griffith joined forces to 
form a coalition government, securing the general support of the majority of their former 
supporters. Thus was initiated the 'continuous ministry ' which, with changing personnel , 
stayed in pown until 1903. 
Some former �upporters of the two leaders, mainly conservatives, initially stood outside the 
coalition and acted as the opposition; but they did so somewhat perfunctorily and the 
government wa.s never under any threat. As the Courier noted towards the end of 1891 :  " The 
Government have no compact body at their back, and yet they carry almost every measure 
they see fit to submit " .34 As the labour movement took form following the industrial unrest of
the early 1890s and economic conditions deteriorated into depression support for the 
government soon consolidated. By mid-decade the essential political division was between the 
government and the Labour Party: the former representing a broad spectrum of opinion 
(encompassing as it did adherents of the former opposed groupings) but united in their
rejection of caJs for more radical reform of the processes of production and distribution made 
in the interestf: of the working class by the Labour Party. The Labour Party gradually gained 
strength over the decade (though it did not formally assume the role of opposition until 1898
33 BC 1 7  /8/89, p .  4. 
34 BC 4/1 1 /9 1 , J:· 4. 
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despite having been numerically larger than the rather motley group which had acted in  this 
capacity ) . But despite the growing coherence and influence of the Labour Party and a
tenacious band of oppositionists the government was never threatened electorally. The 
number of its supporters elected declined only slightly over the ensuing elections held when 
due in 1896, 1899 and 1902. From the mid- 1890s a distinct group representing agricultural 
interests formed within the government; their support for the ministry became less and less 
firm and eventually they were to be the cause of its demise. 
Griffith served as premier until early 1893 when he was appointed to the position of Chief 
Justice. Mcilwraith, who had been treasurer since the coalition was formed, took over as 
premier and led the government at the election held in that year. At the end of that year, 
however, declining health forced him to give up the premiership and, while he remained 
minister for railways in 1894 and nominally a member of the government for some years 
thereafter (though ill-health kept him out of the colony ) , Mcilwraith 's influence practically
ended at this point. For the next nine years the government was in the hands of a diverse 
collection of men. Hugh Nelson succeeded Mcilwraith and was premier from 1894 until 1898 
when he resigned to become President of the Legislative Council. A pastoralist and man of 
conservative nature and views, Nelson had been minister for railways in the Mcilwraith-
Morehead government and Mcllwraith 's treasurer in 1893. Robert Philp was another major 
\ 
figure. A businessman with ideas in the mould of Mcilwraith and Nelson, Philp had also been 
a supporter of Mcilwraith in the 'eighties. He served as a minister in a number of portfolios 
after 1893 and was premier from 1899 to 1903. Other members of the continuous government, 
by contrast, had strong Liberal associations. Thomas Byrnes, a lawyer and protege of Griffith 
was premier briefly (until his premature death) in 1898, having served as Attorney-General
from the inception of the coalition. His successor was James Dickson, a real estate agent and 
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auctioneer and treasurer i n  former Liberal governments of the 1870s and 1880s. H e  was taken 
into the ministry by Nelson in 1 897 after a period of rather qualified support, served briefly as 
premier in 1 899 (until defeated on a policy measure to do with the parliamentary 
consideration of railways) and continued to serve as a minister under Philp until he moved to 
federal politicE in 1901 .  Other members of the government had also formerly been associated 
with the Liberal Party and indeed continued to assert their allegience to liberal principles.35
During Philp 's premiership, however, the ministry became somewhat more conservative, 
taking on rather the appearance of a " collection of old friends" .  36 This led to resentment on
both political and ideological grounds, especially from the group of liberals supporting 
agricultural interests. Indeed both public and parliamentary support for Philp began to 
weaken in the . early 1900s in the face of economic and financial problems (caused in no small 
part by the drought which coincided with his term of office) and the government was perceived 
as unable, or unwilling, to tackle these problems. The end came in 1903 when a group of 
former supporters voted against the government over financial proposals and Philp resigned.  
Following Philp's resignation the Labour Party, not having the numbers to govern in its own 
right, sought a.n arrangement with the dissident liberals. This resulted in a government being 
formed under the leadership of Arthur Morgan. A Darling Downs newspaper proprietor 
Morgan had been a member of parliament since 1887.  Identifying particularly with farming 
interests he had been a qualified supporter of the Liberal Party and the continuous ministry 
and was elected Speaker in 1 899.  Joshua Bell , a lawyer (who had served as Griffith 's private 
secretary at the beginning of the continuous government), and Digby Denham, a successful 
35 Thus, for example, Horace Tozer, colonial secretary, could assert in 1896 that he remained a member of
the Liberal Party, under whose banner he had been elected in 1888, and claim that: • The Government as at 
present constituted . . . was the constitutional Liberal Party of Queensland• .  (Speech at Gym pie, BC 
1 0/2/96, p. 5). 
36 G.C. Bolton, 'Robert Philp ', in D.J. Murphy and R.B. Joyce (eds.), Queen8land Political Portraita 1859-1952,
Univ. of Queensland Press, 1 978, p. 208. 
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produce and grain merchant, both of whom identified closely with agricultural interests, were 
appointed as lands and agriculture ministers respectively. Two members of the Labour Party 
were included in the government: William Browne and William Kidston. Browne, a miner, 
was party leader but Kidston was the more powerful and effective politician. As unrest within 
the ranks of government supporters increased during 1902 and 1903 he came increasingly to 
see an alliance with liberals as the most effective means of implementing the reforms espoused 
by the Labour Party and of advancing his own political career. Having played a decisive part 
in the formation of the coalition he became treasurer and the most influential member of the 
government, bound only in a general sense to the policies of Labour. 
There followed a period of instability and changing political alignments. An election in 1904, 
forced by the defection of some Morganites back to the opposition, confirmed electoral support 
for the government, with both the Labour Party and Morganites gaining seats. At the 
beginning of 1906, however, Morgan resigned to take Nelson 's place as President of the 
Council and Kidston became premier. But some members of the Labour Party became _ 
increasingly restive at Kidston's failure to pursue Labour policies while some liberals were also 
concerned at the speed with which he pursued reform. The latter group included Denham. He 
resigned at the beginning of 1907 after having tried to persuade Kidston to join with Philp to 
recreate a two-party situation comprising, as Denham described it, Progressive Democrats on 
the one hand and Socialists on the other. 37 That Denham attempted this coalition indicated
how much there was in common between the policies of Kidston and Philp. But Kidston still 
saw himself af. a 'Labour man' . At the same time, however, he was not prepared to adhere 
rigidly to the party platform and at the 1907 election broke away to form his own party and 
formally initiate a paralysing three-party situation. Political wrangling and a constitutional 
37 Speech at Corinda, BC 2 1/3/07, p. 5 . 
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crisis saw Philp replace Kidston at the end of 1907 but he was unable to govern. An election 
early in 1908 failed to clarify the situation which was only resolved when the Philp and 
Kidston parties merged, under the latter 's leadership, later in that year to reform the Liberal 
Party. Even then the refusal of some Kidstonites, formerly members of the Labour Party, to 
join the new coalition and other resignations on personal grounds left Kidston without a clear 
majority . A further election in 1909 gave Kidston a comfortable majority and finally restored 
, 
a stable two-party system with a Liberal government and the Labour Party in opposition. 
Kidston retired from politics in 1 9 1 1  and was succeeded by Denham who had rejoined the 
government after the fusion of the Philp and Kids ton parties. Denham led the government, 
winning an elt:ction in 1912  brought on in the wake of the general strike, until his defeat by 
Labour in 19 rn. During this time, somewhat paralleling the situation in the second half of the 
1890s, membe rs of parliament representing farming constituencies formed themselves into a 
group within t.he ranks of the Liberal Party. Initiated with the establishment of a Farmers' 
Parliamentary Union in 1909, a Country-Liberal Party was subsequently formed. This group 
exerted a strong influence over the policy of the government (its first chairman being taken 
into the government as minister for agriculture in 1913) but did not at any stage threaten its 
existence. 
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TABLE 1 .1 
VALUE OF T O TAL EXP ORTS AND EXPORTS OF S ELEC TED 
COMMODITIES, QUEENSLAND 1883 TO 1909 
£ '000 
Meat and 
Total Wool Livestock Gold Sugar 
5,276 2,277 781 698 538 
4,673 1 ,889 642 923 454 
5,243 1,779 857 1,119 720 
4,933 1 ,413 730 1,232 855 
6,453 2,368 1,058 1,432 758 
6,126 2,258 981 1,662 384 
7,736 2,680 921 2,754 443 
8,554 2,524 2,102 2,256 699 
8,305 3,453 1,146 1 ,951 632 
9,170 4,255 1,018 2,069 589 
9,632 3,572 1,271 2,164 753 
8,795 2 ,918 1,205 2,381 886 
8 ,982 2,986 1,368 2 ,265 796 
9,163 2,976 1,758 2,089 833 
9,091 2 ,499 1,855 2 ,539 681 
10,856 3,009 1,967 2,830 1 ,329 
11,942 3,381 2,421 2 ,582 1,163 
9,581 2,197 2 ,159 2,452 669 
9,249 2 ,131 2,034 2 ,185 789 
9,17 1 1,304 1,926 2,440 934 
9,514 1,867 1,885 2 ,858 646 
11,153 2 ,280 2,208 2 ,785 1,257 
11,939 2,649 1,974 2,627 1,448 
12,754 3,388 1,797 2 ,199 1,6 1 5  
14,684 4,133 2,280 2 ,008 1,7 79 
14,194 4,129 2,550 1,941 1,482 
14,844 4,809 2,689 1,963 1,125 
Source:  Statistics of Queensland - 1914, Summary. QPP 19 15-16 I, p. 1493. 
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Butter 
1 
16 
37 
49 
51 
8 6  
24 
47 
345 
455 
582 
503 
618 
541 
£0 
TABLE 1 .2 
PRODUCTION OF MAJOR C OMMODITIES, QUEENSLAND 1903 TO 1914 
Wool 
'000 lb l 'OOO 
1903 34,997 1 ,883 
1904 46,058 2,280 
1905 53,072 2,649 
1906 66,938 3,388 
1907 99,461 4 , 133 
1908 1 10,545 4, 139 
1909 129 ,668 4,8 1 1  
19 10 139 ,250 5,908 
1 9 1 1  142,382 5,580 
1912  136,878 5,561 
1913  154 ,183 6,296 
1914 155,478 6,707 
Sugar (raw} 
'000 tons J. '000
91  ( 1066) 
148 ( 1860) 
152 1 ,660 
184 1 ,988 
188 2 ,075 
151 1 ,510 
134 1 ,461 
210 2 ,248 
173 1 ,940 
1 13 1 ,331 
242 3 ,519 
225 3,241 
Butter Minerals 
'000 lb t'OOO l'OOO 
7,717 313 3,866 
17,538 635 3,704 
20,3 19 786 3,726 
22,746 909 4, 198 
22,789 949 4 ,132 
23,838 1 ,067 3,844 
24,592 994 3,656 
31 ,258 1 ,364 3,7 10 
27 ,858 1 , 180 3,661 
30,307 1 ,483 4, 175 
35, 199 1 ,613  3,857 
37,230 1 ,667 2,976 
Source: Tables presented with treasurer's annual Financial Statement. QPD, various years. 
- £1 
TABLE 1 .3 
PUBLIC REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE, QUEENSLAND 1882-83 TO 1914-1 5  
Revenue Expenditure Deficit Surplus 
" £ l £ 
1881-82 2, 102,094 1 ,883,692 218,402 
1882-83 2,383,859 2,317 ,674 66, 184 
1883-84 2,566,358 2,5 1 1 ,651 54,706 
1884-85 2,720,656 2 ,819,853 99 ,197 
1885-86 2 ,868,294 3 ,090, 159 221 ,865 
1886-87 2 ,807 ,698 3,263,584 455,885 
1887-88 3 , 177 ,518 3,368,883 191 ,365 
1888-89 3 ,6 14,652 3,497,805 1 16 ,846 
1889-90 3 ,2 1 1 ,795 3 ,695,774 483,970 
1890-91 3 ,350,222 3,684,654 334,431 
1891-92 3,473,7 16  3,625,280 151 ,564 
1892-93 3 ,445,943 3,557 ,619 1 1 1 ,676 
1893-94 3,343,068 3,351 ,536 8,467 
1894-95 3 ,413 , 172 3,308,433 104,738 
1895-96 3,641 ,583 3,567,947 73,636 
1896-97 3 ,613 , 150 3,604,263 8,886 
1897-98 3,768, 152 3 ,747,428 20,724 
1898-99 4 , 174,086 4,024, 170 149 ,915 
1 899-00 4,588,206 4,540,417 47 ,788 
1900-01  4,096,290 4,624,478 528, 188 
1901-02 3 ,535,061 3 ,967 ,001 431 ,939 
1902-03 3,526,465 3 ,717 ,806 191 ,341 
1903-04 3 ,595,439 3 ,607,863 12,423 
1904-05 3,595,398 3,581 ,403 13,995 
1905-06 3,853,522 3,725,7 12 127 ,810 
1906-07 4,307 ,912 3,9 1 1 ,797 396, 1 15 
1907-08 4,488,398 4,373 ,096 1 15,301 
1908-09 4,766,244 4,756,303 9 ,940 
1909- 10 5 , 1 19 ,253 5 , 1 13,578 5,675 
1910- 1 1  5,320,008 5,3 14,736 5,271 
19 1 1- 12  5 ,989,347 5,965,692 23,654 
1912- 13  6,378 ,212 6,372,097 6 , 1 15 
19 13- 14  6,973,258 6,962,515 10,742 
1914- 15  7 ,202,658 7 , 199,399 3,259 
Source: Tables Relating to the Treasurer 's Financial Statement (Table C. 3) , QPP 1915- 16  I,
p. 468.
CHAPTER 2 
LAND 
The management of the vast estate of which they were landlord was clearly one of the central 
and inescapable preoccupations of colonial governments. Land policy as it evolved was 
concerned with three distinct though interrelated themes. 
The first issue - both chronologically and logically - was how to manage the extensive pastoral 
use of land so as to allow for its most productive use, to obtain on behalf of society as much 
revenue as possible from its sale or lease and to ensure that sufficient of it could be made 
available for more intensive use, and closer settlement, if required. These three, often 
conflicting, requirements had to be balanced in determining the terms and conditions upon 
which tenants could use land. Specific decisions had to be made about the length, and 
security, of leases granted; the manner in which tenants were treated in regard to 
improvements when leases expired or land was resumed; and the rent which tenants would be 
required to pay for the right to use land. 
Secondly governments had to decide on the manner in which land resumed from extensive 
pastoral use should be made available for closer settlement and indeed, given the importance 
of closer settlement as a goal in its own right, the extent to which land policy should actively 
encourage and promote the more intensive use of land. Again decisions had to be made about 
the terms and conditions on which land was made available to settlers. 
Overlaying both these aspects, but affecting particularly the second,  was the question of 
whether land should be made available on a purely leasehold basis or sold, either outright or 
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on the basis of payment over time during which conditions designed to ensure 'settlement' (for
example requiring occupancy) might be applied.
In addition to these central aspects of land policy , the fact that in earlier decades governments 
had allowed land to be alienated, often in a way not intended, and such land had been 
aggregated into large freehold estates, led to another set of issues. Because these estates in 
many cases comprised highly productive and well located land deemed eminently suitable for 
closer settlement the question arose as to whether these estates should be repurchased by the 
government and subdivided and made available to settlers through its agency. In this case the 
central issue was whether or not this was an appropriate activity of government and, if it was 
to be undertaken, the manner in which the land should be subdivided and the terms and 
conditions on which it should be made available to settlers. 
A further aspect of land policy related to the efforts, especially in the 1880s and 1890s, to 
make land available for community settlement. While these were in some ways only an 
extension of the second aspect discussed above, where settlement was an important social goal 
in its own right, and while the policy and its consequences involved some interesting economic 
questions, they were to a much greater extent social rather economic policies and are not 
considered here. 
Apart from the repurchase policy which (after many years of debate) was initiated by a special
act in 1 894 (the Agricultural Lands Purchase Act) and pursued within this act and its
successor (the Closer Settlement Act of 1906) land policy was embodied almost entirely within
a general land act. A major revision in land legislation was made at the beginning of the 
period under review with the Crown Lands Act of 1884. This was frequently and considerably 
amended over the next thirty years (with major consolidating acts in 1897 and 1910) though it
provided the basic framework of policy during this time. An outline of l�nd policy in the years 
preceding 1884 is necessary to understand the significance of the 1884 act. 1
During the early decades after separation an important distinction was made between the 
'settled ' and 'unsettled ' districts on the basis essentially of land occupied under New South 
Wales law at the time of separation. The former encompassed mainly the south-east corner 
including the Burnett and Wide Bay areas and most of the Darling Downs. It was the settled 
districts that, because they included the best and most readily accessible land, became the 
subject of major debates in land policy in the decades following separation; it was here that 
provision had to be made for pastoral occupation to give way to closer settlement and more 
intensive use of the land. 
Land in the unsettled districts was held under a variety of tenures until it was all brought 
under the Pastoral Leases Act of 1869. This provided for twenty-one year leases at a rent of 
5s. per square mile (for that part of the area defined as 'available' for pastoral use) during the
first seven year period of the lease, this rising to 10s. and 15s. for the second and third seven 
year period respectively. The lease gave no firm guarantee of tenure for this period as leases 
were subject to resumption on six months notice though no such resumptions were made in the 
early decades. 
In the settled districts, pastoral leases in the early years after separation were also held under 
a variety of tenures. Under the 1868 Crown Lands Alienation Act lessees were given the 
option of surrendering one half of their run in exchange for a more secure tenure on the 
remainder: ten year leases were granted at existing rents, though these were still technically 
subject to resumption upon a resolution of both houses of parliament. The 1868 act also 
1 This draws on two studies of early land policy: B.R. Kingston, 'Land legislation and administration in
Queensland, 1 869- 1876' (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1968} and G.P. Taylor, 'Land policy and the 
development of settlement in Queensland, 1868-1894' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1966). Part of the 
latter has been published as G.P. Taylor, 'Political attitudes and land policy in Queensland 1868- 1894 ' ,  Pacific 
Hiatorical Review, 37, 3, 1 968, pp. 247-64. 
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provided a framework for the more intensive utilisation of land made available in this way (or
resumable from leases not brought under the act) . The land was made available for 'selection'
on a conditional purchase basis at minimum prices of 15s. , 10s. and 5s. per acre according to 
the classificat�on of the land. Payment was to be made by ten equal annual instalments
(called 'rent') with freehold granted upon payment of rent and compliance with conditions
relating to residence and improvements. Provision was also made for selection of smaller 
areas, known as 'homesteads' (of 80 and 160 acres) to enable men more readily to establish
themselves on their own land. Further provision was made for the acquisition of homesteads 
in the Homestead Areas Act of 1872. In 1876, after two years of particularly active debate 
and two abortive attempts, the Liberal government passed another land act which effectively 
continued the principles of the 1868-1872 acts though it emphasised settlement in smaller 
areas and gave further encouragement to homestead selection by lowering the price to 2s.6d. 
per acre in consideration of minimum expenditure of 10s. per acre on improvements. 
This emphasis reflected the Liberal view that 'development'  required 'settlement' ;  the more 
intensive use of land and its occupation in small areas by farmers and their families was 
socially, even morally, desirable and to be facilitated and encouraged in whatever way 
possible. In the words of a young Liberal lawyer at the time, 
. . .  it seemed to him that if they could settle ten men on the land instead of one 
they were adding considerable benefit to the country. What was settlement? It was 
putting people to live on the land, to improve it, and become good citizens. 2
And 'settlement' was invariably equated with the development of agriculture. The words of 
Henry Jordan, a traditional Liberal , sum up the view succinctly: 
2 S.W. Griffith, QPD 20, 29/8/76, p. 574.
To till the ground is properly to possess it. To feed sheep and cattle over the 
wilderness is but one remove from the occupation of it by the poor Aboriginals of 
Australia . . . .  Pastoral occupation is but one step towards what is properly called 
" settlement" . . .  which, I understand, means population, agricultural progress, 
wealth and British colonisation in its highest form. 3 
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To ensure that an adequate supply of land was available for settlement Liberals were thus 
particularly concerned with the terms on which land was held by pastoralists in the settled 
districts. This concern, together with an underlying antipathy towards squatters and 
'squattocracy' (partly, it has been suggested, a hangover of attitudes from Europe), led to 
considerable pressure from Liberals during the early 1870s to resume land from pastoral leases. 
After gaining power they indeed embarked on a program of resumption which has been 
described as " a  wholesale repudiation of the ten-year leases granted in 1868 " .  4 The hardline
attitude was embodied in the Settled District Pastoral Leases Act of 1 876 (designed to 
complement the legislation providing for selection) which offered only a five year lease on a 
very insecure tenure. The sitting tenant was given no preferential right and was required to 
bid for leases at auction. The leases were subject to resumption at any time. 
Geographical and economic circumstances were such, however, that the most productive way 
to use land - even that most physically suitable for cultivation - was generally for grazing. It 
was very difficult for the small farmer to earn a living after paying for land and borrowed 
capital, and in the context of a limited market for crops, poor transport facilities and the 
difficulties and uncertainties of production in what was still a relatively new and unknown 
environment. Indeed the term 'struggling' was very frequently coupled - almost 
subconsciously - with the terms selector and farmer at this time. Accordingly the demand for 
3 QPD 49, 26/8/86, p. 5 16. While these words were spoken in the 1880s and, as argued below, the views of
some Liberals - even to some extent Jordan himself - had changed by then, they reflect attitudes which, in the 
1870s, were very widely held by Liberals. 
4 Taylor, 'Political attitudes and land policy1, p. 254. 
£7 
land under the terms of the land acts - at least demand with any genuine economic basis - was 
limited. The Liberals' problem was that there was an incompatibility between what they. 
wanted and what geographical and economic realities decreed. It was these realities and not 
the power of the squatters or the failure of land legislation which limited the extent of 
settlement. The measures of the 1870s in fact over-provided for settlement of the sort Liberals 
wished to see occur. 
This had two important repercussions. Firstly, because of the poor tenure offered pastoral 
lessees in the settled districts, there was little incentive for investment in improvements and 
the land was used less productively than it would otherwise have been. Secondly the policy 
tended to increase the rate at which squatters, through means legitimate or otherwise, sought 
to acquire the freehold of land. This became for many a defensive measure against 
resumption. Under the 1868 act a considerable amount of land was 'dummied ' and while this 
practice was curbed in the 1870s a considerable proportion of the land selected under the 1876 
act was taken up originally for speculative purpose� or sold by the 'struggling farmer ' to the 
nearest squatter when it became evident that geographic and economic circumstances made it 
impossible for many selectors · to prosper, or even survive, particularly on the small 
'homestead ' selections. 
The Liberal (or as it has been termed the 'political ' or 'social ') view of land policy reflected in
legislation of the 1870s has been contrasted with the 'economic ' view. 5 The latter was held by
the squatters .and others of broadly conservative views who were critical of the Liberals' 
attempts to pursue their social goals through land policy. It was well-expressed by Thomas 
Mcilwraith who emerged during the second half of the 1870s as leader of the conservative 
forces opposing the Liberals. Uncommitted to the Liberals ' ideals, he argued that the best 
6 Ibid., pp. 247-50. 
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form of land use was simply the most profitable. He was dubious about trying to force a form 
of closer settlement which was simply not economically viable: 
Unless they could secure residence and settlement, nothing was gained by increasing 
the facilities for acquiring land . . . . The whole of the (Liberal) policy seemed to be
to settle men down on small areas, and that the country would gain greatly by it. 
He could not see the gain unless the man did with the land something more 
profitable than the previous occupant. 6
As premier after 1879 Mcilwraith did not alter the legislative framework in which closer 
settlement could proceed, believing that this was more than adequate. Indeed he acted to 
strengthen the position of the pastoral lessee in the settled districts through an act in 1882. 
During the early 1880s Griffith was leader of the Liberal opposition. If never quite as fervent 
as some more rurally-oriented Liberals in his vision of smiling farms and happy homesteads 
dotted thickly over the countryside he nevertheless subscribed during the 1870s to the 
orthodox Libe�al view of land policy. But by 1883 his views on land policy had developed 
considerably. They were still distinctively Liberal in so far as he favoured the 'small man' 
and the notion of a more egalitarian use of the colony's major natural resource. He had, 
however, come to accept that pastoralism was generally the more profitable way to use land. 
The corollary was to use pastoralism as the medium for closer settlement; while this would not 
be as ' close' as agriculturally-based settlement it held out the prospect of an economically 
more viable means of achieving his goal . At the same time he accepted that while some 
pastoralists had, by acquiring large freehold areas of land, blocked the process of closer 
settlement, the majority of pastoral lessees were undertaking a legitimate and highly 
important economic activity. Further he thought that they should be encouraged to 
6 QPD 18, 27 /4/76, p. 24; see also QPD 20, 29/8/76, p. 665ft'. 
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undertake that economic activity more productively for then the revenue which the people of 
the colony, through their government acting as landlord on their behalf, could be increased as 
higher rents could legitimately be asked. Accordingly Griffith floated the idea of giving lessees 
the option of surrendering part of their leases which could be made available for selection in 
smaller areas; in return lessees would receive a secure lease on their retained land and the 
promise of compensation upon termination for improvements. 7
In arriving at these views Griffith was materially influenced by Charles Dutton. A 'liberal 
squatter ' Dutton had made one unsuccessful bid to enter parliament in 1865 but then 
remained a largely private figure until he developed a relationship with Griffith in the early 
1880s. The extent of this relationship is not clear though at least as early as May 1883 Dutton 
had appeared on the platform with Griffith when the Liberal leader addressed his electorate 
and gave a comprehensive outline of his views. 8 An acknowledged adherent to the views of
Henry George, Dutton was also an advocate of the leasehold principle. Griffith had toyed with 
the idea earlier in his career.9 While somewhat equivocal about it in 1883, the extent to which
he found Dutton 's overall views on land policy congenial was, however, apparent when he 
appointed him lands minister in the government he formed towards the end of that year . 10
THE CROWN LAND S AC T OF 1 8 84 
One of the first measures to be brought before parliament in the first major sitting after the 
Liberals regained power was a bill to give effect to these ideas. The Crown Lands Act of 1884, 
7 Speeches, BC 9/5/83, p. 5; 19/6/83, p. 2; 1 1 /8/83, p. 6. 
8 BC 9/5/83, p. 6. 
9 Taylor, 'Political attitudes and land policy' p. 258. 
10 Dutton summarised his own views at this stage in a speech at Springsure on 24/1 1 /83. (BC 4/12/83, p. 3) 
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as it was to become, was indeed one of the major legislative achievements of the Griffith 
government. 
The act applied to rather more than half the colony, pastoral lessees in the western part 
remaining under the 1869 act. Those within the 'scheduled ' area were given the option of 
retaining their leases under the existing tenure or, as was intended and desired, bringing them 
under the 188·1 act. In doing so lessees would be required to surrender a proportion of their 
holding (the proportion varying from one-half to one-quarter according to the length of time 
the lease had been held) this to be known as the 'resumed' part. In return they were to be 
given, for the 'retained' part, an indefeasible lease of fifteen years in the case of leases in the 
'unsettled ' districts and ten years in the 'settled ' districts. The resumed part was to be made 
available for selection under the mechanisms outlined below though provision was made for 
existing lessees to continue leasing the land before it was opened for selection. A newly­
established Land Board was to determine the compensation for improvements on resumed land 
and the rent to be paid by pastoral lessees for the retained part of their leases, the latter to be 
reviewed every five years. 
Land resumed from pastoral leases was progressively to be made available for selection either 
as 'agricultural farms' (in declared 'agricultural areas ') or as 'grazing farms' ,  in areas not 
exceeding 1 , 280 acres and 20,000 acres respectively . Grazing farms were to be made available 
only on a leasehold basis, the period of lease being thirty years. Agricultural farms were to be 
made available on a fifty year lease though provision was made for the freehold to be 
purchased after ten years. The act set minimum rents for selections and these were to be 
reviewed by the board after ten years and then at five-yearly intervals. Leases were to be 
granted only after specified improvements (in the form of fencing) were made by selectors 
during an initial period when they were given a licence to occupy, and required also that "good 
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and substantial " fences were to be maintained during the period of the lease. Occupancy 
conditions were also specified: these were to be fulfilled "by the continuous and bona fide 
residence on the land by the lessee himself, or some other person who is the actual and bona 
fide manager or agent of the lessee for the purpose of the use and �ccupation of the land 
" 
The act embodied some distinctive and significant departures in land policy. The first of 
these, already foreshadowed by Griffith, related to the form in which settlement was envisaged 
to occur. Henceforth the grazing farm was to be the principal medium by which the land was 
to support a la rger population. As Griffith put it when speaking on the bill: 
No man can attempt to deal with this Land question - knowing the quality of the 
land and that much of it is at present unfit for anything but pastoral purposes, and 
that the only way to utilise it profitably is by grazing - without providing some 
means b:y which fair areas of that land can be given to people who will settle upon 
it and o�upy it as closely as it can be occupied, and so put it to the best possible 
use at the present time. That should be an essential feature of any Land Bill, and it 
has been neglected in all previous Bills. 1 1  
While the act provided for selection of smaller areas for  agricultural purposes, i n  much the 
same way as in earlier acts, this was not a major focus of the measure. Even a veteran Liberal 
campaigner for the development of agriculture as the basis of settlement like Henry Jordan 
accepted the change of emphasis: 
When we talk of settlement we have been too much in the habit, I think, of 
attaching the idea of settlement to tillage of the soil ; and many hon. gentlemen 
believe with the great pastoral lessees, that the idea of farming is utterly absurd 
. . . . I think we have made a mistake in always associating the idea of settlement 
in this colony with the tillage of the soil . Why should not a number of men with 
small capital , hundreds and thousands of them, be settled in this country as small 
1 1  QPD 43, 19/8/84, p .  360.
1 2pastoral tenants? 
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Secondly, in conformity with Dutton 's by now well-known views, freehold tenure was 
abolished in favour of leasehold. When speaking to the bill Dutton explicitly confirmed his 
view that " the principle of leasing is the only true one" . 13  Through this principle, it was
argued, settlement would most readily be encouraged. By making land available cheaply in 
the first instance men of moderate capital could take up land, and apply their capital to 
improving the productivity of land and earning income rather than in merely acquiring the 
land itself. Moreover, the possibility of settlement being 'blocked '  by the acquisition of 
freehold would be avoided. As Griffith put it: 
we do not propose . . .  to give land as freehold, because if we did we should have 
no security whatever that as soon as the land became freehold it would not be 
handed over to a neighbouring large landowner . . . . It would be a complete 
measure for preventing settlement. 1 4  
And, in  the long run, the increment in  the value of  land could be secured to the people 
generally through periodical reviews of rent. A confidential memorandum to Griffith by 
Dutton setting out his suggestions for a " Crown Lands Bill 1884" indicated by its opening 
statement the importance he attached to the leasehold principle and the goals he considered 
would be achieved by its adoption: 
12  Ibid., p. 391 ;  see also BC, 7 / 1 1 /84, p. 4; 1 / 1 /85, p. 4. This act was in fact frequently referred to
informally as the Grazing Farms Act. (See, for example, Oscar de Satge, Page& from the Journal of a 
Queenaland Squatter, Hurst and Blackett, 1901 ,  p. 35 1 .) The change in emphasis has, however, often not been 
recognised. Joyce, for example, in his biography of Griffith commented: ' This land legislation did not 
significantly alter the balance of the Queensland economy. The pastoral industry remained dominant . . . .
Agricultural production remained relatively unimportant• :  such an assessment was inappropriate in terms of 
the aims of the a1ct. (R.B. Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith, University of Queensland Press, 1984, p. 94.)13  QPD 43, 5/8/84, p. 252. 
14 QPD 43, 1 9/8/84, pp. 364-5 .  
To prevent monopoly of land by a few, to ensure the gradual extension of 
occupancy by holders of moderate areas, to bring the occupancy of moderate areas 
within the reach of men with small capital, and to secure to every member of the 
community a participation in some portion of the increasing value of land - to 
which as a worker he must have contributed - the basis of all previous land 
legislation, alienation, is now abolished, and that of leasing as hereinafter set forth, 
is substituted. 1 6  
- 99 
Some concessions, however, were necessary. No reference was made to town and suburban 
land, which had been included in Dutton 's initial proposal, and the purchase of the freehold of 
agricultural farms was, as already noted, to be permitted after ten years. This departure was 
explained by Dutton as " a  concession to the sentimental objections and prejudices of a large 
class of people in the country" .  Griffith was doubtless influential in the decision and in the 
case of agricultural land even def ended the granting of freehold as desirable: he argued that 
alienation " of small areas of land in the more settled districts" to persons "who have shown 
their intention of permanent settlement by living on the land for ten years " was more likely to 
promote than hinder settlement. Griffith was thus prepared to take a pragmatic position. " It 
appears to me that there is nothing very reprehensible in having a freehold. It is not a 
question of abstract right or wrong, but of the interests of the community " . 16 A further
concession was made by continuing the provision for acquisition of the freehold of small 
agricultural selections at low prices as had been available under the 'homestead clauses' of the 
1876 act. Dutton had been particularly critical of these when speaking to his initial bill which 
omitted provision for selection on this basis. Drawing on a report on the state of settlement 
on the Darling Downs by the land commissioner for that district, Dutton argued that the area 
provided for ( 1 60 acres maximum) was simply too small for a man and his family to live upon
and that the majority of these selections had within a short time been sold to large 
15 Griffith papers, Dixson Library, MSQ 186, p. 5. 
16  QPD 43, 19/8/84, p. 365.
- 94 
freeholders. Far from promoting settlement the clauses had merely served to enhance a process 
that blocked it.. "Limiting a man to 160 acres as a homestead would be the most effectual way 
of debarring him from the successful occupation of land; . . .  letting him get it at half-a-crown 
an acre was the sure means of having it turned over to the large freeholders. " 17 Genuine
settlement, it was maintained, could only take place on areas sufficient in size to yield a living. 
But Griffith and Dutton were attacked from all sides for the omission. Liberals saw the 
homestead clauses as the only hope for many 'small men' to acquire land, their sentiments 
being reflected in the Courier 's comment on the omission: 
Mr. Dutton and his colleagues do not understand the wants, the aims or the hopes 
of the poor man who with his few pounds of hard-earned savings, and with no other 
capital but that and his strong arms and stout heart, betakes him to the bush to 
carve a home out of the wilderness for himself and his little ones . . . . They are 
simply wealthy men; and in pure ignorance propose to make settlement impossible 
for the poor immigrant who has come here to satisfy the land hunger at his heart. 18 
For pastoralist.s the clauses provided for a form of settlement which impinged least upon their 
interests and indeed had, on occasions, served as a convenient mechanism for acquiring more 
freehold. In the circumstances Griffith and Dutton relented. A clause was introduced into the 
act providing for the acquisition of freehold of agricultural farms not exceeding 160 acres after 
five years of personal residence (a more stringent condition than occupancy) for 2s.6d. per acre
(to which could be credited rent already paid) provided not less than 10s. per acre had been
spent on improvements. 
The leasehold principle was, however, asserted with respect to one aspect of land policy 
I 
affecting pastoralists: the so-called 'pre-emptive right' of purchase. The 1869 Pastoral Leases 
17 QPD 43, 6/8/84, p. 264. 
1 8  BC 13/8/84, p. 4. 
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Act had provided (in s.54) that "for the purpose of securing permanent improvements it shall
be lawful for the Governor to sell to the lessee of a run, without competition, at the price of 
ten shillings per acre, any portion of such run in one block, not being more nor less than 2,560 
acres" .  Whether this in fact conferred a 'right' of purchase on lessees or, as Griffith argued, 
was introduced merely as an alternative mechanism which the government had provided to 
compensate the lessee for improvements made and was thus a 'privilege' ,  exercisable at the 
option of the Crown, was hotly debated. The clause had come to be regarded as conferring a 
'right' ,  however, and widely exercised, as Griffith put it, so as to "pick the eyes out of the 
country " creating " castles and outposts in the hands of an enemy guarding the surrounding 
districts so that no man can come within a certain distance of these castles and outposts " . 19
Anticipating the extensive exercise of this right as the Liberals ' policy became known, Griffith 
attempted to repeal s .54 of the 1869 act in a bill brought forward in the first short 
parliamentary sitting after the 1883 election. As Griffith said then: " If we are to divide [the 
large] runs, we should not be hampered by finding these little blocks dotted all over the 
country in every direction . . .  we do not intend to allow the scheme that we intend to bring 
forward next session to be blocked by the present pastoral lessees applying to take up pre-
emptives " .  20 A promise embodied in the bill to recognise fully the lessees' claim to the
unexhausted value of improvements on the termination of his lease or on the resumption of 
any portion of his run and the foreshadowing of a more secure tenure21  failed to stem the cries
of 'repudiation ' and whilst the bill passed its second reading it was not further proceeded with. 
Repeal of the pre-emptive purchase provision in the 1869 act was included in the 1884 bill. 
Dutton argued that the promised provision of compensation for improvements gave " the most 
19 QPD 43, 1 9/8/84, p. 361 . 
20 QPD 4 1 ,  19/2/84, p. 390. 
21 Dutton, ibid., p. 385ft'. 
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ample equivalent" for repeal of the clause.22 But the 'right ' was strongly defended by the
pastoralist members and the Legislative Council eventually succeeded in having those parts of 
the clause which repealed the pre-emptive right with respect to existing leases struck out. But 
consistent with what Griffith maintained the legal status of the matter to be, the government 
simply refused to grant applications, maintaining that it was within their discretion to grant 
or refuse them. In the absence of a legal challenge the end of pre-emptive purchases was thus 
23effected. 
The 1884 act embodied new ideas not only with respect to the mechanisms by which 
settlement could be encouraged but also on the treatment of existing pastoral lessees. The 
argument over pre-emptive purchases tended to obscure the favourable aspects of the manner 
in which pastoral lessees were treated and indeed what may be termed 'the new legitimacy' 
conferred upon them by the act. While having to yield a proportion of their land, lessees who 
opted to come under the act were to receive, for the first time, a secure tenure over the land 
they retained. As the Courier observed, " the theory that the squatter should be merely a 
temporary tenant, to be turned out as soon as the agriculturalist apppeared on his land, has 
been abandoned " ,  and the very term 'squatter ' henceforth ceased to be applicable to a large 
number of pastoralists. 24 Griffith emphasised that pastoral lessees should still be regarded as
temporary tenants ultimately to be replaced by the smaller pastoralist, if not the 
agriculturalist, but conceded that this process of displacement would take some time. In the 
meantime the place of the large pastoral lessee was recognised and his position made more 
certain. As a consequence, it was argued, lessees would be encouraged to increase the 
productivity of the land, and would be in a better position to borrow money to do so. This 
22 QPD 43, 6/8/84, p. 255. 
23 BC 27 / 1 1 /84, p. 4; 19/ 10/84, p. 4. 
24 BC 1 / 1 /85, p. 4. 
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only added to the case, which Griffith had already made out in general terms, for higher rents; 
a case elaborated by Dickson, his colonial treasurer. Rents for ·pastoral leases averaged 9s. ld.  
per square mile and £t . 18s.4d. per square mile in the unsettled and settled districts 
respectively: 
I ask any hon. member, does he consider that to be sufficient revenue to obtain from 
the pastoral lessees? I do not think any hon. member will say it is an adequate 
return by the pastoral lessees for the enormous expenditure the State has gone into 
to provide improved means of communication, and in other ways increase the value 
of the territory to the occupier. I say that the pastoral rents have not at all 
increased [and) have not kept pace with the gradual increment in the value of real
estate throughout the colony, or in proportion to the rentals paid for leases of 
freehold property, and I contend that we ought to look at the matter and consider 
whether, without doing him injury, the pastoral tenant should not be called upon to 
pay a higher rent to the state for the additional facilities which have been provided 
for him by the general community.25
Dickson subsequently also noted the average price of leases submitted by auction during 1883-
84 in relation to the existing rents: i 1 .8s.7d. and £2.5s.3d. in the unsettled and settled
districts respectively: 
The ' inexorable logic '  of these facts gives an overwhelming refutation to the 
frequently reiterated assertion that pastoral occupation cannot now afford to pay 
larger rents than those which, originally affixed under the Orders-in-Council [of 
New South Wales] , have been only slightly increased by the Pastoral Leases Act of 
1 869.26
It was primarily to secure the increases considered warranted that the Land Board - another of 
the important innovations in land policy incorporated in the 1884 act and,  as Dutton put it, 
" the keystone of the whole fabric" 27 - was created.
25 QPD 43, 27 /8/84, p. 447. 
26 QPD 43, 1 0/9/84, p. 612. 
27 QPD 43, 5/8/84, p. 255. 
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The board was to consist of two full-time salaried officials whose function would be to 
determine, within the framework of the act, the manner in which land would be opened for 
selection and the price (rent) charged for all Crown land, including the retained part of 
exisiting pastoral leases. The rationale of the board was partly that it was an improved 
method of public administration: important decisions about land policy were taken out of the 
political arena. and away from the direct control of the minister. In most cases the minister 
retained ultimate authority; though, as Dutton noted, " if a Minister should [take) upon 
himself to refuse to act upon the recommendation of the Board he will have to justify his 
action to the House, and justify it in a way that he is scarcely required to do now" .  28 As such
it was seen as a better institution for making one of the most vital economic decisions that 
colonial governments had to make - the price that they as landlord would charge for the 
resource land. 
The minimum levels of rent specified by the act were 10s. per square mile (a little over one­
sixth of a penny per acre) for pastoral leases in the unsettled districts, 40s. per square mile 
(%d.  per acre) for pastoral leases in the settled districts, the same for grazing farms (though in 
the initial bil1 the figure had been set at double this, l %d. per acre) and 3d. per acre for
agricultural farms. In setting rents within these constraints the board was required by the act 
to take account of the " quality and fitness " of land for agricultural or grazing purposes, its 
normal carrying capacity , distance from transport, and water supply and water storage 
facilities (ss. 30.5 and 58.4) .  There is nothing in the public record to suggest that any more 
precise notion of the principles on which annual rent, payable by a lessee for the right to use 
Crown land, should be calculated was either held or transmitted to the Land Board. Given 
the novelty of the form of leases (the thirty and fifty year terms of grazing and agricultural 
28 Ibid.
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selections and the smaller but more secure pastoral leases), and in view of the clear intention 
that in the case of pastoral leases the board should substantially increase rents, this is 
remarkable. But the task seems to have been considered a quite straightforward one. In 
Griffith's view the board's duties were essentially of " a  judicial character " .  They would obtain 
information from various sources and arrive at a conclusion about what the land in question 
was worth. " They will be like a jury called upon to assess the damages a man has sustained 
for breach of contract or from an injury done to him. They have simply to decide questions of 
f t 11 29ac . . . .  
The uncertainty of the financial consequences of the act, relying as it did on Land Board 
decisions, soon became the subject of much debate. In one respect the effect of the act was 
clear: selection of land under the terms of the 1876 act would cease. Payments of rent on 
these selections (which in 1883-84 had constituted 40 per cent of total land revenue) would 
progressively fall over a ten year period as instalments were completed and the freehold of 
land obtained. In their place would be rents of land selected under the terms of the 1884 act, 
the aggregate of which would depend on the rate of selection under the new leasehold tenure 
(either as agricultural or grazing farms) and the rents set. Here Griffith was sanguine. 
Speaking to the bill he claimed: "Embarrassment will not be caused, temporarily even. All 
the rents [conditional purchase payments under the 1876 act] will not fall off at once. They 
will take ten years before they cease, and I shall be disappointed in the operation of this Bill if 
the rents do not increase in every year of those ten very much faster than the amount of the 
rents of the selections falls off" .30 Because the rents on a given selection made under the 1884
act would be lower than the payments made under the terms of the former act it was 
29 QPD 43, 1 9/8/84, p. 363. 
30 Ibid., p. 367. 
obviously assumed that the rate of selection would be higher. Estimates presented by Dickson 
(only after some trenchant criticism had been made of the financial implications of the act) 
suggested that an " unprecedentedly large" amount of grazing selection would be undertaken 
to the extent that it would be "no unreasonable thing to imagine" that 600 grazing farms of 
10,000 acres each would be taken up in the first year, yielding, at the statutory minimum rent 
specified in the original bill of l 1hd. per acre (double the figure then obtained for leases in the
settled districts) £37 ,500 per annum.31 It was assumed that in addition agricultural selection
would proceed at the same rate as total selection under the 1876 act, yielding, at the statutory 
minimum rent of 3d. per acre, /, 8,000 per annum. Both these amounts would increase
annually with new selections, thus offsetting the decreases in rent under the former act, and at 
the end of ten years would become subject to reassessment by the Land Board. 
Further, and more significantly, it was suggested that pastoral rents would, " as they will be 
operated on by this Bill " increase on average by 20s. per square mile per annum, yielding an 
.extra J 100,000 per annum and increasing pastoral rents by 40 per cent over the figure for
1883-84.32 Decreases in revenue from abolition of pre-emptives and sales of country land by
auction (corollaries of implementation of the leasehold principle) were conceded but aggregated
to only relatively small amounts. 
If these post facto calculations gave any grounds for confidence as to the revenue implications 
of the measure their effect was soon undermined by the admission by the chief architect of the 
act that " I  do not pretend to know much about finance; and finance on this question has been 
something I did not care to think about at all " .  Rather, claimed Dutton, " as long as we keep 
straight in view what will produce the settlement of a prosperous class of people in this 
31 QPD 43, 27 /8/84, pp. 445-53. For data on land selection and revenue in the context of which these figures
are better understood, see Tables 2 . 1 and 2.2. 
32 See Table 2.2. 
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country . . .  financial success will follow" .  33
PAS TORAL TENURE 
Pastoralists were slow to respond to the opportunity presented by the 1884 act, despite what 
some saw as the implied threat by Dutton to undertake large-scale resumptions, under the 
terms of existing acts, on those runs not brought under the new legislation. 34
While the security of pastoral tenure had been improved the length of pastoral leases (fifteen 
years in the unsettled districts) was argued to be too short to encourage sufficient application 
of capital to the land (even though compensation for improvements was guaranteed at the 
termination of leases) ;  the leases were also considered by pastoralists to be subject to 
unacceptable uncertainty regarding rent, particularly as rents were subject to review by the 
Land Board after each five year period. Accordingly pastoralists mounted a concerted 
campaign for the period of the leases to be lengthened and rents to be fixed.35
An important amending bill introduced m the 1886 session incorporated a number of 
amendments t.o the 1884 act but little acknowledgement was made of the pastoralists' 
complaints . The only concession offered was a fifty per cent limit placed on rent increases 
made upon the reappraisal due each five years. An extension of time was granted for 
pastoralists to bring their leases under the act. Further amendments were introduced, 
however, as a result of pressure from pastoralists led by Charles Lumley Hill, a former 
Mcilwraith supporter, now a supporter of the Liberal government albeit one of fairly 
33 QPD 43, 27 /8/84, p. 466.
34 QPD 60, 28/9/86, p. 968.
36 Several petitions are reproduced in QVP 1886 II, p. 1 155ff. 
independent mind. These extended the term of leases to twenty-one years (with reviews every 
seven years) on the condition that a proportion of the area (typically one-quarter) became 
subject to resumption after fifteen years. Following the amendments the majority of leases in 
the scheduled area were brought under the 1884 act. Thus was assured the release of large 
areas of land for selection as pastoralists took up their new leases. 
It soon became apparent, however, that one of the main intended consequences of the revised 
pastoral tenure - a large increase in revenue - was not going to eventuate. The first period 
rents set by the Land Board on the retained part of pastoral leases were increased, but in some 
cases only marginally. Thus, far from increasing by J 100,000 as Dickson had estimated there
was, by the beginning of the 1890s, an increase of only about £60,000. In 189 1 ,  in the context 
of the debate on a further amending land act (which did not affect pastoral tenure but which 
was seen as necessary following the failure of pastoral rents to increase as had been hoped) 
Griffith revealed his disappointment at the failure of the Land Board to have increased 
pastoral rents to a greater extent. He affirmed his belief that these rents (particularly when 
considered in relation to those prevailing in New South Wales) should be higher. Nevertheless 
(in a reflection perhaps of his legal outlook) Griffith's attitude to the board 's determinations 
was one of grim acceptance: " . . . the fixing of the rents is not a matter which the 
Government has had to do with. That is a function performed - and I believe properly - by a 
board, and by a judicial board, which fixes them; and we must agree that we cannot properly 
complain of their action. They have done their duty according to the best of their lights, and 
they have assessed the rents at what they thought were the proper amounts " .36
If Griffith had resigned himself to the decisions of the Land Board there was nevertheless a 
widespread feeling that pastoral rents were inadequate particularly when compared with rents 
36 QPD 64, 1 5/7 /91 , p. 202. 
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received from grazing farms, selection of which had proceeded at a steady rate since the late 
1880s. Average rents on the leased portions of runs in the unsettled districts had risen to just 
under 25s. per square mile in the early 1890s whereas those set· on the grazing farms selected 
from land resumed from pastoral leases averaged nearly 80s. per square mile. 37 Before the
Royal Commission on Land Settlement in 1896 the Under Secretary of the Lands Department 
complained that " the method of defining pastoral rents is most unsatisfactory" .  In his view: 
The defects in our land laws at present do not allow us to get at the pastoral lessees 
at all . . . . I say that the rents of the pastoral leases are not high enough. I point 
out that the pastoral rents are a relic of the old days of New South Wales . . . .  The 
thing got into a precedent, and the Land Board and others concerned do not appear 
capable of getting out of the groove. On the other hand, when the Crown takes 
large blocks of the country and throws them open to [grazing farm) selection at £4 a
square mile, we find small men rushing for them at the price. 38 
In the light of the declining fortunes of the pastoral industry during the 1890s, however, the 
pressures were all in the opposite direction. The rents set for the first period of leases upon 
division of runs in the 1880s had occasioned little protest but the 1890s saw considerable 
opposition to the decisions of the Land Board. In 1893 several lessees appealed against their 
first period rents set upon division of their runs and reductions were granted. Objections were 
also made against second period reassessments. Such reassessments had been proceeding since 
1890 (for settled districts leases and a few fifteen year leases in the unsettled districts which
had not been extended under the 1886 amending act) but the number increased markedly in
1894 at the end of the first seven year period of the twenty-one year leases which had been 
taken up under the terms of the 1886 act. The 1884 act had directed that such reassessments 
be made in the light of " the relative value of the holding at the time of the assessment as 
37 Annual Reports of the Department of Public Lands !henceforth Lands Department] , QVP, various years.
38 QVP 1897 II, pp. 1 223-5 .  Questions 9175, 9201 ,  9206. 
compared with its value at the time of the commencement of the lease " (s.30.5 (e)) ignoring 
any increment arising from improvements. By 1894 prices and the market value of pastoral 
properties had fallen considerably and while the increases in rent were generally modest the 
increases led to widespread protest by pastoralists. 
In October 1894 a large deputation (which included a number of persons " indirectly 
interested" in , the industry, among them members of financial institutions) met with premier 
Nelson to request that such increases be waived. It was argued that using the legislative 
guideline set down in the 1884 act no increase could be justified. As one prominent pastoralist 
had earlier put it: " It could hardly be imagined that after seven years, during which pastoral 
property had in many cases fallen 100 per cent [sic] they would 
-
have to guard against an 
increase of rent made on the ground that the run was more valuable than it was before . . . .
He maintained that the value of property, especially industrial property, was what you could 
make out of it" .  Rather, it was suggested, the board had relied simply on the criterion of 
carrying capacity which in the good seasons of the early 1890s was considerably greater than 
during the drought in which the setting of rents on properties first brought under the 1884 act 
had been undertaken. 39
In the deputation much was made by other members of the generally depressed state of the 
industry and the request to waive the rent increases was put as one " to alleviate the trouble 
they were in by legislative enactment" .40 This allowed Nelson to sidestep the nub of the issue:
the legislative criteria for rent increases and the Land Board 's interpretation of these. Instead 
he countered the deputation 's request with the argument that, while it was obvious that 
pastoralists needed to reduce costs, rent was only a relatively small component of those costs 
39 Report of meeting of pastoralists held prior to the deputation, BC 17 /10/94, p. 5.
40 Report of deputation, BC 18/10/94, p. 6.
and to start with that levied by the government was merely taking n the line of least 
resistance" .  In any case the increase only amounted to 17 per cent, (a long way short of the 50 
per cent maximum possible under the act). Had they done all they could to reduce costs such 
as interest or wages or to " increase the products of their stations or to improve their 
quality? . . . He thought it was necessary for them to prove that they had taken all the steps 
that could be taken and exhausted them all in the way of diminishing the cost of production in 
the directions he had indicated before they came to the Government on the matter of rent 
. . . .  " 4 1  Furthermore, he argued, the increases, small as they were, were made on rents which
were very low anyway in comparison to those applying in New South Wales and the grazing 
farms for whkh there continued to be a strong demand. Finally the pastoralists were told 
that if the matter were taken out of the hands of the Land Board it was highly likely that a 
minister for lands "with the Treasurer constantly nagging at him for more money would soon 
find means to put the rents up, and to put them up probably a great deal more than the Land 
Board did " .  42
Thus, as the Courier put it, " the deputation of the session " was "vanquished" .43 But the
central issue - the criteria on which the Land Board set and reassessed rents - remained 
unsettled. Should reassessment be based purely on the value of a holding (however that was 
assessed) in relation to the initial valuation (as a reading of the act might imply)? Or was 
there an implied assumption that the initial rents were an essentially low rent and that (as 
was the case in the 1869 act where rents had been statutorily set) increases would be expected 
more or less automatically? In particular was this implied when a limitation was imposed on 
such increases in 1 886? As was admitted by a leading pastoralist the clause in question gave 
41 BC 18/10/94, p. 6. The advice was not elaborated except by a short lecture on the organisation of
shearing. 
42 Ibid.
43 BC 18/10/94, p. 4. 
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" the impression that the rent was to be progressive, and an increase was inevitable" .  44
In the meantime pressure was maintained on Nelson. 46 And only three months after the
'vanquished deputation' a meeting at Charleville was told quite casually by Nelson: " If any 
grievance existed as far as rents and other matters were concerned he would have no hesitation 
in submitting to Parliament a proposal to postpone any increase in rents for a few years until 
the pastoral industry was once more established on a sound basis " .  46 The offer was confirmed
a week later: " In order to aid [pastoralists] he had no objection to . . .  suspend the Act under 
which the government were entitled to raise the rents each year 
As pastoralist� pursued the matter 48 and seemed to be making some headway with their cause
it was hardly surprising that they were joined in their call for reduced rents by grazing 
farmers.49 Under this pressure Nelson changed his tack; receding from his former statements
and affirming the role of the Land Board he took the line of least resistance and promised 
relief through reductions of railway rates. 50
Shortly after, the whole question was thrown further into confusion by a Supreme Court 
decision in respect of an appeal made by the lessees of Mitchell Downs Station against the 
decision of the board to increase their rent for the second seven year period. of their lease. The 
court confirmed that reassessments had to be made in terms of the relative value of the 
holding at the time of the assessment as compared with its value at the time of the 
commencement of the lease. As the evidence was deemed to prove that, but for the 
44 Report of m•!eting of pastoralists, BC 17 /10/94, p. 5 . The Courier 's view was that 'the principle of
gradually increasing rents was clearly implied' .  (19/10/94, p. 4) 
45 See for example report of further petition for reduced rents, BC 3/12/94, p. 3. 
46 BC 17 / 1 /95, p. 6. 
47 BC 23/1/95 , p. 5. 
48 See for example reports of meetings at Townsville (BC 18/8/95, p. 5) and Thargomindah (BC 2/4/95, p. 4). 
49 See correspondence in BC 1 /4/96, p. 6. 
60 See for example report of his speech at Wmton, BC 9 / 4/95, p. 4. 
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improvements made by the lessees during the period (which were to be discounted) , the
grazing capacity of the run would have been reduced, while the value of the pastures had also 
shrunk because of the fall in wool, sheep and cattle prices, the increase in rent which the Land 
Board had made was disallowed. The decision meant that the original decision of the Land 
Board for first period rents was now crucial for rents henceforth were going to be assessed in 
terms of this rate. It seemed from the board 's own evidence that the original rents had been 
set on a sort of rule of thumb and without explicit reference to market prices of wool or stock 
which, as they pleaded, had not been mentioned in the relevant clause. That this had resulted 
in a rent that was arguably 'too low ' was probably thought acceptable in the knowledge that 
rents could be reassessed after the first period of lease. 5 1
The requirement that reassessments of  rent be  made on  the basis of the relative value of  the 
holding at the time of assessment compared to that when the lease commenced was dropped in 
the 1897 consolidating act and a catch-all clause inserted to allow the Land Board to consider 
in assessing or reassessing rents " any matters" which it considered to affect the value of land52
but the offending paragraph still applied to pastoral leases held under the 1884 act. 
The matter was clarified when it resurfaced in 1898 after the lessees of Norley and 
Thargomindah stations appealed against the decisions of the Land Board with respect to their 
second period rents. In attempting to define more clearly the rule by which rent should be set, 
a judge of the Supreme Court held that rent should be established by apportioning a part of 
the profit which " a  reasonably wise and industrious tenant 11 should be able to make as rent, 
that portion being what a reasonable tenant ought to be willing to give.  The notion of rent 
embodied in the decision was closer to the concept of economic rent strictly defined, but the 
6 1  BC 13/6/95, p .  4; 24/5/95, p .  4. 
52 QPD 77, 24/8/97, pp. 642-3. 
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decision was overruled by the Full Court on appeal by the Crown for whom it was potentially 
calamitous: indeed, as one of the Full Court judges noted, " if they showed that they made no 
profit at all they would have to pay no rent " .  The court held that the " true rule is that the 
rent is to be assessed at such a sum as a tenant might reasonably be expected to give for the 
holding, having regard to the length of tenure and all the circumstances of the case " ,  a matter, 
it was held, "which is generally as easily ascertainable, by comparison with other properties of 
similar character, let at known rents, as any other question of value " .  63 That is, the rent was
to be set in accordance with the 'market value' of properties. 
There were, of course, practical difficulties in ascertaining 'market value' ,  particularly in the 
context of a large number of runs let at set rents which were widely considered 'low' .  
Inevitably it was necessary to have a system where, as the Courier put it ,  " the landlord 
judges the market value and takes the consequences of fixing the rent accordingly " .  64 In the
context of the depressed state of the pastoral industry, however, the decision hardly presaged 
general increases in rent and cleared the way for actual reductions in rent, indeed below the 
statutory minimum for the first period as the Full Court had noted that no minimum rent had 
been specified in the act for the second and third periods of the leases. In the case of one run 
which was the subject of appeal in association with Norley and Thargomindah the original 
Land Board assessment of 14s.6d. per square mile was finally reduced (when the Full Court 
had sent the matter back for reassessment under the new rule) to 5s.66 By 1900, as the
drought had tightened its grip still further, reassessments conceded substantial reductions in 
rents which were lowered even further in many cases after appeal . For example sixteen large 
runs in the G regory South district had their first period rents of between 17s. and 22s.6d.  
63 Report of  Full Court Judgment, BC 3/1 1 /98, p. 9. 
64 BC 1 6/8/99, p. 4; 18/8/99, p. 4.
66 The second period rents for Norley and Thargomindah were reduced from 19s. to 10s. (Annual Report of
the Lands Depart.ment 1899, QVP 1900 II, p. 919) 
reduced to figures between 9s. and 13s. and then on appeal by further amounts ranging up to 
4s. As a consequence aggregate rents for these runs fell from 4'10,319  to £4, 725. In other 
cases rents were increased but over the year 1900 aggregate rents on properties which had been 
brought under the 1884 act fell by over £5,000. 56 Further reductions were to follow.
There was little that the government could do in response. Indeed it was itself forced to 
reduce rents on far western leases still held under the 1869 Pastoral Leases Act most of which 
were now in their third period and liable for rent (on 'available' land) of 15s. per square mile 
as specified in the act. These had been badly affected by the drought and the tick problem 
and as a result a considerable area of land had been forfeited. An act passed in 1 900 {the 
Pastoral Leases Act) reduced rents on land still held to amounts ranging from 5s. to 12s.6d. 
per square mile and amounts ranging from ls.6d. to 2s.6d. per square mile for land which had 
been forfeited. The upshot was that total revenue from pastoral leases actually fell during the 
second half of the 1890s and early 1900s to a figure only slightly above what it had been the 
year before the 1884 act came into operation. {This figure was, however, boosted by revenue 
from occupation licences which, under the 1884 act, could be granted on an annual basis and 
at a minimum rent of 10s. per square mile, on Crown land not otherwise subject to pastoral 
) 67tenancy . 
The term of pastoral leases also ·became a major issue m the 1890s and early 1900s. The 
majority of runs which had been brought under the 1884 act were held on twenty-one year 
leases {most lessees having taken advantage of the extension offered in the 1886 amending act). 
Some of these had been further extended for a period of seven years under the Pastoral Leases 
Extension Act of 1 892,  passed to deal with the rabbit problem: extensions were granted upon 
56 Annual Reports of the Lands Department 1901 and 1902, Q VP 1901  IV, p. 23 and QPP 1902 III, p. 26.
67 See Table 2.2.
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the erection of " a  substantial and permanent fence to prevent the passage of rabbits " .  
Pastoral lessees i n  the settled districts had, however, only been granted ten year leases and 
these were due to start expiring in 1895. 
Nelson had put off the decision of what .to do about these leases - whether to renew them and 
if so on how permanent a basis - for as long as possible. The matter was first raised with the 
government by one such lessee, Albert Norton, in the context of the deputation from 
pastoralists concerning the issue of pastoral rents in October 1894 (see above). The matter 
became a public issue the following year when a deputation of settled district lessees met the 
premier in camera to request an extension to their leases. 58 Quantitatively the problem was
not a major one. The leases covered only about three per cent of the total area of colony 
under pastoral lease and accounted for about six per cent of total pastoral rents. To renew the 
leases would mean barring the land from selection and the prospect of both settlement and 
greater revenue. To allow continued temporary occupation of the land by the lessees (that is 
treating it all as resumed) would have freed the land if it were needed and involved only a 
relatively small sacrifice of revenue (or possibly an increase if it were opened for selection) .  
But the lessees involved constituted a politically powerful group. 
In the face of considerable opposition to extending the leases a land bill was introduced later in 
the session of 1895. It in effect gave the Land Board power to determine whether the land 
ought to be thrown open for selection, an occupation licence granted, or, if it considered the 
land not likely to be required for close settlement, the lease renewed for a period of ten years. 
The measure was put forward by lands minister Barlow as one that was "neither wasteful, 
leaving the land unoccupied, producing no rent, nor unduly closing it from settlement n . 59
58 BC 18/3/95, p. 4; 2/4/95, p. 4. 
59 QPD 74, 1 2/ 1 1 /95, p. 1630. 
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Much distrust was expressed as to how the provisions for the lease extensions would be 
applied . In the face of criticism the government first offered to exempt land in the Darling 
Downs and West Moreton districts and then abandoned the whole proposal leaving lessees 
only with the right of continued temporary occupation. 60 The Courier was later to describe
the attempt as a " legislative enterprise, originated in darkness, [which) was an ignominious
failure " .6 1  But two years later in the Legislative Council, the earlier protagonist, Norton,
backed by none other than Barlow, moved an amendment to the consolidating land bill which 
provided for renewal of leases in the settled districts for a period of five years in cases where 
the Land Court62 considered the land to be not required for settlement. Thus a modified form
of the 1895 measure was, as the Courier put it, " sneaked into law " .63 Lands minister Foxton
did not oppose the measure and subsequently defended it as one to ensure the most productive 
use of land without barring it from settlement in cases where it was so required . 64
Of rather more significance was the increasing pressure brought to bear on governments for 
concessions with respect to other pastoral tenures as, during the closing years of the decade, 
steadily worsening seasons added to the problems caused by ticks and the generally depressed 
state of the industry . 
A particular category of claimant was the lessee in the far west of the colony still operating 
under the provisions of the 1869 act (being outside the 'scheduled area' of the 1884 act) . A
run of bad seasons and the ravages of the tick had hit hard and by the late 1 890s many leases 
60 QPD 74, 9/1 2/95, pp. 1974-6.
61 BC 23/3/98, p. 4. 
62 Under the consolidating land act passed in 1897 the Land Board was replaced by a Land Court. The
function of the court remained the same, however, and the change reflected no important matter of economic 
principle. The Land Court consisted of three members each of whom would be responsible for a different part 
of the colony. Appeal against decisions was to be to a Land Appeal Court consisting of the two members of 
the court other than the one who made the decision appealed against and a District Court judge. 
63 I I 
. 
BC 23 3 95, p. 4. 
64 Speech at Stanthorpe, ibid., p. 7. 
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had actually been forfeited. Appeals in 1898 to Foxton for reduced rents met with no specific 
promises.65 A report by a member of the Land Court following a visit there indicated the
problems faced in the area. 66 Late in the session a bill was introduced to provide for new
leases, on more favourable terms, in these areas. 67 But while sympathetic to the plight of
western pastoralists Foxton was not prepared to be too liberal ; in response to further demands 
by a deputation he bluntly declared that "The bill was brought in for the relief of the 
pastoralists . . . . If it was no good it could go in the waste paper basket" .  68 The measure was
in fact not brought into effect for two years; the bill was eventually passed in 1 900 as the 
Pastoral Leases Act. Twenty-one year leases were granted with fixed rentals, at reduced rates 
(as noted above) for the first eleven. The issue here was not whether the land would be
blocked from closer settlement but what measures could be taken to ensure that the land was 
even occupied. Thus the chief aim of the act was to secure the legal reoccupation of runs 
which had been forfeited. 
By this time pressure was being brought to bear on a very broad front from pastoral lessees 
whose land had been brought under the 1884-1897 acts. (The 1897 act merely extended the
provisions relating to pastoral tenure of the 1884-1886 acts.) A large deputation saw Dickson
as premier in September 1899 asking for extended tenure and a range of other concessions but 
Dickson, committed already to the measure relating specifically to lessees in the far western 
areas, promised nothing for the short 1899 session. As the drought worsened noticeably in 
early 1 900 Philp (now premier) was petitioned by pastoralists representing the views, as they
claimed, "of nearly every station-owner in the colony whose holding is included in the area 
within the schedule of the 1884-1897 Act" .69 While acknowledging that " at the end of the
65 BC 28/6/98, p. 6; 2/7 /98, pp. 5-6; 4/7 /98, p. 4.
66 Q VP 1898 IV, p. 92lff. 
67 BC 25/ 1 1 /98, p. 5. 
68 Report of deputation, BC 6/12/98, p. 6 .  
69 Report of deputation, BC 6/4/00, p. 7. Of the 828 pastoral leases held under the 1 884- 1886 acts, 642 were 
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current leases we will be required to surrender portions of our present holdings for purposes of 
other forms of settlement" they nevertheless argued that not all the land would be so required. 
The continued successful occupation of pastoral lands required, they claimed, a greater degree 
of certainty of tenure after the present leases expired. This was essential in order to borrow. 
" This uncertainty is constraining financial institutions here and in London to strive at the 
withdrawal of their advances as much as possible, and must each year more rigidly curtail the 
improvement of the country by those whose stake in it approaches a possible vanishing point" ,  
the premier was told .70 Philp's formal reply was broadly sympathetic to the request for longer
leases in exchange for provision for partial resumption and he conceded that " a  resumption of 
one-third or one-fourth of the total area at present held, and a renewal of the lease of the 
remaining area for a period of twenty-one years, with power to resume, say,  one-third at each 
seven year period . . . might be granted without impeding the natural progress of 
settlement" .  71 But the pressure of business precluded action in 1900, a position he maintained
despite continued pressure and a petition in support of action from thirty-six members of the 
Legislative Assembly. 72
The government did, however, tackle the problem the following year by way of the Pastoral 
Holdings New Leases Act. The act introduced the important principle of classification. 
Current lessees were given the option of coming under the act in which case the land would be 
classified by the Land Court into one of four 'classes ' according to " the present or probable 
future demand for land for the purposes of closer settlement" .  Extensions of leases for periods 
of ten, fourteen, twenty-one or twenty-eight years would be given for portions of the existing 
leased area varying from one half to the entire holding according to the classification made by 
due to expire between 1 900 and 1909. 
70 Ibid.
71 BC 6/5/00, p. 9. 
72 BC 26 /9 /00, p. 6. 
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the court. The court was to fix the rent and in the case of the last three classes reassess it 
every seven years. The act also gave certain powers of resumption of portions varying from 
one-third to one-half after seven years. 
Potentially the act gave the pastoral lessees all - and more than - they had asked for. But in 
its attempt to provide a flexible framework which ensured that land would not be barred from 
settlement by the granting of pastoral tenure the act left the pastoralist in a state of great 
uncertainty. Far from giving him the concrete security to offer to financial institutions it kept 
the pastoralist at the mercy of the decisions of the Land Court on which all depended. The 
classification was to take place 11 at any time not earlier than seven years nor later then twelve 
months before the date of expiration of the lease of the holding" .  Thus a lessee whose lease 
expired in 1908, for example, would have to bring his lease under the act within six months 
but may have �o wait nearly six years until the Land Court classified his land. There was, not 
surprisingly, little satisfaction with the act on the part of the pastoralists .  By May 1 902, just 
before the term in which lessees could elect to take advantage of it expired, only 123 of the 
total of 837 lessees so eligible had indicated their intention to come under the act - a fact 
which was, in the view of the Courier, "eloquent of its inadequacy " .73 At the end of May a
large deputation " representing the pastoral, mercantile and industrial interests of the State" 
waited upon the premier and minister to present the resolutions passed at a conference of 
pastoral lessees earlier in the month. The deputations expressed the view that the acts of 1900 
and 1901 were " totally inadequate to give relief from the effects of the losses consequent upon 
the disastrous drought and the adverse conditions from which the industry has suffered" .  An 
extension of time for lessees to avail themselves of the 1901 act was requested though not, it 
was emphasised, because the act offered much to lessees but rather " because their necessities 
73 BC 23/6/02, p. 4.
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compel them to take whatever small advantages the act in question may appear to give, on 
the same impulse by which 'drowning men are said to catch at straws' "  .74
Finally , further " remedial legislation" was requested in the next parliamentary session " if a 
disastrous financial crisis in the pastoral industry is to be avoided" .  The essence of the 
argument was that money necessary to carry on and eventually restock would only be given if 
the prospects of the borrowers were placed on a surer footing. And that in essence meant 
longer and more certain leases. A representative of the Scottish Australian Investment 
Company who had come to Queensland to press the case for the secure continuance of pastoral 
tenure had already met with the premier and put his views on this occasion quite baldly. The 
British investor, he said, was not very well informed about conditions in Queensland and was 
content in relying on the board of the institution through which he invested to ensure that he 
secured his dividends. "But the time had now arrived " ,  Philp was told, "when the individual 
investor would have to be taken into their confidence, and if he went back to London with no 
assurance at all that immediate legislation would be brought in he would have to make such a 
report - that would be made public - that a great feeling of unrest in regard to Queensland 
investment would arise . . . . Queensland would no longer be heard of as a place for safe 
investment of capital " .  What the ramifications might be was uncertain; but, he hinted darkly, 
" the security of the State might possibly be affected " .  The hope was expressed that these 
views would "not be thought of to be veiled threats " .  Philp clearly took them as such and 
while arguing that the government had treated pastoral lessees fairly and justly - thus 
somewhat avoiding the issue - the point could hardly have been lost on him. 75 Nevertheless, in
his formal reply Philp declined to agree to introduce legislation to give extended and more 
74 Report of deputation, BC 3 1/6/02, p. 6. 
76 Ibid.
certain tenure: 
To do so would be to go back on [the government 's] consistent policy of so shaping 
their land legislation as to encourage in every possible way closer settlement in the 
pastoral districts, and I desire to point out that the return of favourable seasons, 
the hope of which is at the foundation of the demand of the pastoralists for 
extended tenure, will tell equally in the direction of increasing the number of 
applications for smaller holdings, thus rendering it the more desirable to abstain 
from action which would serve to limit the scope of selection . . . .  The Government 
are bound to adapt their legislation to the wants of an expanding community ,  and 
the course recommended would amount to a reversion to a principle of rigidity that 
would be in contradiction to the progressive policy which the country demands and 
to which they are continuously committed. 
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While conceding that an indefeasible lease afforded much greater security than a temporary 
right of occup.3.tion Philp nevertheless argued that a " long period of non-disturbance" would 
probably be available to pastoralists given " the slowness of the progress of invasion" .  The 
point weakened his own argument of course. But he was unwilling to tie himself down. 
"From a legislative point of view . . .  it is no small thing that is required of the Government 
when they are asked to convert the contingent benefit (of temporary - occupation) into a 
certainty" .76 Moreover, both Philp and his lands minister O'Connell had become convinced of
the desirability of classifying land in the manner provided for in the 1901 act. Such 
classification provided a means of dealing differently with land of different quality and in 
different locations. In O 'Connell 's view this was the "only way to deal with the matter " .77
Philp agreed. "A comprehensive classification of the land of the State . . .  is the only basis 
whereon satisfactory legislation of the kind can be established 11 , he said. "The Act of last 
session was an honest attempt to further this object, and to do so in such a way as would not 
only least interfere with the privileges enjoyed by the pastoralist, but should enable him to 
76 BC 1 1/8/02, p. 7. 
77 BC 3 1/6/02, p. 6. 
- 57 
participate in the benefit of such classification" .  78 Accordingly all that was offered was an
extension of time for pastoralists to come under the provisions of the 1901 act. A more 
sweeping extension of tenure was dismissed as inappropriate and, just as importantly perhaps, 
politically unwise in view of " [the government's) estimate of the state of public opinion on the 
subject " .  Concession had gone far enough.79
A bill was nevertheless introduced late in the session incorporating a large number of 
amendments to land legislation. It dealt principally with the issue of pastoral tenure. The 
notion of classification was preserved though now lessees could have their land classified be/ ore 
electing to come under the act. Leases were to be granted for the unexpired portion of the 
term of the surrendered lease plus ten, twenty or thirty years for Class I, II and III land (with 
maximum periods of twenty, thirty or forty years [or twenty-four, thirty-four or forty-two 
years in the case of holdings under the Pastoral Leases Extension Acts] ) and for forty-two 
years for Class IV land. Rents were to be fixed by the Land Court though not until after a
notice of election by a lessee to come under the a�t. Reassessments were to be made at ten-
yearly intervals. Resumption of one-fourth of the area leased could be made during the period 
of the lease. 
The measure received qualified support from pastoralists as some improvement at least on the 
1901 act. It met some resistance from Labour members though others supported it as being in 
the public interest. Kidston for instance saw the part dealing with pastoral tenures as 
absolutely necessary . . . . It seems to me that the attitude of the House on such a 
measure as this ought to be very much akin to the attitude of a good landlord 
whose tenants are going through a ruinous and disastrous time and who considers 
the well-being of his tenant as well as himself . . . .  It is our duty to do whatever it 
78 BC 1 1 /6/02, p. 7. 
79 Ibid.
is to restore confidence and reinvigorate enterprise in the pursuit of (the pastoral]
industry - not from motives of benevolence or P.hilanthropy for the pastoralist, but 
simply from motives of enlightened self-interest. 80 
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While the 1902 act offered pastoral tenants a considerable measure of relief, they were slow in 
bringing their leases under it. They continued to express dissatisfaction with the terms of the 
act and in 1 904 the Pastoralists ' Association presented premier Morgan with " certain 
amendments which we consider are absolutely necessary . . . before we can with confidence 
avail ourselves " of the act. The more significant of these sought specification of the maximum 
rental for the first period and of the maximum percentage of increase at each reappraisement 
(as it stood this was in the hands of the Land Court); more precise definition of the areas 
subject to resumption during the currency of the extended lease; and explicit provision of the 
right of a lessee to surrender his lease.81 The last of these provisions was sought to ensure that
lessees would not be compelled to pay rent until the end of the lease if they found that the 
holding was not profitable. (Departmental practice had in fact always permitted surrender but 
the pastoralists had argued that lack of an explicit provision to this effect was a source of 
considerable concern to the financial institutions financing many of the lessees. )  Morgan 's 
formal reply showed a trace of impatience with the pastoralists who now had the disastrous 
seasons which had led to the concessions well behind them: " . . .  it is not probable that at 
any future time the Crown tenants will get more liberal treatment than is offered to them by 
the Land Act of 1902 " ,  he wrote bluntly; "and the Government is anxious that the pastoralists 
in their own interests should take advantage of a Statute which was passed for their relief at a 
time when the disasters they had experienced had excited generous sympathy for them in both 
Houses of Parliament11 •82 
80 QPD 90, 2 1/ l l /02, p. 131 1 .  
8 1  BC  9/4./04, p .  6.
82 BC 21 /6/04, p. '6.
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Nevertheless he was sympathetic to some of the requests. In a land bill later in the year 
(postponed and enacted in 1 905) a limit of fifty per cent was placed on rent increases on
reappraisement (this limit having been introduced in the 1886 amending act but omitted in the
1897 consolidating act and the 1 902 act) and, in response to the pastoralists ' request, a clause
inserted which allowed lessees to surrender a lease upon two years notice. These concessions 
were explicitly designed to get lessees to come under the 1 902 act on the grounds that " the 
more symmetry we have in our pastoral legislation, the more runs we have working under the 
one Act, the better " ;  thus the 1 905 act also provided for an extension of time until 1 906 for 
lessees to elect to do so. 83 In 1 9 10 when a consolidating land act was passed 1426 of a total of
1495 pastoral leases in the State, representing ninety per cent of the area under pastoral 
occupation, were held under the 1902 act. The remaining leases were still held under one of 
the 1 869 ,  1884, 1897, 1 900 or 1901 acts. The concessions offered to pastoralists under the 1902 
act meant that after 1 9 10 compensation had to be paid in order to ensure that sufficient land 
was resumed and made available for selection, but this was not regarded as a major 
problem. 84 The 1 9 10 consolidating land act preserved the rights of all existing lessees, these
being set out in a detailed schedule of pastoral leases and thus embodied in law. The act 
provided for new pastoral tenures of a maximum period of thirty years and gave wide 
discretion in the granting of new pastoral leases thus further providing for a more flexible 
system of pastoral tenures. 
So was established a system of pastoral tenure which was flexible, encompassing a range of 
lease periods and resumption provisions, and which took account of the quality of land and the 
possibility of securing its more intensive use by making it available for grazing farm selection . 
83 QPD 95 , 1 5/8/05, pp. 304-5. 
84 Annual Report of the Lands Department 191 1 ,  QPP 1912 III, pp. 6-7.
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If this aspect of pastoral tenure was satisfactorily resolved the question of pastoral rents, and 
hence the revenue raised from pastoral occupation of the land, remained a problem. The 1902 
act had provided that rent should be reassessed by the Land Court when leases were brought 
under the act. Due to the workload involved these assessments were not completed until 1 909. 
But in the early cases, to the government's dismay, the Land Court actually reduced rents. 
By the time the fifty per cent limitation on reassessments was to be incorporated in the 1905 
land bill (after having been held over the previous year) lands minister Bell somewhat wryly
passed it off as " a  piece of irony, in view of the recent decisions of the Land Court under the 
1902 Act" .85 Bell subsequently appealed to the Land Appeal Court against some cases of
downward revisions, b.ut unsuccessfully. His criticism of the court's decisions and his view 
that higher rents should be paid by pastoral lessees were aired publicly . 86 He was supported in
this view by the Under Secretary of the Lands Department who in his Annual Report for 1905 
made it clear that he considered that increases in rents were warranted and in particular that 
pastoral rents should be brought more into line with rents obtained from grazing selections. 
As the Under Secretary declared: 
The imperfect relation of the rentals charged for similar country held under pastoral 
and grazing selection tenure respectively has never been justified. I know that it 
has been denied by pastoralists that any actual discrepancy has existed, an 
explanation being offered that the higher rentals paid by selectors were due to 
superior land and better tenure [but) there were many cases of the entire resumed
part being taken by selectors at double the rent paid by the lessee of the holding, 
and it would be idle to say that the resumed parts were, on the whole, of superior 
quality to the holdings. 87
These claims were strongly rejected by the Land Court. The Under Secretary, it was argued 
86 QPD 95, 1 5/8/05, p. 305. 
86 BC 24/8/06, p. 4. 
87 QPP 1906 II, p. 6. 
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by a member of the court, had based his statements "upon theoretical considerations, and 
made (them] without practical knowledge or having heard all the evidence " .  But while it was 
claimed that " the experience, training, and intelligence of the gentlemen comprising the Court 
should qualify . them to correctly interpret the [plain judicial rule] which any intelligent person 
reading would see was not very difficult of comprehension" ,  no explanation was offered for the 
discrepancies worrying the minister and his Under Secretary. 88 The issue was further discussed
at length in the 1909 Annual Report.89
Drawing on the information Denham, now back in the government as lands minister, pursued 
the matter when introducing the 1910 consolidating land bill. " We consider that the [Land 
Court 's) judgment at times has been erroneous . . . . [The 1902) Act was quite understood 
and believed to be a measure in which extension of tenure would meet the requirements of the 
pastoralists, but the Land Court appeared to have regarded it otherwise" .90 In other words the
government had considered that the reductions in rent had been effected by the Land Court 
explicitly as ' relief measures ' though it had not been intended that there should be such 
reductions. As a result the Land Court had kept revenue from pastoral rents below what the 
government, and the department, thought appropriate. The view received considerable 
support from other members, especially from the Labour Party, and two members of the Land 
Court tendered their resignation . One of the members of the court pointed out that "when 
they were asked to reassess the rents under the [1902] Act, they had to fix rents after a 
drought which had wiped out 14,000,000 sheep and 4,000,000 head of cattle. The good seasons 
had come subsequently " .91  Whether the reductions in rent were seen as a ' relief measure ', as
Denham argued, or merely a proper rent under the guidelines of the act, given the 
88 BC 1 1 / 1 2/06, p. 4. 
89 QPP 1910 II, pp. 6-1 2. . 
90 QPD 106, 4/10/10, p. 1 2 10 and generally pp. 1 210- 14. 
91 BC 1 1 / 1 1 /10, p. 6. 
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circumstances, was not clear .  The problem was exacerbated by the fact that assessments of 
leases as they were brought under the act continued until 1909 ; pursuing a consistent policy 
" right down to the end" ,  as Denham indicated, meant that rents were being reduced after the 
time when such reductions might conceivably have been warranted. 92
No attempt was made in the consolidating bill to alter the nature or the powers of the court: 
Denham indeed explicitly agreed that it would be 1 1  an evil day when the Secretary for Public 
Lands seeks in anywise to influence the Land Court" .93 But he introduced a new clause into
the land act to guide the court in its determination of rents. They were now to take account 
of " the amount which experienced persons would be willing to pay for land of similar quality 
in the same neighbourhood " - the principle which, Denham pointed out, had been laid down by 
the Full Court in the Norley-Thargomindah cases in 1898. Further, an attempt was made to 
remove the fifty per cent limitation on increases at reassessment, which had been reintroduced 
in 1 905. This was defeated at the committee stage. But, within this limitation, the Court was 
formally directed to set rents in accordance with the market value of land with the aim of 
ironing out anomalies, both between different pastoral leases and between pastoral leases and 
grazing selections, and increasing the aggregate rent received from pastoral leases. 
The way wa�; thus cleared for the Land Court substantially to increase rents when 
reassessments were due to commence at the end of the first ten year period of leases which had 
been brought under the 1 902 act. 
92 QPD 106, 4/10/10, p. 1 2 10. 
93 Ibid.
- 69 
SETTLEME NT: TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
As originally conceived by Dutton, the framework in which the more intensive use of land 
resumed from extensive pastoral tenure - and thus 'settlement' and 'development' - could 
proceed was a simple one. The principal medium was to be the grazing farm, supplemented in 
suitable districts by the smaller agricultural farm. Both were to be made available to selectors 
on a purely leasehold basis, for lease period of thirty and fifty years respectively. In order to 
get his land bill passed Dutton was forced almost immediately to amend this framework by 
permitting the freehold of agricultural farms to be acquired after a period and agreeing to 
concessional terms for smaller agricultural holdings along the lines of the former 'homestead' 
selections. Over the next thirty years amendments were made to the terms and conditions of 
grazing and agricultural selection, more particularly in the case of the latter. These changes 
came about in a variety of ways and for different reasons. 
The new form of tenure introduced in th� 1884 act - the grazing farm - became an important 
medium of settlement and remained so throughout the period under review. After a slow start 
the rate of selection built up at the end of the 1880s and strengthened further in the second 
half of the 1890s. 94 The thirty year term of grazing farm leases had, since the beginning, been
subject to considerable criticism for its 'locking-up '  effect. This came, somewhat paradoxically 
and with a considerable degree of ambiguity, principally from conservatives: they looked upon 
the whole concept of grazing farms with a certain disdain and considered the grazing farmer to 
be treated favourably relative to the pastoral lessees he had displaced. During the time of the 
conservative government at the end of the 1880s lands minister Black, in a land bill put 
forward in 1889, attempted (unsuccessfully) to reduce the term to twenty years and a further
94 See Table 2 . 1 .  The concept of grazing homesteads is discussed below.
attempt was made in 1896 (in a consolidating measure which was not brought to finality in 
that year) to cut the term to twenty-one years. In the consolidating act that eventually 
passed in 1897 a range of lease periods - of fourteen, twenty-one, and twenty-eight years - was 
provided for, the decision to be made in a particular case by the minister when proclaiming 
the land open for selection. The provision was necessary, it was argued, to avoid barring land 
from agricultural selection should it be so required within the thirty year period; as things 
stood there was no form of tenure on land resumed from pastoral occupation between the 
annual occupation licence (which was hardly a vehicle for any sort of permanent occupation 
and improvement of land or indeed for a reasonable return to the treasury) and the thirty year 
grazing farm lease. This decision to determine the length of tenure according to the quality of 
land introduced an important element of flexibility into land policy and was a forerunner to 
the ' classification ' of pastoral lands incorporated in pastoral tenures in 1 901/1902 (see above) .  
The rents set when grazing farms were proclaimed open for selection were typically between 
ld .  and l'hd .  pe� acre (4'2 . 13s.4d. and l,4 per square mile).95 This was considerably higher than
the rents on pastoral leases from which the land had been resumed but occasioned little 
protest. Indeed the whole matter of setting rents was regarded largely as one of 
administration rather than policy . (As the act was implemented the setting of rents was 
undertaken departmentally, the Under Secretary and minister acting on recommendations of 
district land commissioners and surveyors. )  The minimum rent was reduced to 'hd. per acre in 
1894. This was done, however, at the committee stage of an amending land bill to introduce a 
new form of tenure, the grazing homestead (discussed below), and was accompanied by a 
suggestion that grazing farm rents were too high; but it did not reflect any such view on the 
part of the government nor any intention to attempt to lower the level of rents. The contrary 
95 Annual Reports of the Lands Department, Q VP, various years.
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was rather the case. The strengthening demand for grazing farms from the mid- 1890s, led 
with increasing frequency to the phenomenon of multiple or ' clashing' applications for areas of 
land opened for grazing selection. Under the act clashing applications were resolved by ballot. 
In these cases an economic rent accrued to the successful balloter. Non-genuine applicants 
were therefore encouraged to put their names down in the hope of acquiring the selection 
which in the situation of strong demand could be sold at a premium. 96 In response to this
situation it was proposed in 1896 (when a consolidating land bill first came before parliament) 
to submit land for which there were two or more applications to auction among the 
applicants. That system was also considered open to abuse, however, and in the reworked 
consolidating measure the following year a system of tendering was introduced. Henceforth, 
applications for selection could be accompanied by a sealed tender for a rent above the 
proclaimed rent if the applicant considered the land worth more, such tenders to be used in 
deciding between clashing applications. Implicit in the measure was acceptance of the fact 
that proclaimed rents were frequently below market value. The system of tendering would, as 
lands minister Foxton put it, allow a " standard of value of the land 11 to be set and ensure that 
" the Treasury would get the full rent for it " .  97
In the meantime, a variant of the grazing farm tenure, the 'grazing homestead ', had been 
introduced in an amending land act passed in 1894. This represented an application of the 
agricultural homestead principle to grazing selection. The maximum area for grazing 
homesteads was set at 2,560 acres and the maximum rent at %d. per acre, equal to the 
previous legislative minimum for grazing farms but only about one half of the actual average 
rent for selections at the time. Personal residence was a condition of the tenure. The intent 
96 In his evidence to the Royal Commission on Land Settlement in 1897 the Under Secretary of the Lands
Department estimated that overall only about 50 per cent of applications for grazing farms were bona fide. 
(QVP 1897 ID, p. 1221 .) 
97 QPD 77, 24/8/97, pp. 649-50. 
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behind the amendment was to settle, in more than one sense, the large number of shearers, 
rouseabouts and other labourers who had been involved in the industrial disputes in the 
pastoral industry, many of whom were now being affected by the economic difficulties of the 
industry. The measure had been foreshadowed in the Governor 's Opening Speech in 1 894 as 
one " having for its object to afford increased facilities for settlement on the land, more 
particularly with a view of inducing men who are employed in various capacities in connection 
with the pastoral and agricultural industries to acquire residential holdings, a course which it 
is hoped will go far to remove the difficulties that at present so frequently occur between the 
labourer and the employer " .98 It was thus essentially a socially defensive and paternalistic
measure the spirit of which is well summed up in the Courier 's view of it: 
Give (bush workers) the opportunity of a domestic life, save them from compulsory 
idleness, convert them from wanderers into settlers, and there is a chance that 
many of them, the thoughtful, sober, industrious, thrifty of them, will become 
citizens the colony will be proud of, that the pastoral industry will be able to get 
the seasonal labour it requires without dread of a strike . . .  and the capabilities of 
the Western country will be [expanded] .99 
The measure ;was therefore intended primarily to put a certain class upon the land rather 
than, as in the case of other land legislation, to put certain lands under settlement. 
The Royal Commission on Land Settlement which reported in 1897 concluded, however, that 
"with the exception of a few carriers, those for whose benefit the [measure] was intended have 
availed themselves of its provisions only to a very limited extent"  . 100 The tenure had been
abused by people merely seeking additional areas of land at the lower rent to work, for 
example, in conjunction with grazing farms but not genuinely fulfilling the personal residence 
98 QPD 71 , 17 /7 /94, p. 2 .  
99  BC 28/9/94, p. 4 ;  also 1 4/7 /94, p. 4; 5/9/94, p .  4 and Philp's speech at Rosewood, BC 3/8/94, p .  6.
100 QVP 1897 ill, p. 907. 
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conditions. Accordingly, in the 1897 act, the terms of the grazing homestead tenure were 
brought into line with those of the grazing farm the only difference being that a personal 
residence condition still applied (now five years, reduced from ten) in consideration for which 
an applicant was given priority, other things being equal, in selecting land thrown open for 
grazing selection. 
Quite a boom in grazing selection developed in the later 1890s but doubts were increasingly 
expressed as to how much bona fide settlement was associated with this form of tenure, 
particularly in the case of grazing farms where the less stringent occupancy condition only 
applied. For some years there had been complaints about the practice of ' aggregating' grazing 
farms through a variety of devices which infringed the spirit of the law if not its letter. 
Grazing farms were commonly held in units of up to 100,000 acres or more despite the 
restrictions in the land act (strengthened in 1897) against other than bona fide selection. 
Joshua Bell, member for Dalby, carried on a campaign against aggregation from the time of 
his membership of the 1897 Royal Commission and brought a motion before parliament in 
1900 that action be taken to stop the process. 101 He argued that bona fide selectors were being
crowded out by speculators and those seeking to acquire grazing farms to operate as part of 
larger holdings. He also pointed out the legitimate complaint of the pastoralist who, after 
having been forced to yield land for closer settlement, found that he had been replaced by a 
similar person (albeit one who paid a higher rent) though the pastoralists themselves had 
figured prominently in the aggregation process ! The combined effects of grazing farmers 
seeking larger holdings and pastoralists attempting to retain control of land resumed for closer 
settlement were thus militating against the essential concept of the grazing farm - indeed to 
the point where, in the view of lands minister O 'Connell, " the beau ideal yeoman grazing 
101 QPD 86, 2/1 1 /00, p. 1692fl'. 
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farmer, who the member for Dalby states was in the eye of Mr Dutton when he was Minister 
of Lands, and of all subsequent Ministers for Lands, until I happened to be unfortunate 
enough to occupy the position , I am afraid [now] exists only to a very limited degree" . 102
The steadily worsening weather conditions only exacerbated the problem. In August 1901 a 
" Special Commissioner " of the Courier in one of a series of articles on the pastoral industry 
concluded that " there is not the profit in [grazing farms] that was anticipated in the earlier 
days of that class of settlement . . . . While there was an uninterrupted run of good seasons 
and unusual conditions for making good profits, speculation in this class of holding was keen. 
But the profits so gained have since been swept away by adverse conditions . . . . Grazing 
farmers now feel acutely their position 11 • 103 A little over a year later another special reporter
concluded that the system of grazing farms had resulted in over-investment in the industry: 
It had always been argued that the original squatter over-capitalised his holding to 
an extent beyond the intrinsic value of the grass the erratic climate permits to 
grow. But when grazing farmers came along, bringing, in the aggregate, large sums 
of money to further improve the country, and assisted by financial companies to 
greater effort in that direction, the whole business seemed to have run riot. The 
value of the grass which grew at intervals on the country could never warrant such 
expenditure for wool-growing. It would appear that unless in exceptionally 
favoured ;places, no matter what term of leases is granted, for these grazing farms -
except those who have aggregated - the prospect before them is a very poor one, 
without they are permitted to increase their area considerably beyond 20,000 
104 acres. 
Deputations to the premier and minister followed conferences of grazing farmers and selectors 
over 1 900-1902. Requests were put for concessions regarding rent and for larger areas and 
105longer tenures. 
102 Ibid., p. 1 696 . 
103 BC 26/9/01 ,  p. 7. 
104 BC 4/10/02, p. 1 6. 
106 BC 14/ 1 1 /00, p. 6; 27 /8/01 ,  pp. 6-6; 8/7 /02, pp. 5-6. 
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Eventually, in the land act passed in 1902 (dealing principally with pastoral leases) the 
maximum area of a grazing farm was increased to 60,000 acres within the limitation of a 
maximum rent of £200. Extensions of leases were granted, subject to a report of the Land 
Court that land was not likely to be required for agriculture, for periods of ten to thirty years 
provided they did not exceed a total of forty-two years (thirty in the settled districts). 
By 1 902 the drought had caused a fundamental review of the capacity of the land. The 
increasing acceptance of the view that drought conditions were normal, and that there had 
been - though to what extent was still a question to be answered - 11 an over-sanguine estimate 
of the normal and average value of the land 11 , called into question the viability of the 'small 
squattages' as a mechanism for settlement. As O'Connell saw it, " the demand for land for 
grazing farm S•3ttlement is practically dead, especially in the Western districts 11 • 106 Selection of
grazing farms did in fact continue through the drought, though at subdued levels, and 
increased as good seasons returned. After the mid- 1900s rents tendered for better land were 
typically 21hd. , to 4d. per acre and on occasions up to 6d. per acre. But the problem of 'non­
genuine' selection continued and complaints were frequent about the manner in which some 
existing grazing farmers and pastoralists were outbidding bona fide selectors when land was 
opened for grazing selection. In 1909 , in response to requests from the Grazing Selectors 
Organization, an amendment to the land act provided for grazing selections to be opened in 
the first instance to homestead applicants only (that is selectors guaranteeing personal 
residence) at the price fixed by the proclamation, multiple applications to be decided by ballot. 
After a period of thirty days if no applications had been received selections would then be 
made available under the tender system. It was accepted that this would mean a loss of 
revenue for, as Denham noted when introducing the measure, it was not unusual for 3d. per 
106 QPD 90, 4/ 1 1 /02, p. 1039. 
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acre or more to be tendered for land on which the proclaimed rent was only ld .  But the goal 
of settlement was asserted over revenue. In words almost identical to those used by Kidston 
when he foreshadowed the measure just before the 1909 election, Denham made this quite 
clear : " the Government hold the view that genuine close settlement is of more importance 
than the mere question of revenue" . 107 This measure achieved its aim to a considerable extent:
as grazing selections in total grew by a third between 1907-08 and 19 13- 14 the proportion 
represented by grazing homesteads increased from less than 30 per cent to over 50 per cent. 108
Reassessments of rent on existing grazing farms had been proceeding since the time the first 
grazing farms selected completed the first ten year period. By the end of 1899 ,  the rents of 
501 farms had been reassessed: roughly three-fifths were left unchanged, one-fifth were 
. d d fifth d d It" . 11 • • 109 D · h mcrease an one- ecrease resu mg m a sma net mcrease m rent. urmg t e 
drought, however, net reductions were made and current period rents were also reduced in 
1902-03 . following provision made in the 1902 land act for such reassessments specifically as a 
relief measure. Indeed it was not until 1910 that reassessments by the Land Court again 
resulted in net increases in aggregate rents. The government did not, however, attempt to 
influence the manner in which the Land Court operated in this respect focusing its attention 
instead on the question of pastoral rents which remained considerably below those of grazing 
farms. 
Agricultural selection under the 1884 act built up to the rate of 1500 selections per year in the 
late 1880s although about 80 per cent of agricultural farms selected were of areas of less than 
1 60 acres to which the concessional terms for acquisition of the freehold were applicable. This 
107 QPD 104, 17 / 1 1 /09, p. 272; also Kidston, BC 8/9/09, p. 6. 
108 Table 2 . 1 .  
1 09 Annual Report of  the Lands Department 1899, QVP 1900 Il ,  p.  921 . 
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was seen to compare poorly to the results under the 1876 act: in the last full year of operation 
under that act 1047 conditional purchases and 1 130 homestead selections had been made. 
Rents were set at levels between 3d. and 6d. per acre (averaging 4d. ) These were generally
recognised as low in comparison to the market value of freehold land. Rather, it was the 
difficulties placed in the way of selectors obtaining the freehold of land of more than 1 60 acres 
that were held to be responsible for the lower rate of selection. When Dutton was replaced as 
lands minister in 1 887 by Henry Jordan the latter had, according to Mcilwraith, considered 
that the act was largely unworkable and the "portion of it which embodied the idea of Mr 
Dutton had been a complete failure" . 1 10 · The leasehold principle indeed was subject to
constant criticism. Mcilwraith raised it several times in speeches during the 1888 election 
campaign arguing that "Every man who came out here did so with the intention of acquiring a 
freehold of his own . . . . Mr Dutton's non-alienation cry was very good in theory, but in 
practice it was absurd. It was very nice to think that the land should belong to the State and 
that everybody holding it should pay rent to the State, but it was impossible to change human 
nature" . 1 1 1
In fact a concession had already been made. The amending act in 1886 had provided for 
payments of rent on agricultural selections during a period of personal residence on the land 
by the lessee, to be regarded as part payment towards the freehold title, that is to be credited 
towards the purchase price of land when, after ten years bona fide occupancy, the selector 
became eligible to obtain freehold title. This was a move back towards the conditional 
purchase principle of 1876.  In 1889, under the conservatives, facilities for agricultural 
selectors to obtain freehold were liberalised by cutting the conditional period from ten to five 
1 10 BC 26/3/88, p. 6. 
1 1 1  Speech at Emerald, BC 24/3/88, p. 5. 
- 7£ 
years; but no substantial changes were made despite the fact that the operation of the 1884 
act, contrary to the Liberals' pr�dictions, had resulted also in a fall in land revenue which was
causing problems for the overall financial position of the government. The main problem had 
been that rents on selections had increased much more slowly than payments on land selected 
under the 1876 act had fallen off. By 1889-90 the latter had fallen by 4'171 ,000 while rents 
under the 1884 act had increased to only �35,000; pastoral rents had been increased by only
!60,000 to offset this. 1 12 By 1889 the Under Secretary felt obliged to draw attention to the
matter in his Annual Report: "Reviewing the present financial aspect of the land question I 
beg to submit the expediency of taking such measures as will provide for maintaining the 
revenue" . 1 13 The obvious solution lay in the outright sale of land by auction, a policy rejected 
by the Liberals but the subject of much debate during the later 1880s (see next section) . Sales
by auction were in fact provided for by the Morehead government's amending act in 1889 but, 
in order to increase land revenue, a significant alteration was also made to the terms under 
which land could be selected. This was done in 189 1 ,  by Griffith himself during his second 
term as premier. Griffith's lands minister, Alfred Cowley, explictly admitted that the measure 
was a response to the " most grievous falling off in revenue" which had followed the 
implementation of the 1884 act. 1 14
In the Crown Lands Act Amendment Act of 1891 the principle of unconditional selection was 
introduced for agricultural selections. The measure was somewhat enigmatically foreshadowed 
at the beginning of the 1891  parliamentary session as one " to facilitate the acquisition of land 
by all classes of persons" .  Under the terms of the amending act land was now to be made 
available for agricultural selection free of the conditions relating to occupancy and 
1 1 2  See Table 2.2 . 
1 13 QVP 1889 III. p. 278. 
1 14 QPD 64 1 5/7 /91 ,  p. 1 88. 
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improvements which had been attached to earlier legislation to ensure bona fide settlement. 
Land could now be proclaimed open for conditional or unconditional selection though 
unconditional selectors would pay a one-third higher price and conditional selectors would be 
accorded priority. More significantly the period of the lease of unconditional selections was 
reduced from fifty to twenty years. Payments were to be made in twenty annual instalments 
at the end of which time the lessee would obtain the freehold. Selectors were given the option 
of paying the balance of the full amount of the purchasing price at any time during the twenty 
years to obtain the freehold. Provision was also made in the act for conditional selectors (both
existing and future) to convert their leases to the unconditional system; further, land in a
proclaimed grazing area could be thrown open for selection as agricultural farms. The demand 
for land under: these terms would come, suggested Cowley, from the " large numbers of men in
the towns, artisans and mechanics, who are desirous of obtaining land, but are unable to 
do so under present restrictions. These men have families growing up, and if they could 
obtain land without the condition of residence or any objectionable restriction, the money 
which they have been in many instances deluded into putting into suburban allotments would , 
go into the Treasury where it should go, to purchase country lands" . 1 1 5
Griffith 's support for the measure indicated a reluctant acknowledgement o f  financial realities 
rather than a wholesale abandonment of his belief in the leasing principle, though he did argue 
- albeit somewhat perfunctorily - that his objection to the alienation of land in this way had 
been " to a very great extent diminished 11 by the Valuation and Rating Act of the previous 
year which provided for the rating of the unimproved value of land. This, he argued, " had 
made a material change . . . in the question of land alienation " for it made the mere 
acquisition of land unattractive and served as a device for ensuring land alienated was used 
1 16 Ibid., p. 189. 
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productively. Griffith further justified abandonment of the conditions attaching to selection 
on the grounds that they were " useless and impracticable " as a means of achieving settlement. 
Cowley argued that the conditions had been effectively thwarted in many cases, certificates of 
fulfilment of conditions (to enable the freehold to be secured) often having been obtained by
selectors through "all manner of dodges" ;  thus "very little practical good had been derived 
from hampering selection in this way " .  
Griffith's statements indicated a marked change in attitude to what governments could do, 
through land policy, to achieve settlement. There was simply no point, he argued, in 
attempting to impose conditions on people selecting land: "speculative selection" would occur 
regardless of measures to prevent it. "Some things can be done by Parliament and some 
cannot; owing to the way in which human nature works, and the way in which men will act, it 
is of not the slightest use to try to prevent some things; they cannot be controlled by 
Parliament or .artificial law. . . . I think the experiments made in Australia, at any rate, have 
shown that attempts to compel the cultivation of land by artificial conditions have been 
entirely futile and there is no doubt that they have been extremely demoralising" . 1 16 There
was an element of contradiction in the argument. If the imposition of conditions did little to 
promote 'genuine' settlement because they could be flouted then it could hardly be argued that 
the conditional clauses did much to retard selection of the more 'speculative ' kind which would 
yield revenue to the treasury. Clearly , however, the conditions imposed upon selectors 
constituted a constraint and the arguments were used largely as a justification for the 
unconditional tenure sought principally in order to boost revenue. 
The minimum purchasing price of unconditional selections was set at 20s. per acre thus 
promising rents of at least ls. per acre with the possibility of lump sum payments to obtain 
1 16 Ibid., p. 189 and pp. 203-4. 
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the freehold. Prices were set initially slightly above this level. In the 1897 act unconditional 
selections were made subject to the same tendering system as grazing selections. Provision 
was continued for this form of selection throughout the period as a means of supplementing 
land revenue and at the same time providing for what was considered a legitimate class of 
selector but one who was unable to fulfil occupancy conditions, though the tenure was availed 
of to a lesser extent than expected and to a diminishing degree after the 1890s. Unconditional 
selection made a relatively slight impact on revenue overall. 
A more significant change to agricultural selection tenure was effected in the 1897 
consolidating act when the conditional purchase principle was fully restored. Agricultural 
farm ' leases' were shortened from fifty to twenty years and annual payments set equal to one­
fortieth of the purchase price with the fifty per cent balance payable at the end of the twenty 
years. The option was given of paying the balance of purchase price and obtaining the 
freehold after five years. The minimum rent was left at 3d. per acre and the minimum 
purchase pric€ set accordingly at 10s. per acre, a reduction from 15s. (the price at which 
freehold could be acquired under the terms of the 1884 act as amended). The 1897 act also 
formally restored the category of agricultural homesteads and enlarged the area of land which 
could be selected under these terms (2s.6d. per acre after five years personal residence and 
expenditure on improvements of between 2s.6d. and 10s. per acre according to the area of land 
which, in turn , depended on the quality of the land and the proclaimed purchasing prices). 
Applicants for homesteads were to be accorded priority . These terms were, it was claimed, 
"extremely libe�al " (indeed they were more so than those offered under the 1876 act) and 
"such as will commend themselves to anyone who desires to see settlement on the land" . 1 17
The change was accompanied by remarkably little argument, for or against. It represented an . 
1 1 7  QPD 75, 1 5/9/96, p .  849. 
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attempt to increase the rate of settlement on smaller areas of land and the recognition that 
cheap land was a necessary incentive. 
There were occasional expressions of disquiet at this policy. In 1901 ,  for example, albeit in the 
context of financial crisis and the need for special sales of land to raise revenue (see below), 
both Philp and his lands minister O'Connell suggested that the price of land - especially that 
which had been sold as homesteads - was insufficient, the latter noting that "of late years the 
best of our Crown lands have been taken up at a price that is not equivalent to the value that 
we ought to get from them 11 • He added, without elaborating, " I  hope to help the Treasurer by 
getting an equitable value from Crown lands for selection purposes in future" . 1 1 8
In  the 1900s Bell i s  also on record as querying the wisdom of  the homestead form of selection: 
. . .  in my judgment, land squandering is not land settlement . . . .  The lands of 
this State belong to the people, and I say that the people of this State should [not] 
part with their property below its proper value . . . . Speaking generally I am 
thoroughly opposed to . . . agricultural homesteads . . . . I believe that more 
genuine s'ettlers can be put on the land t�rough the medium or avenue of paying a 
higher price for land than 10s. than through agricultural homesteads. 1 19
Kidston, however, appeared to tend in the other direction, In 1907 in the context of 
announcing an expanded immigration program, he floated the idea of making a free grant of 
1 60 acres (under strict conditions of bona fide occupation) to all immigrants who paid their 
own passages to Queensland. The measure was suggested "primarily with a view to attracting 
settlers from the countries of Europe" but, in a rather expansive gesture, Kidston extended it 
even further, arguing that "it is settlers we want, wherever they come from, and it is worthy 
of consideration whether we should not also offer to every man in Queensland ,  also every man 
1 18 QPD 87, 4/9/01 , p. 643; also Philp, ibid., p. 647. 
1 19 QPD 91 ,  29/7 /03, pp. 1 16-7. 
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w o may come to ueensland from other colomes , a similar grant on sim1 ar con i ions · 
Accordingly, in 1908 the principle of free homesteads was introduced. The price of 2s.6d. per 
acre that applied to agricultural homesteads was waived although a more stringent condition 
regarding expenditure on improvements was imposed: the 10s. per acre now had to be spent 
before a lease was granted. The measure received widespread support, with even Philp 
agreeing that " so long as we can settle people on the land, it does not matter whether we get 
2s.6d. for it or if we get nothing at all for it" . 1 2 1  Bell was clearly uncommitted to the
principle, however, and only limited amounts of land were made available for selection as 
either agricultural or free homesteads. 122 As a result agricultural selection after the mid- 1900s
was primarily by way of agricultural farms. 1 23
Somewhat paradoxically, the 1908 amending act also provided for land opened for agricultural 
selection to be made available on a perpetual leasehold tenure. The leasehold principle still 
had strong political support, particularly from the Labour Party, as the proper basis on which 
land should be managed·. Labour 's principal spokesman on land policy, Herbert Hardacre had 
in fact been able to have the tenure incorporated into the amending land act in 1905 but the 
clause was rejected by the Legislative Council. Its incorporation by the government in 1908 
was, however, a reflection of the considerable support for this form of tenure in the unstable 
political situation rather than any attachment to it on the part of members of the 
government. On the contrary, they affirmed their belief in the desirability of allowing 
selectors to obtain the freehold of land in those cases where the land was not likely to be 
required for closer settlement in the future. Kidston himself on one occasion countered the 
1 20 Speech at Rockhampton, BC 1 1 /2/07, p. 5. 
1 2 1  QPD 101 ,  30/3/08, p. 366.
122 This is indicated by summaries of land opened for selection under different categories in the Statistical
Appendix of Lands Department Annual Reports, QPP, various years. 
1 23 See Table 2. 1 .  
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familiar criticism by Hardacre of the "pernicious principle" of freehold with the retort that 
" We will never get settlement without it" . 124 Bell made his own lack of enthusiasm clear;
when speaking to the bill he responded rather flippantly to Hardacre's criticism that the rent, 
which had been set at 21h per cent of the proclaimed purchase price, was too high: " [This] is a 
new principle in our land legislation. It is a stride forwards, or sideways, or backwards, or 
whatever you like to call it . . . . I really think that the hon. member, instead of adopting an 
unsympathetic and censorious attitude, might give me credit for putting into a Land Bill a 
principle that he has been advocating for many years" . 1 25 The fixing of the rent at 21h per cent
of the purchase price set for the land in fact made the tenure unattractive as for the same 
amount land could be selected as agricultural farms under existing arrangements and the rent 
credited as part payment for purchase. Bell conceded the point and reduced the rent initially 
payable to 11h per cent of the purchase price; (this was then to be reappraised every ten years). 
By 1 9 14 ,  however, little settlement had been effected under the tenure. 126 This was due largely
to the fact that only limited areas of land were made available for selection in this way so 
that, as Hardacre complained, it was not given a proper trial. 1 27 On the other hand it was also
claimed that there was little interest on the part of selectors in the tenure. 128
The one new form of tenure under which a considerable amount of settlement was brought 
about was that introduced in the Prickly-pear Selections Act of 1901 by Bell ,  at that time a 
private member. The act gave special concessions to selectors taking up land infested with 
prickly-pear (in effect freehold could be obtained after a rent-free lease period if the prickly-
pear were exterminated} though these were aimed primarily at elimination of the prickly-pear 
1 24 QPD 106, 4/10/10, p. 1225. 
126 QPD 101 , 30/3/08, p. 364. 
1 26 See Table 2.1 . 
1 27 QPD 106, 3/10/10, p. 1 225. 
1 28 BC 18/5/10, p.  4.
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problem rather than securing settlement as such. 
THE SALE OF LAND 
Prior to 1884 the outright sale of country land principally by auction and through the exercise 
of the 'pre-emptive right', was a major source of revenue. This was forsworn when Griffith 
and Dutton asserted the leasehold principle. The need for measures to increase land revenue, 
as the payments for land selected under the 1876 act started to fall off and the anticipated 
increases in pastoral rents failed to materialise soon, however, led to a modification of this 
policy. The amending land act passed in 1886 provided for the sale by auction of country 
lands, in unlimited quantities but restricted to lots of no more than 40 acres, at an upset price 
of £1 per acre. Dutton claimed that the measure was an essentially administrative one to 
dispose of cer�ain areas of land too small to throw open to selection and gave an assurance
that the power to auction land "would never be abused by him" . 1 29
By the following year, however, the situation had deteriorated further and criticism of the act 
and its administration was becoming more trenchant. Demands that land be sold to a greater 
extent than provided for in the 1886 amendment in order to bolster the public revenue were 
becoming louder. "Let us sell some, at least, of our public estate for cash to meet our present 
necessities " ,  argued the Courier, making the point used by proponents of land sales: " Our 
children can tax it when they in their turn need a revenue from the land 1 1  • 1 30 Griffith in fact
1 29 QPD 49, 2 1/9/86, p. 873 and subsequently QPD 52, 17 /8/87, p. 278. 
130 BC 17 /9/86, p. 4. 
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opted for a land tax in 1887, though without making any concessions regarding the sale of 
land. His action created a crucial split in government ranks when treasurer Dickson resigned 
in protest. While not opposing the basic thrust of the 1884 act Dickson argued that until it 
had been given a longer trial ,  t1 moderate sales of freehold 11 should be made to ensure that the 
treasury was not starved. Indeed, he argued, this had always been the intention; it had 
actually been provided for in the 1884 act and the principle had been confirmed in the 1886 
amendment. But such sales had been thwarted by Dutton who, he declared, had t1 an extreme 
horror of the mere mention of the alienation of land by freehold . . . . I think he regards it as 
the rankest political heresy for any man to ask him to alienate a piece of land by auction. 
There is no doubt the hon. gentleman holds a most uncompromising creed on this 
t. " 131ques ion . 
The question of whether sales of land should be made to raise revenue became a major issue. 
Dutton dug his heels in, strongly defending his strict adherence to leasehold as the principle on 
which the resource land should be managed in the long-term interests of society. It was, 
according to Dutton, " the duty of the Government to preserve carefully and deal economically 
with the public estate, so that those who come after may also share in the benefits to be 
desired from the proper management of that estate " .  So important was the principle that it 
should prevail over any short-term financial difficulties it created and if additional taxation 
(such as Griffith had proposed) were necessary to implement the principle then so be it. 132
Dutton did little to enhance his credibility by prefacing these remarks with the rather casual 
admission that " I  do not care much about finance" 133 implying that the short term problems
of finance would simply have to be accommodated to the more important larger principles of 
131 QPD 52, 17 /8/87, p. 268. 
132 QPD 49, 25/8/86, p. 503; also QPD 52, 17 /8/87, p. 274ff. 
133 QPD 49, 25/8/86, p. 501 .  
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land management. Increasingly he was being dismissed as a faddist of extreme views wilfully 
ignorant of the need for revenue from land to balance the public finances and finance the 
expenditure necessary to promote development. 
But Griffith stuck with him though there were rumours that he was about to dump Dutton 
and accept the need to sell land. 134 In the context of the rapidly deteriorating state of the
public finances in 1887 he preferred to pursue the land tax policy and let Dickson resign rather 
than renounce his principles - or even, as would have satisfied Dickson, done so to the extent 
which would have allowed moderate sales of land to bolster public revenue. Arguing that the 
amount of money that could be raised from this source was limited anyway and would not 
constitute a solution to the financial difficulties of the colony he declined to accept the 
suggestion. 
Our desire to encourage settlement by men who have only a small capital to start 
with - just enough to enable them to start in farming - would be effectually 
thwarted. This has been the policy of the present Government since it took office, 
and such it will be as long as we remain there. If Parliament desires to reverse that 
policy, and to say that a large revenue is to be raised from the sale of land, they will 
have to get another Government to carry it out. We shall go out of office with our 
colours flying, and not submit to remain in office and reverse this policy which we 
have maintained, and which we believe to be the right one Revenue is not 
the only end a Government should have in view . 135
It was only shortly afterwards that Dutton was replaced as lands minister by Henry Jordan,  
who, as the Courier noted, was "not one who rejects the possession of freehold as an offence 
against the Commonwealth 11 • 136 But Jordan did not effect any changes to this, or any other,
aspect of land policy, the pressures on the Griffith government having been eased somewhat by 
a marked improvement in the overall public revenue situation in the closing months of 1887 
134 BC 29/6/87, p. 5. 
1 35 QPD 52, 1 1/8/87, pp. 259-60. 
136 BC 30/8/87, p. 4. 
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and early 1 888. 
Mcilwraith made the question an issue in the 1888 election claiming to have always 
" deprecated auction sales of land to any great extent, preferring the system of selection as 
more likely to get family settlement " .  He argued nevertheless that "if only for financial 
purposes a certain amount must accrue to the Treasury from that source" . 137 Former Liberal
governments had clearly recognised this, he claimed, having attempted to sell more land by 
auction during the years from 187 4 to 1878 than had his government during the ensuing four 
years. Griffith, however, (having dropped his land tax proposal in the face of widespread
opposition) continued to reject calls for the outright sale of land, a policy he sneeringly
compared to " the wisdom and prudence of the young gentleman who coming into his estate 
thought to cut a great dash in the world by at once selling it for the purpose of getting as 
much money as he could to mask his extravagance" . 138
In the 1889 amending act passed by the Morehead government, the maximum area of any 
portion of land to be sold at auction was increased from 40 to 320 acres within a total annual 
limit of 150,000 acres. The minimum upset price was left at ll per acre for agricultural land
and dropped to 10s. per acre for other land. Black treated the issue as one of simple necessity 
in the face of the effects of the 1884 act on revenue. Claiming that " I  do not wish the House 
to accept any proposition by which land will be recklessly alienated at anything below its fair 
value " ,  he argued, however, " that it is absolutely necessary, if we wish to maintain our credit 
with the people who lend us money . . .  that the House should adopt some measures by which 
our land revenue can be increased" . 139
137 Manifesto, BC 1 4/3/88, p. 3. 
138 BC 6/4/88, p. 5. 
139 QPD 57, 1 8/8/89, p. 264. 
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By the early 1890s it was clear that further measures were necessary to increase land revenue. 
The introduction of the principle of unconditional selection was directed primarily at 
increasing revenue (see above) and represented an important concession by Griffith, in effect, 
regarding the sale of land; but as payments were to be spread o"\>'er twenty years the measure 
had limited potential in this regard. It was evident that if any substantial increase in land 
revenue was to be obtained, both to aid current finances and to pay off the accumulated deficit 
(which had been funded by the issue of treasury bills) provision would have to be made for 
outright sales of land. Such provision was in fact made in the Special Sales of Land Act 
passed later in. the year. This act merely extended the provision for such sales in the 1886 and
1889 amending acts, principally by permitting sales of land in blocks from 320 to 5120 acres, 
allowing three years for payment. The restriction was applied, however, that revenue from 
such sales could only be applied to current finances in the years 189 1-92 and 1892-93 and then 
used for redeeming treasury bills totalling .l 1 .4m. sold under acts of 1 890 and 1891 to
accommodate the accumulated deficits of the 1880s. Griffith sanctioned this further departure 
from his principles on grounds of sheer necessity. As he said foreshadowing the act: " . . .  are 
we to do what_ people generally do when they get into debt and have more property than they
can manage · sell some of it? I confess I have come to that conclusion, personally, most 
reluctantly . . .  .I see no other way of extricating our finances from their present position " . 1 40
In the context of economic depression, however, there were few buyers. In 1893 an attempt 
was made to reduce the minimum price specified in the 1891  act from 10s. to 5s. Represented 
as a means of realising on poorer lands the measure was equally one of cutting the price 
generally in order to make sales, though in the prevailing economic climate doubts were 
expressed as to whether there would be much demand even at 5s. per acre. 1 4 1  The bill in which
140 QPD 84, 1 1 /8/91 , p. 525.
141 QPD 70, 30/8/93, pp. 592-4 ; BC 18/7 /94, p. 4.
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this was incorporated was not, however, proceeded with and in the end only � 432,000 was
raised under the act between 1891-92 and 1896-97 . 142
The 1897 consolidating act continued provision for auction sales but as financial conditions 
improved sales of land in large amounts for purely revenue purposes were generally eschewed; 
indeed in 1896 Nelson had declared that " the settled policy of the colony is to look for revenue 
from our land more by facilitating and encouraging settlement than by sales of large areas by 
auction" . 143 Within a few years, however, the drought and the financial implications of
federation had once again plunged the state into financial crisis and the sale of land by auction 
was looked to as a source of revenue. In 1901 Philp passed another Special Sales of Land Act 
which gave the government power to sell land over and above the total amount and in larger 
areas than provided for in the principal act for the purpose of retiring treasury bills issued to 
fund accumulated current deficits. Philp and his lands minister O 'Connell defended the 
principle of alienating land in this way but made it clear nonetheless that the measure was one 
of sheer necessity. As O'Connell put it: "Even if I did not believe in the sales of land I do not 
see how at the present juncture of affairs, the Government can hope to balance the accounts 
without asking for some extra power to deal with the public estate " . 1 44 The minimum price
was maintained at 10s. per acre and while doubts were expressed about the prospects of 
finding buyers in the current circumstances Philp claimed that some lands would fetch /;2 or 
l3 per acre, arguing that, relative to southern colonies, land was cheap. 145
In the event sales totalling only � 127,000 were made under the act between 1901-02 and 1908-
09 and higher returns were in fact received from auction sales under the principal act. These 
142 See table 2 .2 .  
143 QPD 75, 29/7 /96, p. 400. 
144 QPD 87, 4/9/01 , p. 642. 
145 Ibid., p. 646. It was in this context that Philp and O'Connell suggested that a higher price should be 
obtained for selections - see above. 
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were used by the Morgan government after 1903 as a matter of financial necessity and the 
small surplus which Kidston was eventually able to proclaim for the 1904-05 year was, even 
after the various fiscal measures he had introduced, only made possible by the sale of a 
considerable amount of land just on the close of the financial year. But Morgan and Kidston 
did not agree with selling land as a general policy. As Morgan put it in 1 904: " I  do not think 
that under ordinary circumstances the proceeds of sales of Crown Lands should be treated as 
revenue" .  On the other hand they considered that such sales could legitimately be made in 
order to finance capital expenditure thus allowing continued expenditure on public works while 
avoiding or reducing the need to borrow: "The policy of this Government is to treat the 
proceeds of auction sales of Crown Lands as realised capital , and not as revenue, and to devote 
it to the purpc 1ses to which borrowed capital has hitherto been devoted " .  Indeed the policy of 
using revenue from sales of land to provide, or augment, funds available for capital 
expenditure, particularly on railways, was explicitly pursued. " We are looking to our lands to 
supply the money which we have hitherto got by borrowing for the purpose of building 
railways" ,  said Morgan in 1904 in the context of a further attempt (subsequently abandoned) 
to reduce the minimum price at which land could be sold from 10s. to 5s. 146
A measure to ensure that all monies received from auction sales of land were paid into the 
loan fund to be applied in defraying the cost of public works - the Land Sales Proceeds Bill -
was introduced in 1905 and finally enacted in 1906. In the event the sale of land was virtually 
stopped after mid-decade and only small amounts were ever credited to the loan fund in this 
way,  particularly after economic and financial conditions improved and borrowing was 
resumed. 
146 QPD 93, 6/12/04, p. 1 1 26; also manifesto, BC 23/7 /04, p. 5 and speech at Warwick BC 27 /7 /04, p. 6. 
- 86 
Meanwhile the notion of 'making land pay for the railways' had also been pursued in the 
context of some specific railway-land settlement proposals where it was proposed, albeit in a 
rather imprecise way,  that land would be made available for selection at a price taking 
account of the enhanced value of land (or the betterment) attributable to the provision of
railway communication. The land betterment principle was ultimately incorporated, in a 
rather diluted and indirect form, into the 1906 Railways Act which merely provided that those 
who benefited 'from construction of local railways should guarantee a minimum rate of return 
to the government from the construction and operation of the railway. This aspect is 
discussed more fully in chapter 6 .  
REPURCHA SE 
A further aspect of land policy during the decades under review arose from the fact that in the 
period prior to the mid-1880s a considerable area of land, including some of the highest quality 
and best located land particularly on the Darling Downs, had been alienated. This had been 
done through a variety of means including the practice of 'dummying' . 1 47 Governments were
therefore powerless to make such land available for closer settlement. From as early as the 
1870s it had been argued, however, that the government should act as an intermediary to 
secure the more intensive use of alienated land either by buying it back from its owners, or by 
exchanging larger quantities of land further west for it, and then making the land available for 
147 D.B. Waterson, Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper: a Hiatory of the Darling Down1 1859-99, Sydney 
University Press, 1968, ch. 2 .  
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selection. Between 1877 and 1882 a number of 'excpanges' were effected, the largest in 1878 at 
Allor a. 
The question of repurchase was first formally raised and debated in parliament in 1881 .  
Francis Kates, a Darling Downs member, moved that a sum of  £500,000 be  borrowed for " the 
gradual recovery . . . of the large arable properties now held by private landowners on the 
Darling Downs" . 1 48 In a thin debate the motion received support from Griffith, then leader of
the opposition , and Dickson together with some ministerial supporters but was opposed by the 
government. In 1885 Kates again moved that two estates on the Darling Downs be acquired 
by payment of fourteen year debentures and subdivided and sold. On this occasion Griffith 
and Dickson, now premier and treasurer, opposed the motion along with the opposition and it 
was defeated. A bill to provide for the purchase and resale of land {the Agricultural Lands 
Purchase Bill) was, however, introduced in 189 1 when Griffith was again premier though it 
was dropped during the second reading stage. The repurchase policy was eventually 
implemented when essentially the same bill was reintroduced and passed as the Agricultural 
Lands Purchase Act of 1894 in Nelson 's first year as premier . 
Kates, and those who earnestly supported the idea of repurchase, represented the quintessence 
of the 'social view' of land policy. 'Settlement' was their major and over-riding goal. They 
condemned the fact that " such magnificent, open, rich downs country [was) a waste and 
wilderness, and by no means answering to what by nature it was eminently adapted for -
namely, the habitation of human beings " .  John Stuart Mill was quoted in evidence of the 
advantages and social desirability of small landed proprietors: "Wherever we find peasant 
proprietors, we also find the comfort, the security, confidence in their future, and the 
independence which assure at once happiness and virtue" . 1 49 At the same time the advocates
148 QPD 35, 8/9/81 , p. 523. 
1 49 QPD 35, 8/9/81 , p. 625. 
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claimed there was a sound economic basis for repurchase and subdivision and good economic 
reasons for governments to pursue the policy. It was argued, or rather asserted, that land 
owned and occupied by 'peasant proprietors' in small units would be utilised far more 
productively and profitably than by one large landowner. As Kates had put it, " fifty families 
settled on 20,000 acres [of good land] , by combining the cultivation of cereals with artificial
grasses . . . and other fattening feed for sheep and cattle, would in proportion to their 
holdings draw five times as much produce from the soil " . 1 50 In contrast to one owner who
spent a large proportion of his profits in England there would be hundreds of farmers 
sustaining other industries in the colony and spreading the burden of taxpayers with respect to 
the construction and operation of public works, particularly the railways. 
But opponents of the policy, while agreeing in abstract terms with the notion that a large 
agricultural population was desirable, questioned whether the scheme was economically viable. 
Agriculture on the Darling Downs, it was argued, was not an immensely profitable 
undertaking and as one member argued: "However beneficial it might be to settle an 
agricultural population in a country, it ought to be first considered whether that agricultural 
population could be profitably employed " . 1 5 1  Supporters had pointed to the Allora exchange
lands as an example of successful subdivision and settlement yet Patrick Perkins as minister 
for lands in 1881 claimed that " there had never been a more miserable failure " with selection 
proceeding at a slow rate and at prices on average below that paid for the land. 162 In the
context of insufficient demand in relation to the existing supply of available agricultural land, 
critics questioned the wisdom of borrowing money to buy back land to make more available. 
The chance of financial success was further diminished by the likelihood of the government 
1 60 Ibid., p. 624. 
1 5 1  Black, QPD 35, 8/9/81 ,  p. 537. 
1 52  Ibid., p. 527. 
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being forced to pay high prices for the land and in this connection the spectre of jobbery was 
also raised. 
The most telling argument against the proposal was the fact that the large landholders were 
not themselves subdividing and selling their estates - despite the fact, as advocates of 
repurchase themselves acknowledged, that many of them were ready and willing to sell. If the 
land was potentially more productive and profitable as small farms and the demand was there 
why were the owners not taking advantage of the situation? Surely a land company could be 
formed to act as intermediary if the circumstances were as represented? The issue was largely 
sidestepped and it was clear that in the final analysis the goal of settlement was regarded as 
more important than financial viability. W.H. Groom, for example, another 'agricultural 
Liberal ', responded to criticism of the Allora exchange in the following terms: 
Whether that exchange had realised expectations he was not in a position to say;  
but he knew from personal observation that the land had been surrounded by 
fences, and that the people were settling there and cultivating it. That was the 
prospect that presented itself to him. Whether the affair had been a financial 
success was another matter altogether, but he believed that the settlement of the 
population was of far greater consideration than the financial success. 163 
As noted , Griffith, as leader of the opposition, had supported the Kates motion in 1 88 1  though 
in a somewhat. general way. " It was [he argued] within the province of the Government, if 
they found large tracts of land not being put to the use which ought to be made of it, to 
interfere in order to enable the country to get the best advantage it could from these lands" .  
Dickson also supported the motion agreeing that the need " to settle population upon large 
fertile tracts of territory , which had been for many years absolutely unoccupied by human 
beings " should dominate over " the mere question of profit in its pecuniary shape" . 1 64 Four
153 QPD 35, 8/9/81 ,  p. 632. 
1 54 Ibid., p. 631 .  I 
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years later, however, when Kates moved his more restricted motion to repurchase two 
particular estates on the Downs, Griffith, together with Dutton as lands minister, came out 
strongly opposed. While expressing sympathy with the aims of the motion and the desirability 
of having a large agricultural population (which, Griffith claimed, was all they had done in
1881)  they argued that the scheme was simply not financially viable. The experience of the 
Allora lands was again brought to bear. A large number of the Allora selectors were in arrears 
with their payments - indeed one of Dutton's early tasks as lands minister was to receive a 
deputation from these selectors. 1 65 Many of them subsequently opted to bring their holdings
under the 1884 land act. The assessment of rents by the Land Board had suggested that the 
price paid by many of the selectors had been far in excess of that on which they could sustain 
repayments; they were also well below the rents which would be necessary to pay the interest 
on debentures by which means it was proposed to pay for the estates in question, at the price 
at which it was suggested they might be purchased . In short it was recognised that the 
returns possible from agriculture were simply not sufficient to warrant purchase of land by 
farmers at the prices at which the large owners were intimating they would be willing to sell .  
" What results can be expected from purchasing these properties under such conditions? " asked 
Dutton. "Only one result namely that there would be no chance of getting back the purchase 
tnoney: if there were probably the owners would subdivide the land and sell it themselves" . 1 56
That a company had attempted to purchase one of the estates in question with a view to 
subdividing and reselling but had broken off negotiations after investigation, forfeiting l5,000 
in the process, only confirmed in Griffith's view the doubtful commercial basis of such a 
scheme. 1 57 Griffith, Dickson and Dutton all agreed, therefore, that the scheme would be a
1 55 BC 22/1 2/83, p. 6.
1 56 QPD 46, 20/8/85, p. 4 12 .  
1 57 Ibid., p .  399. 
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financial failure from the point of view of either or both the government and the selectors. 
Moreover, it was argued, there remained in the colony sufficient agricultural land in the hands 
of the Crown, perhaps not as good in all respects as that on the Darling Downs but 
nevertheless sufficient to sustain agricultural settlement. 
Their position on this issue was consistent with that in respect of the major land act where the 
emphasis had been on grazing farms and closer pastoral settlement rather than agricultural 
settlement. Their lack of interest in the Kates proposals further showed how far they were 
from the extrr.me 'social ' view of land policy which ignored the economic aspects. Six years 
later, however, in the first major parliamentary session of Griffith 's second premiership, an 
Agricultural Lands Purchase Bill was introduced. The bill provided for the government to 
acquire estates by payment of twenty-five year debentures at a rate not exceeding 4 per cent 
subject to a report by the Land Board . The board was required to report on several specific 
matters including " the fair value of the land to the owner " ,  its suitability for agricultural 
settlement, the demand for land in relation to Crown lands in the neighbourhood suitable for 
agricultural settlement and the probability of immediate selection . The land was to be re-sold 
at an aggregate price 10 per cent higher than that paid, either by cash or by twenty annual 
instalments with 5 per cent interest added. 
It is not altogether clear why Griffith should have pursued this policy. Speaking to the bill 
lands minister Cowley could do no more than suggest that improved railway communications 
meant that " agricultural settlement has taken place at a very rapid rate; and now there 
appears to be a general desire that certain lands held in large estates should be purchased by 
the Government for the specific purpose of selling these lands again in small areas and on long 
terms . . . .  11 1 58 But the profitability of farming on the Darling Downs (for it was this area
1 68 QPD 66, 6/10/91 ,  p. 1381 .  
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that was recognised as the subject of the policy) was still low. The earlier part of this year 
had seen considerable agitation on the part of Darling Downs farmers for reductions in railway 
freights on the grounds that they could not profitably dispose of their produce (see chapter 5) .
Despite concessions granted as a result, it was claimed during the debate on the bil l that " at 
this present moment there are thousands of tons of produce lying rotting on the Downs, 
between Toowoomba and Warwick, because it will not pay, at current railway freights, to 
bring it down to this market . . . .  If this land was bought tomorrow, and resold again for 
agricultural settlement, the railway rate would have to be materially reduced before the 
growth of agricultural produce could be made to pay "  . 1 59
Possibly it was to alleviate this problem that the repurchase proposal was seen to have some 
virtue. Cowley saw the potential of increased agricultural production from the Downs which 
would "greatly enhance the value of our railways, and contribute largely towards working 
expenses as well as interest on the cost of construction . . . . If no other good was gained than 
the good of finding ample wor:k for railways, and enabling us to make them pay . . . . that 
alone would be sufficient to justify (the government] bringing forward the Bil l"  . 1 80 Yet it is
hard to accept that he really believed that railway traffic could be increased sufficiently to 
allow rates to be reduced so that agricultural producers could operate profitably. 
Nor could much heart have been gained from the limited amount of private subdivision of 
estates that had been proceeding. A syndicate had been attempting to subdivide the Clifton 
estate for some years with very limited success. 1 81 Sales in early 189 1 were reported to be
" brisk" .  At the same time there were no emulators; as the Courier observed, without 
apparently seeing the significance of the point: " It is remarkable that the unenterprising 
1 59 QPD 65, 3/1 1 /91 , p. 1 890. 
1 60 QPD 65, 6/ 10/91 , p. 1384. 
161 BC 28/ 1/91 , p. 8.
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owners of large estates on the Darling Downs have not been tempted to follow (the owner's) 
example" . 162 It was widely acknowledged that owners were willing to sell but could not find
syndicates prepared to take the risk of undertaking the process. Had it been economically 
viable then on·e would have expected the normal commercial processes to work; in which case 
there would have been no need for government to do anything. 
It was countered that government could act as intermediary at a lower cost than private 
syndicates: it could borrow to finance the purchase at 2 to 3 per cent less and would not have 
to make a profit. Farmers would also more readily buy from governments, it was claimed, as 
they have " implicit confidence that whatever contract they may make will be carried out" . 163
But the absence of such activity in the marketplace was indeed a major criticism of the 
proposal. Nelson, for example, argued that the large estates were "no more locked up than 
any other lands held by private individuals are locked up; and they are subject to the same 
laws as any other lands. Why not leave them to take their chance of being dealt with by the 
persons who now own them? Why not let economic laws take their full course? If those lands 
are really required, and have the value that is likely to be put on them for farming purposes, 
there is not the slightest doubt that the parties who are now the owners will be very glad to 
dispose of them to farmers " . 1 64 Or as Morehead put it: "Hon. members must not be carried
away with the idea that this land will be greedily bought up. If that had been so, those 
estates would have been syndicated years ago 11 • 1 65
Griffith made no attempt to counter these criticisms or the suggestion - which he himself had 
made six years earlier - that the policy could not be implemented without a loss being incurred 
162 BC 18/8/91 ,  p. 4. 
163 Cowley, QPD 65, 6/10/9 1 ,  p. 1384. 
1 64 QPD 65, 3/1 1/91 ,  p. 1883. 
165 Ibid., p. 1886. 
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by the government. It seems doubtful that the government was ever very enthusiastic about 
the measure having introduced it late in the session and delayed the second reading debate. It 
was with little regret, therefore, that the bill was dropped before it reached a vote. 
The bill was brought forward again in essentially the same form in 1894 when Nelson, one of 
the sternest critics of the repurchase proposal in 189 1 ,  was premier. It passed into law as the 
Agricultural Lands Purchase Act. Again the motives were not obvious. Neither lands 
minister Barlow nor Nelson attempted to advance any arguments in favour of the measure and 
both appeared lukewarm to the principle, Nelson agreeing that "I have not altered my opinion 
very much on the subject since [189 1 ) " .  His only substantive reason for initiating the policy
was that the market value of land had fallen considerably during the early 1 890s and the time 
was now " manifestly more opportune" for seeing whether "such a scheme can be made 
practicable" . 1 66
Certainly the general fall in values and the difficulties in which pastoralists found themselves 
at this time meant that many large land-owners were willing and indeed anxious to sell land 
that they had acquired in the 1860s and 1870s, a fact which led to some questioning of 
whether the measure was intended primarily to assist large land-owners now in a financially­
embarassed position to dispose of their estates. Whatever the government's motives the bill 
was generally welcomed as a means of further assisting settlement. 
Between 1894-95 and 1902-03 twenty estates (all but two on the Darling Downs or closer to
Brisbane) , totalling just over 300,000 acres, were purchased and made available as agricultural
farms under the terms of the 1894 act. The total purchasing price of the estates (bought at
166 QPD 71 ,  2/10/94, p. 731 . 
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prices ranging from l 1 .2s.6d. to .l3.13s.7d. per acre) was nearly � 800,000. 167 This was roughly
in line with the maximum of .1100,000 per year specified in the act, though in some years the 
amount was ccmsiderably less, compensated for by large purchases in 1 901-02 authorised by a 
special act. 
During this time the policy was in general worked as intended and selections on repurchased 
estates were quickly taken up. There were, however, some controversial decisions made. One 
of the early purchases, the Clifton estate, had in fact already been subdivided privately and 
sold to about 3ixty settlers many of whom, however, had found themselves unable to comply 
with the termE-. of sale. Thus, under the 1894 act, the land had been bought and resold to the 
farmers on more favourable terms. Prominent among the critics was the Courier who argued 
that the transaction did nothing to promote settlement and served merely to bail a number of 
farmers out of a difficult financial situation. " (It] lies absolutely outside the Act 's purpose,
scope and provisions " . 168 A couple of estates also proved unwise purchases in that there was
little or no d«�mand for land on them. The Seaforth estate in the Mackay district was a 
particularly ba.d example; its purchase became, in 1 899, the subject of lengthy and bitter 
parliamentary discussion and suggestions of corruption and the estate remained entirely 
unselected more than a decade later. 
Largely because of the controversy over some purchases {and in particular Seaforth) an 
attempt was made in 1 900 to give the parliament the final responsibility for ratifying 
purchases under the act and to eliminate the upper limit of annual expenditure. This was 
defeated in the Council and the only significant amendment made to the act by 1903 was the 
inclusion of dairying in the definition of 'agricultural settlement' for the purpose of which land 
167 Annual Report of the Lands Department 1904, QPP 1905 Il, p. 381 .
168 BC 7 /2/96, p .  4 ;  also items and editorials 29/1/96, p .  4 ;  6/2/96, pp. 4 and 5 , 10/2/96, pp. 4 and 6. 
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could be purchased. 
Operations under the act were, in general, successful. Selection of land on repurchased estates 
was sufficient for amounts payable by selectors always to exceed the government's 
commitments incurred by purchase and selectors were generally able to meet their 
commitments. Some concern was occasioned in 1899 and 1900 when selectors on several 
estates fell into arrears with their payments largely, it was claimed, on account of adverse 
seasons. In response to representations made to the government early in 1899 a short 
extension of time was allowed for payment of rent, though the Under Secretary in his Annual 
Report thought it necessary to caution against further concession pointing out that " these 
selectors are not on a par with ordinary selectors of vacant Crown lands" and suggesting that 
because of the financial obligations of the government entered into, as it were, on their behalf, 
they " should fulfil their contract within reasonable limits; otherwise, however much it may be 
regretted ,  they must suffer the consequences that happen to persons in other occupations who 
have miscalculated their means" . 169 Following further representations in 1899 and 1900
further extensions were granted by executive authority (the penalties for non-payment
prescribed under the act were waived though 5 per cent of the rent actually due was still 
payable) . These were described in the Annual Report, with a hint of disapproval, as "very
liberal 11 and the whole question of arrears given some prominence " as the question will no 
doubt affect, more or less, future operations under these acts" . 1 70
O'Connell , lands minister at the time, was under no illusions as to the sort of pressures that 
could arise: he was indeed at that time faced with the demands of pastoralists for better 
terms, particularly with respect to lease periods. The problem, as he noted in 1901 ,  was that 
1 69 Q VP 1899 II, p. 813.
170 Q VP 1900 II, pp. 926-7.
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the government was a landlord that was removable by the people. "A private individual 
selling land to a private purchaser has nothing of that sort to fear. He says, 'I make a bargain 
with you, Smith; you pay me so much for this piece of land' ;  and if Smith does not keep to his 
bargain the private seller gets rid of his purchaser, and nobody says to him, 'If you do not give 
me better ter�s I will put you off the Treasury benches' " . 171  In the event the government's
' liberality ' ,  or more precisely its preparedness to depart from strict financial principles, was 
not tested as the arrears situation improved. 
The Morgan government continued to pursue the repurchase policy though without any 
particular commitment. The policy did not, for example, rate a mention in Morgan's 1904 
manifesto. 172 By this time, however, the rate at which large estates were being privately
subdivided and sold was increasing - a phenomenon attributed partly to the success of 
government-sponsored closer settlement on such estates. Indeed as early as 1898 the Courier 
had observed that " many landowners, particularly on the Darling Downs, are now throwing 
open estates to settlement on most advantageous terms, thus to a large extent obviating the 
necessity which prompted the Act" . 173 And a subsequent worsening of the arrears position on
some repurchased estates led lands minister Bell to adopt a rather cautious position on the 
policy in general .  Faced with a request from selectors on the former Gowrie estate for a 
reduction in purchasing price and hence rents (on the grounds that a reduction had been made
on the portion remaining unselected) Bell showed himself to be equally as conscious as his
predecessor of the situation the government was in with respect to requests for ' concessions' ,  
though if anything rather more strong-minded in resisting them. "On the repurchased estates 
selectors were on a different plane from the ordinary selectors on Crown land. When they 
171  QPD 87, 3 1/7 /01 , p .  234. 
172 BC 27 /7 /04, pp. 5-6. 
1 73 BC 16/2/98, p. 4; also item 5/12/00, p. 5; and reports of, and advertisements for, sale of estates for 
example 6/10/03, p. 4; 13/2/04, p. 9; 20/2/04, p. 6. 
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went on repurchased estates they were going on land in which the money of their fellow 
taxpayers had been invested and they had taken up areas on a deliberate contract that they 
would make ce·rtain payments " ,  Bell bluntly told the deputation. 174 While many of the arrears
were, he implied, due to a slackness which frequently characterised financial relations with the 
government, many did in fact represent genuine losses. "Although nothing had occurred in 
connection wit h the system of repurchasing estates that actually caused alarm, at all events 
the experiment, or the method of selection, was in such a state that they could not yet 
pronounce it an absolute success" ,  Bell concluded. 175
If the desired process of closer settlement on the large estates could be achieved through 
private subdivision and sale so much the better as far as Bell was concerned . Thus it was in 
1905 that a measure was introduced the aim of which was, in part, to encourage this process 
and further reduce the need for the government to act as an intermediary. This was the Land 
Monopoly Tax Bill . Aimed primarily at raising revenue, and justified, so the government 
argued, in these terms alone, the measure was also put forward as having the complementary 
effect of breaking up the large estates and promoting settlement. Under the measure it was 
proposed to levy a tax on a sliding scale according to both per acre and total value of private 
estates. The tax was thus intended to have the effect of placing pressure on the owners of the 
larger and more valuable properties to subdivide and sell them. 176 A controversial feature of
the bill was that the value on which the tax was to .be based was to be specified by the owner 
with the proviso that the Taxation Commissioner could question the value in which case there 
would be an attempt made to come to a mutually agreed decision about a fair value. If the 
owner did not reach such an agreement with the Commissioner his land then became subject 
174 BC 13/4/04, p. 6. 
1 76 /bid., also speech at Chinchilla BC 6/8/04, p. 6. 
176 Kidston, QPD 96, 14/9/05, pp. 733-8. 
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to resumption. The provision was def ended against charges of 'confiscation' by the claim that 
it was " a  legitimate way in which the public interests may be made to predominate over 
. t . " 177priva e mterests . 
When the bill was before the Legislative Council a Select Committee was appointed. In its 
report the committee contended that while there was a considerable demand for land 
especially by farmers from southern states the proposed measure would serve no purpose in 
better meeting their needs. The demand for land was by two major groups of farmers: New 
South Wales dairy farmers seeking scrub land near the coast, and Victorian farmers seeking 
land suitable for combined wheat-growing and lamb-raising. In the case of the former the land 
was Crown land at present held as timber reserves awaiting action by the Lands Department. 
For the latter group there was, it was argued, an abundance of land available either through 
the Lands Department or through private subdivision such that the supply considerably 
outran dem�nd; indeed it was argued that to increase the supply further would only serve to 
depreciate the price of land and inflict financial injury on �he farmers who had already 
purchased their holdings. 178
In this light the bill was widely criticised as merely a 'land tax ' .  Moreover, the need for the 
extra revenue which the tax would raise was questioned in the light of the improvement in the 
public finances. Whether the government saw the land monopoly tax as critical in promoting 
privately organised closer settlement and what its effect would actually have been are issues 
remaining open to debate. After the measure was rejected by the Legislative Council , 
however, and possibly stimulated by the rapidly increasing demand for land, Bell adopted a 
renewed enthusiasm for the repurchasing policy. A Closer Settlement Act was passed in 1906 
177 /bid., p. 737. 
178 Report of Select Committee on Land Monopoly Tax Bill_, QPP 1905 I, pp. 499-600.
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which repealed the Agricultural Lands Purchase Act. The 1906 act was very similar in essence 
to the previous legislation except that it raised the upper limit of expenditure in acquiring land 
from � 100,000 to b>oo,OOO and, most significantly, provided for the compulsory acquisition of
land allowing the minister to take the initiative in purchasing land rather than waiting for an 
offer from an owner to sell as formerly. Showing an even stronger mind on the issue than 
Kidston in the debate the previous year, Bell asserted in debate that "we have got past the 
stage where it could be contended that if a man does not like to part with his property that it 
is wrong to make him do it . . . . The supremacy of the community must be asserted as 
against the individual whenever the welfare of the community is at stake" .  The act also 
abolished the requirement that at least 25 per cent of an estate be 'agricultural land' in the 
strict technical sense (itself a modification from 100 per cent, introduced in the 1901  amending 
act, to allow for dairying land to be acted upon in this way) thus moving further from the 
" fetish " with agriculture. 179
The change in attitude on Bell's part was due to a number of factors. Most significantly the 
arrears position on repurchased estates which had worried him in 1904 had improved. On the 
supply side Bell also expressed the view that while figures as to the large area of unalienated 
land in Queensland could be bandied around "we have a great deal smaller area in Queensland 
fit for real close settlement than a lot of people think . . . .  We cannot shut our eyes to the large 
estates on the Darling Downs and in other parts of Queensland, which are running sheep and 
say, 'What do a few more thousand acres matter, we will find other country that will meet the 
demand for close settlement' . . . .  Unfortunately so many of these big estates are situated 
where there is the greater demand for land" . 180 This view, however, was not greatly different
179 QPD 98, 17 /10/06, pp. 1 195, 1 197. 
180 Ibid., p. 1 199. 
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to that expressed in the 1880s and 1890s. But the surging demand for land now led to greater 
concern that the increasing value of large well-situated estates would make closer settlement 
(whether effected through the agency of owners or the government) more expensive: the 
increment in value would accrue to the owners rather than settlers thus reducing the chances 
of success of settlers. And while he did not spell the point out Bell can hardly have been 
unaware of the effect of the possibility of compulsory purchase on the incentive for owners of 
estates to subdivide and sell privately. 
The 1906 act did not, however, usher in a great period of activity. The provision for 
compulsory purchase was used in 1907 with respect to the 120,000 acre Jimbour estate on the 
Darling Downs. The estate was in the process of being prepared for subdivision by the owners 
and their mortgagees (the Queensland National Bank) .  But the government stepped in as a 
creditor of the bank and initiated the process of resumption. Protracted and expensive legal 
action over retention of some land and compensation for both the land and improvements, and 
losses occasioned by the compulsory sale resulted in the government having to pay over 50 per 
cent more for t.he estate than initially offered. 181
If Bell had been at all enthusiastic about the whole policy this experience doubtless served to 
curb that enthusiasm at least in the case of estates where there was a prospect of owners 
themselves subdividing and selling. To a petition from a group of people in 1908 seeking his 
support for a proposal to purchase a 30,000 acre estate near Toowoomba he showed little 
interest. On the contrary: 
He did not think it was an unwise principle for a Minister to go on that as long as 
there was evidence that the owners of the estate were prepared to cut up the whole 
of it, and on fairly liberal terms, there should be no interference. The position was 
181 Annual Report of the Lands Department 1907 , QPP 190_8 II, pp. 1 1- 12. 
such in Queensland that, instead of interfering with the efforts of owners in matters 
of that kind, the government had sufficient scope for its energies on the waste 
Crown Lands or on estates the owners of which had no intention of cutting them 
182up. 
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Over the period 1907-08 to 1913-14 no further compulsory purchases were made and while 
estates were purchased and settled under the 1906 act at a steady rate the policy was pursued 
by Bell and his successors at only a moderate pace and well short of the extent to which the 
act permitted. The period was also one of deterioration in the finances of some of the 
repurchased estates. In an amending act passed in 19 13 ,  aimed " primarily [at] relieving the
[financial] condition of some of those who have already selected 11 , 183 the period of purchase
was extended from twenty-five to forty years; existing settlers could opt to extend leases and 
in this way reduce -their annual payments. Settlers in arrears were granted five years 
exemption from payments of principal and interest at which time arrears would be funded. In 
his second reading speech the minister was virtually silent on the principle of repurchase 
embodied in the principal act. While the policy was still being worked, it was being used only 
minimally and without any great enthusiasm. Certainly the total area involved was 
insignificant when compared with the amount of Crown land selected and the amount of 
private subdivision being undertaken. 
C O NCLUSION 
Land policy revolved around two central themes: settlement and revenue, with emphasis on 
182 Report of deputation, BC 1 6/4/08, p. 5. 
183 QPD 1 16, 22/10/13, p. 2 101 .  
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the former. The desirability of settlement - the more intensive use of land and its occupation 
by men and their families - was universally agreed, though there were differences as to the 
extent to which and way in which settlement could , and should, be effected. The land policies 
of the 1870s, put in place by Liberals for whom the introduction of larger numbers of rural 
settlers into a society dominated by the squatters was an important political goal, generally 
equated settlement with the use of land for agricultural rather than pastoral purposes. To 
encourage settlement the freehold of smaller areas of land resumed from large pastoral leases 
was offered on a time payment basis, the freehold to be granted after conditions relating to 
occupancy and improvement of the land had been fulfilled, thus demonstrating 'genuine' 
settlement. Special encouragement, in the form of a very low purchase price was given to 
'homestead' selectors on small areas of less than 160 acres. For reasons of geography and 
economics the holding of small areas of land and its use for agriculture was, however, except in 
cases of particularly rich and well-located land, an unprofitable activity. Frequently selectors 
found it more profitable to sell their land, when the freehold was acquired, to pastoralists. For 
the latter particularly in the 'settled ' districts, the acquisition of freehold land was a means of 
obtaining the secure tenure of land on which they had only a short and insecure lease, albeit 
an expensive one which created difficulties in later years of lower prices and drought. Because 
pastoral lessees were regarded as temporary occupants to be progressively displaced as rapidly 
as land could be settled rents charged to them were remarkably low, particularly when 
compared to the high incomes they earned and the prices they were willing to pay to obtain 
freehold title to land. Indeed a significant proportion of the total revenue raised from land 
(about 40 per cent by the early 1880s) came from 'rents ' paid by selectors to acquire land.
Thus land policy was neither securing the amount of revenue possible from those who were 
using Crown lands most profitably nor effecting settlement to the extent sought by those for 
whom it was an important goal. 
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The 1884 land act was a comprehensive rev1s1on of land policy which sought to provide a 
framework in which settlement could be brought about more rapidly and, at the same time, 
the revenue r·�ceived from land increased. It reflected still the Liberal goal of settling a 
yeomanry on the land but acknowledged the fact that pastoral activities represented the most 
productive and profitable form of land use. Thus the grazing farm was conceived as the 
medium most likely to effect settlement with smaller scale, more intensive, agriculturally­
based settlement, by way of the agricultural farm, , as a secondary form. The leasehold 
principle was :i.dopted as a means of encouraging selection: selectors would have to pay only 
an annual rent:.. More importantly , the provision for reassessment of rents ensured that in the 
longer term a share of the increasing value of land would be secured to the community .  In the 
short term it was anticipated that lower rents would be compensated for by a higher rate of 
selection, particularly of grazing farms, the new form of tenure introduced by the act. The 
land for settlement was to be made available by large-scale resumptions of pastoral leases 
brought under the act. In consideration, pastoral lessees were offered, for the first time, ,a 
secure tenure over their land. This provided added justification for increasing rents. The act 
was thus intended to provide an overall increase in revenue. The Land Board was created as a 
mechanism for ensuring that rents would be set, and periodically adjusted, according to the 
value of land and thus that an appropriate amount of rent from use of the resource land was 
secured to the community. 
The 1884 act was to remain the basic framework for land policy over the next thirty years 
although major changes were made to some aspects. 
The secure, fixed-term, leases offered to pastoralists under the 1884 act in exchange for a 
significant proportion of their runs were accepted by pastoralists as providing a more certain 
framework in which they could invest and produce though extensions in the terms of leases (in 
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exchange for provision for partial resumption) were secured from the government in 1886. In
the 1890s further extensions were granted in some cases in consideration of expenditure on 
rabbit-proof fencing and in 1902, following considerable pressure from pastoral interests,
major extensions (in some cases of up to forty years) were conceded to allow for recovery from
the ravages of the great drought. The latter extensions were granted, however, within
. 
the 
framework of · a system of 'classification' which provided for several combinations of lease 
period and resumption provisions according to the likelihood of the land being required for 
closer settlement. The 1910 act provided for further flexibility in setting the terms and 
conditions of pastoral leases. Thus pastoralists came to be given a tenure which allowed them 
the security to invest in improvements to increase the productivity of the land but at the same 
time adequate provision was made for resumption to allow for the more intensive use of land 
as the need for this arose. Only towards the end of the period under consideration did the 
very rapid expansion of agriculture and dairying, and renewed prosperity in the pastoral 
industry, which together led to a greatly increased demand for both agricultural and grazing 
selections, mean that some resumptions involving the payment of compensation were 
necessary. 
In its financial aspect policy with respect to pastoral tenure was less successful. The Land 
Board did not see its way clear to raise rents on leases brought under the 1884 act to the 
extent anticipated. The reassessments at the end of the first period of leases took place 
through the 1 890s in the context of depressed conditions in the pastoral industry; these 
resulted in substantial downward revisions by the Land Court over which the government, 
appealed but had no control. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in 1899 that, in 
effect, rents should be based on market values opened the way for increases to be made if and 
when the market value of properties increased. The review of rents undertaken in the post-
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drought situation of the 1 900s as leases were brought under the 1902 act appeared to provide 
the context, the longer leases under the act being seen to have compensated lessees for the 
injury caused by the drought. But the Land Court reduced rents. By the mid- 1900s the total 
revenue raised· from pastoral occupation was below that received in the late 1880s. While the 
government made no secret of the fact that it thought rents should be higher there was little it 
could do short of taking the matter out of the jurisdiction of the Land Court and making it an 
explictly political one. The inclusion of the Supreme Court's principle in the 1910 act was 
intended to instruct the Land Court more clearly to base rents on market value but in the 
absence of a clearer definition of the concept of rent and the way in which it should be 
determined the matter could not be said to have been resolved. 
The grazing farm and agricultural farm remained the basic forms of tenure under which 
settlement was effected but alterations were made in the terms and conditions of tenure in 
those categories, particularly in the case of agricultural selection. The changes followed a 
tortuous path. Taking place over three decades they were influenced by different 
circumstances and underlain by different motives. On occasions revenue was a major 
consideration hut more typically the pursuit of the goal of settlement involved explicit sacrifice 
in this regard. 
The leasehold principle, already qualified somewhat by the time the 1884 act was passed, was 
progressively eroded, at least in the case of agricultural selections. The significant departure 
represented by the introduction of unconditional selection was based on the short-term need 
for more revenue. The main reason for the move back towards freehold and in particular the 
restoration of the conditional purchase principle in 1897 was, however, to encourage 
settlement: this was because of the 'feeling in the heart ' (as it was often expressed) about 
obtaining the freehold of land held (or perceived to· be held) by prospective settlers. Concern 
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about the need to ensure the continued availability of land for closer settlement prevented the 
extension of this more liberal policy to the larger grazing farms. The partial reassertion of the 
leasehold principle with the introduction of the perpetual leasehold tenure in 1908 did not 
reflect any particular enthusiasm or commitment on the part of the government for the policy 
but rather the political necessity to bow to widespread support for it; it impinged little on 
settlement during the remainder of the period under review. 
The setting of rents and prices on land opened for selection was considered essentially to be a 
matter of administration rather than policy. These prices were, and were generally accepted 
to be, low in relation to the market value of land. This was implicitly accepted in the 
interests of encouraging settlement. In the context of a strong demand for grazing farms the 
system of tendering introduced in the 1890s brought rents more into accord with market 
values. When this system was perceived in the 1900s to be crowding out bona fide grazing 
selectors, homestead selectors (those guaranteeing personal residence) were accorded priority
at the proclaimed price in a measure which explicitly sacrificed revenue to promote settlement. 
In the case of agricultural selections the liberal terms introduced in the 1897 act and the 
particular advantages accorded homestead selectors were also a reflection of the priority 
accorded the goal of settlement. In the context of the rapid development of agricultural 
industries after the mid- 1900s the availability of homesteads was restricted but the 
agricultural farm still provided cheap land for prospective selectors. 
The outright sale of land was rejected as a policy by the Liberals in 1 884 as contrary to the 
principles on which the government as landlord should manage land in order to maximise 
settlement and,  in the long run, revenue. The policy was restored in a moderate way as a 
matter of necessity to raise revenue and sanction was sought for special sales in times of 
financial crisis . In general, however, there was a -reluctance to part with control over large 
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areas of land in this way despite the temptation of the short-term revenue gains from doing so. 
The idea of using revenue from sales of land explicitly to fund expenditure on public works (as
distinct from merely augmenting current revenue) and thus indirectly promote settlement and
development was explored in the 1900s but not implemented to any significant degree. 
Settlement was also sought through the policy of repurchasing land which had been alienated. 
A policy initially advocated and promoted by those for whom closer settlement based on 
agriculture was a goal to be pursued almost without regard to financial or economic 
considerations, it was widely opposed on the grounds that if such settlement and the more 
intensive use of land underlying it were economically warranted then the owners of these large 
freehold estates would voluntarily subdivide and sell the estates. It was eventually introduced 
by those who had presented such arguments most cogently and while they conceded the 
argument that the government, by acting as an intermediary, could facilitate this process 
there is also a question of whether assistance to the larger landowners desiring to sell in the 
context of economically and financially difficult times was a more powerful motive than the 
facilitation of settlement for which they had argued there was limited economic justification 
and about which they were rather indifferent. Once introduced, the policy was pursued 
consistently throughout the last two decades of the period under consideration though at a 
fairly moderate level and cautiously , in full awareness of the difficulties which the government 
as landlord could find itself in if farmers placed on the land, through its agency, got into 
financial trouble. That the goal of settlement pursued in this way was subject to the dictates 
of economic and financial forces was clearly acknowledged. In the mid-1900s an apparent 
weakening of interest in the policy in favour of one to force, through penal taxation measures 
on large freehold estates, the more rapid private subdivision of these estates was followed by 
an apparent renewal of enthusiasm for the repurchase policy on a larger scale and with more 
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power to the government. This was in response partly to the surge in demand for agricultural 
land at this time and partly to the defeat of the ' land monopoly ' tax measure the previous 
year. But in the context of an increasing amount of voluntary subdivision of estates and the 
unsatisfactory financial situation of settlers on a few of the repurchased estates only a modest 
amount of activity was undertaken, certainly well below that for which the legislation 
provided. 
Over the period reviewed, land policy thus continued to reflect the tension between what could 
broadly be termed 'economic' and 'social ' goals; and in particular between policies directed 
towards maximising the rate of settlement on the one hand and revenue - both private and 
public on the other. 
In the first part of the period policy debates were dominated by concern, expressed particularly 
by Liberals, that the rate of settlement was so slow. By the mid- 1890s, despite the quite rapid 
rate of structural change in the sugar industry which saw the plantation system largely 
replaced by the small farmer, those seeking the type of land use and socio-economic structure
which men of European background thought of as the norm could still cite the paltry area of 
land being farmed and the small number of working proprietors as evidence of how little 
progress had been made towards what many saw as the desirable form of development. From 
the mid to late 1890s, however, and particularly after the early to mid- 1900s (the great
drought having punctuated the trend) developments in both the pastoral and agricultural
industries saw increases in these variables and in levels of rural production and economic 
prosperity generally. 
The strong recovery in the pastoral industry was closely linked to the growth of smaller 
grazing enterprises and investment in the grazing farms and grazing homesteads which were 
selected during these years; although a considerable proportion of these was taken up by 
1 1 0  
existing pastoral lessees seeking to secure their place on the land as i t  became increasingly 
evident (even with the generous treatment of lessees under the 1902 Act) that they would have
to yield to selectors. Developments in the agricultural industries and particularly in dairying -
the engine of expansion and growth during these years - were also closely linked to the more 
intensive use of land by selectors of agricultural farms. But the extent to which land policy 
could be said to have been 'responsible' for economic development is uncertain. Clearly the 
terms and conditions on which land was made available for selection facilitated these 
developments. But it hardly acted as a specific stimulus to them. The lack of 'development' 
in previous decades in the context of various, but no less generous, facilities for selection of 
land resumed from pastoral leases - and, at different times (for example the latter 1880s) , quite
high rates of selection - has to be explained rather b.y the lack of opportunities for the
profitable use of land in a more intensive mode. 
More interesting from the point of view of this study is the causal relationship which emerges 
in the other direction. Economic circumstances and in particular the rate at which settlement 
was occurring had a discernible influence on land policy: the more prosperous the 
circum�tances and the more rapidly the new rural industries expanded the less the need was 
felt to encourage and promote settlement and 'development' through policy measures. Thus in 
the 1900s the repurchase policy - the clearest example of administrative interference in market 
forces - became increasingly tentative. Similarly the somewhat more stringent attitude 
towards the terms and conditions on which small areas of land were made available for 
selection contrasted with the liberality of measures introduced in the 1890s. But in both cases 
there were some conflicting elements. And in general it is difficult to discern a consistent 
pattern to the way in which the tension between the economic and social goals of land policy 
was resolved as the economic, political - and geographical - context in which decisions were 
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made changed over the thirty years under review. The achievement of  economic expansion 
and the more intensive use of land took the pressure off the need for administrative measures 
to promote the latter, if not the need to ensure that sufficient land was made available for this 
purpose from that held under pastoral leases and the continuing quest to gain a 'fair '  share of 
the returns from land used in this way through pastoral rents. The generous treatment of 
pastoral lesse�, even in the wake of the great drought, thus appears difficult to explain. But
the reason for it is to be found in Land Board administration of the policy rather than the 
intentions of its framers. And it was an administration which became increasingly subject to 
criticism by governments. If any trend stands out it is a move towards economic rationalism 
after a period of experimentation. 
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TABLE 2.2 
REVENUE FROM LAND 1 881-82 to 1 9 1 3- 1 4  
1 8 8 1- 8 2  
1 8 8 2- 8 3  
1 8 8 3-8 4  
1 8 8 4- 8 5  
1 8 8 5-86 
1886- 8 7  
1 8 8 7- 8 8  
1 8 8 8- 89 
1 8 8 9- 90 
1 8 90- 9 1  
1 8 9 1-92 
18 92-93 
1893-94 
1 8 94- 95 
1 8 95- 96 
1 8 96- 97 
1 8 97- 98 
1898- 99 
1899- 1900 
1 900-01 
1 901-02 
1902-03 
1 903-04 
1 904-05 
1905-06 
1 906-07 
1 907-08 
1 908-09 
1909- 10 
1910- 1 1  
1 9 1 1- 1 2  
1 9 1 2- 1 3  
1 9 1 3- 1 4  
Sales 
(a) 
1 7 8  
193 
90 
6 8  
93 
50 
56 
125 
105 
50 
3 3  
5 1  
5 3  
3 4  
2 2  
2 7  
46 
46 
50 
58 
31 
37 
63 
103 
36 
31 
1 3  
7 
1 3  
2 
1 
5 
1 
Special 
Sales 
(b)  
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 2 5  
1 4 9  
5 7  
57 
42 
3 
-
-
-
-
9 
3 7  
2 1  
2 1  
2 1  
6 
8 
3 
-
-
-
-
-
Notes: see next page 
J, '000
Land Revenue Proper 
Pastoral 
Occupation 
Rents on Rents on Selec- Other Rent of Other 
Selections, tions, 1884 Act (e) Holdings (f) 
1876 Act (c) as amended (d) 
2 3 5  - 3 3  2 1 1  8 
242 - 3 2  2 1 7  7 
247 - 2 9  2 46 8 
2 3 7  1 2 2  2 5 2  6 
198 4 2 1  256 1 2  
1 5 7  7 2 7  2 7 3  9 
1 5 1  1 5  3 1  2 8 7  1 2  
1 1 3  2 4  36 3 1 1  1 2  
7 6  3 5  3 8  304 14 
5 7  4 9  3 4  306 16 
32 55 30 3 1 3  1 4  
1 7  6 1  3 0  3 2 2  1 4  
7 7 1  3 1  3 3 4  16 
- 7 7  3 1  3 3 6  17 
- 92 10 341 17 
- 100 12 3 2 7  16 
- 1 1 8  1 3  3 2 2  2 4  
� 137 13 306 2 8  
- 1 3 9  1 3  2 9 4  3 0  
- 1 2 8  3 3  2 8 8  34 
- 144 40 269 36 
149 34 260 44 
- 191 3 9  2 4 9  3 3  
- 1 5 9  4 0  2 3 7  2 8  
- 194 39 2 3 8  3 1  
- 2 19 4 8  236 2 9  
- 241 6 2  2 5 4  3 4  
- 2 5 7  7 8  265 30 
- 293 94 294 2 8  
- 3 2 4  1 17 295 3 5  
- 374 102 295 4 3  
- 3 8 8  1 4 1  300 41 
- 440 154 302 46 
112a 
TOTAL 
666 
6 9 1  
6 20 
5 8 7  
5 8 4  
5 2 2  
5 5 0  
6 2 8  
5 7 2  
5 1 3  
6 0 1  
6 45 
569 
553 
5 26 
486 
522 
531 
526 
535 
5 2 9  
5 6 2  
5 96 
5 8 8  
5 5 9  
5 6 9  
6 1 2  
644 
7 2 2  
7 7 2  
843 
875 
943 
1 1 26 
Notes: 
(a) Mainly sales by auction as provided for under the principal land act. Until 1884-85
includes revenue from sales through exercise of the pre-emptive right of purchase. 
(b) Under the 189 1 and 1901 Special Sales of Land Acts.
( c) Conditional Purchase and Homestead selections. The 1876 act was repealed in 1884.
( d) Under various amendments 'rents' included payments made towards purchase of freehold.
(e) Mainly Timber Licences and Survey and Transfer Fees.
(f) Mainly Occupation Licences.
Source: Tables Relating to the Treasurer 's Financial Statement, Q VP /QPP various years. 
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CHAP TER 3 
IMMIGRATION 
Immigration policy at this time was underlain by the belief (held generally in Australia up to 
1930) that a larger population was necessary in order that the vast natural resources which a 
few people had come to possess should be more intensively utilised - if only to prevent their 
appropriation by others. The economic rationale for a larger population lay in the prospect of 
more people to contribute to public revenue (particularly to fund public investment) and 
provide the economic basis for the provision of a greater range of services. It was axiomatic 
that large-scale immigration was essential to bring about the necessary rate of population 
increase and that, because Queensland was a distant and relatively unknown colony, the 
government had a major role to play in encouraging immigration. 
Policy as it developed revolved principally around a number of issues that were both social 
and economic in nature: what type of people should be sought; what means and forms of 
assistance were most appropriate to attract them; and, increasingly over the period , what was 
the appropriate aggregate rate of immigration to seek in the light of the capacity of the 
Queensland economy to absorb more people? 
The issue of non-European immigration and in particular that of Melanesians to provide 
labour for the sugar industry also figured prominently in the policy agenda of the period under 
consideration. Notice that the immigration of Melanesians would be stopped was given in the 
1880s. The policy was reversed in the 1890s, though the abolition of Melanesian labour was 
finally effected through the agency of commonwealth policy in the 1900s. The policy was not 
itself directed towards economic development but stemmed primarily from social and political 
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considerations. It was, however, acknowledged to have implications for the process of 
development through its consequences for the sugar industry. Efforts were therefore made in 
the 1880s to ensure alternative labour would be available and these form an important sub-
theme in immigration policy. The actual abolition of Melanesians in the 1 UOOs also influenced 
policy regarding immigration from Europe. 1
IMMIGRATION FROM EUROPE 
Right from the time of separation a number of arrangements and schemes were developed to 
publicise Queensland, to encourage potential emigrants and to assist with their passage to the 
colony. An integrated organisation, headed by an Agent-General, was established in London 
to organise the recruitment and selection of emigrants and their conveyance to the colony. 
From the 1860s a range of books, pamphlets, broadsheets and other forms of advertising was 
used to draw the attention of would-be emigrants to Queensland and a network of agents and 
sub-agents was employed to assist recruitment - including a number of special appointees, the 
most famous of whom was George Randall ,  first appointed as accredited government agent 
and lecturer in En'gland in 188 1 .  
By  the end o f  the 1860s immigration acts had established four categories o f  government 
assistance to immigrants. Free passages were given to agricultural labourers and domestic 
servants; assisted passages were made available for skilled mechanics and artisans; assistance 
was also given to approved persons 'nominated' by friends or relatives who paid an amount 
1 The social and economic aspects of Melanesian labour in Queensland have been extensively analysed by
Saunders and Shlomowitz. So has the decision by the commonwealth government immediately after 
federation to prohibit its use. (See the writings of Saunders, Shlomowitz and Birch cited in the Bibliography.) 
The analysis here f oc:uses on the economic: aspects of Queensland government policies with respect to 
Melanesian labour and in particular on the perceived implications for immigration policy of those policies and 
others imposed upon Queensland. The issue of the use of Melanesian labour in the sugar industry was also a 
major element in other economic: policies with respect to the sugar industry; these are considered in chapter 6. 
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towards their fare; and finally a category of indented immigrant was introduced in the 1869 
Immigration Act whereby employers could engage labour from Europe after which the Agent-
General would conclude an agreement with the prospective indented labourer relating to the 
terms of his employment and arrange transport to the colony. 2
There was a high degree of consensus among political groupings about both the ends and 
means of immigration policy. As Mcilwraith put it when introducing an immigration bill in 
1882 to consolidate and liberalise previous legislation: " The value of immigration to the 
colony he had no intention of dilating upon; it was admitted on all sides of the House. . . . It 
was a subject on which all parties in the House could approach one another, and by acting in 
unison make a good and workable measure" .3 As the liberal/conservative distinction emerged
more clearly in the late 1870s and early 1880s, however, so did some significant differences in 
attitudes towards some aspects of immigration policy. 
Liberals equated development with the closer settlement of land by yeoman farmers and their 
families, settlement at this time still being conceived largely in terms of the development of 
agriculture. The type of immigrants sought were not obtained in large numbers by the 
existing measures, however, the major exceptions being the Germans. In large part this was 
due to the inherent difficulties facing those who would take part in this concept of 
development. To the Liberals this meant that immigration policy should provide more 
incentive to the independent small capitalist who would take up land. Mcilwraith 's 1882 
immigration bill sought to repeal all previous immigration acts though it essentially repeated 
the provisions of previous legislation, maintaining the same categories of assistance and indeed 
2 R. Lawson, 'Immigration into Queensland 1870- 1890' (B.A. thesis, University of Queensland, 1963); J.L. 
Keys, 'George Handall 's role in Queensland immigration policy, 1 881- 1902 ' (B.A. thesis, University of 
Queensland, 1 966). 
3 QPD 37, 18/7 /82, p. 1 10. 
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liberalising them in some instances. There was, however, strong Liberal criticism of the 
" narrow class spirit" which was seen to pervade immigration policy in so far as it encouraged 
only people who would work for wages rather than those who might also bring money with 
them and set up in business, particularly on the land. Conservatives, charged the Liberals, 
wanted a larger population which would enhance their money-making activities by providing 
both demand and labour, but they did not want to encourage the sort of person who might 
constitute a new class and a threat to their position in the colony. What Liberals wanted, as 
Dickson put it, was 11 a proper class" of immigrant, one with "a little capital who, with 
industry and perserverence might make it productive" .  4 Agreeing, Griffith as leader of the
opposition moved, successfully, to insert a new clause in the bill (which became s. 17 )  providing 
for the payment of a £10 subsidy towards the fare of immigrants who did not seek, or were 
not eligible for ,  assistance under the other categories. His aim was to secure " a  s_uperior class " 
of immigrant, the man with a small amount of capital who was being attracted elsewhere, 
particularly to Canada and the United States. 
With much the same idea in mind Griffith also moved to have a system of land orders - in 
effect grants of land for immigrants - introduced into the bill. Such a system had operated 
under earlier immigration acts. Under the 1869 act land orders to the value of �40 were 
granted to full-paying passengers and to assisted immigrants upon repayment of the amount 
of passage assistance granted. These orders were non-transferable and deeds were granted 
within five years on fulfilment of certain residence and improvement conditions. Modifications 
to the system were made in 1 872 but it was widely abused and very largely ineffective in 
settling immigrants on the land. The system was abandoned in 1875 the government 
extending the area available to selection under the homestead clauses of the land act as a 
4 QPD 37, 18/7 /82, p. 1 16. 
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corollary measure. 6 Griffith's proposal in 1882 was confined to those immigrants paying their
own passages in the belief that they would be more likely to want to acquire land, settle upon 
it and become the farmers of the colony. These were the men wanted; they were a different 
class to those likely to be attracted· by assisted passages (even to those attracted by the form 
of assistance he had just managed to introduce) and those most likely to bring about " real 
settlement" . The proposal was for non-transferable land orders to the nominal value of J30 to 
be granted in respect of an immigrant and his family and be available for ten years for the 
purposes of paying instalments on a selection taken up under the land act. 6 On this occasion
there was insufficient general support for the measure, Mcilwraith arguing that it would be 
merely " an artificial means of inducing men to go on the land when they ought to be better 
7employed" .  
In the context of a booming economy, however, Mcilwraith ordered that immigration be 
stepped up and the flow of immigrants (nominated, assisted and free) increased markedly . In 
1883, over 28,000 emigrants were despatched by the Agent-General 's office in London, double 
the number in 1882 and about five times the average number during the previous decade.8 As
the 1883 election was being fought immigration was still running at an unprecedentedly high 
level. But the issue hardly surfaced in the election campaign. Griffith did not criticise the 
current policy and indeed in the view of development he put forward, which anticipated a high 
rate of settlement on medium-sized grazing farms, argu:d that " 40,000 immigrants a year was 
not more than we might absorb 11 • 9
6 Lawson, 'Immigration into Queensland 1870- 1890', pp. 26-9.
6 QPD 37, 1 /8/82, p. 230. 
7 Ibid., p. 231 .  
8 Agent-General 's Reports, QVP, various years. Table 3.1 summarises data on numbers of immigrants by
category, and on expenditure on immigration. 
9 Speech in Brisbane, BC 1 1 /8/83, p. 6. 
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Upon assuming office, however, Griffith and colonial treasurer Dickson reacted strongly 
against this "sudden paroxysm 11 in the immigration system. In particular it was felt that s. 17 ,  
under which more than 5,000 emigrants were despatched in 1 883, had been abused. Griffith 
was subsequently to refer to the way it had been operated as "simply a scheme by which 
shipowners were enabled to fill their ships with any persons they chose to send.  There were 
absolutely no restrictions, no safeguards, no precautions whatever; it was simply a matter of 
speculation with the shipowners 11 • 10 In Dickson 's view 11 The service appears to have been
conducted less in the interests of the colony than for the benefit of shipowners who have 
enjoyed the confidence of our London office" . 1 1  But concern also expressed at the ability of the
colony to absorb such an increase so quickly. It is quite remarkable, even given the very 
buoyant economic conditions, that such a large number of immigrants was absorbed so 
readily, although there were some difficulties: Herbert Hardacre, the Labour parliamentarian, 
many years later referred to demonstrations about lack of employment for the immigrants, of 
whom he was one at this time. 1 2  Accordingly, in November 1883 the contracts with the
shipping lines were terminated and instructions given to limit immigration of all classes to 
1 ,000 per month, a figure with which, so it was argued, the labour market could cope. 13 As a
result the number of assisted and free immigrants were cut back though the total number of 
immigrants continued to run at historically high levels . 
Griffith and Dickson still asserted the need for high levels of immigration and between them 
foreshadowed a scheme for conducting it on "better principles " ;  this included greater reliance 
on s . 17 ,  " as it is highly desirable that our immigrants should . . .  possess some small means, 
so that our immigration system may not become the vehicle of planting a pauper population 
10 QPD 43, 2/9/84, p. 5 1 2. 
1 1  QPD 41 , 23/ 1 /84, p. 1 28.
12 QPD 1 00, 25/10/07, p. 1426. 
13 Dickson, QPD 4 1 ,  23/1 /84, p. 1 28. 
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in  our midst" . 14 The amount allocated to immigration in  the .ilOm. loan passed at  the end of
1884 - /.150,000 per annum over five years - was substantial , though considerably less than the 
amount which had been spent in the previous two years. 1 5  This was due partly to the fact that
Griffith hoped that the 1884 land act and the .£10m. loan, and the promise of development 
which these measures contained, would provide their "own attraction 11 to immigrants not only 
from Great Britain and Europe but also from the southern colonies so that high levels of 
immigration would be possible with lower levels of expenditure to assist immigrants. 1 6
In  1886 the land-order system was also reintroduced, along very similar lines to  those proposed 
unsuccessfully in Griffith by 1882. It was incorporated in the amending land act of that year 
and provided for land-order warrants to be issued to the value of t20 to any person paying the 
full cost of his passage for use in paying rent on land selected under the land act. The amount 
was equal to that which would have to be paid to acquire 160 acres of land under the 
'homestead ' clauses of the land act. The policy was attributable mainly to Henry Jordan 
following a somewhat obsessive campaign during which he attempted to have it included in 
both 1 884 land and immigration acts and moved motions in parliament in 1885 and 1886. 
Griffith now appeared lukewarm about the measure arguing that the 1884 land act, by 
adopting the leasehold principle, provided sufficient encouragement for anyone who wished to 
take up land; moreover {doubtless under the influence of Dutton, who had "decided 
misgivings" about the policy) he cast doubt on the likely success of those taking up small areas
of land. 1 7  In the event few immigrants availed themselves of the offer and Griffith, in
recognition of the reality of the situation , assessed immigration policy primarily in terms of its 
impact on the labour market. 
14 Ibid.
1 5  See Table 3. 1 .  
16  QPD 44, 1 6/ 12/84, pp. 1 897, 1923. 
17 QPD 49, 2 1 /9/86, p. 873. 
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After the cut-back implemented at the end of 1883 Griffith could claim a year later that 
" there had been no difficulty whatever in finding employment for all the immigrants who had 
landed" .  The government were, however, "watching carefully from week to week . . . .  " 18 As
economic conditions deteriorated markedly in the latter half of 1886 antagonism to the 
expenditure of money on state-aided immigration increased and was expressed strongly at the 
increasingly frequent meetings of the unemployed at this time. There followed a series of 
measures which were to tighten control over, to restrict, and eventually to suspend 
immigration paid for or subsidised by the government. The bounty system, which had failed 
to attract the type of person Griffith had intended, was stopped early in 1886. As Griffith 
subsequently put it: "There was no satisfactory means of selection, and the result was that 
they were paying for persons whom it was not worth while to support " . 19 An amendment to
the Immigration Act was introduced early in the 1886 session to allow the government to 
regulate or even discontinue the system of nominated immigration which , the Immigration 
Agent suggested in his report, had been used in a "wholesale and somewhat promiscuous" 
manner. Further, to meet the particular concern of increasing urban unemployment the 
immigration of artisans and mechanics was restricted from September 1886 by making all such 
applications in these categories subject to approval by the minister. The measure was aimed 
in part also at reducing abuses of the system and to this extent was seen as a general cost-
cutting measure in the face of the deteriorating state of the public finances. 20
As the unemployment problem worsened Griffith initiated the establishment in late 1886 of a 
Government Labour Bureau. The essential aim of the bureau was, as it was later described, 
" to utilise to the fullest extent the labour-absorbing capacities . . .  the colony possessed by 
18 QPD 44, 19/1 1 /84, p. 1469. 
19 QPD 59, 17 / 10/89, p. 2273.
20 QPD 49, 3 1 /8/86, pp. 569-70; QVP 1887 ill, p. 587.
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bringing employers seeking labour and the unemployed together as far as possible " .  The 
bureau acted in effect as an employment agent and free rail and steamer passes were granted 
to men taking work in other districts. The establishment of the bureau within the 
Immigration Department emphasised the connection perceived between immigration and the 
labour market and, by extension, the sensitivity of immigration policy to economic conditions 
in general and the level of unemployment in particular. 2 1  The bureau was successful in placing
a considerable proportion of men who registered with it. Nevertheless further measures to 
limit immigration were taken in 1887. Early in the year nominatipns were confined to persons 
directly connected with land and its cultivation and a further amending act which came into 
force in September substantially raised the amount required to be paid for the passage of 
persons nominated and for assisted passages (though the latter had virtually been stopped ) . In
October artisans and mechanics were rendered absolutely ineligible for nomination. 
With improving economic conditions in 1888 the system of assisted passages was revived. 22
But as recession again set in the following year the tide of opinion turned more strongly 
against government expenditure on immigration. Ministers in the Morehead government 
generally played down the difficulties in the labour market and argued that continued 
immigration, at least at modest levels, was necessary to sustain demand and ensure continued 
growth and the progress of industries. Morehead himself even declared at one point that the 
"stagnation of trade was brought about as much by want of population as anything else" .23
But his government was forced to concede that expenditure should be restricted and 
immigrants confined to agricultural labourers and domestic servants and treasurer William 
Pattison declared that " The Government have no intention of importing unnecessary 
21 BC 14/3/87, p. 5; 4/10/89, p. 7. 
22  Report of the Agent-General 1888, Q VP 1889 Ill, p. 173. 
23 Speech on northern tour, BC 9/5/90, p. 4. 
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But opposition to immigration continued . The view that it was wrong to be spending money 
on immigration when the immigrants were not going to be employed when they arrived, or if 
they were going to depress wage levels in the labour market, was cogently put by the lone 
Labour member, Thomas Glassey , and supported by many Liberals. The debate was one to be 
echoed many times in subsequent Australian history. A motion to halve the amount provided 
in the 1889 loan estimates for expenditure on immigration , itself a reduction from the previous 
year, received considerable support. Griffith was equivocal but inclined to the restrictionist 
view and supported the motion. 
By mid- 1890 the Morehead government, while recognising that " immigration was essential to 
the progress of the colony" and arguing that " the exigencies of the time do not demand any 
radical change to immigration policy " ,  nevertheless imposed further restrictions by cutting the 
number of shipments by a third. 25 The services of Randall as lecturing agent in Great Britain
had been terminated at the end of 1889. Back as premier, Griffith, while continuing the 
restrictive policy, seemed rather less critical and more inclined to take the long term view and 
assert the advantages of continued immigration: 
There was a time in the history of a country when immigration was clearly to the 
advantage of that country. It was absolutely necessary their land should be 
populated. They had been for many years carrying on a policy which was only 
justified by the anticipation of a large increase in population . If their population 
was to remain stationary, or only to increase by the excess of births over deaths, 
then they would most certainly have to reduce their expenditure to an enormous 
extent. They would have to reduce the cost of living and reverse their mode of 
living altogether . . . He believed the time had not arrived when they should cease 
26 to progress. 
24 QPD 59, 1 5/ 10/89, p. 2 193. 
25 Governor's Opening Speech, QPD 61 , 24/6/90, p. 3. 
26 QPD 62, 24/ 1 1 /90, p. 1 57 1 .  
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Randall was directed to return to England. But as economic conditions continued to worsen 
the pressures against immigration mounted. During 189 1 three large petitions, one signed by 
nearly 6 ,000 people, were presented to parliament requesting the discontinuance of free and 
assisted immigration. Reference was made to the congested state of the labour market and to 
the " cut-throat competition 11 for work in the market. It was also pointed out that Queensland 
was now the only colony spending money on immigration. 27 Several public meetings were held
to protest against government-aided immigration . 28 Later in the year assisted passages were
discontinued and free passages granted only to single girls and farm labourers selected by 
Randall . All immigration was suspended on an instruction from the Griffith government in 
February 1892. 
For the remainder of the period of the 'continuous ministry ' the issue of European 
immigration remained largely in the background. There were supporters of the government 
who consistent.ly argued that a resumption of immigration would prove a significant stimulus 
to development and progress, but subdued economic conditions which continued into the 
second half of the 1890s led Labour to oppose strongly any action which would add to the 
supply of labour. Governments of the time steered a cautious path between these views. 
Until the last couple of years of the decade net annual expenditure on immigration (most of it
for assisted passages) remained below l20,000 in contrast to amounts of between £100,000 and
;£200,000 spent during most years of the 1880s. 29 Only a few hundred immigrants entered the
colony each year either as full paying passengers or nominated immigrants (a few of whom
were still being accepted) .
27 QVP 189 1  IV, pp. 53-7. 
28 For example, 'Be 6/1 1 /91 ,  p. 5 . 
29 Table 3. 1 .  
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As economic recovery became apparent the view that renewed efforts should be made to 
encourage immigration was expressed with increasing force. Prominent among proponents of 
this view was Dickson who as early as 1894 (when he was a private member and independent
supporter of the government) argued that "until European immigration revived on some
satisfactory basis there would never be a revival of prosperity " .30 The argument was
elaborated in a formal motion put in parliament in 1896 where Dickson and his supporters, 
aware of the attitude of Labour, claimed that the demand for labour which would be 
generated by immigration on a proper basis would be greater than the increase in the supply 
of labour it would provide and denied that it would lead to a lowering of wages or a restriction 
of employment opportunities. On the other hand, it was argued, the boost to production and 
income provided by renewed immigration would allow the costs of government and in 
particular public expenditure on development works more readily to be met. 
The type of immigrant Dickson had in mind was the independent person, preferably. of some 
means, . seeking 11 more freedom greater room for self-exertion and a better prospect of 
ultimately obtaining that independence they expected to achieve on leaving the large centres 
of population 11 , the type of individual who could be induced by an advertising and publicity 
campaign to pay his way to the colony " if reasonable inducements, under certain safeguards, 
to settle on lands [were] offered " .  31 The policy corollaries of this view were increased
expenditure on advertising the colony in Great Britain and "better land legislation 11 • The 
latter was not spelt out except in so far as the question of land grants was once again raised .32
The system of land-orders which had been introduced in the 1886 land act had not been a 
success. Of the £60,000 worth of orders issued under that act only ..63,000 worth had been 
30 QPD 72, 7 / 1 1  /94, p. 1 188. 
31 QPD 75, 20/8/96, p. 608. 
32 Ibid., pp. 612- 13. 
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used for bona fide settlement and applied to payments for land, and the policy was abolished 
in the 1894 amending land act. Dickson had voted against this action arguing to the contrary 
that " some larger inducement to immigrants" would be appropriate.33 But he made no specific
suggestions, then or later. 
Premier Nelson had no objection in principle to Dickson's views, but nor was he particularly 
enthusiastic. He had already taken action , however, to negotiate _t12  passages with the 
British-India Company (which had the Torres Strait contract) for approved immigrants.
Money was made available for the Agent-General 's office to advertise the cheaper rate for 
'approved' persons who were, according to the 1897 report, " farmers with capital , and the sons 
of farmers who, besides having practical experience here, would be in possession of sufficient 
funds to take up land on arrival in the colony " .34 During 1896 and 1897 agents and lecturers
(including Randall) were appointed in Great Britain and Europe to publicise the opportunities
in Queensland and encourage emigrants. As a result an increasing, though still fairly modest, 
number of full-paying immigrants were attracted. Improving economic conditions during 
these years would have played some part in attracting these immigrants as they did also in the 
increasing number of nominated immigrants. 
In 1 898,  with Dickson now premier, " the requirements of the colony" were deemed to justify 
the reintroduction of free passages for female domestics, farm labourers, and " those who desire 
to settle on the land " .  There was, Dickson argued, a need for the categories of labour 
mentioned, a need which had been documented in a report he had commissioned from the 
Labour Bureau. He explicitly affirmed his belief that the supply of labour should not be 
encouraged to outrun the demand but argued that the requirements of domestics and 
33 QPD 72, 2 1 / 11 /94, p. 1340. 
34 Q VP 1898 II, p. 696. The "1 2 rate compared to the standard rate for open berths of .416. 16s. 
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agriculturists - requirements which had been " constantly pressed upon their attention 11 - were 
such that immigrants in these categories would be " readily absorbed 11 • 35 Free passages were
thus once again offered from 1899. 
The policy of granting free passages met with consistent opposition from Labour whose 
representatives objected to the use of taxpayers' money " to bring out a further supply of 
indigent labourers to enter the labour market and compete against them and reduce wages for 
the benefit of the employing class " .36 The Immigration Agent in his 1899 report (dated July
1900) claimed, however, that " no difficulty has been experienced in finding employment at
good wages for the special additions to the ranks of labour " and argued that "unless strongly 
adverse industrial conditions should set in, the further maintenance of free immigration on 
cautious proportionate lines, will be found amply justified in the result "  .37
As the drought worsened and economic conditions deteriorated, however, free passages were 
discontinued in 1901 and by 1902 only restricted numbers of nominated and full-paying 
immigrants were arriving. Randall was recalled once again though a small amount was still 
spent through the Agent-General 's office on advertising " to try and induce people with capital 
to come out here and settle on the land 11 • 38 Through the economic and financial crisis of the
early 1 900s the question of immigration once again faded into the background until improving 
economic conditions and the particular problem created by the decision of the commonwealth 
government to end the use of Melanesian labour in the sugar industry led to renewed pressures 
for more active policies to promote immigration . 
35 QPD 80, 27 / 12/98, pp. 1701-4. 
36 QPD 83, 22/12/99, p. 1 565. 
37 QVP 1 900 V, p. 676. 
38 Philp, QPD 90, 18/1 2/02, p. 17 18. 
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In the context of rapid economic recovery after 1903 the Morgan government declared itself 
favourably disposed to a renewal of immigration though with a firm emphasis on men with 
agricultural backgrounds, preferably possessing some capital , and prepared to pay their own 
way: men who would settle on the land and become " genuine wealth producers " rather than 
merely swell the still-large ranks of the unemployed.39 Denham affirmed the government's
rejection of the "old methods of immigration " but argued that " at least 20,000 people " could 
be attracted on this basis over the following ten years: a figure which , when compared with 
the numbers of immigrants who actually arrived during the 1880s and with the target figure of 
'thirty to forty ' thousand per year mentioned (albeit rather casually) by Griffith in 1883,
emphasises the relatively conservative attitude adopted at this stage. 40
In order that these prospective settlers could be attracted Agent-General Horace Tozer was 
brought back to the state to familiarise himself thoroughly with the opportunities offering to 
prospective settlers. Further, a provision was introduced into the 1905 amending land act 
allowing a proportion of blocks opened up for agricultural farm selection be set aside for 
exclusive selection in Great Britain. Payment of passage money by a selector for himself and 
his family was to be credited towards the rent payable on land so selected . The measure was 
seen by lands minister Bell as one which would "bring a considerable number of people to 
4 1these shores " .  
Morgan and K idston were, however, reluctant to take much action to increase other forms of 
immigration. These measures in the land act would ,  it was hoped, 11 get a class of settlers who 
would come hf�re, not to compete in the labour market, but go direct on the land and become 
producers " .  These were the " only class . . .  Queensland was very much interested in at the 
39 Morgan, manifesto, BC 23/7 /04, p. 5. 
40 Speech at lndooroopilly, BC 28/7 /04, p. 6. 
41  QPD 95, 1 5/8/05, p. 310. 
- 128 
moment" .42
The Agent-General 's Office in London was expanded in 1906, chiefly with a view to 
encouraging immigrants who wanted to go on the land. But aspirations were modest and 
indeed it was argued that the work of making more land available for settlement and 
extending railway communication was a " necessary preliminary . . .  to any extensive scheme 
of immigration 11 •  43 The results were negligible. The provision for selection of land in Great
Britain met with little response, due largely to deficiencies in the scheme: very early in the 
piece the Agent-General had commented on the " large element of chance" as to the character 
of land selected under the scheme and the British Emigration Office had cautioned emigrants 
about selecting land in this way.44 The provision was subsequently repealed in the 1910 ]and
act, Denham admitting that the measure had " in no wise been a success " .45
By late 1906/early 1907 Kidston was commg under increasing pressure to encourage 
immigration more energetically. 46 An important factor in this was the increasingly apparent
shortage of labour starting to emerge in some industries. This was especially the case in the 
sugar industry which was about to suffer the loss of several thousand Melanesian labourers as 
a result of commonwealth government policy (discussed below). 
During his famous Rockhampton manifesto speech in February 1907 Kidston promised a "bold 
and liberal " immigration policy. It was revealed that (in the continuing search for the 
potential settler) an arrangement had been made with the Orient Steamship Company for a 
reduced rate which would allow the Queensland government to offer " suitable immigrants of 
42 Kidston, QPD 96, 1 2/ 12/05, p. 2095. 
43 Governor's opening speech, QPD 97, 24/7 /06, p. 2. 
44 QPP 1908, pp. 464-5. 
45 QPD 106, 4/10/10, p. 1 208. 
46 The arguments were reftected and approvingly rehearsed in a series of leading articles in the Courier
between 26/1 1 /06 and 17  / 1 /07. 
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the farming class who can also show they possess a certain small capital " assisted passages to 
Queensland " at a rate somewhere about J3 to ,J5, so as to compete with the rate at which 
they can go to Canada 11 • With an eye to this class of immigrants and to Canadian precedent 
the premier also declared himself to be " considering the propriety" of offering a free grant of 
1 60 acres of land to bona fide settlers. In acknowledgement of the labour problems of the 
sugar industry the intention was expressed also of making available free passages to " certain 
agricultural labourers" although it was clearly stated, there was to be no " indiscriminate 
dumping" of immigrants in the coastal towns.47
The arrangement made with the Orient company provided for "about 200 immigrants per 
fortnight " .  These were to be made up from the two broad classes identified in the 
Rockhampton speech: the first to be provided with passages at J5 per statute adult where the 
head of the family possessed ,£50 capital (proof of which was to be given by the deposit of that
amount with the Agent-General) ; the second, agricultural labourers, to be given free
passages. 48 No indication was given of the relative proportions expected ,  or hoped for, in each
class. 
Response to the provision of these assisted passages (and to passages at the Standard
Government Rate by those not eligible for assisted passages) was initially slow. According to
the Agent-General few farmers with the sum necessary to secure assisted passages wished to 
emigrate (a fact which casts doubt on how many independent immigrants were the type of
prospective settler specifically sought) and those who did were offered better terms by other
states. 49 Activity focused rather on obtaining agricultural labourers for the sugar industry.
Under the scheme announced by Kidston " cane farmers and others " wanting to obtain 
47 BC 1 1 /2/07, p. 5. 
48 The details were made available in a statement by Kidston, BC 26/5/07, p. 5. 
49 Report of Agent-General 1 906, QPP 1908, p. 451 .  
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labourers were to be required to pay J,5 per labourer and empower the government to enter 
into a contract on their behalf, guaranteeing a year 's work and setting out the wages that the 
employer want.ed to pay .  Priority was to be given to employers offering the highest wages and 
" no action whatever will be taken by the government where the wage offered is not 
satisfactory " .  The government would, through the Agent-General seek to procure suitable 
labourers in Great Britain and Europe and bring them to Queensland. Upon their arrival the 
immigrants wc�re to be " taken in hand by a Government officer, who will see them located on 
the farms on which they are to work" .  50 The free passage scheme was thus in effect one of
indenturing labour for the sugar industry under strict supervision by the government. 
The details were announced during a conference of sugar-growers and mill-owners at 
Townsville called to consider the impending labour problem in the industry. Concern was 
subsequently expressed by growers about a number of aspects of the scheme - the cost to them, 
their lack of control over the selection of men and the manner in which priority was to be 
given to those employers offering higher wages: this latter aspect, apart from its tendency to 
create " undesirable and destructive competition" ,  did not allow for regional variations in the 
recognised general level of wages. 51 The scheme was also criticised for its generally restrictive
nature in the light of the serious labour shortages anticipated for the 1907 season following the 
deportation of remaining Melanesian labourers. 
Kidston, however, firmly asserted his view that immigration of agricultural labourers should 
be closely managed and controlled. "While he remained Premier there would be no general 
importation of labourers. There would only be labourers brought here when he knew who was 
going to pay them" .  In particular, he declared , he wished to avoid creating unemployment 
60 BC 26/2/07, p. 6. 
6 1 See in particular deputation to Kidston from the conference, BC 1 6/3/07, pp. 5-6. 
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and/ or bringing about downward pressure on wages. The government was " anxious and 
willing" to help the cane farmers, but to do so "without dislocating the labour market, and 
inflicting hardships not only on the people who are coming, but those already here " and in a 
way that ensured that "workers are not debased by competition in the labour market" .52
Kidston seems to have seen the control over the volume of immigration (regulated by the 
extent to which cane growers were prepared to pay i5 and enter into contracts with labour) as 
providng an inbuilt safeguard over the general level of wages (that is in so far as the 
immigration would not create a general oversupply of labour). With respect to wages within 
the sugar industry the implication contained in Kidston 's original statement that a minimum 
would be enforced gave way to the view that "he was not anxious to determine what wages 
they should pay. The wages for which men were prepared to work at in the industry was, he 
presumed, the :wages the planters should pay " .  53 But priority was to be given to those offering
higher wages and he clearly assumed that wages below those prevailing generally would be 
unlikely to attract any takers. 
The determination to maintain a controlled and restrictive policy was related in large part to 
the seasonality of the demand for labour in the sugar industry. Only about one-third of the 
labour required during the crushing season (May/ June to November/December) was needed in 
the first half of the year, a phenomenon characteristic also of other major employing industries 
including the pastoral and other agricultural industries. Kidston was particularly aware of the 
undesirability of bringing in labour to serve the needs of employers in the busy season who 
would then only increase the level of unemployment and create downward pressure on wages 
for the other half of the year. The twelve month contract was designed to avoid such a 
52 Kidston to deputation, BC 16/3/07, p. 6. 
53 Ibid. 
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situation, and as a corollary measure, Kidston foreshadowed the concentration of government 
work on road and railway construction in the off season. The issue was also complicated by 
claims and counter-claims about the extent of the labour shortage, the problem being that 
what some saw as the 'unemployed ' others (employers) saw as 'unemployable' .  As one cane
grower put it: "Even at the time when they were short of labour and were advertising for it, 
there was surplus labour around the mill, so-called unemployed labour, but really what they 
54called unemployable 11 • 
In the context of all these difficulties Kidston was thus trying to run what he described as a 
" middle course " between the employers' wishes on the one hand and labour views on the 
other, both of which he rejected. The one, he characterised in its extreme form as "Rush 
[immigrants] out here by the thousands - never mind about wages or terms, and then we can 
get our work done for anything we like to give" ,  the other as "Don't bring out any 
immigrants, and then we can demand anything we like for our labour " .  55
The Agent-General was able to select and forward over 600 single men under the scheme by 
July 1 907, though he had to rely on the agents of the Orient line to undertake the selection 
process and expressed doubts as to how suitable many of them might be. 66 The Immigration
Agent confirmed that indeed 11 a large proportion of them appear to have been unsatisfactory 
57 . 58 as regards the work expected of them 11 , a view also expressed by growers themselves. Thus 
while the scheme assisted the industry in a year of crisis it was not used subsequently. 
The pressures on Kidston to encourage and facilitate immigration to ease the labour shortage 
continued to mount and become more general . In September 1907 a deputation representing 
54 W.J. Munro, deputation to Kidston, BC 16/3/07, p. 5. 
55 BC 21 /2/07, p. 5. 
56 Report for 1906 (dated 30/9/07) QPP 1908, pp. 450-1 .  
57 Report for 1907, QPP 1908 (Second Session) II ,  p .  947. 
68 See deputation to Kidston, BC 8/4/08, p. 6. 
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Darling Downs farmers waited upon the premier to urge the more active encouragement of 
immigration of farm labourers and a meeting of North Queensland Pastoral Employers 
resolved that the demand for labour in all the producing industries of the state called for a 
vigorous system of immigration to be encouraged by the government. 59 In April 1908 a
deputation " representing the primary industries of the State " urged upon Kidston " the 
prospect of an unprecedented deficiency in the supply of suitable labour which threatens the 
primary industries generally " - a deficiency which, it was noted, could only be exacerbated by 
the competition for labour which would be created by the large program of railway building 
foreshadowed. 60 In addition, the Courier kept up a constant barrage of criticism against the
premier 's inactivity claiming him to be a prisoner of Labour dogma on the subject of 
immigration. 
Kidston did in fact respond with a number of measures. Free passages were reintroduced for 
female domestic servants and the wives and children of assisted , nominated and contract 
immigrants at. the end of 1907. 61 Kidston also took action to stimulate the interest of
prospective immigrants by supervising the relocation and reorganisation of the Agent-
General 's office when he went to England in 1908. Indeed he had told a deputation pleading 
for a more vigorous policy that one of his " chief purposes " in going to the old country was to 
advertise Queensland . . .  and to set about it in a systematic way,  and to spend 
money on it, and to have it done as it ought to be done . . . . I am going to take 
the question of advertising Queensland in hand, and I am quite sure that my 
rearrangement will enormously increase the number of immigrants . . . . I will do 
my very best to inaugurate a sufficient stream of emigration from the old country to 
62Queensland. 
59 BC 13/9/07, pp. 2 and 4. 
60 BC 8/4/08, p. 5. 
61 BC 29/10/07, p. 5. 
62 BC 8/4/08, p. 6. 
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As a result new offices were obtained in the Strand and what was reported as a "bold and 
expensive" adYertising campaign was authorised by the premier.63 In 1 9 1 1  free passages were
offered to labo'urers to work on the two grand railway schemes approved in 1 9 10 (see chapter
4). At the same tiine the deposit required in order for approved agriculturists to obtain ..l5 
passages was reduced from £50 to J,5. 
The number of immigrants coming to Queensland rose markedly after 1 907 .64 The biggest
increase was in the category of nominated immigrants which accounted for more than half the 
total number of immigrants between 1907 and 19 14. Despite the early poor response to the ..65 
passage schem·� numbers in the category also increased markedly particularly after the deposit 
required was 1 educed to J,5 at the beginning of 1 9 1 1 .  The number of free immigrants also 
increased, born :ted particularly by large numbers of railway labourers recruited during 1 9 1 1 .  
The increase i n  the number of 'nominations ' for  immigrants made at this time i s  attributable 
largely to buoyant economic conditions at this time. The government was accommodating to 
this form of aHsistance which was accepted on a remarkably broad level , even by the Labour 
Party. Reflecting a general attitude, the Immigration Agent suggested that nominated 
immigrants " coming here to join relatives and friends and embrace foreseen opportunities are 
not likely to become an encumbrance on the labour market or a burden on the State, which 
exacts a guarantee from nominators for the reception and maintenance of their nominees. 
[They are] invariably of the classes wanted 11 • 65
But strong and consistent opposition to other forms of assisted immigration was maintained 
by the Labour Party whose leader in 1910 described it as " indiscriminate immigration . . .  the 
63 BC 24/9/08, p. 6. 
64 Table 3. 1 .  
6 5  Report for 1903, QPP 1904-05 II, p .  47; for similar sentiments, Report for 19 10, QPP 1 9 1 1 - 1 2  II ,  p .  655; for 
Labour Party attitude QPD 104, 30/ 1 1/09, pp. 552 and 556. 
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bringing out of hundreds in the steamers . . .  and dumping them down indiscriminately . . .
without any possibility of them finding employment" . 66 The associated effects of " booming
rents" and depressing wages were also commonly adverted to in discussion; by some, state-
aided immigration was seen merely 11 a capitalistic move to flood the country with cheap 
labour" .  67 Contrary to these claims the Immigration Agent, in his Annual Reports as the
number of immigrants grew rapidly, remarked how the demand for the labour continually 
outran the supply, particularly for men experienced in work in connection with the land. He 
noted in his 1 9 10 report, for example, that 11 at all times the various shipments passed through 
the (Immigration] Depot with amazing rapidity " .  68 And employers continued to press their
requests for a more active program to ensure a sufficient supply of labour was available. A 
deputation from the Sugar Producers ' Association in early 1 9 1 1 ,  for example, asked for " the 
assistance of the Government in securing labour, which they believed would be unobtainable in 
Queensland, or in Australia to harvest [the crop] 11 • 69
In the context of these opposing views Kidston continued to proclaim his " middle course " .  
While accepting that there was a shortage of labour and that a higher level of immigration 
was desirable - and having liberalised immigration regulations to allow for this - "he was not 
willing to open the door indiscriminately and simply pour in labourers so as to injure the 
labourers who were already here . . . . He wanted it to be distinctly understood that the 
Government would do nothing to overload the labour market, and whenever there seemed to 
be any difficulty in men getting employment the Government would stop supplies at once" .70
In fact he kept an extraordinarily tight rein. Thus, for example, the increased need for labour 
66 QPD 106, 1 4/ 10/ 10, p. 1 491 . 
67 QPD 102, 1 6/ 1 2/08 p. 716. 
68 QPP 1910 II, p. 1039; 1 9 1 1 - 1 2  II, p. 665. 
69 BC 2/2/ 1 1 , p. 5. 
70 Ibid., p. 6. 
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occasioned by the two large railway construction projects initiated in 1 9 10 in addition to an 
already considerable program of construction was catered for by a special recruitment 
campaign. Suitable men were to be given free passages and guaranteed work at wages 
prevailing in the relevant district . While they were not placed under contract and were 
therefore at l iberty to go and work elsewhere if they wished, they were transferred straight 
from ship-side to the construction sites in a program that was clearly intended to do no more 
71than match supply and demand. 
The year 19 1 1  was a peak year for immigration of all types72 but no difficulty seems to have
been experienced in absorbing immigrants into the labour market of the booming economy. In 
the ensuing years immigration fell off to more subdued levels. This resulted largely from the 
difficulty in obtaining shipping accommodation. As numbers of immigrants had increased , not 
only to Queensland but to other states as well, the Agent-General had increasing difficulty in 
securing berths. Special charters were arranged to supplement the accommodation provided 
by the lines with which the government had long-term contracts, but in May 19 12  the Agent-
General was unable to obtain further special charters at the old rates as shipping companies 
had increased passenger rates in the context of high demand for cargo space. 73 Denham
declared that " there are very cogent reasons why we should resist at the present time the 
increased rates demanded by shipping companies " and, consequently, " for the immediate 
present we shall be content with such numbers as can be brought out by our contractual lines 
of steamers " .74 No further nominations were to be received , nor other forms of assistance
given, until the backlog had been cleared. 
7 1  BC 7 /3/ 1 1 , p. 5; Annual Report of Immigration Agent 1 9 1 1 , QPP 1912  II, p, 1271 .  
72 See Table 3 . 1 . 
73 See Agent-General's Reports for 1910 to 1912. 
74 BC 3 1 /5/ 1 2, p. 5 . The contracts still had about three years to run.
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This was in part a business decision by Denham. The Courier, at least, saw the increased 
rates as an attempt on the part of the shipping companies to take advantage of the situation 
and Denham's reaction as "making them more inclined to come to reasonable terms when 
negotiations are renewed 11 •75 In part, however, it reflected his caution about immigration
which was virtually identical to that of Kidston. At the time the state had suffered an 
extended dry spell and was anxiously awaiting rain, a factor which Denham explicitly linked to 
policy to restrict immigration. 76 And in an interchange with an earlier deputation from the
Chamber of Manufactures Denham had declared himself unwilling to countenance any 
immigration unless there was evidence of an actual shortage in the area in which he may be 
employed. Indeed he expressed concern that many women coming out as domestic servants 
were in fact "t ailoresses, typewriters and shop assistants, and it is time a check was applied 11 • 
He indicated some sympathy with a proposal that nomination of emigrants by employers 
should be permitted but " there must be an assurance that the people will be absorbed straight 
away . . .  .I am opposed to any scheme to flood our labour market" .  He further foreshadowed 
a scheme whereby the Agent-General would be given more detailed information about the 
state of the labour market in Queensland and on this basis be discriminating in the way in 
which assistance was given to emigrants through the nomination system. 77
While concern about the weather soon passed Denham was still pleased to talk of the " tight 
grip 11 which the government had on immigration. This ensured, as he put it, that there was 
no " unemployed agitation 11 while at the same time he had " no evidence that any industries 
were languishing for want of labour" .78 Later in the year applications for nominated
75 BC 31/5/ 1 2, p. 4. 
76 Speech to Brisbane Merchants Association, BC 13/6/12, p. 4.
11 BC 6/1 /12 ,  p. 14. The deputation was part of a sequence by the Chamber and the Labour Party in which
opposing views ·were put about labour shortages. The Chamber on this occasion sought to confirm and support 
its claims that 11 J 3 out of the 29 trades represented in our membership are short of skilled labour" .
7 8  BC  3 1/7 / 1 2, p .  7. 
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immigrants were once agam taken, leading to a rush of applications to the Immigration 
Agent. 79 The system was again suspended from time to time during 19 13 .  When revived at
the end of the year the response was subdued and to meet the obligation to the contracted 
shipper the Agent-General was " obliged to work the Assisted System11 •80 
Thus it was that the number of immigrants fell after 19 1 1  and immigration was confined 
largely to nominated immigrants. But due to a slight slowing in the economy and what 
appears to have been a high level of inter-state immigration in 19 13  the agitation for higher 
levels of immigration diminished and, in a statement that encapsulated the attitude of the 
government towards immigration in these years, Denham expressed himself satisfied that the 
program was "meeting the requirements of the market 11 •81
MELANE SIAN LABOUR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Melanesian labour had been used in Queensland, primarily in the sugar industry , since the 
1860s. The planters, and political conservatives generally, saw the use of Melanesian labour as 
an important, indeed essential ,  means to the development of the industry. To them it was a 
legitimate way of individual planters furthering their own pursuit of economic gain and at the 
same time creating further wealth and development in the economy generally .  The 
importation of Melanesian labourers was opposed by Liberals right from the start though the 
reasons for, and strength of, their opposition varied considerably . Initially the focus of 
concern was the manner in which labourers were recruited and then treated while they served 
their indenture in the colony. The Polynesian Labourers Act of 1868 provided a legislative 
79 BC 2/10/ 1 2, p. 6. 
80 QPP 1916- 1 6  II, p. 525. This accounts for the increase in the 'assisted' category in 19 14  shown in Table
3. 1 .
81  QPD, 23/9/13, p. 1 492 . 
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framework for the recruitment and employment of labourers which provided them with a 
measure of protection from abuse though it left considerable room for practices which grossly 
infringed ordinary human rights. The regulations were progressively tightened but there 
remained an underlying opposition to the whole notion of 'servile ' labour. Increasingly, 
however, concern was expressed about the larger socio-economic consequences of indentured 
coloured labour in the colony. The changing focus of concern was succinctly expressed by 
Griffith in 1877 :  " In 1868 it was necessary to pass an Act to protect Polynesians from 
ourselves; now we had to legislate to protect ourselves from them 11 • 82
Until the early 1880s Griffith did not oppose the use of Melanesian labour if it were strictly 
confined to the sugar industry. Indeed the above words were spoken in support of a bill 
introduced by the Liberals to so confine them. The bill was not enacted but the policy was 
embodied in a comprehensive act passed in 1880 by the Mcilwraith government which also 
provided a tighter set of conditions for the recruitment, and return, of islanders and their 
treatment in the colony. Griffith's only objection at this time was that the bill did not 
address the question of the consequences of some Melanesians remaining in the colony after 
their three year period of service for which they were recruited: " the real grievance that [he] 
felt was not their employment on sugar plantations; - not their employment during the three 
years after they first arrived under the agreement they made on the ship before they landed; -
but their employment after the expiration of that time in towns and in competition 
undisputedly with white labour as domestic servants, grooms, coachmen, and so on 11 • 83
Accordingly he moved, though unsuccessfully, that the restrictions should be applied to 
Melanesians so long as they remained in the colony, not just during their three year term of 
82 QPD 23, 22/5/77, p. 67. 
83 QPD 32, 1 0/8/80, p. 1066. 
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indenture. 
But a new complexion was put on the question by the moves, initiated by the Mcilwraith 
government in 1881 as a consequence of the rapidly growing demand for labour by the 
expanding sugar industry and the increasing difficulty in recruiting islanders, to obtain 
labourers from India (widely referred to as 'coolies ') .  Mcilwraith appeared to meet the concern
voiced by Griffith by requiring that the labourers (under threat of imprisonment) either be
returned to India or re-engaged after their initial term of service had expired. This 
requirement in fact stalled the proposal as the Indian government declined to accept it but 
Mcilwraith continued to seek a compromise and the question became one of the leading issues 
in the 1 883 election campaign. 
By this time the Liberals, and Griffith in particular, were engaged in a vigorous campaign 
against 'coolie' labour. There were several, often intertwined, strands in the arguments 
brought to bear .84 Firstly the existence of a " servile " race was deemed to be incompatible with
" free " and " democratic "  institutions. The dilemma facing a country admitting an " inferior 
race " was either to abandon democracy or, as had occurred in the United States of America, 
admit the servile race to their franchise: Griffith found both options distasteful.85 Further,
whatever he may have thought in 1880, the prospect of the immigration of coloured labour on 
a much larger scale led Griffith to doubt whether it would in fact be possible to confine 
labourers to plantation work, particularly after their term of service had expired. Both 
Mcilwraith and the planters had indicated their agreement with so confining them and their 
belief that this could be done. As Mcilwraith put it just before the 1883 election : " I  believe it 
84 Comprehensin, if at times discursive, statements by Griffith of his views are contained inter alia in
speeches in QPD 37, 27 /7 /82, pp. 56-7; QPD 39, 26/6/83, pp. 13-17; BC 19/6/83, p. 2; BC 1 1 /8/83, p. 6. 
Criticism of the traffic in labour on the grounds that it was inherently immoral and had infringed the bask 
rights of Melane�iians who had been involved was still made by some Liberals such as William Brookes, but 
these arguments were used only incidentally, if at all, by Griffith. 
85 QPD 37, 27 /7/82, p. 56; QPD 39, 26/6/83, pp. 1 5- 16; speech at Mackay, BC 19/6/83, p. 2. 
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is possible to bring coloured labourers to work on the plantations and to force them to stop 
there" .86 But, to a deputation of planters, Griffith expressed the view that " it would be as
easy to make water run uphill as to devise any system of regulations which would have any 
permanent effect in preventing one part of the population mixing with the other " .87 Moreover,
he doubted the depth of Mcilwraith 's resolve to do so, for during the early part of 1883 
Mcilwraith had continued negotiations with the Indian government which involved a 
weakening of the arrangements by which a labourer could be restricted to tropical agriculture 
or forced to return home. 88 This raised the spectre of integration on a much larger scale.
Concern that such integration would take employment from white labour and tend to lower 
wages in those areas where coloured labour competed was expressed frequently in public 
discussion of the issue. This aspect was, however, barely discernible in Griffith 's own 
expressed ideas. His overriding concern was the maintenance of the social and political 
integrity of the colony and to a large extent his views were simply racialist. If there was an 
economic argument underlying Griffith's position it was of a more long-term nature: the 
future economic expansion of a multi-racial society would be retarded as it would not be able 
to attract the large numbers of European immigrants necessary for rapid expansion. 89
A further aspect of Griffith 's case against the use of coloured labour was that it was associated 
with the plantation system.  He considered this to be an undesirable socio-economic structure: 
"I do not regard with any great admiration the formation of vast sugar estates, owned mostly 
86 Speech at Bundaberg, BC 8/8/83, p. 6. 
87 BC 9/6/83, p. 2. 
88 Griffith, QPD '39, 26/6/83, pp. 1 5- 1 7. 
89 To the extent., however, that concern about the short-term economic consequences for white labour were
expressed in public discussion they did Griffith no harm; indeed Mcilwraith was later to argue that many 
people had been influenced to vote for Griffith in 1883 on this basis: 11 • • • the working man could only see it 
in that way, [that if they brought coolies into the colony wages would be reduced] and it was with the idea
that he was protecting himself against the coolie and the kanaka that he voted as he did " .  ( QPD 43, 2/9/84, 
p. 6 13) .
by absentees, and cultivated by gangs of servile labourers II Rather, he wished to see " a  
population not of tenants, not of a servile race, but of men living on their own lands, growing 
their own sugar, making not large fortunes but fair incomes, bringing up families respectably 
and well , and selling their produce to the mills 11 • 90
Thus, he argued, " the idea of two races permanently existing side by side could not be 
entertained, and that in the end one race must go" .  The country "would some day have to be 
the heritage of a white race or a black; it could not be the heritage of both " .  91 Even more
bluntly: "He did not define the country as one which ought to be 'influenced by white men 
and owned by white men' .  He defined it as a country which ought to be inhabited by white 
92men " .  
While the case against coloured labour had been put primarily in the context of the Indian 
'coolie ' proposals, the arguments were in principle applicable also to Melanesians. On 
occasions, however, Griffith took a rather softer line on the latter. " Some people believed that 
the proper thing to do was to say at once that no black labour should come into the colony. 
He had never taken up any extreme position, and he trusted he never should " .  93 He took this
position on largely pragmatic grounds: the sugar industry had been built up on the basis of 
Melanesian labour and to stop it suddenly would be both economically and politically unwise. 
Furthermore the Melanesians by virtue of their limited numbers did not present the same 
threat as the vastly more numerous Indians. But there was no question in Griffith's mind that 
the Melanesians were only a " temporary solution to the difficulty " .94
90 Manifesto, BC 30/7 /83, p. 6; QPD 39, 26/6/83, p. 1 5 . 
91 QPD 39, 26/6/83, p. 15 .  
92 Speech at  Mac.kay BC, 19/6/83, p.  2 .  
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
The permanent solution to the " difficulty" was, Griffith asserted, the use of white labour, 
preferably associated with a restructuring of the industry to a small farm basis. "He knew 
[this) would involve a diminution of profit " ,  he quite bluntly (and bravely) told a deputation of 
planters in Mackay but he clearly saw that this was the price that would have to be paid 
ultimately to exclude black labour. He recognised also that the labour would not be easy to 
obtain but ht! assured the planters in Mackay of his "hearty co-operation . . . in the 
introduction of labour from Europe" to replace the Melanesians, and committed himself to 
such an " experiment " .95 Such was Griffith's position as he assumed office at the end of 1883 .
In his first short parliamentary session Griffith attempted to repeal the act under which it was 
proposed to bring in Indian 'coolies' ;96 he also amended the Pacific Island Labourers Act so as
more effectively to confine all Melanesians (including those whose period of service had 
expired) to field work, fairly narrowly defined, in addition to tightening up administration of 
the recruitment and employment of Melanesian labour. 
The latter measure was not, Griffith emphasised, to be regarded as a "final settlement" of the 
question but merely 11 a modus vivendi to meet present conditions . . .  an attempt to mitigate, 
if not to avoid, the present evils. " Griffith justified the measure on the ground that "every 
kanaka engaged in these occupations is displacing a white man " .  The issue was not, however, 
one of the availability of employment nor of wages, which did not even get mentioned, but 
rather the basic political question : " Is this colony of Queensland the inheritance of Europe or 
A . ? 11 97Sia .  
95 Ibid.; also QPJ> 39, 26/6/83, p .  15 .  
96 This was don•? by  way of  the Indian Immigration Acts Repeal Bill. The passage of  this bill was thwarted
by the Legislative Council but it finally passed in 1886. 
97 QPD 43, 23/1/84, p. 133 ff; 5/2/84, p. 236. 
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The opposition, who on this issue were led by Maurice Hume Black, a sugar planter from 
Mackay , offert:d no objection to the confinement of kanakas to field work. Their main thesis 
was that coloured labour was essential to the operation of the sugar industry and their main 
concern was that such labour continue to be made available. There was clearly a major battle 
still to be fought over that issue. This measure, as Black put it, " still left everyone in doubt 
as to what [Griffith 's] intentions with respect to the Labour question really were " .98
While Griffith 's ultimate objective was to have the plantation system replaced by small farms 
owned and operated by Europeans his immediate goal was to replace Melanesian labour with 
white labour. The stricter controls over recruitment had made it more difficult to obtain 
Melanesians - as Black observed at the end of 1884 (though with some exaggeration) :  1 1  [The 
government] had imposed so many difficulties and regulations that by indirect means, they 
were stopping it 11 • 99 Following the rapid expansion of the sugar industry in both Queensland
and Fij i during the early 1880s the supply of potential recruits was also dwindling: passage 
money charged by recruiters had risen steeply in the early 1880s as recruiting voyages became 
longer and the whole process more difficult. 100 So there were problems on the supply side .
But the critical question was: who was going to replace the islanders? and at what cost? The 
nature of the work in the industry was notoriously unattractive to Europeans, and Melanesian 
labour still cost considerably less than white labour. 
Melanesians on their first indenture were usually paid .(5 per annum (the legal minimum wage) 
and re-indentured labourers about 50 per cent more; on top of this employers had to pay for 
clothing and rations, the cost of bringing them to the colony (up to ,£25) and of transporting 
98 QPD 43, 23/1 /84, p. 135. 
gg QPD 44, 19/ 1 1 /84, p. 1475. 
1 00 R. Shlomowitz, 'The search for institutional equilibrium in Queensland's sugar industry 1884- 1913 ' , 
A u�tralian Economic Hist ory Review, XIX, 2, 1979, pp. 100-2 . 
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them from the port of entry to the plantation, the licence fee for introducing them (i2) ,  stamp 
duty, the annual capitation fee payable towards the cost of Polynesian hospitals and the 
labourers' home passage after their indenture period (about one-half of the cost of their
original passage) . There was also a significant death rate among the labourers, often shortly
after their arrival , in which case little labour was received even though substantial costs were 
incurred. Taking all these factors into account one estimate put the effective equivalent cost 
of a Melanesian labourer of .l30 per annum. This could well have been an exaggeration and 
would have been reduced where re-indenture allowed fixed costs, particularly with respect to 
passage money, to be spread over a larger number of years. But, it was still considerably below 
the average weekly rate in the colony of around .465 - J,70 per annum. 101
There was thus an inescapable dilemma. Either white labour had to be obtained at rates 
comparable to those paid to coloured labour, or the sugar industry, at this time reeling from a 
marked fall in the price of its product, was to suffer a very considerable increase in its cost of 
production. The consequence of the first would have been the creation of a 'lower class ' of 
labour which would have had the effect of depressing the general level of wages (to a much
greater extent than Melanesian labour for it would have been much more difficult to restrict it 
to certain types of work) ; the consequence of the second would have been severe economic
difficulties for the sugar industry as it was then structured . Griffith seemed to ignore this 
dilemma as well as the argument that white labour would not do the work of the Melanesians 
anyway. He thus defined the problem simply in terms of a 'shortage of supply ' of labour 
suitable for employment in the industry. That there was difficulty in obtaining white labour 
within the colony despite the high levels of immigration in the· early 1880s was attributed to 
101 Shlomowitz, 'The search for institutional equilibrium', p. 102; also articles in BC 31 /7 /84, p. 4 and
26/8/84, p. 6.
the low proportion of experienced agricultural labourers among the immigrants. 
His remedy was embodied in the Immigration Act Amendment Act introduced and passed 
early in the 1884 session. The aim of the measure was in effect to allow sugar planters to 
obtain indentured labour from Europe, in particular Germany and Scandinavia. The 
provisions of the principal act were liberalised to allow for employers to indenture labour with 
the labourer paying only i 2 towards the cost of his passage, the remainder being paid by the 
government. 
That the labour recruited under the act would be 'cheap labour ' was never explicitly admitted 
by Griffith though he must have realised that the act would only be worked by the planters if 
the labour they could obtain through it could be got at a price equal to or not significantly 
higher than that paid to coloured labour. As Black said in a subsequent debate: " The 
government had not used the word 'cheap ', but to take the place of coloured labour it must 
necessarily be cheap " . 102 And indeed this is how Mcilwraith characterised Griffith's position:
he had accept(:d that sugar could not be grown unless labour was available at a certain price; 
so the government was going to bring in cheap European labour to substitute for cheap black 
labour. The corollary of this was seen to be a depressing effect on wages generally. As 
Mcilwraith put it: "They could not reduce the wages on sugar plantations for European 
labour, without reducing wages all over the colony 11 •
103 Mcilwraith probably didn't care much
about this, but it was a good debating point. The measure was thus represented as one 
whereby the working men of the colony would be paying for the introduction of labour to 
depress their own wages. 
102 QPD 44, 19/ 1 1 /84, p. 1475. 
103 PD I . Q 43, 2 9/ 84, p. 608.
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Griffith's own words had indeed given some basis for this view: conceding that the argument 
existed, he claimed that it would be preferable for wages to be diminished than "white labour 
to be driven out of the field " .  104 When pressed however, he denied that he was trying to
obtain cheap labour for the planters: "he had always warned them that if they expected 
Europeans to come to the colony and work for lower than the current rate of wages they were 
making an egregious mistake . . . .  Any Europeans engaged to come out here would be made 
fully acquaint£:d with the state of affairs in the colony . . . . The Government were not going 
to bring out men to work at less than a fair rate of wages " .  He indeed maintained that the 
planters themselves had told him that they were not principally concerned with obtaining 
cheap labour hut rather with simply getting suitable labour not otherwise obtainable. 105 But
just in case they had not quite accurately conveyed their position, and vice versa, he 
emphasised that " if they attempted to engage any labourers on any different terms they must 
expect to meet with failure. Let that be distinctly understood. If the planters could not get 
their work done without reducing the rate of wages for European labour , then he was sorry for 
them, but he could not help it " .  The principal issue, in Griffith's view, was one of "Europe 
against Asia 11 and if pursuit of that policy involved an economic conflict - the general level of 
wages versus profits of this sugar industry - he had made it clear where he stood. 106
Despite this apparently uncompromising position of Griffith, various groups of planters did 
initiate action to recruit labour from Europe under the act. While clearly preferring to 
continue using coloured labour they could see that the tighter regulations would severely limit 
the supply in the near future. At the same time they held that labour in the colony would not 
104 Ibid., p. 273. 
105 This was on the basis of a deputation to him in August 1884 regarding the supply of labour, though the
mere absence of explicit discussion about the price of labour on that occasion hardly seemed to warrant his 
conclusion. Report of deputation, BC 23/8/84, p. 6. 
106 QPD 43, 2/9/84, pp. 51 1-2.
do the work or realised that if it would, it would be too expensive. As Black, leading a 
deputation to Griffith in August 1884 put it: "The position the planters found themselves in 
was this - that, unable to obtain an adequate supply of coloured labour, and finding that the 
European labour . . . in the colony is unwilling to take the place of the coloured man . . .
they are under the necessity of trying the experiment which the Government has forced upon 
them" . 107 The risk of Europeans being unsuited to the industry and breaking their indenture
was a concern but it was reckoned that such labour could be obtained at an overall cost not 
generally in excess that of the Melanesians. It must have been assumed that in the event 
Griffith would not rigidly enforce his views about the rate of wages. 
But the impossibility of the situation became clear following the publication of a pamphlet by 
the Mackay planters setting out the terms under which they would employ labour under the 
act. Among other, fairly harsh, terms regarding housing, hours of work and other aspects of 
employment, it was pointed out that " (the sugar industry] cannot be carried on and pay for
unskilled work at the high rate of wages now ruling in the colony " .  Thus, " one of the main 
objects of this pamphlet is to clearly point out to the intending immigrant that the rate of 
wages now offered to him during his two years of indenture is below the rate now paid to men 
in the colony " . 108 The rate offered was £20 a year plus rations. Griffith 's response was
unequivocal . "He could assure them that if these were the terms on which the Government 
were expected to assist immigration from Europe, he for one would have nothing to do with 
it" . 109 With some justification Mcilwraith defended the pamphlet as " the true fruit of the tree
planted by the Parliament 11 • It is indeed difficult to imagine what other solution the planters 
could have - or could have been expected to - come up with or that Griffith could have been 
107 BC 23/8/84, p. 6.
108 QPD 44, 19/ 1 1 /84, p. 1474. 
109 /bid., p. 1475 . 
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otherwise judged, as he was by Black, as " refusing to carry out a scheme which he himself had 
1 10promulgated" .  
Griffith 's agitation over the position he had got himself into was obvious. The Courier 's 
comment on his dilemma was apposite: "Perhaps if one may venture to guess at the Premier's 
state of mind, he is in a state of revolt against that inexorable law which decree: that two and 
two shall make four, however excellent the intentions of a man who hopes they may stretch as 
far as five" . 1 1 1  His problem was that there was no  way i n  which the pursuit of his basic aim -
the replacement of black by white labour could have avoided either lowering wages (to the
extent that this was argued to be a consequence of employing European labour at cheap rates) 
or damaging the sugar industry by forcing up the price of labour. 
The planters obviously thought he had opted for the latter position. "The Government now 
does not appear to appreciate the efforts made to follow its lead 11 , the Mackay planters wrote 
to him in Dec·ember 1884, 11 and while their present unfavourable attitude is maintained this 
Association (the Planters and Farmers Association) would not venture to proceed further with
its negotiations to procure a supply of labour which is so badly needed 11 •
1 1 2 In subsequent
negotiations Griffith appeared to soften his position somewhat. 1 13 But it soon became clear
that agreement between the government (meaning essentially Griffith) and the planters as to
the terms under which the immigration of indentured labour could be carried on was simply 
not possible. It is difficult not to agree with the Courier 's interpretation of the policy as " a  
hopeless experiment for the satisfaction of political theorists " . 1 14
1 10 Ibid., p. 1476. 
1 1 1  BC 21 / 1 1/84. p. 4.
1 1 2  BC 31 /1 2/84. p. 5. 
1 13 BC 10/ 1 /85, p.  4. 
1 14 BC 24/ 1 /85, p. 4. 
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Nevertheless, Griffith persisted and in March 1885 appointed A.R.H Pietzcker, a German 
resident in the colony, to act as Agent for Emigration on the Continent of Europe. In doing so 
Griffith appeared to have relented on the wages question: one of the duties set down for 
Pietzcker was " to explain to (prospective emigrants) the circumstances of the colony, the 
conditions under which they will have to work, the current rate of wages in the colony, and 
the reasons why they - being unfamiliar with the language and circumstances of the colony -
may reasonably expect at first a lower rate of wages than that usually paid . . . .  "1 1 6 But it all
came to nought. Pietzcker received a very poor reception in Germany. Garrick, the Agent-
General in London reported this privately to Griffith noting that he had even been subject to 
police harassment and accused of being " an Englishman everywhere but in the place of his 
birth" . 1 16 The scheme to attract German labourers was resisted by the German government
and criticised in several letters and articles in German newspapers. Indeed German law 
(passed several years earlier in response to attempts to obtain immigrants for Brazil) did not 
permit intending emigrants to enter into agreements in Germany for service in foreign 
countries. At the end of the year Griffith had to admit that, in the face of these difficulties, 
11  direct German emigration to the Colony is unlikely to commence soon 11 • Authorities in 
Denmark, which was considered an alternative source of indented immigrants, were similarly 
obstructive and in the event no labourers from Europe were obtained. 1 17
Despite the failure to find an alternative source of labour, further steps were taken against 
Melanesian labour in 1885 in an act amending the Pacific Island Labourers Acts. Under this 
act the amount which planters had to pay to introduce islanders and the hospital capitation 
fee was doubled - a necessity , Griffith argued, in the face of the rising costs of administering 
1 1 5  Griffith to Agent-General, 1 1 /3/85, Q VP 1886 II, p. 907, emphasis added.
1 1 6  Griffith pape::-s, Dixson Library, (MSQ 186, pp. 182-93, Sept. 1885). 
1 17 QPD 47, 1 5/10/85, p. 1075; BC 4/ 1 1 /85, p. 3.
- 151 
the acts. More significantly the act fixed a time limit (31/12/1890, just over five years ahead) 
beyond which no further licenses to introduce islanders would be granted. 
The move was triggered by the report of the Royal Commission which was appointed at the 
end of 1884 to investigate the circumstances under which labourers were recruited from the 
newly opened waters of New Guinea. The commission found that there had been grave abuses 
amounting to kidnapping and murder. The decision in 1885 was indeed subsequently 
generally attributed to the commission 's findings and the attempt to preserve the fair name of 
Queensland. But at the time Griffith probably saw the report as no ·more than a convenient 
occasion to implement the policy, even though the restructuring of the industry and the 
provision of alternative labour - its necessary corollaries - had not commenced. Significantly, 
Griffith made no reference to the Royal Commission when he spoke to the bill. Rather, he 
looked ahead to "great changes " whereby 11 [the sugar industry] will be conducted by farmers 
working for themselves rather than by men working in large numbers for absentee 
employers" . 1 18 Black, on behalf of the planters, pressed for a clearer statement of just what
Griffith 's labour policy for the industry was and what he expected to happen in and to the 
sugar industry . The response was hardly either reassuring or convincing: 
He was not prepared to say what would be the condition of the industry in five 
years ' time. He hoped it would be in the same condition as all other industries 
. . . . he had not the slightest fear that the industry would be stopped. Instead of 
being as it was it would be far more profitable, and of lasting value; but he was not 
prepared to say exactly by what means that would be brought about. Five years 
would at any rate afford a breathing time, and planters, knowing what the intention 
of the Legislature was, would see exactly what they ought to do; and that if they 
wished to exist it would be their business to work with the rest of the community, 
and not fto against the rest of the community with regard solely to their own
interests. 9 
1 18 QPD 47, 15/10/85, p. 1078. 
1 19 QPD 47, 20/10/85, p. 1 1 43. 
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When pressed, he referred to his plan, foreshadowed in the 1885 budget, for allocating-l50,000
to establish central sugar mills. The construction of central mills and, more generally, the 
restructuring of the industry thus came to be seen by Griffith as the principal means by which 
1 20 the labour problem would be solved. 
At the 1 888 election the coloured labour question was hardly an issue. In his election 
manifesto Griffith defended his policy to discontinue the recruitment of Melanesian labour not 
on the basis of the arguments relating to the social and political integrity of the colony but 
rather on the grounds of the injustices which had been perpetrated on the people involved and 
the effects on the reputation of the colony as a result of those injustices: " the action of the 
Government with respect to the Pacific Island trade . . .  has effectually retrieved the character 
of Queensland in the eyes of the world 11 • 1 2 1  The decision having been made, it was politically 
more expedient to defend it in these quite valid terms than to rake over the coals of other 
more complex arguments. Mcilwraith declared that his interest in coolie labour, which had 
been a major issue in the 1 883 election, had ended but remained significantly silent on the 
question of Melanesian labour; after gradually hedging his position, however, he finally came 
out with a statement on the eve of the poll rejecting all coloured labour. 
The question of Melanesian immigration arose agam m 1889 in the aftermath of the Royal 
Commission which had been appointed to enquire into the sugar industry and in particular 
" the causes which have led to its present languishing condition , and the best means to be 
adopted for reviving and maintaining its prosperity " .  On the subject of coloured labour, the 
chairman of the commission W .H. Groom, in a minority report, was equivocal. His position 
1 20 This policy i11 discussed in chapter 5 . 
1 2 1 BC 8/3/88, p. 2 . 
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was that the issue had been emphatically decided upon at two general elections and there were 
insufficient grounds for over-turning the decision to exclude coloured labour. One of his 
arguments was that a state of depression existed in countries where cheap coloured labour was 
easily obtainahle: by implication the continued use of it in Queensland could not be regarded 
as a significant measure of relief. 1 22 The other members of the Commission, A.S. Cowley and
H.E. King, were more definite. Even in the southern parts of the colony, they concluded, 
" sugar cannot be grown profitably, without the employment for hard work in the field of a 
class of labour cheaper and more suitable for the work than white labour " .  Accordingly they 
recommended, inter alia, that " the introduction of Polynesian labour be permitted to 
continue, at all events for some years longer than the period now limited 11  •
1 23
Cowley subsequently brought a motion before parliament that " it is desirable, early next 
session, to adopt some means of encouraging the sugar industry " .  While the questions of 
irrigation and a reciprocal treaty with other colonies with respect to sugar imports from other 
countries were raised (those having been canvassed in the commission 's report) the chief issue
was that of C(lloured labour. Cowley in effect argued for a five year extension of the period 
during which Melanesian labour could be introduced into the colony. His case rested on 
grounds of bot.h economy and indeed the whole future existence of the industry . Attempts to 
obtain European labour had failed. 1 24 White labour could thus only be employed from within
the colony at the ruling rate of wages which, it was claimed, would not allow the industry to 
operate at a profit. More fundamentally there were certain tasks - including most of the field 
122 QPD 1 889 IV. p. 89.
1 23 /bid., pp. 71-2. 
1 24 While no lahourers had been obtained from continental Europe under the 1885 act some from England
had been engaged though with limited success. One witness to the Royal Commission described his experience 
with thirty labourers engaged at l20 - £40 per year, • a  salary we could afford to pay them• ,  as a total failure.
They were discontented at working at less than the ruling rate of wages and were the butt of criticism from 
other working m en for so doing. ' They at once created as many difficulties as they could . . . . I had an
idea we could work the plantation with white labour; this was the start of it, and this is how we were 
treated ' .  (Questions 2774-5 , 2780, QVP 1889 IV, p. 176) 
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work - which it was claimed only coloured labour could and would do. Cowley made much of 
one witness who had worked as a ganger on a plantation and who declared that he would 
rather " hump his drum" than do " the same kind of work as the kanakas" even at 30s. per 
1 25week plus board. 
An extension of five years was seen as sufficient " to answer all present requirements" .  By the 
end of that five years, it was argued, the bonus system in European countries would have been 
abolished and sugar prices risen; moreover an increasing number of small growers would have 
entered the industry using the central factory system and this, together with increasing use of 
steam and horse power, would have " materially reduced " the need for labour. 1 26
In response Griffith rehearsed his arguments against coloured labour, emphasising again the 
socio-political arguments. He downplayed the significance of the abolition of coloured labour 
in the present economic difficulties of the sugar industry, arguing that low prices and the high 
interest costs being incurred by planters as a result of the high prices paid for plantations in 
the boom years of the early 1880s were much more of a problem. Griffith claimed also that · an 
extension of time to use coloured labour would be of little use anyway because the sources of 
supply had contracted very significantly. 1 27 Whatever the truth of these claims they hardly
met the arguments of the planters and their supporters. But the debate was of little practical 
significance. Despite the strong feeling in favour of the continuation of coloured labour by 
many of the government's supporters (and some ministers) premier Morehead declined to
embroil his government in controversy and disclaimed any intention of extending the existing 
provisions of the Polynesian Labourers Act declaring this to be a "definite position " . 1 28
1 25 QPD 57, 6/6/89, p. 1 46fJ. 
1 26 Ibid., p. 1 62. 
127 Ibid., p. 169. 
128 Ibid., p. 1 68. 
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Pressure was maintained on the government to assist the sugar industry by various means. 1 29
An extension of time for recruiting Melanesian labour was still widely advocated. But the 
government continued to declare the issue as settled. Black, now minister for lands, advised 
deputations against pursuing the question: 11 No Government, however anxious to do justice to 
the industry, could in the present state of public opinion on the subject carry any motion for 
the extension of coloured labour " . 1 30 But Black, and other members of the government, still
supported the use of coloured labour. 131 Such statements were interpreted by the Courier as
11 a declaration that the moment the people are caught napping the policy of the previous 
government will be reversed 11 •
132 Griffith, it seemed, was still concerned that the policy would
be reversed and in early 1 890 it was reported that " the Opposition has thrown its whole 
weight against anything in the shape of a continuance of imported kanaka labour into 
133Queensland 11 •  
The fact that the Mcilwraith-Morehead government had regarded the coloured labour matter 
as settled but did nothing else to assist the sugar industry lost it a good deal of support and 
exacerbated tensions within the government as northern members, particularly Black, 
continued to speak privately in favour of coloured labour. By contrast, Griffith when returned 
to power in 1890, lost no time in taking action to assist the industry with the problem he had 
created for it, albeit in line with the restructuring of the industry he hoped to see brought 
about. On this occasion labour was sought from Italy though Griffith again found himself in 
an economic and political dilemma and embroiled in controversy over the matter. Prominent 
in the new moves was Robert Philp who had initiated discussions with Griffith about the 
1 29 For example, report of a ' large and influential" deputation, BC 3 1/ 1 /90, p. 6.
130 Ibid.
131 See Black's speech made as " the member for Mackay• rather than minister for lands in the debate on the
sugar industry, QPD 68, 2/8/89, p. 943ff. 
132 1 /2/90, p. 4. 
133 BC 22/2/90, p. 6.
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possibility of indenturing agricultural labourers from Northern Italy. Griffith immediately 
inquired of the Agent-General as to the policy of the Italian and German governments with 
respect to the "emigration of indented labourers" . 134 Apart from the difficulties of getting
European countries to agree to the emigration of their people under such terms Griffith also 
realised that there would be problems in getting planters to agree to using indentured labour -
the experience of 1884-85 had made these obvious. Indeed he was to come to declare himself 
against the very notion of 11 indented labour 11 • He put to Philp an alternative proposal that 
such immigrants should be obtained essentially as prospective small farmers on the 
understanding that planters would guarantee to sell land to them after an initial period during 
which the immigrants would be guaranteed employment by the planters. The proposal thus 
presented a solution to the problem created for the planters by the cessation of the 
introduction of coloured labour and was in accord with the process which was starting to 
accelerate j ust at this time of planters leasing or selling their land to small farmers. 135 Philp
subsequently confirmed that " intending employers propose during the agreements [that is, 
between the immigrants and the planters with respect to the terms of their employment] to 
either sell, lease, or metayer land at reasonable prices on long terms to grow sugar-cane at 
ruling market prices 11 • He added: 1 1  Now that coloured labour will no longer be procurable 
after 1 890 I know that a number of planters will only be too anxious to cut up their large 
holdings and let or sell to anyone on reasonable terms, so long as they are guaranteed a certain 
quantity of cane to keep their mills working" . 136
Thus it was that in the context of an increasingly restrictive general policy on immigration 
(see above) an increased vote for immigration was asked for in 1890. While not expressly
134 Griffith to Agent-General, 6/9/90, Correspondence Relating to the Emigration of Indented Labourers from
Germany and Italy, QVP 1891 IV, p. 1 . 
135 Shlomowitz, 'The search for institutional equilibrium', p. 103. 
136 Philp to Griffith, 5/9/90, QVP 1891 IV, p. 4. 
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stated, this was to make prov1s1on for Italian immigration though no specific arrangements 
had yet been made. In this context Griffith - though only under some pressure - spelt out the 
rationale of the scheme. He proceeded on the basis of two assumptions: firstly, that coloured 
labour would no longer be available and secondly, that substitute labour could not be obtained 
within the colony. Further, Griffith implicitly accepted that (after his experience of the mid-
1880s) the answer did not lie in obtaining 'cheap ' European labour (the effective criticism that 
this would lower wages ruled this out). But there was still a need, at least in the short term, 
for labour. The proposal Griffith had in mind was to reconcile this with his long term goal of 
a restructured industry based not on the large plantation but on the small farmer. If 
immigrants could be induced to come on the basis of a guarantee that they would be sold land 
on reasonable terms soon after their arrival with a guarantee of employment in the meantime 
the restructuring of the industry could be promoted. The question of the rate of wages to be 
paid during this initial period was glossed over somewhat. But the terms on which these 
people were obtained meant that even if wages were initially to be below the prevailing rate it 
could be argued that (contrary to what might have been said about indentured labour) the 
immigrants would not constitute a ' lower class ' of labour which, when it merged in the 
economy generally, would tend to lower the general level of wages. Thus, as Griffith put it, 
the scheme "would assist in settling the Northern lands, [by replacing the large planter with 
the small farmer] and would not tend to reduce the price of wages [sic] , which the 
Government had no desire to do" . 137
By the end of 1890 a form of agreement (between planters and immigrants) had been approved 
by Griffith. It provided that the rate of wages to be paid 11 must be fairly in accordance with 
current wages for new arrivals 11 , a form of words which allowed for some flexibility . 138 But
137 QPD 62, 84/ 1 1 /90, p. 1 558. 
138 Letter from Under Colonial Secretary to President of Planters' Association, 1 6/ 12/90, QVP 1891  IV, p. 7. 
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some applications by planters in the Bundaberg district were rejected in March 1891  on the 
grounds that the wages quoted in the applications were "not reasonable "  . 139
Despite the prospect of the same difficulties as had beset his earlier scheme Griffith pressed on. 
A letter from the Immigration Agent publicising the scheme was sent " to all employers of 
Polynesian labour in the colony" in June 189 1 .  The letter also invited attempts " to secure 
immigration from the United Kingdom on similar conditions 11 and, to this end, the services of 
Randall , recently sent back to England, were offered to planters. In the event, however, only 
one group of Italians (over 300 in number) arrived in the colony before the scheme, whatever 
its chances of further development may have been, was overtaken by circumstances. 
By the early 1890s the coloured labour question seemed firmly settled despite doubts about the 
ability of the new scheme to alleviate the labour problem. Increasingly the industry resigned 
itself to this fact. In March 1890, for example, a conference of planters, farmers and business 
and labour representatives held in Mackay to consider ways in which the government should 
be asked to assist the industry proceeded on the . assumption that there would be no more 
coloured labour. 140 Those industry members who continued to press were firmly rebuffed. A
Chamber of Commerce deputation to Griffith's colonial secretary, Horace Tozer, in Bundaberg 
in October 18U l ,  asking for an extension of time for the employment of coloured labour, was 
told that it was " impossible for the Government to go beyond the voice of the people " and 
that the question had been " absolutely settled " . .  Tozer noted that the government had been 
trying to find a "substitute . . .  in fact no question had troubled [them] more " but indicated 
139 BC 6/3/91 , p. 6, in which is reproduced Griffith's minute to the Immigration Agent on the subject. While
the minute and the report do not make it altogether clear, it seems that the applications were also only for 
• indented servants " and did not entail the right to acquire land; the applications were thus rejected on dual
grounds.
140 BC 1 6/3/90, p. 6 .
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that the matter was very much in the hands of the premier. 14 1
At the beginning of 1892, however, as the deterioration in general economic conditions which 
had gone on through 189 1  accelerated, opinion - reflected in and to some extent led by the 
leading articles in the Courier - hardened against the Griffith government's policy of "drift "
and inactivity ; the coloured labour question, among others, was one on  which i t  was called to
act, in order to give a stimulus to economic activity. An important catalyst in the process was 
a letter from James Dickson (former Liberal treasurer now temporarily out of politics) 
published in mid-January. The cessation of Melanesian immigration for tropical field 
industries " under the proper and vigilant safeguards which existed at the time of its 
termination" ,  had been, he argued, 11 a fatal mistake" . 1 42 From this point the Courier actively
took up the cause. Over the following weeks it ran a series of articles and interviews with 
planters and business people associated with the industry which emphasised the depressive 
effects on the industry of cutting off its supply of coloured labour and of the consequent effect 
on other industries, and employment therein, with both forward and backward linkages to 
sugar. By the end of the month the Courier was claiming 11  an emphatic change in public 
. • ''  143opm1on . 
Griffith returned to the colony in early February to find increasing dissatisfaction with his 
inaction and the Courier calling on him for a reversal of his policies with respect to coloured 
labour declaring public opinion now to be in favour of such action. 144 At the opening of the
Warwick Show on 10 February Griffith made no comment on the labour question. 145 Only
three days later, however, he released his famous manifesto, announcing that he now accepted 
14 1 BC 23/ 10/91 � p. 6.
142 BC 14/ 1 /92, p. 6.
143 BC 29/ 1 /92, p. 7.
144 BC 10/2/92, ·p. 4. 
145 BC 1 2/2/92, p. 5.
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the need for the resumption of Melanesian immigration. This was then given effect to in the 
Pacific Island Labourers (Extension) Act which was one of the measures passed in a special
early sitting of parliament in 1892 .  
In explaining his about-face on the issue Griffith confirmed his belief in the reasons which led 
him to oppose and abolish coloured labour, and his belief that the industry could be 
restructured and reorganised so as to be based essentially on small-farming and white labour 
in a way that would render the employment of coloured labour unnecessary. But the 
reorganisation of the industry, while accelerating, had still not proceeded very far and the 
schemes for introducing European labour into the industry had failed or, in the case of Italian 
immigration, had met with strong opposition. 146 Thus, Griffith conceded, " the planters as well
as the smaller· farmers already engaged in sugar culture do not know where to turn for the 
necessary labour to cultivate and take off their crops " and the continued existence of the 
industry itself was under threat. 147 While remaining convinced that eventually the industry
would be restructured he agreed that in the meantime in the absence of replacement labour 
the only alternative to continuing Melanesian immigration was the possible destruction of the 
industry. The action he was taking was thus necessary " to bridge over the interval which 
must necessarily elapse before the change of system can be brought about" . He continued to 
regard it, as he always had, as 1 1  a temporary and transitional expedient" . 1 48
The increasingly powerful labour movement mounted a strong attack on the decision based on 
the argument that low-priced Melanesian labour even though it may be restrained from 
coming in direct competition with white labour , tended to cheapen labour of all kinds; and the 
presence of time-expired Melanesians did actually bring them into competition and have this 
146 See for example the debate QPD 64, 4/9/91 ,  p. 879ff.
147 QPD 61, 29/:s/92, p. 89 . 
148 /bid.
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effect. The counter-argument, which had been put forcefully by Dickson, was that any such 
lowering - if it did occur - would be more than compensated in aggregate by the direct, and 
indirect, encouragement given to production, income and employment by the resuscitation of 
investment and production in the sugar industry which ,  it was claimed, would follow the 
reacceptance of black labour. The net effect would be to increase the demand for labour and 
149the total rewards of labour. 
Griffith himself had never made very much of the 'cheap labour' argument against Melanesian 
labour, having been always concerned primarily with the socio-political aspects of its 
employment. He did not take up the issue now, but he did take the opportunity to attack 
aggressively the whole stance that the Labour Party had taken on employment in the sugar 
industry and indeed to suggest that the necessity for the continuation of black labour was 
attributable to their intransigence. His attempts to secure labour from Europe to replace 
Melanesian labour had, he argued, been thwarted by Labour opposition . At the same time 
they had declined to work in the industry themselves "except at rates of wages which the 
industry cannot pay . . .  .In short, these men will neither engage in the work themselves, nor, 
so far as they can prevail, allow anyone else to do so " . 1 60 He warmed to this theme in a speech
in Maryborough some weeks later, just before the parliamentary session opened. 
The industry was begun with the aid of coloured labour, but for various reasons it 
had been considered that the coloured labour was competing dangerously with 
European Labour, and a strong desire to substitute white labour for the coloured 
labour was aroused. . . . Those who desired to displace the black men desired to do 
so not because they wished to prevent the soil from being tilled , but because they 
wanted it to be tilled by somebody else. But where was the somebody else? Had 
successive Governments not done their best to find the somebody else by 
encouraging emigration from the north and south of Europe, from Great Britain 
and Ireland? They had done their best and what had been the result? [Labour) had
149 Letter from Dickson, BC 14/ 1 /92 , p. 6.
1 60 QPD 61, 29/3/92, p. 8.
been denouncing every white man who engaged in the sugar industry, denouncing 
the Government who brought the white men here, and absolutely scorned to do the
k h . l 1 s 1 wor t emse ves. 
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There was some justification in Griffith's criticism. Labour's opposition was to 'cheap labour' 
of whatever sort, black or white. But cheap labour could not be replaced by labour being 
paid the ruling level of wages without the profits of the industry being squeezed, in many cases 
beyond that sustainable. 
Yet Griffith 's position effectively amounted to one of securing 'cheap ' European labour. There 
was, however, little chance of any such scheme being allowed to succeed, particularly as 
economic conditions deteriorated and the strength of organised labour increased. And indeed 
Griffith himsel.f refused, at least publicly, to sanction the notion of 'cheap labour ' !  His whole 
position had probably been based on the expectation that the restructuring of the industry 
would proceed more rapidly and that white labour, to the extent that it was necessary, would 
be more readily obtained both from within and without the colony. He would probably also 
have assumed better sugar prices and hence the greater ability and readiness of the industry to 
sustain the higher costs inevitably associated with replacing black with white labour. To some 
extent, however, Griffith simply failed to think through the economic and political 
implications of his goal to exclude coloured races from the colony. In 1892 economic and 
political necessities left him with little alternative but to reverse his policy . 
During the 1890s Melanesian labour was recruited at an average rate of a little over 1 ,000 per 
year. As a result of the numbers returned to the islands, however, the total number in the 
colony remained virtually stationary, at a little over 9 ,000, over the period from 189 1- 1900. 1 52
1 5 1 BC 21 /3/92, p. 6.
152 Reports on Pacific Island Emigration, QVP, various years. The number fell to a low of 7,500 at the end 
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The Labour Party maintained its opposition to coloured labour but there was no indication 
that the govt�rnment considered any changes to policy. Following federation, however, 
matters were taken out of the hands of the Queensland government. In 1 901 the 
commonwealth Pacific Island Labourers Act provided that March 1904 should be the cut-off 
point beyond which no Melanesian labour would be permitted to enter Australia and that no 
agreement with such labour should remain in force after the end of 1906. After this date any 
Pacific Island labourer was subject to deportation. As corollary measures a protective tariff 
was placed on sugar imports and an excise levied on manufactured sugar, to be partially 
rebated where sugar was grown with white labour. The intention of these measures was to 
compensate sugar-growers for the higher cost of using white labour and to encourage the 
t • t• • kl "bl 1 53rans1 ion as qmc y as poss1 e. 
Prime minister Barton had given notice of his policy of the 11 gradual abolition 11 of coloured 
labour and Philp, during 1901 ,  appears to have resigned himself largely to the inevitable. He 
took no action to influence Barton 's thinking on the issue, despite frequent expressions of 
concern about the need for some positive action. In August 1901 , in response to criticism from 
the Courier of continuing " ministerial sleep " ,  Philp commented merely that " at present there 
was nothing definite to act upon 11 and expressed the rather sanguine view that he was " not so 
sure, notwithstanding the declarations made, that Mr. Barton will go to any lengths in the 
matter " . 1 54 These comments were made in the light of a report, made several months earlier,
by Dr Walter Maxwell ,  Director of the Sugar Experiement Stations. The report had been 
made at the request of Barton and with Philp 's concurrence. As Maxwell was himself 
of 1 893. 
1 53 The implementation of this policy has been analysed by Alan Birch, 'The implementation of the White
Australia policy in the Queensland sugar industry 1901 - 12 ' , Auatralian Journal of Politica and Hiatory, II, 2, 
1965, pp. 198-210. 
1 54 BC 9/8/01 , p. 4; 1 0/8/01 , p. 4.
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subsequently to confirm, 165 and Philp would no doubt have concluded, the report argued a
strong case for the continuing use of coloured labour. But its style (which as Maxwell was
later to agree was "formal and reserved " ) and its emphasis on changes in both technology and
economic structure which were gradually eliminating the need for coloured labour may have 
encouraged Barton in taking the firmer action which, it has been suggested, the exigencies of 
the political situation were dictating. Birch indeed has referred to it as "a cogent statement of 
the economic trend towards the amortization of the Kanaka" and " the basis of commonwealth 
action " . 1 56 Whatever the reasoning behind the terms Barton incorporated in the 'Kanaka Bill ' ,
Philp appears to have been genuinely shocked at the severity of the measure. As he wrote to 
Barton, "notwithstanding the many indications of the probable policy of the Commonwealth 
government in connection with the employment of Pacific Island labour in Queensland, the 
government were totally unprepared for legislation of so summary and drastic a 
t 11 157na ure . . . .  
Philp then proceeded to oppose the measure with some force. Following the introduction of 
the bill into the federal parliament he wrote a long and detailed letter of protest to Barton, 
attempted to raise the matter at a Premiers ' Conference, sent Maxwell to Melbourne to lobby 
federal parliamentarians, made a direct appeal himself to the Senate and finally attempted 
through the Governor-General to have assent delayed. 1 58 The measure was widely supported,
however, and it is doubtful whether Philp had �ny real expectation of having the measure 
amended or even, as he resorted to asking towards the end, referred to a Royal Commission. 
In all the political heat generated there was not in fact a great deal separating Barton and 
1 55 Maxwell to Philp 5/10/01 , BC 7 /10/01 ,  p. 5 . 
1 66 Birch, 'The implementation of the White Australia policy in the Queensland sugar industry', p. 200. 
1 57 BC 8/10/01 , p. 5 . 
1 58 BC 8/1 0/01 , pp. 6-8; 6/ 1 1 /01 ,  p. 4; 14/1 1 /01 ,  p. 4; 27 / 1 1 /01 ,  p. 4; 1 7  / 12/01 , p. 4 .
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Philp. The more particularly economic question of the effect of the measure on labour costs 
was not an issue. Maxwell demonstrated in his report that the cost of coloured labour, taking 
into account all the costs associated with its use, was less than half that of white labour. 
Barton had always accepted that this was so and that compensation would be necessary: 
hence the fiscal measures proposed. Philp did not even wish to debate the question of 
compensation. His central thesis was that white men would simply not do the work. Thus, he 
wrote to Barton: 
I confess I cannot see how any such fiscal assistance can mitigate the disastrous 
tendency of the policy contemplated in the Bill. No matter what duties are 
imposed, the operation of the tariff will not affect the question of how and where the 
supply of field labour necessary for the production of sugar can be obtained . High 
duties will be of little service to support our industry if the commodity on which the 
duties are imposed ceases to a large extent or altogether to be produced. 169 
Despite his very definite statement about the inability of white labour to undertake field work, 
however, Philp nevertheless appears to have accepted that some substitution of white for 
coloured labour would be possible provided a sufficiently long period were given for the 
adjustment to take place. The 11 minimum necessary . . .  to allow of such preparation as 
might avert disaster by giving a fair opportunity for progressive change with regard to the 
1 60 sources of labour supply" , he suggested, was seven years. Indeed seven years appears to
have been the period that Philp anticipated would be specified in the bill. 16 1  Philp was also
aware of the implications of the development of mechanical and chemical aids. These had 
been documented by Maxwell in his report on the industry where he had argued that their 
159 BC 8/10/01 , pp. 5-6. Saunders ' claim that "Philp continually reminded the Commonwealth that, unless
generous tariffs were forthcoming, the sugar industry would flounder and collapse" is thus somewhat 
misleading. (Indentured Labour in the Britiah Empire 1840-1920, Croom Helm, 1984, p. 165) 
160 BC 8/10/01 , p. 5 emphasis added.
161 Statement BC 6/10/01 ,  p. 5. 
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application was gradually rendering coloured labour redundant: Maxwell referred to it as the 
" natural operating law "  by which "higher forms and standards of producing agencies" could 
be expected to operate with " continued and increasing results, providing it is not checked 
through any device by which it may be sought to hasten the rate of movement of the natural 
law. 162 Barton took the point but not the somewhat subtly expressed proviso. So both sides
accepted that it was only a matter of time before the need for coloured labour would be 
diminished; they differed only with respect to the time frame and as well the extent to which 
it could be forcibly shortened. Barton actually argued that the imposition of a shorter time 
frame would in fact act as "a spur to increase the efficiency of the machinery employed" . 1 63
As it turned out, however, the eventual consummation of the policy which Griffith had first 
tried to implement over twenty years earlier did in fact create labour problems which, as 
noted in the previous section, became a matter for immigration policy to address. The fiscal 
machinery established by the commonwealth in association with the 1901 act also came to be 
an important influence over the Queensland government 's policy to assist the industry and a 
matter in which the government became involved in the 1 900s; these aspects are discussed in 
chapter 5 .
C O NCLUSIO N 
In an economy based heavily on rural industry it is not surprising that the class of immigrant 
most keenly sought was the enterprising individual prepared to go on the land and add to the 
producing-power of the colony. For Liberals, the more so earlier in the period under review, 
such persons were also seen as constituting a 'yeoman' class to break down the economic and 
162 BC 1 2/8/01 ,  p. 8, emphasis added.
163 Speech on the bill, BC 5/10/01 , p. 5. 
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political power of  the pastoralists. In  order to attract and assist such immigrants it was 
consistently proposed throughout the period (for example by Griffith in the 1880s, Dickson in 
the 1890s and Kidston in the 1 900s) that free grants of land should be made available to bona 
fide intending settlers. But on the only occasion when this policy was actually implemented 
(through the land-order scheme which operated between 1886 and 1894) it turned out to be an 
almost total failure. 164 In the 1 900s Canadian policy along these lines was increasingly
adverted to but the only small step in this direction was made by Kidston in 1 9 10 when he 
arranged for fuller and better information to be given to immigrants landing in Queensland 
about land available for settlement. In 1 9 14 the then lands minister foreshadowed legislation 
to allow the government to provide the sort of " ready-made farms" which had been discussed 
for many years but the proposal was not linked specifically with immigration. 165
The provision m the 1 905 land act for prospective immigrants to select land through the 
Agent-General 's office in London (and be able to credit passage money towards the purchase of 
the land) was underlain by the same motive and also met with very little response. Other 
policies aimed
: 
particularly at attracting the sort of person who might go on to the land -
Griffith 's 'bounty system' and the assisted passage scheme of 1 907 - while availed of by 
considerable numbers for the short periods of time in which they were operated also failed to 
produce the result intended. In fact the majority of new arrivals sought employment rather 
than land, at least in the short term. Despite their fond hopes, governments recognised this 
and in practice immigration policy was heavily influenced by the general level of economic 
164 Proposals were also made throughout the period, though they were less seriously entertained by political
leaders, that land should be cleared and farms 'prepared' for immigrants. Even more so than the mere grant 
of land this policy smacked of unfair favouritism to immigrants in relation to existing residents and was 
generally summarily dismissed as impracticable anyway; in 1882 for example Griffith's response to such a
suggestion had been the somewhat off-hand comment that 'the colony could not offer !afford?J to give
!immigrants] farms ready cleared and with horses harnessed to the ploughs ' .  ( QPD 37,  1 /8/82, p. 241 ) 
165 BC 6/ 1 / 1 4, p. 5; 8/ 1 / 1 4, p. 6; 16/3/1 4, p. 6; 16/4/14 ,  p. 7.
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activity and the demand for labour. This became more and more the c�se through the period 
as organised labour seeking to protect its level and share of income exerted its growing 
influence over both the extent to which immigrants were sought and permitted to come, and 
the expenditure of money (on both advertising and publicity and assisting immigrants with
their passage) . Indeed the fluctuation in the number of immigrants entering Queensland over
the thirty year period and the expenditure on immigration provide a remarkably good 
barometer (wit.h some lags) of the general level of economic activity.
As economic conditions declined and unemployment rose from the mid- 1880s governments 
were forced progressively to restrict various categories of immigrants and reduce expenditure 
on passage money. The revival of immigration policy at the end of the 1890s followed 
economic recovery though with a considerable lag. Even then assistance was only provided 
where a need for certain types of labour could be demonstrated and abruptly stopped when the 
downturn occurred at the beginning of the 1900s. A greater preparedness to accept and indeed 
encourage and assist immigrants was evident following recovery in the mid- 1900s though once 
again there was a noticeable lag. A range of measures was thus implemented to encourage 
immigration after 1 907 . 
But throughout this final period governments were acutely concerned to avoid creating a 
situation where the supply of labour outran the demand. Accordingly they charted their 
'middle course ' between those who opposed large-scale immigration and the spending of public 
money on its encouragement and those who advocated a more ambitious policy . The keynote 
of policy was, however, caution and restriction. Indeed, the difficulties with shipping in the 
years after 1 9 1 1  gave Denham what apeared to be almost a welcome excuse to cut 
immigration levels below those which could have been achieved, particularly through the 
nomination system, had higher passage costs been accepted . Only immigrants who were likely 
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to be economically independent or for whose labour there was a clear need were wanted. 
Apart from full-paying and 'nominated ' immigrants, who were considered readily absorbable, 
there was a very tight monitoring of immigrants granted assistance. Only about one-third of 
the total number of immigrants between 1907 and 1 9 14 were in other categories. The 
restrictive nature of the policy overall is emphasised when the total number of immigrants 
after 1 907 is considered in the context of the economic expansion that took place during these 
years and the evidence put forward at different times of labour shortages, together with the 
way in which considerably larger numbers were absorbed into the much smaller economy of 
the early 1880s. 
Thus the expansive policy of the early 1880s came quickly to be replaced by one which was 
determined largely by the level of economic activity and the state of the labour market. For 
the period as a whole immigration policy in practice may be described as one which attempted 
to accommodate development rather than force its pace. 
The immigration of non-European races - and in particular Melanesians to work in the sugar 
industry - posed particular problems. Liberals and, subsequently, the Labour Party opposed 
coloured labour. Initially the grounds for doing so were overwhelmingly social-political. 
These related in part to the rights and interests of the Melanesians themselves but increasingly 
it was the perceived need to protect the social and political integrity of the colony that 
underlay moves, associated particularly with Griffith, to end Melanesian immigration. 
Griffith 's policy in 1 885 was not an economic policy in the sense that it was motivated by 
economic considerations. But the policy had some significant economic implications, and,  as 
Griffith himself acknowledged, implications for immigration policy. If Melanesians were to go 
they had to be replaced. The immigrants currently entering the colony were deemed unlikely 
to include sufficient numbers of agricultural labourers to fill the gap. Special arrangements, 
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Griffith recognised, would have to be made and he pledged his government to assist the 
planters in securing the necessary labour. His first attempt to do so threw into focus the 
dilemma he faced. Replacement labour either had to be as cheap as the Melanesian or the 
costs of the industry had to be raised at a time of financial crisis for the industry. Yet Griffith 
denied he wished to obtain 'cheap ' labour. His attempts to get European labour for the 
industry forced the nature of the dilemma on him and eventually he reluctantly accepted the 
continuing need for Melanesian labour. 
The commonwealth 's move to end the immigration of Melanesian labour was based not only 
on the social-political arguments which had motivated Griffith but also on the economic 
argument that cheap labour tended to reduce the general level of wages and the standard of 
living. The dilemma remained but the motives underlying the legislation now revealed it more 
explicitly; Barton was prepared to solve it, at national cost, by compensating the industry 
through the tariff and bounty mechanisms. The question remained as to whether an 
alternative to the use of Melanesian labour was possible, the key point in Philp 's vigorous if 
somewhat resigned campaign against the commonwealth bill. But even here the only issue 
separating the two parties was the length of time for which such labour would be necessary in 
the light particularly of technical progress being made in the industry . 
In the event the industry did experience severe labour problems and the problem spilled over 
on to immigration policy generally in the years following the end of Melanesian immigration . 
It was only in the first year after Melanesians were excluded , however, that any specific 
measures were taken to assist sugar-growers to obtain substitute labour from overseas. After 
this sugar growers, in company with an increasing number of other industries, rural and 
urban, had to plead their case for higher levels of immigration to augument the labour supply 
as the governments of the 1900s kept a tight rein. 
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TABLE 3.1 
POPULATION AND OVERSEAS IMMIGRATION 1880-1914 
NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS BY CATEGORY (a) NET 
EXPENDITURE POP ULATION 
FULL- ON '000 
PAYING (b) NOMINATED ASSISTED FREE INDENTED TOTAL IMMIGRATION (c) (d) 
'000 
1880 (85) (811) (1 ,19 1) (1 ,003) (3,090) 40 215  
1881 (1 16) (1,703) (802) (2,494) (5,1 15) 56 227 
1882 (719) (2,361) (2,525) (8,484) (14,089) 107 248 
1883 ( 1034) (3,399) (12 ,206) ( 11,793) (1 12) (28,544) 258 287 
1884 1 ,593 4,209 10,942 16,774 362 310 
1885 1 , 1 15  3,379 3,519 2,661 57 10,736 154 322 
1886 1 ,426 4,188 2 ,506 3,649 108 1 1 ,879 173 343 
1887 1,061 6,018 3,31 1 71 10,466 147 367 
1888 818 3,071 408 4,746 125 9,171 180 387 
1889 887 2,528 596 3,1 16 34 7,162 130 407 
1890 335 1 ,472 273 1,492 16 3,599 91 399 
1891 242 960 256 1,453 7 2,919 62 410 
1892 160 326 22 381 859 58 421 
1893 (13) (13) 20 432 
1894 (123) (123) 1 1  445 
1896 ( 106) (106) 9 461 
1896 17 225 242 7 472 
1897 9 1  449 540 1 1  486 
1898 n . a .  n . a .  896 18 499 
1899 402 366 30 899 1,697 22 5 13 
1900 426 464 36 2,272 3,198 47 494 
1901 432 441 3 387 1 ,263 67 606 
1902 282 487 769 22 6 1 1  
1903 44 334 378 14 5 16 
1904 48 2 16 264 9 522 
1905 206 151  357 8 628 
1906 390 344 734 8 535 
1907 663 471 53 1 632 1,710 6 546 
1908 556  1 ,234 398 369 28 2 ,584 23 558 
1909 991 1 ,874 1 , 186 283 65 4,399 47 679 
1910 1 ,290 3,639 2,064 648 6 7,647 70 599 
1911 1 , 107 6,142 3,678 2,865 13,692 91 622 
1912 371 5 ,818 362 142 6,693 144 636 
1913 558 4,468 123 5, 149 45 660 
1914 189 3,399 670 4 4,162 65 677 
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Notes: 
(a) Source: Annual Reports of Immigration Agent, QVP and QPP, various years. Data for 
1880- 1883 and 1893- 1895 not available; figures shown in brackets are numbers 
despatched by Agent-General 's Office. Numbers may not add because of sundry 
categories mainly stowaways. 
(b) Includes 1st, 2nd and 3rd class and steerage passengers, and passengers paying tqe 
Special Government Rate negotiated for some years in the 1890s and 1 900s. Source: as 
above. 
(c) Year ending 30 June. Total expenditure from current revenue, loan fund and trust fund 
less contributions received by immigrants. Source: QPP 1 9 15- 16  I, p. 488. 
(d) As estimated at 31 December. Source: Summary of Queensland Statistics 19 14, QPP 
1 9 1 5- 1 6  I ,  p .  1 49 1 .  
n.a. - not available. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RAILWAYS 
Investment in railway construction constituted one of the most important economic activities 
of governments in the period under review. The formulation of railway policy revolved around 
several interrelated and overlapping issues: where should railways be constructed and to what 
purpose?; shou ld railways be used to open up new country or to serve country already settled?; 
to what extent . should railway policy pursue the goal of balanced regional development within 
Queensland?; to what extent should 'profitability ' be taken into account when deciding where, 
and to what overall extent, railway construction should be undertaken?;  what measure of 
profitability should be adopted, and in particular what weight should be placed on the narrow 
measure of ret.urn to capital?; how and to what extent should secondary benefits of railway 
construction be taken into account?; how should the necessary expenditure be financed?; could, 
and should the obvious method - borrowing be supplemented by other measures such as the 
sale of land?; could, or should, private capital be permitted, or induced , to undertake railway 
construction and if so under what terms and conditions?; to what extent should railways, and 
in particular local or branch railways, be seen as 'national ' undertakings or, alternatively, 
works which benefited primarily a narrower group who should be required to bear a larger 
proportion of the cost? Finally, decisions had to be made about the appropriate political and 
administrative processes for undertaking and managing borrowing and for making decisions 
about the level and direction of expenditure. 
Between 1865, when the first line of railway was opened in Queensland, and 1883 a little over 
1 ,000 miles of railway were constructed, all of it by the government using borrowed funds. 
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The years immediately preceding Griffith 's accession to power - those of Mcilwraith 's first 
government - had seen a high level of activity in this area dating from the " policy of bold and 
judicious liberality in carrying out public works" foreshadowed in Mcllwraith 's first Financial 
Statement in 1879. 1 At the end of 1883 the three major trunk lines in the southern, central
and northern parts of the colony were being pushed westwards, sections of the Maryborough, 
Bundaberg, Mackay and Cooktown railways were either opened or under construction and a 
program of branch line construction, mainly in the south-east, had been initiated. 
While all work had been undertaken by the government using loan monies there had 
nevertheless been a great deal of discussion about alternative means of financing railway 
building. The Railway Act of 1 872 passed by Sir Arthur Palmer 's government provided for 
the making of railways by private contractors in exchange for grants of land. An attempt by 
Mcilwraith , who was minister for works in the Macalister government in 187 4, to negotiate 
with a Melbourne firm of railway contractors to build a north-south transcontinental line 
under the terms of the 1872 act failed when Macalister withdrew his support and pursued a 
counter policy. This was embodied in the Western Railway Act of 1875 the principles of 
which were extended to a more general Railway Reserves Act passed in 1877 .  
In seeking to avoid placing ownership and control of railways in private hands the alternative 
favoured by the Liberals was to finance construction of government railways by the sale of 
land in 'railway reserves ' to be established along the route of the line. As John Douglas 
(premier when the 1877 act was passed) explained when the bill was introduced the previous
year, the idea had grown out of the original Mcilwraith proposal but now the government were 
seeking " to place themselves in the position, as it were, of [such contractors as these with 
whom Mcilwraith had been negotiating] to carry out on their own account, the construction of
1 QPD 29, 4/6/79, p. 294. 
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the railway, by allocating to itself a land grant, which was made chargeable for the purpose " .2
The major criticism of the measure, voiced most strongly by Mcilwraith (now gathering
support as the main opponent of the Liberals) was that such sales would draw on much needed
capital from within the colony: government railways would be much better financed by 
borrowed money. 3 In the event the Railway Reserves Act failed as a measure to raise sufficient
funds through land sales to finance railway construction and by the 1878 election campaign 
the Liberals were outbidding Mcilwraith in their promises to borrow for railways. 
But Mcilwraith saw a continuing need to supplement these funds and in 1880 passed the 
Railway Companies Preliminary Act which provided the framework for negotiations with 
private entrepreneurs to undertake construction of railways, which they would subsequently 
own and operate, in exchange for grants of land. Mcilwraith affirmed his belief that the best 
way to undertake railway construction was for the government to borrow money and 
undertake construction themselves. But this policy could easily be taken too far in the context 
of an already high level of indebtedness and the small population of the colony. " If they did 
they would assuredly be brought to such a position that they would be unable to pay the 
interest from the ordinary revenue; consequently it behoved them to look about for some 
means by which they could gain the object desired - railways" .4 Two specific proposals under
the act were subsequently brought before parliament for ratification - one for a line from 
Charleville to the New South Wales border in the W arrego Railway Bill in 1882 and the other 
a more ambitious proposal for a line from Charleville to the Gulf of Carpentaria in the 
Transcontinental Railway Bill in the following year. The first passed by a slender majority to 
be subsequently withdrawn; the second was defeated as the Liberals united in their opposition 
2 QPD 21 , 27 /9/76, p. 713. 
3 Ibid. , p. 791ff. 
4 QPD 33, 29 /9 /80, p. 846. 
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to the proposal and they were joined by a number of squatters who feared losing the tenure of 
land which might be required for the eleven million acres which the provisional agreement in 
this case provided would be granted to the syndicate building the line. It was the defeat of the 
transcontintental railway proposal that precipitated the 1883 election. 
Making the is�me a central one in the election Griffith declared himself a strong opponent of 
the transcontinental railway and land-grant railways in general. The three major trunk lines, 
he argued,  were being pushed westwards and were only just starting to tap the more 
productive western lands which promised to provide the trade to make them profitable and 
repay the stai.e for expenditure on their construction. The transcontinental railway would 
constitute a rival line to take the trade away to a new port at the proposed terminus of the 
line on the Gulf of Carpentaria. The government, asserted Griffith, should not "spend all our 
resources in trying to develop trade, and then hand the profits over to the first adventurers 
who came along and asked us for them 11 • 5 He also raised the spectre of the political and
economic power which schemes such as this would place in the hands of the syndicates 
controlling them, claiming the schemes would " lead to the creation of vast freehold estates in 
the hands mostly of absentee proprietors, and to the introduction amongst a comparatively 
small people of powerful corporations exercising a preponderating control over our internal 
affairs and threatening us with the gravest social and political dangers" .6
Liberal policy was thus to keep railway construction and management " in our hands, and 
under our cont.rol " to ensure that the ultimate benefits of railway construction accrued to the 
community. 7 In order to finance the borrowing necessary to undertake expenditure on state
railways, he argued that higher rents ought to be obtained from those using the land which 
5 Speech in Brisbane, BC 9/5/83, p. 5. 
6 Manifesto, BC :m/7 /83, p. 6. 
7 Griffith, speech in Brisbane, BC 1 1/8/83, p. 6. 
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the railways made more productive. It was in this context that Griffith developed his land and 
immigration policies and foreshadowed an expansive borrowing and railway construction 
policy: 
I have no fear that we shall not be able to borrow at the rate of a million - or, if 
necessary, more - every year if only we utilize the magnificent resources of our land 
estate by encouraging the immigration of small capitalist settlers from Europe and 
neighbouring colonies and by insisting upon receiving a fair rental for the vast 
tracts of pastoral land in the interior which are directly benefited by the railways. 8 
THE ' £1om. LOAN'
The extent of the government's borrowing and expenditure program was foreshadowed in the 
colonial treasurer's first Financial Statement in early 1884: arguing that the colony had 
benefited greatly from past loan policies, Dickson concluded that "our present position , both 
as regards revenue and loan obligations, justifies us in pursuing a bold, vigorous loan policy " 
and promised "an energetic policy of construction of public works" .  9 As the first major session
of the government approached he confirmed that " although in the past the Liberal Party had 
been accused of a 'rest and caution ' policy it formed no part of their political programme at 
the present time" . 10 At the same time, minister for works, William Miles was indicating the
sort of pressure he was also bringing to bear for an energetic policy: "He had asked the 
Treasurer to make provision for six millions of money [for railways) , and he must have it " ,  he
was reported as saying to an enthusiastic audience on a ministerial visit to Warwick. 1 1
8 Ibid . •
9 QPD 4 1 , 23/ 1 /84, p. 131 .  
10 Speech in Brisbane, BC 6/6/84, p. 5.
1 1  B C  9/6/84, p .  3. 
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The loan estimates introduced at the end of this first session in fact provided for a loan of 
£ 9,980,000 (the ' ilOm. loan ') to be raised and spent over the next three to five years. Nearly 
£ 7m. was allocated to railways. The role of the loan and the expenditure (particularly on
railways) that it would allow was explained by Dickson: 
The colony may be likened unto a man commencing business with small means, who 
has inherited large sources of material wealth, undeveloped through lack of capital , 
mistrust of investors, or want of a market, having but a small amount of ready 
money, and equally restricted credit, has at length surmounted preliminary 
difficulties, and having wisely conserved his credit and duly discharged,  as they 
matured, his obligations finds himself in a position to make unwonted use of his 
good name, and with such extended credit to afford unprecedented encourafiement
to the further and fuller development of his great natural sources of wealth 11 • 
While the projected annual rate of expenditure which the loan was intended to sustain was not 
greatly above that of the immediately preceding years, the loan was unprecedented in 
magnitude. Its effect, when executed, would be to raise the total indebtedness of the colony by 
over 50 per cent, from £t6 .5m. to J, 26.5m. But it was confidently predicted by the treasurer
that the " augmented charge for interest [will] be provided without any appreciable 
pressure" . 13  To ensure this it was promised that the capital would be administered with 11 a
due regard to economy" and spent only in the construction of " reproductive works" .  The 
promise was confidently made in the light of the improving rate of return shown on the capital 
expended on railways in recent years. To the extent that a proportion of the interest charge 
would have to be paid from consolidated revenue, as it always had been, the proposed land 
legislation , which by this time seemed assured of passing in its essential form, was argued to 
12 QPD 44, 1 5/ l '/./84, p. 1874. 
13 Ibid., p. 1879. 
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provide a more than adequate source of revenue. Indeed the two measures were quite 
explicitly linked. 1 4  It was also argued that the economic expansion induced by the
government's land, population and expenditure policies would generate increased public 
revenue, mainly through customs and excise, which would also contribute to the interest costs. 
The railway construction policy embodied in the £ 10m. loan was in line with that enunciated 
in an early ministerial statement by Griffith1 5  - equal emphasis on extension of the three
major trunk lines and branch lines, together with a new major line from the Gulf to the 
mineral areas at Cloncurry. The individual railway proposals put forward in the estimates, 
and the aggregate amount allocated to railway construction - £7m. - seem, however, to have 
been very much the work of Miles, aptly styled the " chartered libertine of the Griffith 
government" . 16 As he himself said in 1885: "He was responsible for the railway policy of the
Government . . . . He provided the Government with the schedules of the lines of railways 
which he thought ought to be constructed. . . . When he told them that he wanted an 
expenditure of l 7 ,000,000 it rather staggered them but he was able to convince them . . . .  " 17
It was a grand scheme of railway construction. But beyond a politic allocation of lines and 
expenditure between regions and electorates and the most generally expressed notion that the 
railways should 'promote settlement' and 'be remunerative ' - principles often in conflict with 
each other - it is difficult to discern any more precise criteria or principles underlying Miles' 
schedule. The estimates were based on very meagre information about the cost of 
construction of some of the lines. Many had not been properly surveyed and indeed seven of 
those included in the estimates, including some to which the largest sums had been allocated, 
14 For example, Miles' speech at Warwick BC 9/6/84, p. 3.; see chapter 2 for details of the expected revenue
gains from the land act. 
15 QPD, 41 , 10/1 /84, p. 36. 
16 BC 1 6/9/84, p. 4. 
17 Speech at opening of Logan railway, BC 9/4/85, p. 5. 
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did not even have defined routes. In many cases, the amounts were no more than rough 
guesses often considerably below that which it must have reasonably been expected to be 
necessary to complete the line. 
The estimates were introduced very late in the session and presented the opposition with a 
dilemma. While there was criticism of both the total amount of the loan and of individual 
items there was no effective opposition. The passing of the estimates and of the loan act based 
upon them authorised the government to borrow the amount voted for application to the 
purposes specified. Governments were free to raise the money, in whole or in part, as and 
when they saw fit: in this case i 6. 75m. of the .£10m. was raised by the Griffith government
between May 1885 and February 1887 . 18 Loan acts were conventionally regarded also as
authorising appropriation from the loan fund and expenditure of money for the purposes 
specified subject only to the approval by parliament of individual lines, or sections of lines, 
which the government proposed to construct. 
During the parliamentary sessions of 1884, 1885 and 1886 an unprecedentedly large number of 
railways were thus brought before parliament for approval including extensions to the 
southern and central trunk lines, sections of the coastal line, sections of the Mackay, Cairns, 
Cooktown and Gulf lines, and several branch lines. Miles, as minister for works, usually spoke 
only briefly to his motion giving information which varied in detail about the route of the 
railway, the type of country it traversed, technical aspects of construction and the general 
nature, purpose and benefits of the line. Reference was usually made to the cost of 
construction on the basis of surveyors ' and engineers ' reports, though often this was done in 
an extremely casual manner. Similarly reference was usually made, again on the basis of 
18 AB it happened this was considerably in excess of the amount actually expended during this period and the
funds, deposited in the banking system, helped to fuel the speculative boom of the late 1880s. 
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surveyors' and engineers ' reports, to the revenue likely to be obtained from traffic on the line 
and the land or mineral fields likely to be 'opened up ' as a result of its construction, though 
this information was generally even scantier and less precise. For example, in introducing the 
plan for an extension of the Logan branch line to Beaudesert, the minister cited the estimated 
cost as � 4,000 per mile "but he was inclined to think that this was only a guess, as only an
approximate sum was put down after the preliminary survey " ;  on the other side he could only 
quote the engineer's report in which it was stated " that [the line] would command a 
considerable amount of traffic [and] there was a considerable quantity of land at the head of 
the Logan River which would be available for agricultural purposes if the people have facilities 
for bringing their produce to market" . 19 With respect to extensions to many of the branch
lines and to J ines such as that from Cooktown to connect mineral fields which had been 
commenced by previous governments, it was frequently argued that the extension was 
necessary to make the line pay ,  or at least improve the rate of return to the expenditure 
undertaken. 
Members were understandably keen to secure railway communication for their electorate and 
hardly a line was not described by someone (usually the local member) as 'running through 
some of the best country in Queensland' .  Yet discussions of the type of country through 
which the proposed line was to run, the nature of existing settlement, and the potential for 
closer settlement and the produce likely to be carried were typically characterised by claim 
and counter-claim wildly at variance with each other. There was mounting criticism, 
particularly from a group of opposition members, directed particularly at branch lines and 
those serving mining areas. Doubts were frequently expressed about the profitability of these 
lines and the burden they would place on the public finances. Criticism was also directed at 
19 QPD 47, 2 1 / 10/85, p. 1 149. 
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the lack of information - about both the capital and maintenance costs of lines on the one 
hand and the revenue which they may be expected to yield on the other - necessary to permit 
an evaluation of the financial implication of the proposals. 
One of the most consistent critics was Hugh Nelson. In a typical statement in the debate on 
the Cairns-Herberton line in 1885 - proposed primarily to serve the mineral fields on the 
Tableland and one of the most costly lines voted under the £ 10m. loan - Nelson expressed 
regret that 
information given by the Minister was so meagre. He had heard no information 
given as to the quantity of traffic likely to go over the line when completed, or when 
it was probable that its earnings would return any revenue. When once they 
committed themselves to a line, it became a sinking fund into which they had to 
put money year after year. The line under construction seemed one of the most 
gigantic undertakings ever proposed in the colony, yet the information with regard 
to the probable cost was extremely vague. The Minister for Works did not seem to 
have the slightest idea what it would cost. 20 
Even supporters of the government often expressed concern about the casual manner in which 
decisions were made. Henry Jordan, a staunch advocate of closer settlement, felt constrained 
to say in relation to the proposed Beauaraba branch on the Darling Downs: 
It was a very difficult thing . . .  from the discussions they had on these railways to 
get at anything like a correct idea of all those circumstances which would enable a 
person to form correct judgment as to the value of a line or whether any great 
mistakes had been made in laying it out. 21 
Requests for further information generally yielded little from the minister, who was frequently 
floundering and shown to be quite unfamiliar with even basic details of lines, and only a highly 
partisan account of the likely benefits and remunerativeness of the line from the local member. 
20 QPD 46, 1 5/9/85, p. 687. 
21 QPD 46, 1 6/9/85, p. 710. 
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After a typical discussion with respect to the Rockhampton - Emu Park Railway Morehead, in 
his inimitable style, expressed his concern over the way in which decisions about railways were 
made: 
Parliament was asked to commit the country to an expenditure which would 
amount to not less than /. 130,000 when it was all over: . .  and the Minister for 
Works, on being asked to state the number of people residing at Emu Park, told the 
Committee that he had only been there once, when he saw a large number of 
people . . . .  Then came the hon. member Mr Hyson, who told them he had seen fifty 
visitors staying there, and that nine other people at Rockhampton were waiting for 
the railway to be made so that they might go and build shops there. If it was not a 
serious matter it would be a joking matter . . .  he objected to the country 's money 
being wasted in such a reckless fashion. 22 
A statement made by the leader of the opposition in 1886 during the debate on the Laidley 
Creek branch is remarkable more for the fact that it was felt necessary to make it than for the 
views contained in it: 
They had to take into consideration whether a line was going to be remunerative or 
not, because they were going to borrow money for the work. He did not believe the 
line passed yesterday (the Warwick - St George line] would be unremunerative, and
if these smaller lines were to be remunerative too, the loss on the year 's transactions 
- that was to say the amount that had to be made up from some other source to 
meet the interest which fell due every year - would become considerable. 23
For the first time the House divided over the proposal and while it still passed comfortably the 
vote showed that several members were now prepared to indicate their disquiet formally . 
Debates on individual lines - even the main western and coastal trunk routes to which there 
was little opposition - came to broaden readily into discussions of railway policy and loan 
policy in general with warnings of the consequences of 'reckless expenditure' frequently given. 
22 QPD 46, 8/9/85, p. 587. 
23 Norton, QPD 50, 2 1 / 10/86, p. 1349. 
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" The principle of the Government seemed to be to try and get through the money as quickly 
as they could " ,  declared Hume Black in a typical expression of concern, "but the day of 
retribution would inevitably come, and that, he was afraid, before they were many years 
24 older " .  
These criticisms appeared to cut little ice with government members and, indeed, reliance on 
narrow financial criteria was explictly rejected . In the debate on one of the first branch lines 
to be considered by the government, the Fassifern branch, criticisms about the lack of 
profitability of the line were countered frankly by the minister. "That is the rule with branch 
lines where the traffic consists of agricultural produce and timber. It is not profitable 
traffic . . . .  11 But, he argued, " the country derives the benefit from getting the farm produce 
to market" .  25 The treasurer himself seemed little concerned by the issue of profitability. In
one instance, countering criticism along these lines, he admitted that "If they were to accept 
that position a.s a sufficient cause for delaying public works they might at once stop all railway 
construction 11 , but argued that railways were vital to "open settlement"  and that, "with 
returning prosperity of the colony they would find abundant justification for the large railway 
policy which they were now entering upon" -26 Thus, despite expressions of disquiet about the
burden on the public finances that the railway proposals were almost certainly creating, the 
prevailing view, especially among supporters of the government, was that they were a 
necessary means of developing the country and of allowing production, especially agricultural 
and mineral p roduction, to expand in a way that would sustain a larger population. It was 
accepted that many of them could not be justified on narrow financial criteria as represented 
by rates of return on individual lines. Sometimes this was done explicitly and the view taken 
24 Ibid. , p. 1356. 
25 QPD 44, 1 1 /1 2/84, p. 1 813. 
26 QPD 50, 20/ 10/86, p. 13 10. 
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that the wider economic benefits that the lines would confer, in terms of allowing more 
production to take place or existing producers to operate more profitably, would more than 
offset the direc t cost burden of the lines themselves and provide revenue to the government in 
other forms such as land rents or customs and excise revenue. Rarely were these arguments 
spelt out, however, or any attempt made to quantify the benefits. 
In a telling statement, the leader of the government in the Legislative Council rejected the 
criticism of the Acting Commissioner (in evidence before a Select Committee in 1884) of 
branch lines on the grounds of their unprofitability. " This is the secret of the whole of Mr 
Curnow 's evidence" ,  he sneered. 
He is of the opinion that there should be no line of railway constructed in any 
portion of the colony for the purpose of developing agricultural or timber 
production at all ,  because he looks at the question from a purely commercial point 
of view. He has the management of a large concern which he desires to see worked 
as profitably as possible in the shape of a money return to the State on the capital 
invested, without looking at all at the indirect profit which may ensue to the whole 
country hy the development of industries arising from the productions of the soil. 
That is where Mr Curnow made a mistake. 27 
The direct financial implications of the railway proposals were thus simply brushed aside as 
irrelevant: railway construction, of all categories, was a vital means of developing a new 
country and the ultimate benefit was considered to be as axiomatic as the immediate need. 
The view was encapsulated in a statement by a member of the Legislative Council : 
To make a railway anywhere in Queensland was to populate the country ; in fact 
nothing opened up the country like railways, and he had no hesitation in saying 
that money was economically expended which was spent on railway construction . 28
27 QPD 42, 1 1 / l i /84, p. 193. 
28 Foote, QPD 42, 5/8/84, p. 48. 
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Added to this were the pressures on the individual member of parliament to secure a railway 
for his electorate, for whatever the overall impiications of railway building, a line certainly 
conferred considerable economic benefit on producers, traders and landholders in the region 
where it was constructed; brave was the member who resisted the building of a railway in his 
own electorate. 'Log-rolling' was a practice which all deprecated, but only in the third person. 
The macro-economic importance of railway expenditure and its ability to sustain the level of 
employment at a time of general economic malaise and considerable unemployment was also a 
factor which blunted the analysis of the financial implications of individual lines. 
Proposals also had to be approved by the Legislative Council. Under a standing order adopted 
in 1879 proposals were referred to a Select Committee which examined surveyors and 
engineers who had worked on the route, usually the Railways Commissioner and sometimes 
local people. Questions were often blatantly leading such as the following remarkable 
sequence to a local businessman in regard to the Highfields branch line in 1884: 
98. What is your opm1on, Mr Munro, about the line paying, if it goes on to 
Crow's Nest? You think it will be one of the best paying lines in this Colony, 
as a branch line? . . . .
100. Do you think there will be a vast amount of split timber sent m by this 
railway? . . . .
101 .  I suppose we  shall get ten times as much as now? . . . .  29
Committees almost invariably reported favourably, if at times somewhat equivocally; many of 
the reports were adopted , and lines approved, without debate. Increasingly, however, 
criticisms of railway expenditure and of the way in which proposals were evaluated were 
echoed in the Council and in a couple of cases lines were even rejected . The Select Committee 
enquiring into the Laidley Creek branch for example reported against the line on the basis of 
29 Quoted in ibid. 
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estimates which put interest and working expenses at i 2,920 per annum compared to
estimated revenue of l 700 per annum. It was the first time such calculations had been made.
The line was rejected; but in general the Council influenced policy little. 
Annual expenditure from the loan fund grew from the already historically quite high figures of 
the early 1880s to over £1 ,300,000 in 1885-86 and 1886-87.30 By this stage, however,  as noted,
reservations were being expressed about the wisdom of some of the expenditure on railways in 
the light of 1 .he increasing burden of interest on the public finances resulting from the 
decreasing profitability of the railways. Over three years, as total interest payments on loan 
increased, the net surplus of the railways declined. The decline was due partly to the drought, 
which affected even the more profitable trunk lines, but more importantly to the particularly 
unremunerative nature of some lines, particularly branch lines not one of which was even 
. k "  31  covermg wor mg expenses. 
The resignation of Dickson and the death of Miles within a month of each other early in the 
1887 session , and the worsening financial situation, forced Griffith to " take an interest in the 
financial business of the country" which, by his own subsequent admission, was an aspect of 
government he had hitherto neglected.32 Certainly Griffith had taken little part in the railway
debates. In his Financial Statement, delivered on short notice after Dickson's resignation, 
Griffith referred to the summary of railway finances in the tables accompanying his statement 
as 11 a most discouraging table 11 which demonstrated that the railways were becoming a 
"growing burden on the finances of the colony " .33 This led him to cut substantially the
number of raiJways put before parliament for approval. Among those put forward, however, 
30 See Table 4. 1 .
31 Trends in railway finances during these years, and the increasing burden of the railways on  the public 
finances, are indicated by the data summarised in Table 4 . 1 .  
32 QPD 67, 1 /8/89, p .  936. 
33 QPD 52, 1 1 /8/87, p. 269. 
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there were some controversial lines including the first stage of that from Warwick to St 
George. Having been rejected the previous year the first section was now put forward, in a 
somewhat ambiguous way ,  as a branch line from Warwick to Thane's Creek. During the 
discussion the familiar arguments about need for the Warwick - St George line to protect the 
border trade and the way in which the proposal was integrally connected with the via recta 
(the direct line from Ipswich to Warwick, which had been included in the 1884 loan estimates) 
and in turn t.he likely ultimate route for the line connecting Brisbane and Sydney were 
rehearsed and the value of the line to Thane's Creek as a branch line discussed. But the 
debate quickly broadened into one about railway policy in general in the light of the increasing 
gap between interest payable on account of borrowing for railway construction and the 
contribution of railway earnings towards that interest. While it was generally recognised that 
a sudden curtailment of expenditure would have undesirable repercussions on the general level 
of economic activity and employment the view expressed by Morehead was widely accepted : 
I say that there may be a time in the history of a State, as in that of an individual , 
when a policy of rest and caution should be pursued; that there may be a time when 
even the most progressive country or person will have to stop and exercise that 
policy; and I say that the time for rest and caution has come now. 34 
In the event the only line approved in 1887 was a further section of the coast railway just 
north of Brisbane. 35 Thus actual expenditure in the 1887-88 financial year fell for the first time
in several years, though only slightly; existing contracts committed the government to a 
continuing expenditure, as the incoming Mcilwraith administration was to discover. 
34 QPD 52, 13/10/87, p. 1060. 
35 The Warwick-Thane's Creek line was withdrawn by the government after five days of debate which
included one twenty-four hour sitting. 
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RETREAT AND REVIEW 
Under Mcilwraith, as premier and treasurer, the government borrowed a further -l2.5m. under
the ,l lOm. loan in July 1888 but expressed the intention to refrain from any further borrowing
during 1888-89 in order " to prevent any chance of a mishap " .  As Mcilwraith put it "we have 
enough to do [to find the interest payable on existing loans] without going into any new 
expenditure until we get out of the hollow we have dropped into with the -610m. loan " .36
Within the more restrictionist expenditure policy the scope for decision was, in the short term, 
severely circumscribed by the contractual commitments inherited from the previous 
government. These Mcilwraith claimed to be over .£ 1 .Sm. of which nearly _l1 .6m. was for
railway construction . 37 As Nelson, now minister for railways, put it: 11 all this government
could do was to carry on the best they could with all the engagements made by the previous 
government hanging over their heads " .38 Actual expenditure was cut back in 1888-89 and
again in 1 889-90, albeit slightly. 
The period was marked by a further decline in railway finances and the picture presented by 
1890 was a dismal one indeed. In the Financial Statement delivered in July of that year John 
Donaldson, treasurer in the doomed Morehead government, presented a comprehensive and 
gloomy account of the deterioration in the public finances and the role of railway finances 
therein . During the previous six years the length of railway open in the colony had nearly 
doubled (increasing from 1 141  miles at the end of 1883-84 to 2 1 13 miles by mid- 1890) ,
extensions having been made to the main trunk lines, to the Brisbane city and suburban 
system and to the system of branch lines to serve mineral and agricultural areas. But the gap 
36 QPD 55, 2 / 1 1 /88, pp. 1062-3. 
37 Ibid. 
38 QPD 58, 27 /8/89, p. 1 254. 
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between interest payable on capital expenditure on open lines and the net earnings of those 
lines steadily widened and the figure which was used most often to indicate the state of 
railway finances, the rate of return to capital expenditure on railways, had declined over the 
period from J,3. ls.5d. per cent to 19s. 10d. per cent.39
The deterioration in railway finances was due in part to subdued economic conditions during 
this period and to drought which seriously cut much railway traffic. Nevertheless the figures 
lent much support to Donaldson's contention that " a  very large proportion of our railway 
construction since 1883-84 has most undoubtedly been of a most unremunerative character " .  
On the basis of the Railways Commissioners ' figures he was particularly critical of the 
emphasis that had been placed on branch lines which, he argued, instead of acting as feeders 
which would bring traffic and increase the returns to the main lines, "have really proved 
leeches or bloodsuckers, taking the vitality out of the main lines and rendering the whole 
system unremunerative 11 • 40
While they had little chance of effecting major changes in railway finances, and indeed, as 
noted, were locked in to the Griffith government's policy to a large extent, the Mcilwraith-
Morehead administrations did, however, make attempts, in which Nelson was the central 
figure, to reform the management of the railways and in particular the procedures by which 
railway construction was undertaken. A new railways act passed in the first parliamentary 
session provided for the management of the railways to be taken over by a board of three 
commissioners who would be appointed for seven years subject to the powers of the 
government to suspend them and bring any issue of dispute between the commissioners and 
the government before parliament. The act had significance for two aspects of policy; firstly 
39 See Table 4 . 1 .  
40  QPD 61 ,  24/7/90, p .  368. 
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the setting of railway tariffs was now in the hands of the commissioners and out of the direct 
influence of the government and secondly the consideration of the construction of new sections 
of railway by parliament was henceforth to be undertaken in the light of a statement by the 
commissioners showing " their estimate of the cost of the proposed line . . .  and of traffic on the 
line, and any other returns likely to be derived therefrom " ,  such statement to be laid upon the 
table of the Legislative Assembly. Speaking to the bill , Nelson and Mcilwraith both 
emphasised its role in taking politics out of the construction and management of the railways. 
At the same time it was made clear by Nelson that the commissioners would be instructed to 
manage the railways in a way that would "best conduce to the public benefit " ,  one important 
criterion of which was the way in which they induced and promoted the close settlement of the 
country . In doing so he emphasised that this did not imply management on " commercial 
principles, . . .  [that is] with the dominant idea of making a direct and immediate profit. Hon. 
members will find nothing of that sort in this Bill " .  41
The act, however, raised the essential problem of such arrangements, namely the precise 
nature of the power vested in the commissioners and their relationship with the government 
and parliament. Griffith was most reluctant to allow such important matters of policy to be 
entrusted to the commissioner. "We cannot take out of the hands of the government matters 
of policy " .42 The difficulty was, of course, as Mcilwraith pointed out, that such matters when 
left in the hands of the government rapidly became matters of politics as had occurred in cases 
of changes in railway tariffs. At the same time Mcilwraith indicated that in the event of any 
disagreement or "if the commissioners ha.d a policy opposed to the policy of the country , I 
would not have the slightest hesitation in suspending them in such a case and appealing to the 
41 QPD 66, 28/8/88, pp. 1 27, 130. 
42 Ibid. , p. 136 . 
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Nelson also took steps to improve the whole procedure by which decisions were made to spend 
money borrowed on public account on railway construction. The matter had first been raised 
by Griffith when his forced involvement in financial matters following Dickson's resignation 
made it obvious to him that parliament had no direct control over loan expenditure in any 
year. This wa.s particularly the case where loan policy was conducted, as it had been in the 
case of the £ lOm. loan, by getting approval for very large amounts to be spent over a period
of years. As treasurer he tabled for the first time a statement of estimated annual expenditure 
from the loan fund. The matter appeared to worry him more for the way it infringed 
constitutional law (in so far as money was actually appropriated and spent without formal
approval) rather than political or economic principles. Mcilwraith also took up the point and
indeed it seemed generally agreed that parliament had to reassert its authority over 
expenditure. 
This required loan estimates to be based on detailed surveys and plans and hence accurate 
estimates of the cost of construction of individual lines; and further that loan acts based upon 
these estimates should require the amount to be spent to be voted annually. The loan 
estimates put before parliament in 1 889 were, according to Nelson based on these principles. 44
But they included an amount of llm. allocated simply to 'railways' ,  the lines not being
specified. Griffith labelled the unspecified ilm.  vote "grossly unconstitutional " and argued
that it placed the government in a position " to use more corrupting influence over the 
constituencies than any Government in Australia had ever used before" .45 Using the analogy
43 Ibid. , p. 136-7. 
44 QPD 59, 1 5/10/89, p. 2202. 
45 QPD 69, 28/10/89, p. 2472.
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of a three-legged stool Griffith argued that while the government had moved to provide the 
missing third leg (stricter parliamentary control over expenditure) it was at the same time 
pulling out one of the others (by not specifying the purposes for which money was required 
when approva] for borrowing it was sought). 
It was the ' constitutional ' aspect of the issue which Griffith, not surprisingly , emphasised. 
The specification of the purposes for which borrowed money was to be used was, he argued, a 
central principle of their constitutional system. 11 Absolutely no instance could be given in the 
history of constitutional government, in which a Parliament was asked to raise a sum of 
money without being informed as to what it was required for " .46 The rationale for adopting
the practice was, as Griffith argued it, to avoid the 'corruption ' which could so easily be 
involved. An unspecified and untied amount such as the ltm.  for 'railways' could be used to
'buy ' support as needed. But, regardless, it was "a matter of constitutional law " ,  the 
Constitution Act itself requiring that " the precise purposes for which the money was to be 
spent should be mentioned 11 •47
Mcilwraith had resigned from the government a month earlier and supported Griffith 's 
opposition to the form of the estimates. Deprecating the former system, whereby control of 
loan expenditure passed out of the hands of parliament, and supporting the proposals of the 
government to reassert such control, he argued, however, that failure to specify the purposes 
for which money was borrowed in the first place would introduce a far worse fault in the 
procedure. To have an amount of money sitting in the treasury not tied to specific railways 
would simply give "greater stimulus to the host of applicants for railways who torment the life 
out of Ministers for Railways, and other Ministers too [and) would be bound to be a bone of 
46 QPD 59, 2 1 /tn/89, p. 2330. 
47 QPD 59, 24/ 10 /89, p. 2426.
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contention much greater than if the railways were named. There is bound to be a scramble 
over it that will introduce more political immorality than they ever had had before by putting 
over /,7 ,000,000 in the control of the Government to manipulate " .  48
The counter-argument was that the Constitution Act did not necessarily reqmre the 
specification of details of the category 'railways ' and that indeed in previous loans, including 
Griffith 's own .ltOm. loan, there were large amounts specified only in general terms (such as
buildings, telegraphs, defence etc. ) . Moreover, the unspecified .£1m. was not advocated as a
general principle of procedure; rather it was the only way of implementing the government's 
policy of ensuring greater control over expenditure and at the same time giving the 
government some scope for implementing its own railway policy. For included in the 
estimates was a slightly greater amount for specified railways already initiated by the previous 
government under the .llOm. loan for which detailed plans and estimates were available. But,
so it was argued, the government declined to continue the old system of voting railways on 
vague and unreliable estimates as had been the case with the ilOm. loan. In Nelson 's view it
was axiomatic that "before railways were voted in the shape of money for their construction, 
the House mmit be certain of their cost in a very much better manner than it had ever been 
heretofore " .49 The £1m. was thus a sort of provisional allocation pending that information
about lines the government were interested in becoming available, at which time if the cost 
was regarded as reasonable, they would be put forward. Indeed it was implied by Nelson that 
as a sufficient bank of data on proposed lines was built up it would, in the future, be the 
normal procedure to specify lines, along with detailed information about estimated cost of 
construction , when annual loan estimates were put forward . 
48 QPD 59, 1 6/ 10 /89, p. 2206. 
49 QPD 69, 2 1 / 10 /89, p. 231 1 .
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The rejoinder by Griffith was that some information no matter how imprecise was better than 
no information. The argument indeed became more than usually tangled and Griffith 
stonewalled the estimates. Eventually an agreement was negotiated whereby the estimates 
(with the exception of the amount voted for Immigration) were withdrawn and a loan act 
passed which simply covered the amount of Treasury Bills authorised to be issued by three 
acts of parliament in 1886, 1887 and 1888 pending the passing of a loan act. That amount, 
together with the balance of the 1884 loan, was raised in March 1890. 
One of the first actions of Griffith and Mcilwraith when back in power together in 1890 was to 
amend the Audit Act to require that annual estimates of expenditure from the loan fund (to be 
termed 'loan e:3timates ') were presented each year along with estimates of current revenue and 
expenditure. Such expenditure could then only be effected by a special appropriation passing 
through a committee of supply. It was constitutionally necessary for all such expenditure to 
be included in a loan act in order to authorise the raising of the money to be so spent. The 
basis of loan acts were henceforth to be termed 'loan proposals' .  What were formerly known 
as 'loan estimates ' had previously been deemed to fulfil this constitutional function . It was 
not necessary: however, for loan proposals and loan acts to be passed in advance of 
expenditure to which they gave constitutional authority or even annually, only as necessary to 
authorise raising of funds to credit the loan account. This was possible because, as it 
happened, some of the projects for which the raising of loans had been authorised by the loan 
act of 1884 (the tlOm. loan), were not in fact undertaken. Among these were the lines from 
Ipswich to Warwick (the ' via r e c  ta �' from Warwick to St George, and from Cloncurry to the 
Gulf, totalling well over £1m. The money had, however, been raised and thus provided a sort 
of 'buffer' in the loan fund. 
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The 1890 loau estimates provided for an expenditure of £ 1 , 140,000m. on railways, a small
increase on that for previous years. The amount, Mcilwraith (as colonial treasurer) implied,
was higher than desirable but was one "we could not get out of except by stopping works 
under contract. and actually in progress, or leaving works that are in progress throughout the 
colony in such a state that no money would be earned by them" .  50 Indeed, he argued more
than £800,000 further was required simply to fulfil present contracts. Loan proposals and a
loan act was passed the same year authorising the borrowing of a further /, 1 ,365,000 for
railway construction. Attempts to raise the money in London in May 1891 were a disastrous 
failure. 
In his Financial Statement later in the year Mcilwraith feigned pleasure at the reprimand 
given to the colony by London investors: "we have been irresponsible and pulled up " .  51 The
prospect for the next few years was clearly recognised by the government. Speaking to a 
railway deput.ation shortly after the loan failure minister for railways Unmack was 
unequivocal : "Unless matters changed very much it was no use asking for further railway 
extension for the next two or three years . . . .  He might as well talk plainly to them as, unless 
he did so, he would have twenty or thirty deputations during the next month 11 • 52 The failure
of the loan and the economic depression and financial crisis of the ensuing years indeed led to a 
period of great.ly reduced expenditure of borrowed money. The balance of the 1890 loan was 
raised , quite successfully, in January 1893 but no new loan proposals involving railways were 
put until 1896. After 1890-91 ,  annual loan expenditure was cut steadily, declining from 
,£1 ,081 ,000 in that year to only £1 1 1 ,000 in 1894-95. 53 Expenditure was almost entirely on 
works initiated in the 1880s. 
60 QPD 61 ,  18/9/90, p. 575, also pp. 576, 583. 
61  QPD 64, 4/8/J H ,  p .  444.
62 Report of dep11tation regarding Redland Bay railway, BC 20/7 /91 ,  p. 6. 
63 See Table 4. 1 .  
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As the state of the public finances improved after mid-decade there was renewed pressure for 
public expenditure to be undertaken on railway building despite the fact that railways 
continued to constitute a drain on public revenue. "The resumption at an early date of 
reproductive works on a moderate scale" was foreshadowed as early as mid- 1894. 64
During the remainder of the period of the continuous ministry several new lines were in fact 
brought forward for parliamentary approval, the majority in large batches in the 1895 and 
1900 sessions. Those which were approved became 'available', as it were, for inclusion in 
annual loan estimates as the government saw fit. From 1895-96 until 1902-03 a higher level of 
expenditure from the loan fund on railways construction was maintained; loan proposals were 
put forward, a.nd the money raised, as necessary. The revival in expenditure during these 
years can be attributed to a considerable extent to the efforts and enthusiasm of Philp who 
was minister for railways from 1895 to 1897 and premier from 1899 to 1903. But throughout 
the period the overall rate of return on the investment in the railway network remained low 
and the charge on consolidated revenue attributable to the railways was still substantial .  
Thus the level of expenditure on railway construction was kept well below that of the second 
half of the 1880s and the prevailing attitude among successive members of the government 
was one of caution lest further borrowing and expenditure should cause an even greater burden 
on the public finances. 55
Philp 's " light-heartedness " (as the Courier put it) with regard to railway expenditure
contrasted with the more sober approach of premier Nelson who, in 1895, had just spent two 
very difficult years as treasurer dragging the public finances back into balance. He had indeed 
54 Governor 's Opening Speech, QPD 71 ,  17 /7 /94, p. 2. 
56 Expenditure on railways and details of railway finances during these years are summarised in Table 4. 1 .  
During the second half of the 1890s, partly as a result of the replacement of  worn out stock, expenditure on 
rolling stock rosr markedly and constituted, on average, 20 per cent of total expenditure. This compares to 
about 10 per cen·; during the 1880s; thus expenditure on actual railway construction was a lower proportion of 
total expenditure . 
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declared earlier in that year that " no large railway scheme" was anticipated. 66 Philp 's
enthusiasm prevailed, though later in the year when the lines started to come before 
parliament Nelson declared his indifference to the fate of the proposals: " If the House chooses 
to object to any of these railway proposals the Government will not be in the least 
67offended " .  
Nelson's cautious approach followed from his appreciation (gained as minister for railways in
the 1880s and treasurer in the '90s) of the drain on public funds which unwise investment in
railways could constitute. He frequently expressed the view that railways proposals needed 
more careful assessment. 58 But the difficulties were obvious. The whole of the discussion of
the batch of proposals in 1895 was indeed reminiscent of the way in which decisions had been 
made in the 1880s, and pervaded by the pursuit of particular interests. Towards the end of 
the session th•! Courier suggested that the proceedings had been " characterised by haste, by 
over-eagerness:, by a lack of thoroughness and by a disposition to put generalisations in the 
place of practical information 11 ;  and questioned whether " the old faults of hurry and 
carelessness and insufficient inquiry [were) still in existence. Is the Government itself animated
by a sufficient feeling of responsibility? "  In particular Philp and his "enthusiast's fine scorn 
for caution in enterprise " was contemplated with concern. 59 In a subsequent review the same
journal declared that 11 a rough and tumble, unpremeditated single-night debate in the 
Assembly is a very poor substitute for a patient, fearless and practical investigation 11 • 60
What form sueh investigation should take was of course the crucial question. Under the 188& 
act a report made by the commissioners had to accompany the plans of a railway when 
56 Speech at Winton, BC 8/4/95, p. 5;  also BC 9/4/95, p. 4. 
57 QPD 74, 1 5/ 10/95, p. 1249.
58 For example, speech at Winton, BC 8/4/95, p. 5 . 
69 BC 1 1 / 1 1 /95, p. 4 . 
60 BC 16/ 1 1 /95, p. 4 . 
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brought before parliament. These had been generally brief and sketchy documents which shed 
little light on the economic and financial merits of proposals and did nothing to resolve either 
the political conflicts associated with proposals or the division of opinion as to the need for 
railway investment to show a direct profit. For the first time, in 1895 ,  select committees were 
established in the Legislative Assembly to consider several of the proposals. The first of these 
was for a line from Hughenden to Winton which was the subject of a bitter conflict between 
central and northern members (the line having significant implications for the relative strength
of Townsville and Rockhampton as ports and service cities) and much argument over the
issues, including the question of whether railways should be designed to open up new country 
or better service already settled country . The principle of such a committee received 
considerable support as a means of providing more information which would allow parliament 
to make a wiser assessment of the proposal . In the view of one member the procedure would 
"prevent political railways, take the onus off Ministers, and enable non-members to know what 
they are doing when they are asked to vote large sums of money for the construction of 
railways" .  61 Much the same had been said, of course, in favour of the procedure of obtaining
reports from the railways commissioners. Why it was thought that a select committee of 
members of parliament would provide better 'information ' than the railways commissioner is 
not clear.62 The commissioner 's report in this case was almost completely ignored . In the event
the select committee appointed only represented the larger division of opinion already existing 
and it was itself divided. The proposal only passed after stonewalling and an all-night sitting. 
When Dickson replaced Philp as minister in 1897 he seemed rather taken aback by the spate 
of deputations. which waited upon him and adopted a conservative stance. As he said to one 
61 QPD 74, 16/ 10/95, p. 1 256. 
62 The number of commissioners had been reduced from three to one in 1894.
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deputation: 11 He did not know whether it was owmg to the change in [minister) or to the 
approach of the season (session?] , but he was receiving numbers of applications for the 
construction of railways, and he had therefore to take a very deliberate view of the whole 
position " .  63 The Courier noted approvingly Dickson 's comment to deputations: " the
Minister 's tone was that of a man who had resolutely made up his mind to safeguard the 
public money" .  64 Advocates of a line from Nerang to the border, for example, were rebuffed
when Dickson told them that "so far as he was able to judge from the reports of his 
responsible officers, it seemed that the cost of the line would be too great as compared with 
the benefits that were likely to accrue from its construction " .  65
Dickson attempted to mitigate the problem through a policy of constructing ' light lines '  (see 
next section) but encountered difficulties in putting it into effect. In the meantime, as 
deputation after deputation added further railway proposals to the already long list and the 
problem of deciding between competing proposals only became more acute. By early 1899 
Dickson, now premier, and Murray his minister for railways were quoting figures of 3,000 miles 
and i26m. as representing the magnitude of railway demands which had been put before them 
in one way or · another. 66 But, as if paralysed by the enormity of the demands, governments
had brought the initiation of new railway projects almost to a halt. It was in this context that 
Dickson brought forward a proposal in the 1899 parliamentary session to establish a 
parliamentary committee in order to 11 investigate all proposals for railways and report to 
Parliament thereon " .  67 A bill to establish a parliamentary Railways Standing Committee was
duly brought forward. 
63 Report of deputation regarding the Humpybong railway, BC 16/4/97, p. 4. 
64 BC 27 /4/97, p. 4. 
65 BC 29/4/97, p. 6. 
66 BC 6/2/99, p. 5; 19/6/99, p. 6. 
67 Governor 's 01 1ening Speech, QPD 82, 1 2/9/99, p. 3. 
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The bill provided for a committee of nine members, the chairman to be appointed by the 
Governor-in-Council plus three from the Legislative Council and five from the Assembly 
according to standard parliamentary procedure for appointment of joint select committees. 
No minister was to be a member and no member was to be allowed to vote or take part in the 
proceedings when 11 any proposed railway in which he is personally interested or which is 
proposed to he constructed in, into, or through the electoral district (if any) which he
represents " was under discussion. This, suggested Murray "will prevent anything in the shape 
of log-rolling" .  The committee was to consider proposals submitted to it through the 
parliament and report on the estimated cost of construction , working expenses, revenue and 
11 any other special advantages which are likely to accrue from the construction of the 
railway " .68 Parliament was to retain the right to accept or reject the committee's
recommendation and make the final decision . 
To what extent the committee was intended to be concerned with railway policy in general is 
not clear. The scope of its enquiries was to include proposals for ' light' railway lines or 
tramways and for the private construction of railways by syndicates (see below) though only 
as referred to it by parliament. And with respect to the large number of proposed government 
lines the comrrjttee was intended to be concerned with the relative merits of the lines and with 
establishing priorities: Murray spoke of the need "to weed out from the list [of railways asked 
for] the lines most urgently required the least debatable ones " .  Essentially, however, the 
function of the committee appears to have been seen to provide "fuller information 11 about 
individual lines referred to it. Significantly it was thought that this could not be done by the 
railways department. Murray, in particular, spoke of the need for "very much more 
information than we are likely to get at the hands of our railway officials " though he also 
68 QPD 83, 10/4/99, pp. 94 1-2.
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suggested that the committee could adequately undertake its work "without leaving Brisbane" 
and 1 1  by taking the evidence of the officers of the department 11 • 69
Thus the nature of the 'better ' and 'fuller ' information appeared not to relate to the narrow 
financial impli cations of a proposed railway but its role in economic development in a rather 
larger sense. As Dickson expressed it, the problem with relying on the advice of departmental 
officials was that " these gentlemen, able as . . .  they are in their respective departments, are 
not the best judges of a policy which will suit the country and which will open it up for 
settlement . . . .  There is a very great difference between offering recommendations and advice 
as to whether a railway will pay, and the character of the country it will traverse, and 
deciding upon a railway policy " .  The commissioner, he argued, tended " not to press on 
railway lines unless there is a probability of them paying from the start" and thus "not to 
speculate too much in regard to railway extension 11 • This, noted Dickson, may lead him to 
"err through a policy of extreme caution, and retard the development of this country which, I 
allege, can chiefly be promoted by the extension of railways commensurate with our financial 
ability to pay for them 11 • The measure was therefore presented as one which would " infuse 
more activity into railway construction than is shown at the present time" but at the same 
time "protect ourselves from blunder " .  70 Underlying the bill was the notion that proposed
railway expenditure should be assessed objectively but on criteria which took into account 
both an appropriate time frame and the secondary benefits of railway investment. 
In the event it was the victim of politics. With whatever degree of conviction Labour opposed 
the bill on the grounds that its purview should be extended to all public works and on other 
aspects including the composition of the committee and its procedures. Labour was joined by 
69 Ibid., pp. 940- 1 .
70  Ibid., pp. 950- 1 .
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the growing band of members disaffected with the government and while the bill finally passed 
its second reading by a narrow margin the measure was not pursued as Dickson treated the 
vote as one of no confidence and resigned. 
LAND-GRANT R.AJLWAYS, THE GUARANTEE PRINCIPLE, 'LIGHT LINES'  
AND LOCAL AUTHORITY R.AJLWAYS 
The diminished ability and willingness on the part of government during the 1890s to 
undertake railway investment using borrowed funds led not only to the search for a better way 
of assessing competing bids for use of borrowed funds in building railways; the period was 
characterised also by a greater willingness to consider alternative means of financing railway 
construction and mechanisms which would limit or minimise the financial liability of the 
government when it applied borrowed funds to railway construction. 
Almost as soon as it became clear at the beginning of the 1890s that borrowing, and 
expenditure from the loan fund, would be severely curtailed the issue of land-grant railways 
surfaced once again in public discussion . A motion in favour of the principle put before 
parliament in 189 1 was talked out, but by early 1892 the issue was being grouped with policies 
on land and coloured labour (see chapters 2 and 3) as means of the government breaking out of
its policy of 'mere thrift and drift ' .  Again the Courier conducted a concentrated and 
influential campaign. 71  Mcilwraith remained as much as ever a believer in land-grant railways
despite his renunciation of the policy during the 1888 election . In the face of the charge of 
adopting a 'dog in the manger' attitude of not undertaking public works but at the same time 
71 BC 4/12/9 1 ,  p. 4; 16/1/92, p. 4 ;  28/1 /92, p. 4; 29/ 1/92, p. 4; 4/2/92, p. 4; 10/2/92, p. 4 .
standing in the way of private enterprise Griffith soon relented. His attitude in 189 1 in 
response to the motion before parliament had been equivocal : 11 1 am not prepared to say that
under no circumstances should the land-grant system of building railways be resorted to" .  
Accordingly, he promised to give 11 any definite proposal . . .  impartial consideration 11 on its
merits.72 No such 'definite proposal ' was forthcoming but the opening speech of the 1892
I 
session foreshadowed the implementation of the system.73
The Railways Construction (Land Subsidy) Act was passed later in the year .  The act was 
purely a general measure, providing a framework and the machinery for private companies to 
construct railways and be granted Crown land adjacent to the line of railway and aid of such 
construction . Griffith himself introduced the bill. Professing no great attraction to the system 
as such he nonetheless defended it against some of the criticisms, including those which he 
himself had made less than a decade earlier. He had come to see the alienation of land as a 
necessity (and one that would be so "for many years to come" ) and refuted the claim that 
large estates would be created on the ground that " the land will be of no profit to the 
company unle�s they can succeed in getting it used " .  Griffith's main argument, however, was 
that this was seen as the only way that railways were going to be built. " It may be taken for 
granted that for the present . . .  we shall not be able to carry out the system of constructing 
railways by means of borrowed money . . . .  (W)e are [thus) reduced to the position of having 
either this system or no more railways" .74 There was some disagreement and controversy
about some of the terms and conditions of the different types of contract provided for in the 
legislation but widespread parliamentary support for the principle. At the same time there 
was considerable public opposition and disquiet among pastoralists for the same reason that 
72 QPD 65, 22/10 /91 ,  p. 1676. 
73 QPD 67, 29/3/92, p. 2 . 
74 QPD 67, 1 6/6/92, p. 344. 
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they had opposed the Mcilwraith scheme in 1883.75
It was recognised that railways could only be constructed under the land-grant system in 
regions where sufficient Crown land was available in the neighbourhood of the line. The act 
provided that, in cases where the government thought a line of railway desirable and it was 
possible for grants of Crown land to be made, parliamentary sanction for the line should be 
sought as the first step. The intention was that the government could then enter into 
negotiations with persons willing to construct the line, with any contract actually entered into 
under the terms of the act being subject finally to the ratification of parliament. At the end of 
the session the government in fact put forward eleven lines of railway for approval by 
parliament. 76 Again Griffith handled the matter himself. It was stressed that there was no
expectation that all of the lines would be constructed - indeed some were explicitly seen as 
mutually exclusive. Rather they were put up as "possibilities " on which negotiations with 
intending contractors might be entered into. Griffith stressed also that none but very 
preliminary and general negotiations with likely contractors had been entered into. The 
discussion brought forward some of the standard arguments against the land-grant system and 
the terms of the act, but these were overwhelmed by the almost comic rush by members to 
have a line of particular interest to them included in the list. 
On the basis of these lines and some assumptions about the cost of construction and the 
average price of land (and hence the amount of Crown land which would have to be granted to 
the railway syndicates) representatives of Labour published the famous 'grid-iron map '  (also 
referred to as the ' land-grab map ') just prior to the general election the following year, 
purporting to show that nearly two hundred million acres would be alienated if these railways 
75 A public meeting attended by approximately 2,000 people was held in July 1892 to protest against the
measure. (BC 19/7 /92, pp. 5-6).
76 QPD 68, 1 0/ 1 1 /92,  p. 1 802fJ.
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were constructed under this system. The government responded with a map prepared in the 
Surveyor-General 's Department. This related only to four of the lines (the extensions
westward to the boundary of the state of the three major trunk routes and a line from 
Normanton to Cloncurry) the others having, so it was claimed, proved to be "practically 
impossible for years to come" due to the insufficiency of available Crown land adjacent to the 
lines. Calculations based on a much lower cost of construction and higher value of land showed 
these four lines to require only a little over twelve million acres for subsidy purposes. The 
government's defence included also a summary statement of the aims and advantages of land-
grant railways : 
This system proposes to continue public works, and to encourage the employment 
of labour and the settlement on the land in the vicinity of these railways, thereby 
relieving the unemployed, increasing the railway and customs revenues, populating 
the country, and utilising lands not now fairly productive. It increases the value of 
all adjacent country opened up by means of the facilities for communication, 
thereby securing a very much higher annual rent roll, and it gives much value to the 
alternate blocks as to enable the Government with the proceeds to carry on the 
public business of the country, to live within their means, and to devote their 
energies to public works and Government railways in the coast districts without 
additiona l  taxation. 77
In the event, with economic depression and financial cr1s1s, no contracts were ever entered 
into, despite the persistence of Mcilwraith in seeking interested parties. While ill-health forced 
him to resign t.he premiership towards the end of 1893 and to seek refuge from the Queensland 
summer Mcilwraith remained in the government as minister for railways and a planned trip to 
North America and England was aimed in part at studying land-grant railways and 
investigating the possibility of interesting a syndicate. But the near impossibility of selling 
land in the colony was a major stumbling block. Mcilwraith returned to the colony in mid-
77 BC 15/4/93, p. 9. 
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1894 with a "new scheme" but despite his efforts no railways were ever constructed under this 
78 act. 
Realising that little could be done through the land-grant system, and that in any case its 
applicability was limited to those parts of the colony where sufficient Crown land existed and 
could be resumed from leases Nelson then proceeded to develop the idea of 'guarantee 
railways' as a means of insulating the government from some of the financial burden which 
investment, particularly in branch lines, had imposed. 
The 'guarante·� principle' ,  in a different form, had been the subject of much discussion, and 
even a formal parliamentary motion in the 1880s. This system provided for the construction 
of railways by private companies with the government guaranteeing to the companies a 
specified minimum rate of return from the operation of the railway. It had actually been 
implemented in Tasmania and in India and some South American countries. Under the 
system, however, the government's liability could be just as great, or greater, than if it had 
built the railway itself, depending of course on the amount of guarantee agreed upon and the 
profit made - or declared - by the company involved. Mcilwraith had always been strongly 
opposed to the principle and while Griffith had toyed with the idea in the 1880s and 
acknowledged its possibilities when introducing the land-grant act in 1892 the system was 
never seriously entertained in Queensland. 79
Nelson 's proposal was quite different. It aimed in essence to secure the guarantee of a 
minimum rate of return on a branch or local railway from the people in the district it served . 
Such a line would only be constructed if those who most clearly and directly benefited from 
the construction of the line would guarantee that the government would receive a specified 
78 BC 25/10/93, p. 4 ;  also 4/6/94, p. 5 and 1 5/6/94, p. 4. 
79 Griffith's manifesto, BC 30/7 /83, p. 6; Mcllwraith's manifesto, BC 8/8/83, p. 5; QPD 61, 1 5/6/92, p. 344.
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return on its investment in the line by making up any difference between the specified rate and 
net revenue generated by this line (or by paying that rate plus any working losses) .  The 
scheme was given effect to by the Railway Construction (Guarantee) Act of 1895,  which was a 
modified version of a bill first introduced in 1894 but rejected then by the Legislative Council. 
The act provided for the government to construct such railways subject to a guarantee by the 
relevant local authority (or authorities) ,  possibly in conjunction with any private individual or 
firm, that the government would receive a specified minimum return on its investment in the 
railway. This would be done by the relevant authority making up any deficiency between the 
specified rate and net revenue generated by the line when in operation (or in the case of 
working losses paying the rate plus the losses) .  Local authorities were required to get the 
consent of ratepayers before giving the guarantee, and the act also provided that surpluses in 
future could he repaid to ratepayers, via the local authority, to cover any contributions 
obtained from them to provide the guarantee. The rate specified in the 1894 bill was 4 per 
cent but in thf act as finally passed this was altered to 3 per cent and was to apply to only one 
half the loss. 
The principle underlying the act was that while trunk routes and main lines were properly to 
be regarded as national undertakings, any net costs of which should appropriately be borne by 
the colony and its people as a whole, local lines could be thought of as having a more clearly 
defined set of beneficiaries who could reasonably be required to guarantee the costs of their 
operation . The principle of making beneficiaries of public expenditure guarantee any losses 
arising from it was a significant innovation though it raised the difficult problems of 
identifying who the beneficiaries were and setting the level of the guarantee. Branch lines 
could be argued to confer benefits on a wider group of people than the inhabitants of the 
relevant local area though under the act it was they who had to provide all the guarantee (in 
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the sense that the guarantee rate was virtually the same at which the government was 
borrowing money at that time) . Moreover, there were almost certainly people who benefited
more than others from non-guarantee railways yet were only required to 'guarantee' the line to 
the same extent as other taxpayers generally. Furthermore there were many branch lines 
yielding low returns and indeed working losses which were, and would continue to be, 
'guaranteed ' by taxpayers as a whole (including those who might be called upon to guarantee
the return on a line in their area) . It is not surprising, therefore, that there were many who
saw the measure as highly inequitable. But, it was countered , the willingness to guarantee a 
line would be a measure of the benefit to the people concerned; it would enhance their chance 
of obtaining a railway for their district; and it would also be an indication of the 
appropriateness of the government constructing the line on their behalf. 
Local authorities - who were to be the medium of providing the guarantee - were not very 
enthusiastic ahout the concept. Philp, as minister, never seemed very keen either though he 
did use it as a device for testing the conviction of railway deputations, for dismissing the more 
absurd proposals and for hedging his bets in more marginal cases. So to a deputation pressing 
for a line from North Pine to Redcliffe but reluctant to have it made a guarantee line he could 
point out that " It was very much against the strength of the deputation 's case that they were 
not prepared t.o give a guarantee, which, after all would only amount to a guarantee of half 
the loss if any . . . .  The guarantee was a small matter but it seemed to him that it was an act 
of good faith " .  8° Certainly the act, as the Courier observed , had " a  wonderfully sobering
influence on railway deputations " and introduced an element of financial discipline - however 
appropriate that was - into discussions about railway building.81
80 BC 13/1 1 /95, .p. 5.
81 Ibid., p. 4.
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In the event only four short lines, approved by parliament in 1895 and 1896, were ever built on 
the guarantee principle. In only one of these was it unnecessary to invoke the guarantee (a
line to service the Mount Morgan mine) ; in the other cases the need for a guarantee to cover
losses soon led to disputes. 82 The system was not pursued and in a review of railway policy in
1901 the Courier declared guarantee railways to have been an "absolute failure " as a principle 
of railway building.83
Dickson's 'light lines ' policy was another, somewhat different, attempt to advance railway 
construction but at the same time protect the public finances from the consequences of 
unremunerative railways. The idea was the essentially simple one of utilising cheaper forms of 
construction to build more miles of line, serving a larger area and generating more revenue, 
than would be possible using conventional construction methods. Dickson talked the idea 
through to many deputations during 1897 and evolved a general policy of extension of the 
main lines supplemented by the construction of "feeders " on the " light railway system 11 , 
expressing the intention of having ultimately a system of " light feeders to all centres of 
population 11 from the main lines. 84
Towards the end of the year he felt able to declare the colony to be "on the eve of a very great 
change in the system of railway construction and expansion of that system . . .  . In agricultural 
and mining districts he considered that it would be incumbent on the State to construct light 
lines to open up those districts " .85 Dickson in fact expressed the hope of formulating some
proposals for consideration by p�rliament during the remainder of the 1897 session and had 
"no hesitation in giving a promise that (if the government were there for another session] some
82 BC 2 1/2/98, p. 7; 6/2/99, p. 5 . 
83 BC 18/9/01 ,  p. 4 .  
84 BC 8/7 /97, pp. 6-6; also, 1 6/4/97, p. 6 ;  27  /4/97, p .  4; 24/6/97, pp. 6-6; 14/10/97, p .  6 .
85 Speech at opening of Gladstone to Bundaberg railway, BC 18/ 10/97, p. 5. 
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proposals would be made for light lines in the agricultural districts of the colony" .86 Nelson
put a stop to such notions when he returned to the colony the following month arguing 
principally tha.t the financial situation still did not allow more than minimum expenditure on 
railway constr uction.87 The idea was revived in 1899 by which time Dickson was premier and
the Opening S;>eech to the 1899 session declared the government to be 11 anxious that action be 
taken to provide for construction of light railway lines in agricultural districts " .88 But nothing
came of it, at least in the form envisaged by Dickson. 
A major problem was a divergence in view as to just what was meant by ' light lines' .  Dickson 
had in mind the construction of 3 '6"  gauge lines using lighter materials and cheaper methods 
of line formation. But the railways chief engineer, Henry Stanley, who had been sent to 
overseas in 1897 to investigate among other things the question of cheaper methods of 
construction, recommended a 2 '6 "  gauge rather than cheaper methods of construction on a 
wider gauge. One of his main concerns was that there would be a temptation to run ordinary 
rolling stock 011 the latter lines which would they not be able to withstand. 89 As Murray put it
in 1 900 when the subject was debated: 
With regard to what are termed ' light lines ' it is a question of some difficulty to 
decide what are the most beneficial class of lines to construct. The lines must 
necessarily be of such strength as to carry the existing Government rolling stock , 
and as far as cost is concerned, on level country, there is very little difference 
between the cost of a narrow gauge tramway and a 3 '6"  line. In fact, one is almost 
as cheap as the other, and in running such branch lines I do not think it would be 
advisable, if it can be avoided, to have a break in the gauge owing to the cost and 
delay of unloading and reloading. 90
86 Ibid. 
87 BC 4/1 1 /97, p. 4. 
88 QPD 82, 1 2/9/99, p. 3. 
89 BC 29/9/97, p. 4 on Stanley1s Report; also Dickson to a deputation regarding the Ayr railway, BC
3/1 1/97, p. 6. 
90 QPD 85, 2 1 /9/00, p. 930. The context was the debate on a motion to urge construction of 'light lines'.
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A proposal for· a 'light line' ,  fifteen miles of 2 '6 "  gauge line from Caboolture to Woodford, was 
in fact included as an "experiment" in the bunch of government railways put forward in the 
1900 session. It included a section up the range (the circumstance in which it had been
considered a narrow gauge might be warranted ) though mainly on account of this section the
line was by n<> means a cheap one. There was considerable opposition to the gauge and on 
account of the doubtful financial viability of the railway,  the railways commissioner had 
concluded in his report: "I must certainly hesitate in recommending the Government to 
expend so large a sum on what, after all ,  is a very questionable venture" .  91 An amendment to
approve the line on 3 '6 "  gauge was passed (albeit very narrowly) . This meant, as the minister
put it, that the experiment was rejected and "for all time there will be no other proposal to 
construct narrow-gauge railways" .92
In the meantime Philp had been pressing an alternative system of constructing local railways 
which Dickson had recognised and endorsed but seen as separate from his 'light lines ' idea. 93
This was for local authorities to undertake the construction and operation of railways - or 
'tramways' as · they were often termed although there was no clear distinction either in terms 
of gauge or method of construction - using loan funds borrowed from the government. This 
could be done within the framework of the Tramways Act of 1882-1890. In the late 1890s 
several such loans were included in the estimates. 
Philp pushed the idea strongly both within and outside parliament and to deputations seeking 
government railways.94 The policy was specifically referred to, and further such loans
foreshadowed, in the Opening Speech of the 1900 session. 95 As a result six lines of tramway -
91 QVP 1900 III, p. 817. 
92 QPD 86, 18/1 2/00, p. 2706. 
93 Speech at opening of railway to Gladstone, BC 18/ 10/97, p. 5. 
94 For example, speech at Mackay BC 20/6/00, p. 4; QPD 85, 2 1 /9/00, p. 938ff.; to a deputation for a line
from Beaudesert to Lara, BC 20 /7 /00, p. 6. 
95 QPD 84, 17 /7 /oo, P· 2 . 
- £19 
some on a 2 '  gauge, some on 3 '6 "  - were opened in 1900 and 1901 , all in North Queensland.96
The total length of these lines was about 130 miles and a further four lines totalling about 
seventy miles were authorised during the remaining period of the Philp government. Use of 
the system provided a means of satisfying the demand for local railways especially in 
agricultural districts and, while the funds still came from loan monies, liability for any loss 
made by the railway was placed on the ratepayers of the district served by the railway (in so 
far as any deficiency between revenue raised and loan repayments would have to be raised by 
the local authority. )  
The proposal thus represented an amalgam of  the guarantee system and ' light line ' concept 
and was essentially a device for promoting the construction of railways but at the same time 
limiting the financial liability of the government, placing the liability of covering any 
deficiency between revenue and costs (including interest) of the railway on those who were seen 
to benefit from it. 
A significant, though almost entirely unheralded, development of the principle came in 1902 
with the incorporation of a clause in the consolidating Local Authorities Act which provided 
for application of the betterment concept in cases where local authorities borrowed money 
from the government for the purposes of building a tramway. A 'tramway area' could be 
declared and a tramway rate levied on property which was deemed to have been enhanced in 
value. The measure was the first application of a principle soon to be more generally applied 
as a more specific means of 'making land pay for railways ' .  
96 For details of  these local authority lines, see articles in  BC 1 3/3/04, p .  1 2  and 10/2/09, p. 5 .
PRIVATE RAILWAYS 
The late 1890s also saw renewed interest by the government in the construction of railways by 
private capital . While no proposals had been forthcoming to construct railways under the 
1892 land-grant legislation attempts on the part of Labour in 1894 and 1897 to repeal the act 
were widely opposed by non-Labour members. This did not necessarily indicate support of the 
act in its specific form. Nelson for example had from the beginning expressed the view that 
the act as framed would never become operative. But, as Dickson put it on the second 
occasion, it left an option open to the government to make use of private capital and served as 
" a  State advertisement to encourage private enterprise to consider the advisability of opening 
up large tracts of territory . . . .  I cannot divest myself of the idea that possibly the State itself 
may not be a sufficient factor in the development and extension of our railway system" .  97
Indeed at this time a proposal was before the government from a syndicate - the British 
Colonial Railway Corporation - which had been formed in London with a view to constructing 
a railway from Norman ton on the Gulf to the mining area of Cloncurry. The syndicate had 
pressed the proposal upon Nelson when he was in England for the Jubilee celebrations.98
Neither Nelson nor Dickson was keen to allow such a mineral-rich district to be controlled by 
a syndicate in this way, however, and the scheme was finally definitely declined by the 
government in May 1898. 99
But in the meantime the government had received another proposal (submitted in a letter 
dated 15/ 1 1/9 7) by a syndicate which had interests in the Chillagoe mines to construct a line 
from Mareeba to Chillagoe (a distance of about ninety-five miles) to serve the mine in return 
97 QPD 78, 1 1 / 1 1 /97, p. 1 499. 
98 BC 7 /7 /97, p. 5 . 
99 BC 10/5/98, p. 4. 
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for certain concessions, though not including grants of land. In a general review of railway 
policy Dickson, noting the limited capacity of the colony to finance railway construction in 
relation to the lines for which demands had been made, and the difficulties he was having in 
furthering his ideas about 'light lines' ,  affirmed his view that " it would be a very desirable 
thing for this country if reasonable proposals for railway construction emanated from private 
individuals or private companies" .  Indeed, he added, " I  look upon the proposal as heralding a 
new era of railway construction in Queensland 11 • 1 00 
An act was subsequently passed to provide a legislative framework for construction of the 
railway and a generally encouraging attitude was adopted by the government. Both a 
deputation asking for a government line from Normanton to Cloncurry and the syndicate 
seeking a land-grant arrangement were in fact urged to press for a proposal more along the 
lines of the Chillagoe line. IOI In this light a number of proposals were made to the government
during 1898 and 1899 .  Draft agreements had been completed for three of the lines by the end 
of 1899 ; 102 and in 1 900 five bills to authorise the construction of lines of railway by private
syndicates were put before parliament. All lines were to provide specific mineral leases with 
railway communication: from Normanton to copper mines at Cloncurry; from the Albert 
River and Burketown to Lilydale in the Gulf country further west to service proposed silver-
lead mines; a branch line from the Mareeba-Chillagoe line to Mt Garnet (copper and silver
mine) ; a line from Gladstone to coal mines at Callide; and a line from Miriam Vale to
Glassford Creek. The bill to approve the Normanton to Cloncurry line was withdrawn 
following charges of corruption against the chairman of the syndicate. The others were 
100 QPD 78, I8/ l l /97, pp. I616- I8. 
101 Dickson told the deputation: 11 • • • he thought it possible that offers might be made by capitalists in the
direction of constructing railways which might very well be considered" (BC 19/ 1 1 /97, p .6); and a report of 
the government's rejection of the land-grant scheme suggested that as a result of negotiations the syndicate 
would make a further proposal " somewhat on the lines of the Chillagoe syndicate " (BC 10/6/98, p. 4). 
102 BC 2 1 / 1 1 /99, p. 4; and 20/I 2/99, p. 4. 
103enacted. 
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The act to authorise construction of the Chillagoe railway and the four acts passed in 1 900 
were basically the same. Each authorised construction of the line by the company or syndicate 
which held mineral leases and provided for the company to operate the line. Construction was 
to be undertaken within a specified period and to be under the control of the railways 
commissioner. Companies were to have control over the working of the line though the rates 
they could levy were limited to a maximum of one and a quarter, and in some cases, one and a 
half times those charged on government railways. Extended mineral leases of fifty years were 
granted and provision made for government purchase after this period. In two cases (the 
Chillagoe and Lilydale lines) exemption was granted from the provisions of the Mining Act 
(which among other things set conditions relating to the employment of labour including the 
number of men per acre of leasehold to be employed) in exchange for a higher rent. 
Labour, now the formal opposition, bitterly opposed the principle of private railways and 
stonewalled, causing protracted debates and one marathon sitting of seventy-two hours. In 
the end the government changed the standing orders to enable it to press the last four bills 
through the committee stage in a fixed time. 104 The major issue, though the question was
multi-faceted,  was whether the social benefits of permitting syndicates to construct and 
operate railways would outweigh the social costs of the power they obtained from being so 
permitted. 
103 The term 'tramway' was applied in some of the 1900 acts - in one of them both 'tramway' and 'railway'
were used in the act - and the terms were used interchangeably in discussion. The gauge was only specified as 
being 'not less than 2 feet' (in the case of the Chillagoe railway it had been specified as 3 '6" ) .  The term was
probably promoted as being less politically charged than 'railway'. 
104 QPD 86, 7 /12/00, p. 2957ff. This contrasted, as Philp pointed out, with the way in which the twelve lines
of government railway put forward in the session, involving expenditure of nearly .t2m., had gone through the
house in a total of three days of debate. 
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The argument of the government was that the state was not justified in spending money on 
lines such as t'1.is, especially in the context of the current financial situation: the drought was 
beginning to affect current finances (and thus the ability of the government to sustain interest 
payments on railways not covered by revenue) and the London money market was very 
strained due to events in South Africa and China (thus affecting ability to borrow further 
funds for expenditure on railways). The mining operations they would primarily serve were 
highly speculative ventures and other railway proposals were more certain to promote 
settlement. While the point was never very clearly spelt out it was also argued that because 
the railways in most of these cases were so specifically related to the exploitation of mineral 
deposits (the c�untry traversed by the proposed lines was by and large unsuitable for anything 
other than extensive pastoral use) investment in railways should be seen as the responsibility 
of private capitalists in the same way as investment necessary to undertake the actual mining 
operations. If private syndicates did, however, consider the expenditure warranted, 
Queensland and its people stood to benefit considerably: income and employment would be 
created through the linkage effects of both the investment expenditure and the mining 
operations; further mining activities may be encouraged in the region served by the railway; 
and other activities in the region, limited though these were, would be encouraged and those 
engaging in them benefited . As Philp put it: " Let them do it. If they succeeded in making 
money out of the sums they invested he would be pleased . The companies took all the risk , 
and the colony had everything to gain and nothing to lose " . 105
Opposition to the private railways focused, however, on the social costs likely to be associated 
with them, in particular these resulting from the economic and political power accruing to the 
company owning the railway and its ability, as one Labour member argued, " to exploit every 
105 BC 11 /9 /oo, p. 4.
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producer who has to carry produce or supplies over that railway " . 1 06 The parliamentary
library provided abundant evidence of the social evils associated with private railways 
overseas and much was made of their significance in Richard T. Ely 's American study of 
monopoly . Particular concern was expressed at the power of the companies to charge 25 or 50 
per cent more than the government rate on the lines and to exert other forms of control and 
influence over other producers through the concessions granted. It was argued that a line 
considered profitable by private enterprise would surely be profitable to the state, able as it 
was to borrow longer and at lower rates of interest. Concern was also expressed at the ability 
of the companies in question to exploit workers, in particular by paying wages lower than 
those on government railways, and in two cases (the Callide and Glassford Creek lines) 
Labour managed to insert at the committee stage a clause requiring the company to comply 
with all the regulations concerning "wages, hours and conditions of railway employees" 
enforced on government railways; in one of these, during the marathon sitting, a clause 
requiring also that all labour employed on the construction of the railway be paid at current 
rates of wages ruling in the district was also inserted. Criticism was also directed at the 
concessions granted by allowing exemptions (in the two cases where it was done) from the
provisions of the Mining Act, particularly where these protected working conditions of miners. 
Concern about 'concessions ' to the syndicate was also heightened by the grant made by the 
railways commissioner to the syndicate building the Chillagoe railway of leases of lands and 
waters around the Barron Falls. This concession was subsequently deemed illegal but was the 
basis of much controversy for a large part of the parliamentary session in 1899. 107 There was
considerable controversy also about the grant of land provided for in the aborted Normanton-
106 Joe Lesina, QPD 84, 1 6/8/00, p. 4 10. Lesina was one of the most vehement opponents of syndicate
railways. His speech during the second reading of the Callide Railway Bill (ibid. , pp. 403- 13) contains one of 
the most comprehensive and colourful rehearsals of the arguments. 
107 QPD 83, pauim.
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Cloncurry bill . Some also saw the proposals as a device by which syndicates might more 
readily raise capital , " a  bait to catch British investors" as Kidston put it, asking whether the 
syndicate ever had any intention of ever building the railway . 108 Fears were expressed too that
acceptance of these proposals heralded a fundamental change in the policy of government 
railways which had clearly been established by premiers Nelson and Dickson. The leader of 
the Labour party saw it as an attempt " to drive this wedge into the settled policy of State 
railways and split it up, and in the end we shall have nothing but private railways" . 109
Such hyperbole was typical . Kidston, however, while opposing the government bills, 
acknowledged the demand and need for railways where the government was not justified in 
building them. As a constructive step he put forward a motion incorporating a compromise 
policy while the four bills were still before the House. His proposed system was an adaptation 
of the guarantee principle. It provided that railways such as those under discussion should be 
built by the government if at least one-half of the estimated cost of construction be deposited 
with the government. The company would subsequently be required to guarantee to pay any 
difference between revenue and working expenses (that is, to save the government from loss on 
the actual working of the railway). Where revenue exceeded working expenses, the 
government would have claim on an amount up to that equal to 2 per cent on the capital cost 
of construction; the balance would go to the company and be regarded as repaying the deposit . 
The railway would remain under state management and control . Philp rejected the idea 
arguing that the government preferred to let syndicates build speculative lines entirely on 
their own account and take all the risk. 1 1 0  The idea was not pursued .
108 QPD 84, 8/8/00, pp. 305-6. 
109 Browne, QPl> 84, 22/8/00, p. 476.
1 10 QPD 85, 1 1 / 10/00, p. 13 15ff. 
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Of the five private railway acts passed at this time only two were acted upon. The Chillagoe 
line was opened in 1 900 and the Mt Garnet branch was under construction when Philp lost 
office. 
Despite Labour's implacable opposition to any form of private involvement the Morgan 
government adopted a pragmatic policy on the issue. Its first railway measures were in fact 
bills to allow the construction of short branch railways by two gold-mining companies in 
Charters Towers. The opposition, spurred on by criticism from within Labour ranks, had 
some fun over the measures, Philp claiming them to be "on all fours with our private 
syndicate Bills " . 1 1 1 Labour 's Browne - now a minister - rightly claimed that there was in fact
a material difference in that no concessions were offered to the companies in connection with 
the projects. In 1905 , however, an act was passed to provide for an extension of time for the 
company involved in one of the private railway acts passed in 1 900 to raise the necessary 
capital and start work on the line. The drought and difficult conditions in both the local and 
London capital markets were cited as reasons fo� the delay and Morgan declared himself 
satisfied as to the bona fides of the company and the likelihood of the project proceeding. 
More significantly he affirmed his acceptance of the principles of the principal act, the only 
change in which he had (unsuccessfully) sought was a reduction in the period after which the
government cC1uld purchase the railway . 1 1 2 Kidston did not speak to the bill but, with all
other Labour members, voted against it. 
The pragmatic position of the government was spelt out during the 1 904 election campaign, an 
action prompted particularly by the negotiations with the Chillagoe Company with respect to 
a line from thP- existing Chillagoe line to Georgetown. These had actually been initiated with 
1 1 1  QPD 91 ,  1 1 / 1 1 /03, p. 1 147. 
1 1 2  The Albert River, Burketown and Lilydale Tramway Act Amendment Act; QPD 96, 2/ 1 1/05, p. 1 426ff. 
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the Philp government but had been going on with the Morgan government since late 1 903. 
While adopting the position that " the private ownership of railways is usually accompanied by 
evils so grave that the State should not, under ordinary conditions, sanction the construction 
and manageriient of railways by private enterprise" ,  Morgan conceded that in the 
circumstances of the time "we may have to choose between allowing private enterprise to 
supply the want and leaving the want unsatisfied "  . 1 13 He expressed the government's
preparedness to consider proposals though only on certain conditions and in particular " the 
condition of State control and working, pending the exercise of the option of purchase, which 
should form part of every agreement for the construction of such lines 11 • 1 1 4 
After several proposals and counter-proposals an agreement was finally entered into after 
authorisation by parliament at the end of 1 905 . The agreement was validated by the 
Etheridge Railway Act passed the following year. Under the terms of the agreement the 
Chillagoe Company was to provide the capital , estimated at l 400,000, to build the line which
would be constructed privately under the supervision of the government and subsequently 
operated by the government. The profits were to accrue to the company with a guarantee 
provided by the government of 21h per cent on cost of construction; that is, if profits were less 
than 21h per rent the government would be obliged to augment them to the extent of the 
shortfall ,  but anything over 21h per cent accrued to the company. Provisions were made for 
purchase in fifteen years time at a price equal to 31h per cent of the average annual net 
earnings of the line during the five years immediately preceding purchase. 
In supporting the proposal Kidston reaffirmed his opposition to the proposals of the Philp 
government but claimed that the present policy avoided the problems associated with private 
1 1 3  On assuming office in 1903 in the context of accumulated deficits of over �l m. Morgan and Kidston had
adopted a policy of no borrowing and drastically reduced expenditure from the loan fund. 
1 1 4 Manifesto, BC 23/7 /04, p. 6; Also speech at Warwick, BC 27 /7 /04, p. 6. 
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control of railway operations. He also invoked the support of the Worker which in July 1 904 
(in relation to earlier negotiations but essentially the same terms) had declared that: "There 
is little in [the proposal] that Labourites can take exception to. It preserves the principle of 
State ownership and control, while at the same time providing facilities for its construction of 
developmental lines in districts where the Government is not itself prepared to build 11 • 1 1 6
Despite this a number of Labour members opposed, and voted against, the measure. 
Construction of the railway commenced in 1907 . 
During Kidston 's period as premier two further agreements were entered into which provided 
for private capital to be employed in the construction of mining railways, both in 1 908. An 
agreement validated by the Hampden-Mt Elliott Railway Act provided for the Hampden and 
Mount Elliott companies to pay (in the ratio 40:60) one-half the cost of an estimated £200,000 
line from Cloncurry to the area of the companies' mines. 1 16 The railway was to be constructed
and operated by the commissioner. The government was to be entitled to 31h per cent return 
on the money it had spent (that is one-half of the total cost of construction) ,  net profits in 
excess of 31h per cent all going to the companies. Any losses were. to be borne by the 
government. The act provided for 'purchase ' after fifteen years on the same basis as had been 
specified in the case of the Etheridge Railway. Despite the elimination of all the features of 
private railways to which objections had been made, Labour stuck rigidly to its policy of full 
and pure state ownership and opposed the bill. The most implacable opponent, Joe Lesina, 
spoke for six and a half hours during an all-night sitting during the second reading and the 
guillotine was applied during the committee stage. 1 17 At the same time yet another agreement
was reached with Queensland Silver-Lead Mines relating to the construction of a tramway 
1 1 6  Quoted in QPD 97, 14/8/06, p. 261 .  
1 16  B C  10/4/08, p. 6 ;  QPD 101 ,  10/4/08, p .  768ff. 
1 17 QPD 101 ,  10/4/08, p. 768ff. 
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from the Gulf to Lilydale, the company having forfeited its deposits made under the earlier 
acts of 1900 and 1905. The agreement was similar to that with the Mount Elliott company 
though it required the company to find three-quarters of the cost of construction and required 
also that until the time the money was provided and work on the line commenced expenditure 
of £1 ,000 per month had to be undertaken on development works at the mine. Thus it was
even less favourable to the company than the Hampden-Mt Elliott agreement and considerably 
less favourable than the agreements of 1900 and 1905: in particular the ownership and control 
of the line and the concessions granted under those acts which could have given the company 
the dreaded 'control over the district ' were not renewed. The first of these lines was opened in 
1910 though it was soon taken over by the railways commissioner to form part of the Great 
Western railway . 1 18 The line to Lilydale was never built, the company once again forfeiting its
deposit, and its mineral leases; 1 19 the act was repealed, along with others which had never
been taken advantage of, by the consolidating railway act of 19 14. 
No further arrangements of this type were entered into during this period. The only lines 
actually constructed under the arrangements were the Etheridge and Mt Elliott railways 
though some other 2' tramways were built privately under the mining act. 1 20
THE BETTERMENT PRINCIPLE 
The search in the 1890s for alternative principles of financing railway construction had led to 
1 18 BC 7 / 1 / 1 1 ,  p. 5 .  
1 1 9  B C  28/5/ 1 1 , p .  4. 
1 20 J. Kerr, 'North Queensland mining railways', in K.H. Kennedy (ed.), Readings in North Queenaland Mining
Hiatory, vol. 1 ,  History Dept., James Cook University of North Queensland, 1980, pp. 287-90; G.C. Bolton, A
Thouund Mi/ea Away: a Hiatory of North Queenaland to 1 920, Jacaranda, 1963, p. 289. 
relatively few actual changes and at the end of the decade railways were still being built on 
much the same basis as they had hitherto. Indeed, despite the poor financial performance of 
the railways from 1900 to 1903 and the large overall budget deficits {for which the railways 
were partly responsible) in these years, Philp maintained the level of expenditure on railway
construction at levels comparable to the second half of the '90s. Morgan and Kidston, by 
contrast, pursued a policy of severe cutbacks in both current and loan expenditure after their 
government replaced that led by Philp. From 1903 to 1906 loan expenditure on railway 
construction was drastically trimmed, falling from just on .£700,000 in 1902-03 to .£120,000 in 
1904-05 . 1 2 1  No further borrowing was undertaken.
Part of Kidston 's policy of financial rigour was directed at the failure of local authorities to 
honour their obligation to the State government with respect to loans which had been made 
particularly for central sugar mills and local railways/tramways. As a report in the Courier in 
1904 put it, most of the local authorities appeared to have regarded the conditions regarding 
repayment of their forty year loans for tramways as "permissive rather than imperative" .  The 
only tramway with respect to which the relevant shire or municipal council was up to date 
with interest and redemption payments was the Ayr tramway. With respect to the other 
tramways there was owing to the government roughly -l12,000 for interest and nearly £4,000
for redemption . A circular had been issued to the relevant authorities requesting them to pay 
outstanding amounts or make satisfactory arrangements under threat of having imposed upon 
them a special rate to cover outstanding indebtedness. 122 In this context the system of lending
local authorities money so that they could construct and operate local railways was not 
further pursued. In any case the money would have had to come from the loan fund and it 
121 See Table 4. 1 .  
1 22 BC 13/3/04, p. 13. 
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was Kidston 's aim to cut loan expenditure so as to avoid the need to raise any further loans in 
the short to medium term. 
But while construction of railways by local government authorities and by private enterprise 
did not play a significant part after 1903 the other principles developed in the 1890s were 
further explored. The betterment principle had already been put into effect by the Philp 
government in the Local Authorities Act of 1902 and its more general application had been 
under review when the government lost office. 1 23 Morgan, who had taken the railways
portfolio himself, extended the idea to that of actually financing the whole capital cost of 
railways through the sale of Crown land at the 'enhanced ' value resulting from the provision 
of railway communication. 
In late 1903 and early 1904 George Phillips, a railways engineer and surveyor and 
acknowledged expert on Queensland railways, was requested to inspect and report upon the 
possibility and viability of settlement in conjunction with the construction of light lines of 
railway in a number of districts in the Burnett and Darling Downs regions. In each case 
Phillips was asked to report on the extent of land suitable for close settlement; the possibility 
of constructing light lines of railway connected to the existing system to serve the district; the 
value of land under present conditions, the expected enhanced value of land after railway 
communication and " the increased price which the Government would require to receive for 
the land to recompensate the outlay in providing [railway) communication 11 •
As Phillips was making his report on one of the proposed lines referred to him, Morgan showed 
his interest in the concept by floating it before a deputation asking for the line to be built, 
after telling them bluntly that its construction on the usual basis was out of the question . 
1 23 QPD 93, 8/ 12/04, pp. 1 190, 1 1 97. 
Paraphrasing his remarks, the Courier explained that: 
The theory is that provided the revenue of the State is protected there is no reason 
why rich and now practically inaccessible lands should not be opened up by a light 
line cheap enough to be within the power of a Government to build and effective 
enough to increase the value of the Crown lands in close touch with the proposed 
line to an extent more than sufficient to cover the cost of the railway. 1 24 
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The thrust of Phillips' detailed reports were strongly to recommend construction of light 
railways in these districts though he conceded that they would probably run at a loss in the 
short term. His calculations showed, however, that the enhanced value of land attributable to 
the provision of railway communication considerably exceeded the estimated cost of 
t t. f · 1 125cons rue ion o ra1 ways. 
A difficulty ,  however, which Phillips subsequently acknowledged, was that in some cases a 
considerable proportion of land the value of which, it was estimated, would be enhanced was 
held under freehold tenure (or was selected land in the process of being alienated) . Had all
land been Crown land so that the betterment accrued to the government, and thus able to be 
capitalised by sale of the land at the enhanced value, then, on the basis of Phillips' 
calculations, the revenue received would have more than covered the capital cost of railway 
construction . But this was not always the case. No acknowledgement was made in 1 904, 
during the election campaign or in the opening speech of the session where the policy was 
advocated ,  of the need to apply the betterment principle to freehold land if the system was to 
work. 1 26 In fact it is not clear exactly what, at this stage, the betterment was intended to
cover: for example, in Morgan 's 1 904 manifesto reference was made simply to the in terest on 
1 24 BC 1 5/3/04, p. 4. 
1 26 Phillips ' six reports appear in QPP 1904-05 II, p. 199ff. 
1 26 Morgan's manifesto, BC 23/7 /04, p. 4; speech at Warwick, BC 27 /7 /04, pp. 6-6; QPD 93, 2 1 /9/04, p. 4 .
- 227 
the cost of construction being " borne by the land benefited " .  
But during the 1 904 session a Land Betterment Assessment Bill was introduced. This was to 
apply to land betterment arising from all causes other than those attributable to the actions of 
the owners. It was made clear, however, that, as Denham put it, " the measure really grew out 
of the investigation into the possibility, or practicability, of applying the betterment principle 
to railways that are going to be built . . . 11 • 1 27 The bill provided that l'h per cent of the
betterment attributable to actions other than those of the owner should be paid each year. 
The policy involved many conceptual and practical difficulties and had clearly been hastily 
conceived and not fully thought through. Whether the government really expected it to be 
passed is deb2.table. In the event it was strongly opposed on account of its broad-ranging 
nature and was widely criticised as a land tax. As the government owed its very existence to 
the taxation policies of the Philp government and had itself promised no new taxation the 
measure was criticised as 11 a wanton breach of faith with the constituencies " . 1 28 Considerable
uneasiness among the government's own supporters resulted in  the measure being dropped 
fairly readily. But, so the government argued, it was possible still, in some cases, to finance 
railway construction by securing the whole of the betterment by sale of Crown land. Thus 
two lines through districts where a considerable amount of Crown land was available (or soon
would be through leases falling in) were put forward to parliament for construction on this
principle towards the end of the 1904 session: these were the extension of the Gayndah 
Branch in the Burnett and the branch line from Dalby on which Phillips had reported. 
It was proposed that in the areas served by the lines Crown lands would be withdrawn from 
sale (indeed action to this end had already been taken) to be put back on the market at an
127 QPD 93, 22/ 1 1 /04, p. 887. 
1 28 BC 18/ 1 1 /04. p. 4. 
- ££8 
appropriately enhanced value when construction of the railway had been approved. Proceeds 
from sales of Crown lands in the two districts were then to be considered as consisting of two 
parts: the 'p'rairie value ' of the land, and its added or enhanced value given by the 
construction of the railway. The former was to be paid into consolidated revenue, the latter 
into the loan . fund to be applied in the retirement of the capital cost of the railway. 1 29
Whether it was really intended that land sales would be used to cover the capital costs of 
railway construction in any precise way and if so over what period of time is not clear; the 
proposed accounting procedures were not spelt out. (If, as was clearly implied, the land was to 
be made available for selection under the terms of the land act, revenue would only accrue 
through instalments of purchase money paid over twenty years. )  Phillips' reports must have 
made it obvious that each district would be likely to yield different total 'added values ' to 
Crown land w.hich, if realised, would vary in their relation to the capital cost of the railway. 
In the case of �he Gayndah Branch line his figures supported the claim that the betterment of 
Crown land would exceed the capital cost of the railway. In the case of the second line (the 
branch line from Dalby) the position was considerably less satisfactory as nearly half the 
length of the line ran through two large freehold properties; Phillips' original report had made 
I 
clear that the betterment on Crown land would be small in relation to that on the freehold 
land and in fact would not cover the cost of construction. The estimates were as follows: 
Gayndah branch 
Dalby - Maida Hill 
1 29 QPD 93, 8/1 2/04, pp. 1 189-90. 
Estimated cost 
of construction 
/, 
75,382 
3 1 , 693 
Estimated increment 
in land value 
Available 
Crown land 
£ 
107,742 
20,000 
Freehold (or 
Selected) land 
£ 
70,527 
78,750 
££9 
The problem in the second case was taken up by the railways commissioner in his report on 
the line where he had argued that: " Considering the advantages of this line to the owners of 
[the two large runs] I am of opinion that a strong effort should be made to induce them to pay 
in some form or other part of the cost of construction 11 • 130 The government had by this stage
effectively dropped the Land Betterment Assessment Bill so had no policy on this matter. But 
an amendment to the motion to approve the railway which required a " contribution by the 
owners of all benefited freehold lands of a proportion of the cost of construction according to a 
benefited area 11 , with the balance of construction cost to be secured by realisation of the 
enhanced price of Crown Land, placed the government in something of a dilemma. 131 Its
supporters included a number of ardent advocates of the betterment principle and indeed the 
betterment bill was still before parliament. Philp argued that it was inconsistent to bring 
forward a general betterment bill but then oppose an attempt to introduce the principle in a 
particular case. Labour members who were strong advocates of the principle were in a 
particularly awkward situation and only opposed the amendments and let the original motion 
for the line stand after Morgan acknowledged the principle involved and promised that the 
government would address the issue. He conceded that " If it was fair that the people who 
bought the ummld Crown lands paid the added value given by the construction of the railway, 
it was also fair that they should look to the owners of the intervening lands for a contribution 
towards the cost of the railway in return for the benefit they would derive. It was only a 
question of how they should accomplish what they desired " .  The Land Betterment Bill had 
been dropped as being too all embracing and politically unlikely to succeed ; but Morgan 
agreed that "Parliament ought to supply the authority to meet such cases as the present" ,  and 
he promised to address the government " to securing for themselves, and for their successors, 
130 QPP 1904-05 II, p. 654.
131 QPD 93, 1 2/ 12/04, p. 1 231fl'. and p. 1 247ff. 
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the power to deal in an effective way with situations such as they found themselves confronted 
with at Dalby, where they had to construct a railway through several miles of privately owned 
land in order to render Crown lands available for settlement" . 13
2
No progress was made along these lines, however; and in fact Morgan fell back on the much 
broader policy of financing railway construction by sales of land in general - a policy he had 
put forward a'U the election earlier in 1904. 133 In this case no attempt was made to define in
any precise way the relationship between the cost of railway construction and the enhanced 
value of land thereby caused. Thus, when a deputation in July 1905 seeking an extension of 
the Bowen rail way met Morgan, the following interchange occurred : 
Morgan: If they refrained from going to the London money market there was only 
one way by which they could add to the capital available for expenditure on such 
works as this, and that was by realising upon some of the capital we now had in the 
form of national estate. He had no hesitation in recommending to the country a 
year ago that the proceeds should be devoted to the construction of railways, which 
would benefit the lands remaining in the possession of the State. 
A member of the deputation : That land, for instance, on this line might be sold. 
Sell that land and build the railway with it? 
Morgan: He would not say sell that particular land, but it was good, sound advice 
that, in order to get money to provide development works, they should realise upon 
some of the national estate and apply the proceeds . . .  as capital to the construction 
134 of developmental works. 
To this end he foreshadowed a policy to establish a fund whereby proceeds of sales of land 
could be applied to the construction of railways. The policy was embodied in a bill brought 
before parliament in 1 905 and finally enacted in 1906 as the Land Sales Proceeds Act. This 
provided that the proceeds of all sales of land made under the provisions of the 1897  land act 
should be paid into the loan fund. There was no requirement that land sales should be related 
1 32 Ibid., p. 1 244 . 
1 33 Manifesto, BC 23/7 /04, p. 5; speech BC 21 /7 /04, p. 6.
134 Report of deputation, BC 1 5/7 /05, p. 5, emphasis added.
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to any particu lar railway project nor was there any indication of the extent to which revenue 
raised from land sales was expected to fund expenditure on railway construction. The policy 
also abandoned the distinction made in the context of the earlier proposals between the 
'prairie value' of land and the enhanced value, only the second of which was to be paid into 
the loan fund. In the event such sales were made to only a small extent. 135 This was a result
partly of the buoyant economic conditions after mid-decade in which borrowing was once 
again resumed at a high level and partly because of the policy with respect to railway 
construction adopted in 1906.  
This policy w.is developed by Denham when he took over the railways portfolio following 
Morgan 's resignation and incorporated in the Railways Act of 1906. Recognising the problem 
which had confounded Morgan (how to secure the betterment accruing to the owners of large
freehold estates benefited by the railway) as well as the way in which, under the Morgan plan,
new selectors would be disadvantaged relative to those who had already taken up land, 
Denham subsequently explained how " they devised what they thought was an equitable 
scheme" . 136 The policy represented a synthesis of ideas about the financial principles of
railway construction as they had emerged over the previous decade. The act was to apply to 
all railways henceforth to be constructed by the government. It provided that any deficiency 
between (i) the cost of maintaining and working the railway plus interest at 3 per cent per
annum on the cost of construction, and (ii ) the earnings of the railway, be met by a 'railway
rate ' ;  this was to be levied on the ratepayers within the area benefited by the railway (to be
known as the Railway District) together with the treasurer in respect of vacant land situated
within the district. The railway rate was to be calculated on the basis of the capital value of 
136 See Table 2.2. 
136 QPD 1 14 19/8/13, p. 909. 
the land including an allowance for the enhanced value resulting from the railway 
construction, and, in the case of Crown land held under lease or license, an amount equal to 
forty times the amount of annual rent payable to the Crown at the time when the valuation 
was made. The act also provided that where no deficiency arose for three consecutive years 
the ratepayers and treasurer were released from all liability under the act (any surpluses could 
be carried forward for the purposes of such calculations). 
The act thus sought to secure betterment through the guarantee principle; the policy was 
applied to all cases of railway construction by the government - not just those where 
ratepayers voluntarily brought themselves under such a principle as in the case of the Railway 
Guarantee Act of 1895 (which was repealed save in respect of the four railways which had 
been built under the act). It was not, however, an attempt to secure all betterment and apply 
it to the cost of railway construction (which in cases where the railway was to run through 
large areas of unsold Crown land could, over time at least, through sale of that land have 
financed the whole of the capital cost of construction). Rather it merely ensured t�at any 
deficiency in working expenses and interest on the capital cost of the line was met by those 
land owners (private and public) who benefited from the construction of the railway. Thus the 
principle embodied in the railway proposals put forward in 1904 (the Dalby and Gayndah 
Branches) which envisaged the use of 'public betterment' to fund railway construction and 
thus avoid the accrual of public debt had been considerably amended - almost inevitably given 
the political a.nd practical difficulties of raising revenue from betterment. But the policy 
implemented in 1 906 had the advantage of its generality. While there was a reversion to 
dependence on borrowed money to fund railway construction, the requirement that those 
deemed benefited by a railway should guarantee that the government received a return only 
slightly below the prevailing level of interest rates ensured that the additional claims on public 
revenue would , at worst, be minimal .  Thus there was established a general policy under which 
the matter of railway construction came to be regarded, in Denham 's words, 11 more strictly as
137one of finance 11 • 
Misgivings were expressed about the equity of the measure though these were less valid than in 
the case of guarantee railways under the 1 895 act. It was argued that railways should be seen 
essentially as national undertakings which conferred benefits in a general way and that it was 
unfair to place the whole burden of guarantee on those people in an arbitrary 'benefited area'; 
at the very least the government and people generally should be required to bear a proportion 
of any direct financial loss. Philp moved to have the guarantee reduced to 2 per cent, but he 
was defeated: it was argued that any burden on ratepayers in a benefited area from a railway 
(which they have the right to veto) would be more than offset by advantages conferred.
The act was seen as a means of greatly facilitating railway construction and the borrowing 
necessary to finance it. Not only would the government be insulated from any losses on 
railway cons�ruction and operation, its ability to borrow would be enhanced . In Denham 's 
words: "With such a Bill as this on the Statute-book any government would be warranted in 
an active energetic railway policy, instead of hanging back and wondering whether if the line 
is built it is going to add to the interest burden of the general taxpayer . . . .  If we are to 
proceed with an active railway policy it is incumbent that we should borrow more money. If 
there is no danger of our public works being unremunerative there can be no possible objection 
to borrowing money. 11 1 38 The act indeed paved the way for an unprecedented burst of railway
building by the government in the context of rapidly improving economic conditions and a 
marked improvement in railway finances. 
137 QPD 57, 31 /i' /06, p. 91 .  
138 Ibid. , p. 90. 
EXPANSION UNDER GUARANTEE 
After 1906 there was a dramatic increase in expenditure on railway construction in 
Queensland. 139 From a low point in 1904-05 when only i120,000 was expended from the loan
fund on railways, expenditure rose steadily to nearly .l3m. in 1 9 1 1-12 .  It was reduced in the
following years but remained at levels which exceeded that of any year hitherto. During this 
time the length of railway line open in Queensland was extended by 50 per cent, from just 
over 3,000 miles to more than 4 ,500 miles; and 294 miles remained under construction in mid-
1914. 140
The bold railway policy of the period was an integral part of the thrust for development which 
characterised the period. In the context of a run of good seasons the pastoral industry 
recovered strongly and the development of agricultural industries constituted a new base for 
economic growth. Improvements in railway communication were seen to be necessary to 
facilitate and promote further development and,  at the same time, to be justified economically 
by the rapid · improvement in general economic conditions which these developments 
underpinned. The mood of liberality was encouraged by the marked improvement in railway 
finances which occurred during the period : after 1 906 the rate of return to investment in 
railways rose to, and remained at, levels not hitherto achieved . Correspondingly, the charge 
on consolidated revenue (the interest chargeable to expenditure on railways less net revenue
from railways) fell to historically low levels and in two years the railways actually contributed
to consolidated revenue. 1 4 1  Whatever the precise meaning of these figures they were widely
heeded at the time. In any case the application of the guarantee principle through the 1906 
139 See Table 4. t .  
140 Annual Report of the Railways Commissioner 1913- 14, QPP 1 9 1 4  ID ,  p .  2 10.
141 See Table 4. J . 
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act was seen to insulate the government from the consequences of unprofitable railways and 
prevent new railway investment imposing a burden on taxpayers in general . 
The high level of expenditure deemed justified in this context entailed borrowing on a massive 
scale. The low level of loan expenditure by the Morgan-Kidston governments from 1903 to 
1908 was undertaken out of the credit balance of the loan fund, augmented by £500,000 raised 
in April 1908 from the unsold balance of the loan authorised in 1902 under the Philp 
government. By 1908, as a bolder expenditure policy was evolving, it was clear that authority 
for raising further loan money was needed; and in any case it was constitutionally necessary to 
validate expenditure which had already been undertaken by including the projects in a loan 
act. Loan proposals, and a loan act, were thus passed in 1908 for a loan of .!3.2m. nearly all 
of which was for railways. 142 A further loan act authorising the raising of nearly £10m. was
passed in 19 10. All of it was for railways, just on .66.8m. for two major trunk line projects 
which had just. been approved by parliament; the balance related primarily to branch railways 
where, in most cases, the lines had already been included in loan estimates and the money 
expended out of the loan fund. The bulk of this loan was actually raised between April 19 1 1  
and April 19 14. A loan act i n  1 9 14 authorised the raising of an additional sum of over .l6m. 
for railways to cover expenditure already undertaken as well as to provide further funds for 
the large number of railways which were coming forward ,  receiving parliamentary approval 
and being placed on the loan estimates. Increasingly difficult conditions on the London market 
and the need to pay higher rates of interest constituted no deterrent. 
The main limiting factor to railway building during the period was in fact the ability of the 
economy to handle the large injection of expenditure involved and the railways department to 
142 The act covered entirely projects on which money had already been spent. In effect, therefore, it was
merely providing the constitutional validation for that expenditure and giving authority to raise additional 
funds to augment. the loan fund. See statement of K.idston explaining the situation, BC 2 1 / 1 2/08, p. 5 . 
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qndertake the hugely expanded task associated with surveys, preparation of plans and 
supervision of building. By 1909 the minister was complaining of a shortage of labour. 1 43
After four ccnsecutive years where parliament had approved long lists of railways a 
moratorium was called in 1912 .  At the middle of that year nineteen railways were under 
construction, their total estimated capital cost being about l2m., while the ten lines 
authorised by parliament in 1 9 1 1  were yet to have work started on them. At this stage about 
3,500 men were directly employed on railway construction and many others were indirectly 
employed (for example sleeper-getting and working with teams). Despite schemes to obtain 
immigrants specifically to work on railways there were continuing difficulties in obtaining the 
necessary labour as well as the necessary skilled staff such as engineers and surveyors. The 
problems of pressing too hard for other sectors of the economy were also obvious. 
The essence of the government's railway policy during this period was the construction of 
branch lines both to service and to facilitate closer settlement based on the expansion of 
agriculture and dairying. It was these industries which were attracting the major part o� 
private investment during the period and serving as the basis for the marked economic growth 
which took place from mid-decade onward. A number of lines were also approved and built 
primarily to service mining areas and a couple mainly as timber lines. Superimposed upon this 
program were two grand schemes of railway construction: one to extend and link all the 
coastal railways north of Rockhampton to provide a continuous line from Brisbane to Cairns 
(the North Coast railway);  the second to extend and connect the major trunk routes in the 
southern, central and northern parts of the state (the Great Western railway). 
Long lists of railways were placed before parliament for approval from 1908 onwards. (The 
intention had been to start the process in 1907 but plans were thwarted by the political crisis 
1 43 QPD 104, 10/ 1 1 /09, p. 1 25. 
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at the end of that year.) The two trunk routes were brought forward and approved in 19 10.
As noted, a halt was called in 1912  and 1913  due to the bank up of lines under construction 
and not yet st.arted, but there was no diminution in the enthusiasm for railway building; in 
1914, with the backlog of construction reduced, sixteen lines, an unprecedentedly large 
number, were put to and passed by parliament. 
In the context of buoyant economic conditions and the healthy state of railway finances and 
the public finances in general, and with the 1906 railway act providing the government with 
an assured minimum rate of return on its railway investment, the evaluation of railway 
proposals became less and less stringent. The procedure by which proposed lines were brought 
forward to, and evaluated by, parliament was basically unchanged from that which had 
applied in the 1890s. There was considerable scope here for the exercise of personal whim and 
judgment on the part of ministers, as the experience of the first year of renewed activity 
showed particularly clearly. At the beginning of the year railways minister Denham noted to 
a deputation t.hat out of twenty-seven railway propositions that he _had investigated and in 
most cases received reports on he had selected ten 11 that he would press hard and press 
quickly, in tlte hope of getting the plans sufficiently forward for the next session of 
Parliament" . 144 When Denham resigned in February his successor, Joshua Bell , progressively
amended this to a list of eleven which, however, excluded six in the former list. George Kerr, 
who replaced Bell in the middle of the year, finally settled on a list of thirteen in October after 
much toing and froing and involvement by Kidston: these thirteen included five from the 
original list of Denham 's, three from those added by Bell and five fresh proposals of his own.  
It was only at this time that definite instructions were given to the commissioner with respect 
to preparation of plans and reports for parliament, but the crisis intervened before any could 
144 BC 24/ 1 /07, p. 5 . 
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actually be brought forward. The political circumstances were exceptional here but the case 
illustrates the .power of the minister at this preliminary but critical stage of proceedings. 1 46
When it was decided which proposals to bring to parliament they were tabled in the 
Legislative Assembly along with the commissioner's report and moved by the minister. If and 
when passed they went to the council, were reported on by a select committee of the 
Legislative Council (as had been the practice throughout the period on the basis of the 1 879 
standing order) and debated. When passed the proposals were subject to the processes 
specified under the 1 906 act (objectors to the declaration of the Railway District - the 
benefited area - could require a poll of ratepayers involved on the proposal) .  If not vetoed in 
this way the proposals were then available for inclusion in loan estimates. Annual estimates 
were also subject to debate and approval by a committee of supply. The way was then clear 
for expenditure of loan money. 
During this period none of the decisions of the government either with respect �o the nature of 
railway policy regarding the lines to be built, or its overall magnitude was altered in any 
significant way by any of these procedures. (The only exception was in the case a proposal 
branch line from Blackall which was vetoed at a poll of ratepayers. )  The commissioner 's 
reports followed a standard format. Descriptions of the type of country to be traversed and 
technical details of the line were followed by estimates of cost of construction , and of 
anticipated revenue and working expenses, a definition of the benefited area and his 
recommendation . Estimates of revenue and expenses (especially the former) were 
acknowledged .to be rough and were usually based on the experience of other lines considered 
'comparable' .  The estimated rate of return varied considerably, sometimes exceeding the 
145 The details were spelt out at an election meeting in January 1908 by J.D. Campbell, railways minister in
the brief Philp government, in an attempt to illustrate the "incompetence and insincerity" of the Kidston 
government's raiJway policy. (BC 8/1 /08, p. 6.) 
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critical 3 per cent though in many cases falling considerably below this figure and on occasions 
below 1 per cent. As lines were often explicitly designed to 'open up ' new areas the view was 
frequently expressed that the situation would inevitably improve as more traffic was generated 
(though to what extent this anticipated increase was built into the estimates is not clear) and 
indeed the commissioner 's recommendation was often based primarily on the value of the line 
in opening up new area for development and closer settlement. 
Debates in the Assembly were generally brief. The definition of the benefited area occasioned 
some dispute. And the familiar complaint of insufficient information to allow members to 
make a sensible decision was also occasionally heard. But controversy was usually confined to 
matters such as rival routes or alternative proposals; discussion of profitability was usually in 
this context. Jndeed, especially in 1 908 and 1909,  more time was spent in debate arising out of 
the concerted move by Labou·r members to have conditions regarding wages to workers 
engaged in railway building written into approvals. 
Passage through the Legislative Council was even easier. The select committees appointed 
under standing orders rarely provided any more penetrating analysis of individual proposals. 
Witnesses usually consisted of the railways commissioner and chief engineer and sometimes 
local farmers or businesspeople and the local member. Questioning was general and random 
and often leading. Information gained was imprecise and frequently no more than anecdotal. 
Concern was mainly focused on the possibilities for 'development ' and 'opening up' of country 
or on specific matters such as routes. Little attention was paid to financial aspects. In some 
cases members of the committees displayed less than complete familiarity with the guarantee 
provisions of the 1 906 act. 
As it happened, therefore, the parliamentary processes altered the railway policy of the 
government in no way during this period. Its feeding of lines into annual loan estimates as 
considered appropriate also escaped control: the estimates were invariably passed virtually 
without debate. 
The attitude t.owards the analysis and evaluation of railway proposals at the time is perhaps 
best illustrated by the Great Western railway proposal . Such a line had been talked of for 
some time - indeed it was not dissimilar to Mcllwraith 's proposed transcontinental railway to 
be built on the land-grant principle which had been put forward in 1883. Dickson had also 
talked of the need to link up the railway systems when he was minister in the 1890s. The 
question was given more attention following the great drought when devastating stock losses 
were experienced. In 1903 a motion had been put to parliament supporting the concept and 
received considerable support, including that of Philp. Philp in fact made the linking up of 
the railway systems part of his policy at the 1907 election and from this time the idea was 
pressed from several quarters: for example a deputation from the Brisbane Chamber of 
Commerce urged the project upon the minister in October 1907 . 1 46 The major benefit and
justification of the scheme was argued to be the facility it would provide for shifting stock in 
times of drought either to the coast or other drought free inland areas and for transporting 
fodder to drought-affected areas. Never was the manner in which this would operate spelt out 
in any detailed way, however, or any calculation of the costs and benefits attempted. The 
advantages of the railway for defence purposes and for promoting closer pastoral settlement 
were also frequently referred to, but again never in any detailed way. By 19 10, with the 
revival of the fortunes of the pastoral industry, Kidston was convinced that the scheme should 
be pursued. 
It was a grand scheme involving nearly 1 ,300 miles of railway (about one third of the existing 
mileage of line in Queensland) and an expenditure of over l4m. But the only information 
146 BC 17 / 10/07! p. 2 .
available to members when the bill was initiated was a two-page report from the commissioner 
and a six-page report from a surveyor based on a motor-car trip which did not even exactly 
cover the proposed route of the railway. 1 47 While it was rather outside of the surveyor 's brief
to offer comments on the financial aspects he nonetheless did, offering the view that while the 
project would not pay directly, indirectly " it should pay the State handsomely " largely 
because of the facility for moving stock in time of drought and concluding with the 
observation that "I heard one gentleman remark that if he owned Queensland he would not 
hesitate 5 minutes before trying to borrow the necessary money for the Railway . . .  and I 
thought he was talking sensibly " . 1 48 But these comments were not based on even rough
estimates of revenue and working costs, nor even of the capital cost of the line which the 
surveyor suggested could best be made by the commissioner. The commissioner 's estimates of 
capital cost and net revenue from the line yielded a figure of over £80,000 per annum which 
would need to be raised by a railway rate to cover the interest on capital cost at 3 per cent, or 
8s.9d. per square mile in the benefited area, a figure which , he asserted , " should decrease year 
by year until ultimately extinguished " .  In relation to current average rents in the area of 
12s. 9d. per square mile this appeared remarkably high. But, it was claimed, the advantages 
accruing to run-holders in the form of decreased management, freight and interest costs (the
latter because of quicker returns) , lower stock losses in time of drought, and improved
conditions of life generally would more than compensate for this change. Indeed, the 
commissioner argued, some increase in land rents might even be justified thus benefiting the 
state generally . 1 49 Further information , including estimates as to increased carrying capacity
in the four districts making up the benefited area and the estimated savings in freight costs for 
147 QVP 1910 m, pp. 487-94. 
148 Ibid., p. 491 .  
149 Ibid., p .  488. 
typical stations in the districts, was tabled during the minister 's second reading speech. But 
the lack of any serious analysis was obvious. While it was generally acknowledged that a 
measure such as this should not be a party measure it in fact became one. The acting leader 
of the opposition moved that a " competent commission 11 be appointed to consider and report 
on the "engineering, pastoral , agricultural , mining, commercial, and financial aspects " of the 
proposal . 150 His speech and those of many other Labour members contained moderate and 
well-reasoned criticism of several aspects of the proposal: the lack of data that had been put 
forward relating to the effect of the railway on stock numbers and its financial prospects; the 
absence of any plans or even a clearly defined route; and the waiving of the right of ratepayers 
(ordinarily ava.ilable under the 1 906 act) to object to the railway in the light of the admitted 
financial burdens it would impose on them. Telling criticisms were also levelled at the 
arguments commonly used to support the railway ,  particularly the idea that it would enable 
the ready removal of stock in time of drought (most persuasively put by Vernon Winstanley, 
member for Charters Towers ) . 1 5 1  By contrast the government and their supporters, even 
though acknowledging some of the weaknesses of the proposal , rallied to support it at times 
exhibiting a sort of mindless infatuation with the boldness of the scheme. As one Labour 
member put it: " The Ministry seems to be afflicted with some form of megalomania" . 
The Great Western railway scheme (and the North Coast railway) were symbols of the bold 
policy which the exceptional economic progress of the time seemed to require and for which 
Kidston asserted to a party meeting where he sought approval for the schemes - almost by 
way of challenge - Queensland now "had the heart " . 152  The Western railway thus readily 
became one for "opening up " and "developing" the western country, 153 complementing the 
150 QPD 107, 1 / 12/10, p. 2462. 
161 QPP 107, 2/ 12/ 10, p. 2509ff. 
162 BC 18/ 1 1 / 10. p. 5 . 
163 QPD 107, 29/1 1 / 10, p. 2370; 1 / 1 2/10, p. 2462. 
program of branch line construction in the agricultural areas nearer the coast. 
During these years there was little questioning either of the processes of decision-making or of 
the principles embodied in the 1906 act. The consolidation of the various railway acts, finally 
effected in 19 14 after two attempts in the previous years, provided the context for some 
discussion of these matters and in particular the guarantee principle; but no major changes 
were made. There was a body of opinion which felt that to impose any charge on ratepayers 
deemed to be the people 'benefited ' by the railway was inequitable and that all railways should 
be regarded a:' national undertakings where the state as a whole should be regarded as the 
appropriate economic unit to both bear the costs and reap the benefits. A motion to have the 
guarantee required from ratepayers in the benefited areas of railways reduced from 3 per cent 
to 2 per cent gained some support. Denham agreed that " the betterment areas were arbitrary, 
and it might l ie better if all the boundaries could be done away with and the liability placed 
on the entire State" . 164  But he nevertheless affirmed his belief in the principle and pointed out 
that in the light of the state of the London market and rising interest rates there was indeed 
an argument for increasing rather than decreasing the figure. A reduction of the guarantee 
figure would mean that the revenue shortfall to the government would have to met either by 
increased railway fares and freights or some other form of taxation . Overall, it was argued the 
act as it stood provided the best mechanism for getting those who benefited from the 
construction of a railway, including in particular the owners of freehold land in the area it 
served to guarantee its profitability. 
The question was also raised as to whether the guarantee prov1s1ons of the 1906 act 
constituted an adequate safeguard against unwise expenditure and, ultimately , public liability 
for the financial consequences. Back in the 1890s when the guarantee principle had first been 
1 64 QPD 1 1 4 ,  19/8/13, p. 909. 
introduced the railways commissioner had urged caution upon the government when operating 
under the system: 
The desire for railway construction throughout the colony is so great that the 
promoters are far too apt to lose sight of their liabilities, and, in many cases, do not 
realise what they really mean. The liabilities of interested ratepayers in connection 
with some of the lines now being promoted will ,  if the lines are built, ultimately 
land them in financial difficulties, which must inevitably result in an appeal to the 
State for relief. 1 55 
After 1 906 these fears were, to a point at least, borne out. In their bid to get a railway for 
their district ratepayers had been all too willing to commit themselves in respect of projects 
which in other circumstances would not have been undertaken. While the overall performance 
of the railways had improved considerably since 1 906 the profitability of the new railways 
built under the 1 906 act was less impressive. By 1 9 14 thirteen of the thirty-six lines built in 
this time were showing a loss (working expenses exceeding receipts) and only six of the thirty-
six had shown a surplus after the 3 per cent ratepayers were obliged to guarantee had been 
added to working expenses. Only four railway districts had been relieved of further liability 
by virtue of · lines having shown an overall surplus over three consecutive years. 1 56 
Accordingly, the guarantee provisions of the 1 906 act were extensively applied, even after 
branch lines had been credited with part of the profit of the main line which they fed. In 
general the obligations falling upon ratepayers in railway districts were met without complaint 
(or 'appeals for relief') and Denham implied that there was widespread agreement that the 
costs imposed were at least matched by the benefits conferred by the railways. 1 57 
Nevertheless, it was considered desirable, in 1 9 14 ,  to amend the act to defer the operation of 
the guarantee provisions until three years after the line was opened, and to capitalise any 
165 QVP 1897 IV , pp. 659-60. 
156 Report of the Railways Commissioner 1914, QPP 1914 Ill, pp. 220-2. 
157 QPD 1 14, 19/8/13, p. 910. 
losses accruing during this time. There was indeed some basis for the fears expressed at this 
time that a good deal of the railway investment made under the 1906 act had been unwise and 
that the liability would eventually have to be assumed by the government. To impose more 
discipline on decision making Labour 's E.G. Theodore proposed the establishment of a 
Parliamentary Railways Committee " to take such measures and procure such information as 
will enable them to inform or satisfy Parliament as to the necessity or advisableness of 
constructing any proposed railway " . 1 58 The measure, and the arguments underlying it, were 
similar to those put forward by Dickson in 1899.  Whether or not such a committee would 
have provided any 'better ' information or constituted a better safeguard is debatable. But at 
this time the whole question was one which few members were in the mood even to discuss. 
CONCLUSION 
The formulation of railway policy amounted largely to making decisions about how, and at 
what rate, borrowed money should be spent on railway construction. Other methods of 
financing investment in railways - the sale of land and the utilisation of private capital in 
exchange for land or other considerations - had been proposed and, in the case of the former, 
experimented with in the 1870s and 1880s, but came to nothing. Both were the subject of 
discussion and experimentation in the following decades. But it was loan expenditure that 
financed all but a very small part of railway investment between 1883 and 19 14. 
In undertaking this expenditure rational decision making was made extremely difficult by the 
geographical ,  technical and economic uncertainties and unknowns of what was still a relatively 
1 58 QPD 1 17, 4/8/1 4, p. 530. 
new and unfamiliar environment. To a large extent railway investment was a matter of faith. 
It was considered to be so integral to the whole process of development, and implicitly, to 
yield such large external benefits (even if these were to accrue over a period of time) that 
slavish adherence to the criterion of profitability in the narrow sense - the rate of return on 
railway investment as measured by the ratio of net revenue generated by railway operations to 
capital outlay - was widely rejected. At the same time profitability could not be ignored for 
there was a limit to the extent that general revenue could be used to make up the gap between 
revenues generated by the railways and interest payments on money borrowed to build them. 
In fact, the financial performance of the railways - the result of past investment decisions and 
of changing economic circumstances - was a major determinant of the level of expenditure and 
borrowing during the period. Concern with financial performance was reflected also in the 
other main tht !mes of railway policy of the period : the search for a way of improving decision 
making about railway construction; the evolution of procedures to limit or minimise the 
government 's financial liability aris�ng from railway investment; and experimentation with 
other means of financing railway construction. 
The high levels of expenditure in the second half of the 1880s and in the period from 1908 to 
1914 were both initiated in the context of general prosperity, relatively high rates of return on 
railway investment and a strong overall budget position. Decision making in both periods was 
characterised by a lack of concern with the direct financial implications of expenditure. 
The first of these bursts was followed very quickly by a marked decline in railway finances, the 
result partly of the drought but more particularly the failure of much of the investment 
undertaken, especially in branch lines (Donaldson 's 'bloodsuckers ' ) to generate revenue 
sufficient to cover the interest on the investment (and in a large number of cases even to cover 
working expenses) . The Liberal government had implicitly recognised that the net charge on 
consolidated revenue would increase as a result of this bout of spending but planned to offset 
this by securing higher revenue from land, particularly from increased pastoral rents. But 
land policy fai led to generate significantly higher revenue and the overall financial position of 
the government deteriorated badly through the second half of the 1880s. While railway 
investment was maintained at high levels until the beginning of the 1890s, partly because of 
the need to complete projects and fulfil contracts, the continuing decline in railway finances 
and the public finances generally led governments to accept that the creation of further 
liabilities was unwise. The failure of the 1891 loan and the necessary curtailment of borrowing 
made a reduction in expenditure a necessity. By the mid- 1890s investment in railway 
construction had virtually ceased .  
The modest revival in  expenditure and borrowing in  the second half of  the decade prompted 
by an improvement in railway finances and economic conditions gave way to a further 
progressive reduction in annual expenditure after 1902 following the disastrous drought and 
the financial and economic difficulties of these years. No new borrowing was undertaken 
between 1902 ,and 1908. The resumption of a high level of expenditure (and of borrowing to 
sustain it) in the later 1900s through to the end of the period followed the improvement in 
economic conditions and railway finances which was underpinned largely by the development 
of the 'new' rural industries based on agriculture and dairying, and the recovery of the 
pastoral industry from the great drought. The guarantee of a minimum rate of return 
provided by the 1906 Railways Act gave further encouragement to the expansive attitude of 
these years. 
During the period of nearly twenty years when expenditure was constrained governments 
became increasingly conscious of the need to allocate funds as effectively as possible. The first 
manifestation of this concern came in 1888 with Nelson 's Railway Act whereby three railway 
commissioners were appointed and a report by them on any proposed railway and its financial 
implications was to be tabled in parliament before proposals were debated. The appointment 
of select committees by the Legislative Assembly when it considered the batch of railways put 
forward in 1895 and more significantly the moves to appoint a standing parliamentary 
committee can also be interpreted as attempts to subject railway proposals to more stringent 
financial analysis. But the motives for these actions were highly ambiguous. The problem 
remained of deciding what weight should be placed on the narrow criterion of the immediate 
prospective rate of return on investment in a particular line of railway and what regard should 
be had to social benefits and the role of the railway in permitting country to be 'opened up' ,  so 
allowing a larger revenue to be generated by the railway in the future. In any case a more 
precise financial analysis, even in terms of the relatively crude analytical techniques then used, 
was extremely difficult: the reports of the railways commissioner(s), which often openly 
admitted that the financial implications of a proposed line were hard to predict, contributed 
little to the decision-making process. There was the added problem that political expediency 
could on occasion be served by a less stringent financial analysis of railway proposals; few 
members of parliament, and governments, would have objected to the infringement, in a 
particular case, of generally accepted criteria if it meant that their electorate could obtain 
improved railway communication. In fact, despite the provisions of the 1888 act and the few 
instances where select committees were formed in the Assembly, parliamentary consideration 
of proposals showed no greater interest in hard financial analysis than in more subjective and 
often explicitly political implications of railway building. Whether Dickson's proposed 
standing committee to assess railway proposals would have made much difference to the 
process is doubtful, particularly in the light of the ambiguity of its purpose that was reflected 
in Dickson 's own analysis of it. 
The concern with profitability led also to a search for alternative systems of railway 
construction in order to mitigate the problems inherent in decision-making. Dickson's policy 
of ' light lines ' pursued in the 1890s was essentially an attempt to improve the profitability of 
branch lines by reducing the capital cost of construction . The system of guarantee railways, 
introduced in 1895, and the encouragement of local authorities to build and operate short lines 
using money loaned by the colonial government were attempts to impose a limit upon the cost 
of operating government-built railways by making those who wanted railways put their money 
where their demands were. But none of these proved to be of any general use as principles of 
railway building. 
Nor did the revived interest in the use of private capital . The land-grant principle, adopted 
by Griffith in the early 1890s within a decade of his rejection of Mcllwaith 's earlier schemes, 
was never implemented. The encouragement of private investment in railways in 
consideration of certain concessions other than land, initiated by the Dickson and Philp 
governments at the end of the 1890s and continued by the Morgan and Kidston governments, 
did result in a limited amount of railway construction which made either no claim or a limited 
claim on public funds. These railways were limited to lines associated with mining ventures, 
however, and most of them were more appropriately regarded as part of the mine 
infrastructure rather than national undertakings. In the absence of grants of land being made 
to private investors, it is difficult to think of other circumstances where private railway 
investment would have been undertaken. In any case the use of private capital , and the 
associated arrangements, raised a whole new set of problems relating to private and social 
costs and benefits which the political controversies surrounding private railway proposals 
highlighted only too clearly. 
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In the early 1900s an attempt was made to 'make land pay for railways ' in a more explicit and 
direct sense than, for example, embodied in Griffith 's policy of the 1 880s by using the 
enhanced value of land 'benefited' by a railway to finance its construction . The idea was not 
fully thought through, however, and foundered particularly on the difficulty of securing 
betterment from freehold land. But two policies did develop from the idea. The first was that 
of crediting all sales of land to the loan fund. Given effect to in 1906 the policy was never 
greatly utilised as improved economic conditions led to a more liberal attitude to borrowing. 
In the same year, and more significantly, the guarantee principle was applied generally to 
railway construction on the basis that those who benefited from the construction of a railway 
should be required to guarantee its profitability. 
Under this principle, and in the context of a new phase of economic growth and a consequent 
improvement in railway finances, the new splurge on railway building exceeded that of the 
1880s both in scale and the casualness, even abandon, with which expenditure was undertaken. 
The growing need for the guarantee provisions to be invoked as the new railways failed to 
return the specified 3 per cent and the increasing cost of borrowing failed to stern the 
enthusiasm. The concern which had evolved since the 1880s to impose financial discipline on 
railway investment was muted by the prosperity and optimism of the time. Paradoxically , the 
1906 act, which was born out of that concern, only heightened the mood of permissiveness, a 
mood which was most clearly reflected in that grandest of grand schemes, the Great Western 
railway. 
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TABLE 4.1 
RAILWAY INVESTMENT AND FINANCES 1881-82 to 1 9 1 3- 14 
Miles Loan Receipts 
Open Expenditure from 
on Railways Railways 
(a) 
/. '000 /. 1000 
1881-82 813 563 371 
1882-83 9 12  7 10  476 
1883-84 1 , 1 4 1  1 , 103 583 
1884-85 1 ,255 1 , 198 665 
1885-86 1 ,438 1 ,31 1 669 
1886-87 1 ,62 1 1 ,326 652 
1887-88 1 ,879 1 , 1 96 753 
1888-89 2,004 1 ,088 781 
1889-90 2, 1 13 1 ,073 776 
1890-91 2,192 1 ,081 882 
189 1-92 2,320 682 1 ,025 
1892-93 2,373 1 54 998 
1893-94 2 ,379 137 931 
1894-95 2 ,379 1 1 1  977 
1895-96 2,386 268 1 ,052 
1896-97 2 ,442 709 1 , 136 
1897-98 2 ,635 626 1 , 1 58 
1898-99 2,746 628 1 ,322 
1899- 1900 2,801 637 1 ,422 
1900-01 2,801 494 1 ,246 
1901-02 2,801 751  1 ,316 
1902-03 2 ,827 695 1 ,245 
1903-04 3,044 388 1 ,297 
1904-05 3,092 1 20 1 ,409 
1905-06 3, 137 1 58 1 , 535 
1906-07 3, 137 555 1 ,822 
1907-08 3,359 885 1 ,939 
1908-09 3,498 1 ,053 2 , 1 1 1  
1 909- 10  3,661 1 ,263 2,319 
1910- 1 1  3,868 1 ,686 2 ,707 
19 1 1 - 1 2  4, 1 23 2,855 3,033 
1912- 13 4,380 2,067 3,319 
1913- 14  4,570 1 ,679 3,676 
Notes: 
(a) Includes expenditure on rolling stock. 
Expenses Net 
of Operation Revenue 
/,1000 .£1000 
202 169 
271 205 
319 263 
408 256 
467 201 
522 1 29 
545 208 
572 208 
618 1 57 
639 243 
639 386 
638 359 
598 332 
583 393 
644 408 
684 452 
686 472 
784 537 
948 474 
1 ,057 188 
992 324 
863 382 
812 485 
81 5 595 
863 672 
913 909 
1 ,054 886 
1 ,227 884 
1 ,414 904 
1 ,563 1 , 144 
1 ,917 1 , 1 16 
2 , 15 1  1 , 1 68 
2,393 1 ,282 
(b) Net revenue as a percentage of total expenditure on railways. 
(c) Interest on actual expenditure for year less net revenue. 
Return on Actual Charge 
Capital on Consolidated 
Invested Revenue Fund 
{b) on Account of 
Railways 
(c) 
per cent £ 1000 
2.32 n.a. 
2.61 n.a. 
3.07 n.a. 
2.62 1 73 
1 .77 279 
1 .03 399 
1 . 5 1  365 
1 .43 396 
0.99 493 
1 .42 450 
2 .20 318 
2.01 360 
1 .81 420 
2 . 13 364 
2. 18 348 
2.33 317 
2.36 316 
2.61 244 
2 .23 327 
0.87 630 
1 .43 5 13  
1 .65 477 
2 .05 388 
2 .51 282 
2.82 2 10  
3.72 {8) 
3.52 46 
3.38 82 
3.29 108 
3.94 (76) 
3.50 56 
3.43 85 
3.59 3 
Source: Tables Relating to the Colonial Treasurer 's Financial Statement, Q VP /QPP, 
various years. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INDUSTRY 
ASSIS TANCE TO AGRICULTURE 
Those who earnestly sought the expansion of agriculture in the two or three decades after 
separation saw land policy as the critical factor. But despite legislation which had made land 
readily and cheaply available, agriculture remained largely undeveloped, a matter widely 
lamented by those who saw it as the basis for settlement and the kind of economic and social 
development considered most wholesome. From the 1880s attention was focused on the 
repurchase issue: the retardation of agriculture was attributed to the fact that, as a result of 
past land policy, large tracts of land highly suitable for agriculture were ' locked up' from 
development because they were held in large freehold estates and used merely as 'sheep-walks ' .  
Increasingly, however, it was recognised that the fundamental problem was that agriculture 
was not a profitable activity. Griffith had acknowledged this when transferring the emphasis 
away from agricultural to pastoral settlement in his land policy . While Liberals continued to 
press for land policies which facilitated agricultural selection (including the repurchase and 
subdivision of the large estates) they also sought alternative explanations for the problems of 
agriculture and ways in which governments could enhance the profitability of agricultural 
pursuits. 
Two particular problems were identified: lack of knowledge about methods and techniques of 
production and the difficulty and cost of obtaining the necessary capital to undertake 
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agricultural production. These views were concisely echoed by the Courier. Agreeing that it 
was " disheartening to reflect upon the small success which has attended legislative efforts to 
promote close settlement upon the agricultural lands of this colony " ,  it concluded that it was 
"want of capital [and] want of knowledge, which is capital also, [that keeps] many industrious 
men struggling in the mire of debt and failure" . 1 This view had two main policy corollaries: 
one was that the government should assist farmers to improve methods of production, and 
hence efficiency in a technical sense, by aiding the diffusion of knowledge and information; the 
other was to facilitate and, if possible, reduce the cost of borrowing to finance agricultural 
production . These two aspects are discussed in this section. There were other measures taken 
which fall under the broad heading. The more significant of these include the 'protection ' of 
agricultural producers either through the device of the tariff or through concessional railway 
freights which came to be regarded as a surrogate for tariffs; policies to assist the marketing of 
produce overseas; and policies which were specific to the sugar industry . These are discussed 
in the later sections. 
The need for a government department of agriculture and 'agricultural colleges ' to improve 
knowledge about agriculture was much discussed in the 1880s. A parliamentary motion 
moved by Francis Kates, the Darling Downs Liberal, in 1885 to set aside reserves of land for 
agricultural colleges on the grounds that the "union of science of practice" and the consequent 
dissemination and acquisition of knowledge about production techniques, diseases and other 
scientific matters would allow agriculture to become more profitable met with a lukewarm 
response from Griffith and opposition from Dutton. 2 Griffith doubted the " practical effect" of 
such a policy . Dutton questioned the "special emphasis " of such a measure on agriculture 
1 BC 6/5/89, p. 4. -
2 QPD 47, 30/10/85, p. 1349fl'. 
arguing in effect that there was no case for assisting agriculture in this way any more than any 
other economic activity; why not colleges for pastoral education, he asked?3 Dutton also 
rejected the proposal on the grounds of its inability to assist (directly at least) more than a 
small number of people, expressing belief rather in an improved basic education system for all 
aimed at giving individuals the basis and capacity to educate themselves further. 
Dutton 's views about special treatment were not shared by the majority of Liberals who, in 
varying degrees, agreed that the desirability of agricultural development and the settlement it 
fostered was sufficient to warrant assistance. Doubts about the 'practical effect' of special 
educational institutions, however, led to more faith being placed in the ability of a government 
department to achieve the same broad objective. The possible functions and advantages of 
such a department had been discussed from time to time both inside and outside parliament. 4 
Following this general pressure an Agriculture Department was established, within the broad 
framework of the Lands Department, in 1887.  The first officer in charge of the department 
was Peter McLean a former district lands commissioner and before that a Liberal 
parliamentarian (and very briefly lands minister). The expressed function of the department 
was the " collection and diffusion of practical knowledge" .  Griffith also initiated moves to 
obtain (through the United States Department of Agriculture) an 'lnstructor ' ,5 though that 
person, in the form of Professor Shelton, did not arrive until 1 890. In its early stages the 
function of the department appeared to be seen largely in terms of providing information and 
assistance about availability of land to selectors6 although McLean did initiate some activities 
designed to diffuse information to farmers. A system of travelling dairies with a 'dairy expert' 
3 Ibid, pp. 1363-4. 
4 A summary of these arguments was presented in the Queenslander 's article, 'What an Agriculture 
Department Might Do', 2/1 /86, p. 17; also 20/ 1 1 /86, p. 81 7 and 28/ 1 1 /86, p. 866. 
6 QVP 1888 III, p. 801 .  
6 Jordan, Dutton QPD 62 ,  30/1 1/87, pp. 1870- 1 .  
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was established in 1888 and was followed by programs of practical instruction in preserving 
hams and bacon and making ensilage. Government nurseries were established at two centres 
in north Queensland to foster the development of tropical agriculture. Pamphlets with 
information on a variety of agricultural pursuits began to emerge also. While the department 
had been treated with, at best, indifference by the conservatives in opposition, Hume Black as 
minister for lands in the Mcilwraith-Morehead governments was an important force behind, 
and enthusiastically supported, these activities. 
Agitation in favour of agriculture colleges continued nevertheless. Groom moved in 1 889 that 
money be voted to allow for their establishment but this met with opposition from members of 
the government, including Black, on the ground that "practical men 11 were of more use than 
"theoretical professors " .7 The coalition government toyed with the idea during the first half of 
the 1890s8 and eventually a college was established at Gatton in 1897. 9 
In the meantime the activities of the Agriculture Department had been steadily expanding 
though without any particular encouragement or influence by lands ministers following Black 's 
departure. By the mid-1890s, however, the increasing role that agriculture was to play in the 
economy was becoming apparent. As the Courier declared in 1895: 11 Agriculture in its 
breadth of promise is coming to the front. Politicians must reckon with and serve it" . 10 In 
1896 the department was given a separate ministerial head. A.J. Thynne was made Secretary 
for Agriculture (in addition to the job of Postmaster-General) and in 1897 was made 
responsible solely for agriculture. The appointment of a lawyer in the Legislative Council as 
minister met with considerable criticism but Thynne proved an enthusiast who presided over a 
7 QPD 57, 26/7 /89, p. 832. 
8 For an account of policy during this time, BC 26/2/97, p. 4. 
9 BC 1 1/6/97, pp. 5-6. 
10 BC 1 /8/95, p. 4. 
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new phase of activity. In addition to the opening of the Agricultural College the period also 
saw the establishment of four experimental farms run by the department and the initiation of 
the Queensland Agricultural Journal. 
Expenditure on the chief office of the department and on the Agricultural College and State 
Farms grew steadily during the late 1890s until financial difficulties led to cut-backs after 
1899. While largely supported in parliament this expansion took place against an 
undercurrent of doubt as to the worth of expenditure on scientific experimentation and the 
diffusion of knowledge and information about agriculture. In the early 1 900s (as expenditure 
on the department was cut) the thrust of criticism changed, however, to the ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of the department in undertaking its role. The criticism has to be seen in part as 
an attack on the encumbent minister, David Dalrymple, and the Philp government in general , 
by this time losing the backing of many of its supporters particularly those from agricultural 
areas. The Courier mounted a savage attack on the department and its minister during 1902-
03. The department was characterised as a 'tired department' (a term that recurred with 
remarkable frequency in debates in subsequent years) ; Dalrymple was accused of being "out of 
sympathy with the primary producers, or asleep to their needs " and giving no lead in making 
the department more useful. 1 1  The savageness of the attack probably stemmed in part from a 
particular dispute with Dalrymple1 2  but was taken up in parliament, particularly by Denham 
who focused on what he claimed to be the lack of overall purpose and cohesion in the running 
of the department and argued that it needed to be "galvanised into life "  . 13 
Following the demise of the Philp government Denham became ministerial head of the 
department. Proclaiming his belief in the trinity of " science, education and machinery, 
1 1  BC 2 1/ 10/02, p. 4; 9/1 2/02, p. 4; 22/2/03, p. 4. 
12 See QPD 90, S/ 1 2/02, p. 1 5 29. 
13 Ibid., p. 1 536. 
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represented by the chemist, instructor and inventor " 1 4 he, and his successors, presided over a 
decade of steady expansion in the activities of the department. By 1914  the Chief Office of the 
department, the State Farms and the Agricultural College between them undertook extensive 
chemical, bacteriological , entomological and pathological research and analysis activities, 
experimented with production techniques in a wide range of crops, diffused information about 
agricultural production through its own instructors, the college, and its various publications, 
as well as administering several acts relating to agriculture (such as the Diseases in Plants and 
Pure Seeds Acts) . Expenditure on the department grew from under i30,000 in 1904-05 to 
J,77 ,000 in 1 9 1 3- 14 .  This could be regarded as modest given the context of buoyant economic 
conditions and the rapid growth in the importance of agriculture itself to the economy. But 
the difficulty of demonstrating readily the returns to public expenditure on these sort of 
activities led governments of the time, even though there was very general support for the 
work of the department, to be relatively conservative. 
The notion that government should assist agriculture by providing 'cheap money' to farmers 
was aired with increasing frequency during the 1880s and 1890s, particularly as, in the early 
'90s, New Zealand and most other Australian colonies implemented such policies. The second 
half of the decade saw some determined pressure from Labour members, and from Kates and 
other 'agricultural members ' whose disaffection with the continuous ministry was becoming 
increasingly strong and obvious. On three occasions the Labour member for Clermont, J.M. 
Cross, attempted to introduce his State Advances Bill based on a combination of the South 
Australian and New Zealand legislation but on none of these did the measure get past the 
second reading stage. In 1898, "a scheme to enable farmers to secure financial assistance for 
the improvement of their holdings on more favourable terms than those at present obtainable " 
14 Speech to Agricultural Conference, BC 1 6/5/05, p. 5. 
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was promised for the parliamentary session1 6 but even though, as Cross put it, the question 
was "so ripe . . .  as to have got beyond the pa�ty stage" 16 and the government had a bill in 
print no action was taken. Eventually the Philp government passed an Agricultural Bank Bill 
in 1900. It was blocked by the Council , but enacted in substantially the same form the 
following year. 
The act provided for an Agricultural Bank under the control of three trustees to raise up to 
J250,000 by the issue of government debentures (at a maximum rate of interest of 4 per cent) 
and to lend to farmers and selectors for improvements on the security of their land and 
improvements. Up to 1 3s. in the pound of the value of proposed improvements could be 
borrowed, repayable at 5 per cent over twenty-five years with payments for the first five years 
to cover interest only. The measure was explicitly recognised to be limited in scope and not a 
general 'cheap money for farmers' bill in so far as no money could be lent by the bank with 
respect to any land encumbered by any previous mortgage or charge. It did nothing therefore, 
as agriculture minister Chataway conceded, to 11 lift the mortgaged farmer out of the hands of 
the money-lender " ;  although he indicated the general intention for the measure to be so 
extended at some time in the future. 17 The government's dilatoriness may be explained in part 
in the terms suggested by its opponents: the lack of any direct interest on the part of 
government members in agriculture and pressure from financial institutions against such a 
measure. There were also significant objections to the principle of the measure. The most 
fundamental of these were expressed forthrightly by the irrepressible Morehead, now a 
member of the Council , who objected to the special treatment accorded to agriculture through 
the establishment of what he was pleased to call the 'potato bank ' .  As he said when the bill 
16 QPD 79, 26/7 /98, p. 2. 
16 QPD 80, 10/l l /98, p. 1099. 
17 QPD 86, 6/12/00, p. 2398. 
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was before the House: "Why should we not establish a bank for every industry in the colony? 
Why should we give this special consideration to agriculturists? . . .  Nothing has been said to 
show that the man who grows potatoes or cabbages has done more to advance the colony than 
the miner or the pastoralist . . .  yet the general taxpayer is asked to put his hand in his pocket 
for that particular class of persons . . . . If we are going to spoon-feed a particular class of the 
community we are opening a very wide door " . 18 The actual cost to the government would 
probably not have been very great although the original {1900) bill to which Morehead was 
here referring left only a very small margin - 1 per cent of the maximum capital of A!l00,000 -
for running expenses, ignoring any bad debts. Of more practical import were the not 
dissimilar though rather more soberly expressed views of Thynne when he was minister for 
agriculture. In other respects an enthusiast for government aid to agriculture, particularly 
through the department, he was, when reluctantly drawn to comment in 1897 ,  very cautious 
about the proposal : 
When it could be shown that the farmers could make their farms pay,  the value of 
the farms was a settled and so valuable asset for obtaining loans that there was 
very little need for any interference of the State . . . .  The less they required the 
State and the less they allowed the State to interfere in the natural arrangements 
with their business, the better it would be for them in the long run. 19 
In the end the "screw of the electoral machine" was turned too tightly for the government to 
. t 20 res1s . 
In the early years of its operation, however, the bank's activities were very limited, only about 
18 QPD 86, 20/1 2/00, p. 2794. 
19 BC 15/6/97, p. 6. 
20 The term was used in a Courier editorial in 1 896 opposing such special treatment. The paper subsequently 
softened its line though continued to express misgivings about the extent to which the government would be 
susceptible to political pressure with respect to such financial transactions, especially if farmers had trouble 
repaying loans, a concern also commonly aired in parliamentary debates. (BC 1 5/5/96, p. 4; 14/6/01 , p. 4). 
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&20,000 having been advanced by it to farmers by 1 904. The limited scope of the act and the 
bank were continually criticised by agricultural and labour representatives and in 1 904 an 
amending act was passed by the Morgan government which permitted the bank to make 
advances for the purchase of stock, machinery and implements (that is, no longer confining it 
to funding fixed improvements such as fencing and water supply} and, more significantly, for 
the purpose of paying off existing liabilities - the latter permitting, for example, the transfer of 
debt from a bank at 8 per cent to the Agricultural Bank at 5 per cent. 
Whereas the original act was restricted in its purpose largely to assisting new settlers make 
capital improvements to their land and establish viable farming enterprises, as amended it 
became a more general instrument of government aid to farmers - a measure to achieve 
'justice ' for 'struggling selectors ' as much as a means to promote economic development. As 
Denham himself put it when speaking to the bill: " I  believe if this Bill passes . . .  it will be the 
means of making pleasant, or more pleasant, the lives of some of our hardy pioneering settlers 
(and will] also galvanise some of the existing holdings into a living asset" .  2 1  Such sentiments 
had of course been central in the thinking of early proponents of an agricultural bank. While 
they had been opposed by many government supporters in the 1890s, the 1 904 amendment 
received almost universal support and indeed had been part of the policy of the Philp 
government for the session in which it was put out of office. 
In succeeding years the policy issue become one of the 'liberality ' with which the bank was 
conducted and much criticism was directed, particularly by Labour members, to the cautious 
and conservative administration of the bank by its trustees who J.M. Hunter (member for 
Maranoa}, for example, attacked for having been more concerned " to protect the bank and 
22 protect the sta.te" rather than help the selector. Hunter led a campaign to liberalise the 
21 QPD 93, 23/ l l /04, p. 918. 
22 QPD 109, 24/10/1 1 ,  p. 1748. 
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provision of credit to selectors moving on several occasions that the Government Savings Bank 
be extended into a larger State bank and incorporate the functions of the Agricultural Bank. 
These moves were not accepted by the government which did, however, (through a further 
amending act in 1 9 1 1 )  introduce a number of changes to streamline the operation of the bank 
(including the creation of a position of managing director to take on most of the functions 
previously undertaken by the part-time trustees) and liberalise some of the terms of 
borrowing. The need for special assistance to farmers was not questioned - on the contrary the 
Labour proposal to create a more general state bank was opposed in part because it would 
eliminate the institution designed to operate specifically in the interests of agriculturists. 
"Farming interests are surely entitled to some recognition and some exceptional treatment" , 
declared Denham.23 The 1 9 1 1  amendment in fact heralded a period of rapid growth in the 
bank 's operations, advances made in the two years 19 12- 13  and 1 9 13- 14 (totalling l421 ,000) 
being nearly equal to those made in the whole period of the bank 's operations up to 19 12 .24 In 
I 
1914 another amending act transferred the administration of the bank from the Agriculture 
Department to the Lands Department (to permit crown lands rangers to become inspectors 
and to allow a better information bank on farms to be built so as to facilitate its operations) 
and some further changes were made which liberalised the terms on which money could be 
advanced to farmers. 
23 Ibid. , p. 1820. 
24 Report of the Trustees of the Agricultural Bank, QPP 1914 II, p. 837. 
MEAT AND DAffiY PRODUCE ENCOURAGEMENT 
From the early 1890s the dairy industry and, in certain periods, the meat industry were (along 
with sugar) major forces for expansion in the economy. Specific measures to assist in their 
development, which in both cases was heavily dependent on overseas exports, were important 
elements of economic policy. 
A major impetus to the development of the meat export trade was the build-up in surplus 
stock which started in the closing years of the 1880s and accelerated with the good seasons at 
the beginning of the 'nineties. Attempts were made to develop the frozen meat trade -
particularly by the Queensland Meat Export Company which opened meatworks in Brisbane 
and Townsville in 1892 - but these were beset by technical and fi
.
nancial problems. 25 As a 
result, pastoralists sought the aid of the government in furthering the trade. One of the 
schemes they put forward was that the meat export trade should be 'subsidised' to allow it to 
operate profitably . The 'subsidy ' in the form of an 'export bonus ' was to come from the 
industry itself by way of an assessment on the stock. In this way the profitability of meat 
exporting companies would be assured; and cattle-owners as a group would realise a net 
benefit because the additional income from exports (assured under the arrangement) together 
with the higher domestic prices as stock was withheld from the Australian market would more 
than compensate for the assessment. The scheme did not involve any transfer of revenue to 
the industry. Indeed its initiator, R.M. Collins, a director of the QME Company, declared 
when advocating the scheme: " The pastoral interest requires no support from outside sources; 
it wants the strength which union gives, and to be saved from the weakness which disunion 
and consequent competition entails " .  26 For such a system to be operated, however, the agency 
25 E.A. Beever, 'A history of the Australian meat export trade 1865- 1939 ' , (Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 1968) , p. 62ff. 
26 Letter BC 14/ 1 /92, p. 6. 
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of the government was required. 
A series of meetings of stockowners in 1 892 indicated widespread support for the proposal . 27 
With alacrity Griffith incorporated the proposal in a draft bill which Mcilwraith was able to 
hand to a deputation shortly after. 28 The measure was made part of the program for the 
special parliamentary session of 1892 (in which Griffith was to reverse his policies on 
Melanesian labour and land-grant railways) as one calling upon stock owners generally to co-
operate in inaugurating an export trade in meat. 29 Problems both of principle and practice 
soon, however, surfaced. Dairy farmers, faced with the prospect of being caught in the stock 
tax net, were promised that part of the fund created would be allocated to the payment of a 
bonus on the export of dairy produce. But arguments over the size of the levy and the manner 
of determining the bonus, together with difficulty of balancing the costs and benefits borne by 
and accruing to different categories of stock owners, meant that within a month the policy was 
abandoned. 
An alternative scheme was introduced by Mcilwraith the following year and embodied in what 
became the Meat and Dairy Produce Encouragement Act of 1893.  A tax on stock over a five 
year period was to be used to provide loans to assist manufacturers of meat and dairy produce 
with emphasis on the former. Up to 50 per cent of the actual cost of land, buildings, 
machinery and works could be advanced, to be repaid over a period of fifteen years during the 
first five of which interest only was payable. 
The measure was probably the only practicable way of allowing the industry to help itself and 
was, Mcilwraith argued, the best means of expeditiously solving the central problem: to get 
27 For example, meetings in Beaudesert and Townsville representing owners of 430,000 head of cattle; BC 
8/3/92, p. 5 and 17 /3/92, p. 5. 
28 BC 26/3/92, p. 4.  
29 QPD 61, 29/3/92, p. 2 . 
production under way. A recovery in meat prices on the London market in 1892-93 doubtless 
underpinned his confidence that once frozen meat was produced in Queensland means could be 
found of successfully and profitably transporting it and selling it on the London market.30 Not 
everyone was so sanguine and the need for attention to be given to the process of marketing 
the produce in England and the question of agents, cold stores and outlets had often been 
pressed. The government had in fact responded to these suggestions by sending former lands 
minister Hume Black to England. Among his duties, as a Department of Agriculture 
memorandum put it, was the responsibility " to inquire and report with respect to the most 
advantageous manner of disposing of the products of Queensland in Europe" .31  But Black 's 
work created little interest and the government showed no inclination to be more directly 
involved. 
Under the act, advances were made for several meat works during 1894 and 1895 and the 
manufacture and export of frozen meat increased dramatically during this time.32 By 1895 a 
substantial production capacity had been built up and it was generally agreed that the act had 
fulfilled its purpose. Accordingly it was provided, in an amending act, that monies lent out of 
the meat fund . be returned to contributors when repaid. A strong body of opinion opposed the 
measure on the grounds that much still remained to be done to establish the export trade on a 
firm basis and that the money should be applied, under the guidance of the Meat and Dairy 
Board, in efforts to improve transport, marketing and production techniques. 33 Such had 
indeed been Mcllwraith 's intention when he passed the measure in 1893.34 But Nelson saw the 
fund essentially as a trust fund belonging entirely to the contributors which had been created 
30 QPD 70, 8/8/93, p. 373. 
31 BC 23/1 /92, p. 6. 
32 Beever, 'A history of the Australian meat export trade ', p. 105ff.; also Table 1 . 1 .  
33 For example, Dickson, QPD 73, 24/7 /95, p .  327. 
34 QPD 70, 8/8/93, p. 373. 
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specifically for the purpose of assisting in the construction of meat works and he declined to 
sanction the extension of its purpose. 
The general question was raised again, however, following the severe fall in meat prices on the 
London market in 1896.  In this year prices were 30 per cent below these prevailing four years 
earlier in a situation where Australian meat commanded a relatively low price anyway because 
of its inferior quality and irregularity of supply.35 A Joint Parliamentary Committee on Meat 
Exportation , chaired as it happened by the chairman of the QME Company, recommended 
that the government borrow /, 500,000 to finance the construction of cold storage facilities at 
several distributing centres in Great Britain in order to assist in the more efficient and 
profitable marketing of Queensland meat.36 The proposition that the government should 
construct cold storage facilities in Queensland to serve both the meat and dairy industries had 
often been made and while Mcilwraith had indicated some sympathy with the idea 37 Nelson 
rejected it38 as he did the parliamentary committee recommendation . Other suggestions from 
various quarters (including _ the minority reports of the committee) for different forms of 
assistance in marketing and advertising Queensland meat in Great Britain were similarly 
deemed beyond the function of government. 
Production of meat for export increased towards the end of the decade as a combination of the 
drought, the tick and financial problems led to a planned liquidation of numbers. Prices 
improved but .the problems involved in selling on the London market remained. The whole 
industry collapsed dramatically after 1 902 as the stock surplus turned into a shortage. Until 
1909 it suffered from chronic over-capacity and, on the demand side, fierce competition from 
36 Beever, 'A history of the Australian meat export trade', p. 131ff. 
36 Report of Committee, QVP 1896 IV, pp. 569-70. 
37 To deputation, BC 14/7 /93, p. 6. 
38 To deputation, BC 31 /5 /94, p. 6. 
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the United States, Argentina and New Zealand. During this time of both boom and depression 
the question of government assistance to the industry simply did not arise, presumably 
because producers felt that there was little that the government could do to help . In the 
context of a renewed build-up in stock numbers from 1 909 onwards the export trade entered a 
new phase of expansion. A Royal Commission appointed in 19 13  to investigate a range of 
issues connected with the industry made no significant recommendations concerning the role of 
government. The inability of some producers, especially in northern and central districts to 
have stock treated when in fat condition was recognised and a recommendation made for 
encouragement (undefined) to be given to local authorities to construct public abattoirs and
cold storage facilities to provide a more competitive structure. A minority report put the case 
more strongly, noting the particular problems of small producers when the export companies ' 
meatworks were tied up with large quantities of stock secured from large holdings.39 But in
general it was accepted that private enterprise had responded adequately, and the government 
implicitly agreed. 
The assistance provided to the dairy industry under the 1893 act had in a sense been an 
incidental part of the policy to encourage the meat export trade. But the Dairy Fund was to 
be subsidised hy cattle owners generally - under the act it was to be constituted by a levy on 
all cattle generally used for dairy purposes and on herds of less than one hundred (which was
not expected to yield very much) plus 10 per cent of the general levy . As Mcilwraith saw it:
"The cattle industry is going to benefit very considerably by the introduction of a new 
industry - that is the dairying industry, and I do not think it will be an unfair thing to 
consider it the foundation of the fund for that 11 • 40 The dairy industry had not yet expanded to
39 Report of Royal Commission, QPP 1913 II, pp. 715-828. 
40 QPD 70, 8/8/U3, p. 373. 
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the point where supply exceeded local demand, however, though it was clear that its continued 
expansion would depend on exports. Whether or not production for export would be 
economically viable was still a matter of doubt. In this context the bonus concept was 
reintroduced {for dairy produce only) in an amending act in 1 894 which provided that a 
portion of the Dairy Fund could be used to provide bonuses on overseas exports. There was 
indeed considerable pressure from representatives of farming areas for the bonus to be 
subsidised from public revenue. But there was also a good deal of opposition to the principle 
of bonuses, even those paid out of the Dairy Fund. Dickson, for example, pointed out the 
dangers of encouraging production for export on an artificial basis: the further the industry 
developed the more revenue would have to be raised, in one way or another, to support it. 
Lands minister Barlow, who introduced the measure, appeared to have little appreciation of 
the principles involved. Nelson, who took no part in the debate, would probably have 
concurred with the dissentients but probably considered that, given the existence of the fund, 
it was better t.o allocate part of it to encouraging the development of an export trade rather 
than merely using it to support increased facilities for undertaking production for which there 
was not an assured profitable outlet. 
The bonus was paid on the early exports of butter though the part of the fund allocated for 
this purpose was exhausted by the end of 1897 .  After this time exports continued to expand, 
the fact that (as was noted by the Under-Secretary for Agriculture) they were made "on a
purely commercial basis (being] evidence that the industry is able to stand upon its own
foundation" .  41  With the continuing strong growth of the industry the issue did not again
arise. The only other circumstance where bonuses were granted was for a short period 
between 1898 and 1 902 with respect to the exports to other Australian colonies/states of
41 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture 1897-98, QVP 1898 III, p. 1037.
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chilled meat. In this case the bonus was paid out of general revenue, through the Agriculture 
Department. The measure, implemented following representation from the Rockhampton 
meat exporters, reflected the view that it was considered desirable, in the light of " the 
congested state of the London market, and the general trouble in the meat business, that some 
encouragement should be given to open up new markets " .42
After the levy on stock ceased at the end of the five year period provided for in the Meat and 
Dairy Produce Encouragement Act provision was made annually in the estimates for loans in 
aid of co-operative agricultural production. Dairy factories and flour mills were the main 
forms of investment that the measure was intended to assist, but relatively little advantage 
was taken of it. Indeed by 1906 Kidston, when introducing the item in the Estimates, 
11 confessed he did not know what this vote meant and thought that for conscience sake it 
should be dropped" .  Philp concurred , suggesting that, for the purposes in mind, banks would 
lend " cheaper and with less trouble than the government " . 43 Right at the end of the period
under review, however, the Co-operative Agricultural Production Act of 1 9 14 provided a more 
permanent framework within which loans could be made to companies in which the majority 
of shareholders were primary producers to aid in the construction of buildings and factories for 
the purpose of the manufacture or storage of primary products. In addition to milk, butter 
and cheese, bacon and flour were products also specifically mentioned .44
I 
Two other forms of government action arose out of the development of these industries. The 
first related to control of the quality of the product, especially butter . The importance of 
presenting a high quality and reliable product on the British market in maintaining the 
reputation of Queensland produce was generally recognised. In the case of meat a system of 
42 QPD 80, 1 5/ 1 2/98, p. 1 563. 
43 QPD 98, 1 1 /1 2/06, p. 2 1 54 . 
44 QPD 1 18, 17  / 1 1 / 14 ,  p. 1 18ff. 
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inspection was initiated with the Live Stock and Meat Export Act of 1895 .  The measure was 
introduced under the immediate necessity of having meat exports accepted by some countries 
though it was considered also a means of enhancing the reputation of Queensland meat in the 
English market.45 But the act was concerned only with preventing diseased meat being
exported, and other aspects of quality which were accepted as being critical to the reputation 
of Queensland meat and hence the development of the industry were deemed to rest with the 
relatively small number of producing companies. In the case of the dairy industry, however, 
the large number of producers meant that the wider exercise of power by a higher authority 
was necessary if production standards were to be regulated. From the mid- 1890s the 
Department of Agriculture and particularly the Dairy Instructor repeatedly called for action to 
control production standards and implement an effective system of inspection and grading. 46
The first attempt to regulate standards within the industry was made in 1897 by Thynne. A 
measure was promised in the government 's program in that year and a Dairy Produce Bill 
duly introduced. It was justified on the grounds that " No individual dealer or manufacturer 
ought to be permitted to injure all the other persons engaged in the industry by detracting 
from the reputation it has obtained " .  47 While supported by the leading manufacturers of dairy
produce the measure was seen by many to impose too severe a burden especially on smaller 
and less prosperous producers and farmers. 48 Despite there being no formal organisation of
dairy farmers - or perhaps because of it, for such a group might actually have seen the 
measure as in their interests - and widespread recognition that regulation of standards was 
necessary no further action was taken for seven years. Bills were drafted and ready to be put 
by successive ministers in nearly every year but were displaced by more pressing business. 
45 QPD 74, 5/ 1 1 /95 , p. 1 537. 
46 Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture 1898-99, QVP 1899 II, p. 596.
47 QPD 77, 24/8/97, p. 631 . 
48 Report of conference between Thynne and representatives of butter factories, BC 2/4/97, p. 4; QPD 77,
24/8/97, p. 632ff. 
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Eventually Denham piloted through an a�t in 1 904. By this time such a measure had become
even more necessary as a result of strong competition in England by high quality produce from 
countries with. highly regulated industries and the widespread on-farm use within Queensland 
of the hand separator which had increased the variability of produce received by butter 
factories and led to an overall lowering of the quality of butter produced. The act provided 
for the comprehensive regulation and supervision of production from the milking of the cow 
through the production of cream on the farm, its transit to the factory and factory production, 
to the grading and handling of the product at the port. The rationale of the measure 
remained essentially unchanged: the dairying industry, as Denham put it, was "a  national 
matter" and its regulation was clearly in the national interest. The measure, it was 
recognised, would impose costs on producers and farmers - particularly those whose operations 
were at present sub-standard - and indeed it was intended that the direct costs of 
administering the legislation would also be covered by the industry itself through a system of 
registration fees (a principle which was also applied under the Live Stock and Meat 
Assessment Act). But, it was argued, the benefits received by the industry as a whole would 
far outweigh these costs; looked at in national terms the net benefits would be even greater. 
By this time the policy had virtually universal support. 49 
As the meat and dairy industries developed the question of shipping facilities for exports also 
arose. The Queensland Meat Export Company had secured contracts with an associated 
shipping line and in 1895 ,  as new establishments came into production with the assistance of 
the Meat and Dairy Produce Encouragement Act, the government acted to ensure that the 
contractors carried frozen meat offering for shipment by other producers, reserving the power 
to distribute equitably the refrigerating space available. With a view more particularly to 
49 QPD 93, 4/10/04, pp. 1 59-67.
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providing for the carriage of dairy produce the government also came to an arrangement with 
the British-India Company for a monthly service to be provided to Queensland via the Torres 
Strait with shippers of farm and dairy produce having the first claim on refrigerated cargo 
space and rates not to exceed those charged for produce leaving Sydney or Melbourne. In 1899 
an attempt was also made to provide more certain refrigerated shipping facilities from 
Brisbane to Sydney to connect with the more frequent services to England and Europe leaving 
from there. This was done by guaranteeing a minimum payment to the Adelaide Steamship 
Company for the service though the shortfall in supplies of butter due to drought meant that 
the policy was a costly one for the government and was abandoned. 50 The provision of a direct
shipping service remained an issue for some years with both Philp and Morgan acknowledging 
the need for the government to help secure such a service51 particularly in the light of a
contract that the commonwealth government had entered into which in their view 
discriminated unfairly against Queensland in favour of southern states. In 1 908 Kidston 
finalised a contract with the British-India Company for a service connecting Queensland ports. 
Increasingly, however, the need was seen to be more broadly based. On his visit to England in 
1908, Kidston entered into a contract with the British-India Company for a monthly service 
from London to Brisbane (via the Torres Strait and calling at northern and central ports but 
on the outward-bound voyage only) requiring a modest subsidy of i37,000 per year. This
arrangment was maintained throughout the period under review but its benefits were seen in 
very general terms. One of the terms of the contract indeed was that accommodation for at 
least 200 immigrants be provided on each voyage; requirements were also stipulated, however, 
that a certain amount of refrigerated cargo space be available. 
50 BC 3/8/01 ,  p. 4; Department of Agriculture 1901-02, QPP 1902 II, p. 1 33. 
61 For example RC 1 1 /9/01 ,  p. 4; 2 1 /7 /05 , p. 5.
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THE SUGAR INDUSTRY 
Of all the major industries it was sugar-growing that was subject to the most extensive and 
consistent government intervention, all of which stemmed directly or indirectly from the 
widespread use, in the developmental phase of the industry, of Melanesian labour. In the late 
1880s the industry was still organised primarily on the plantation system. Small farmers 
growing cane on land they had selected or had bought or leased from the planters had to rely 
on the plantation mills to process their cane. This dependence disadvantaged small growers 
considerably. Aware of Griffith's dislike of coloured labour and the plantation system, a group 
of selectors petitioned him while he was on a visit to Mackay in 1885 requesting that the 
government provide loans to enable mills to be erected to serve the needs of small farmers. 
Such farmers could,  Griffith was assured, profitably grow sugar without servile labour. The 
proposition was brought before Griffith, as he was reported as saying, " quite unexpectedly " ,  
and while having "previously thought over the matter " he did not commit himself to anything 
at this stage. 52
Less then two months later, however, a Special Supplementary Appropriation of .l50,000 to 
assist in the erection of central sugar mills was announced in the budget in order both to assist 
existing growers in getting their cane processed and to 11 encourage extensive cultivation of 
sugar-cane by holders of small farming areas " .  53 Griffith subsequently argued the measure
would assist in the " establishment of a yeoman class of farmers, working their own lands, and 
displacing the absentee landlords " and contrasted the " two states of civilization 11 implied in 
the small farming and plantation systems. Implicit in Griffith 's thinking was the view that 
the central mill system would obviate the need for coloured labour. Only when it was pointed 
52 BC 22/6/85, p. 5. For the actual petition QVP 1885 I, pp. 1 155-6.
63 QPD 46, 18/8/85, p. 378. 
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out to him by opposition members that small farmers themselves would be likely to want to 
use Melanesians did he make the expectation explicit by declaring the measure to be 
conditional on the use of white labour in central mills. 
The planters, reeling from the blows of low prices and the impending cessation of coloured 
labour (following the passing of the Pacific Island Labourers Act) actually saw the scheme as 
being in their interests. As Black conceded quite frankly, if the scheme went ahead and were a 
success it would, in his view, lead to " an enormous increase " in the value of their properties 
which at the time were "somewhat unsaleable" ;  if it failed it would " put paid to the labour 
question 11 • 54 But the principle of such a 11 long stride in the direction of practical socialism" (as
the Courier termed it )55 was widely criticised. The Mackay petitioners had admitted that
private capitalists had rejected the proposition as unprofitable. In these circumstances the 
proposal was, as a leading member of the opposition expressed it, "opposed to political 
economy . . .  and all commercial principles " :  he made the point by inviting " the capitalists in 
the Liberal party [to) put up the money " .56 Even Kates, who had recently argued for a not
dissimilar use of public money to repurchase large freehold properties for closer settlement, 
argued against the proposal on much the same grounds: if private capitalists were not going 
into such ventures " there were no dollars behind it" ,  he declared, and governments should not 
risk taxpayers' money by getting involved. 57
Griffith agreed that "Under ordinary circumstances he did not think it was the duty of the 
Government to interfere in such matters; he thought that ordinarily, the Government should 
let such things take their own course " .  But in this case the social goal was more important 
54 QPD 41, 4/ 1 1 /85, p. 1446. 
55 23/6/85, p. 4. 
56 Macrossan, QPD 41, 4/1 1 /85, p. 147 1 .  
57 Ibid., p .  1 448. 
than the economic principle: " They saw before them the possibility ,  by the proposed 
experiment, of revolutionizing the history of the Colony, and the Government thought they 
were justified · in asking that a moderate sum should be allowed to be expended for that 
end " .  68 The appropriation was eventually adopted though only after some determined
opposition and a certain lack of enthusiasm by many government supporters. 59
By the time the appropriation was approved Griffith had sought and received a considerable 
amount of information about financial aspects of central mills. A Draft Memorandum and 
Articles of Association of a Co-operative Sugar Manufacturing Company had already been 
drawn up under Griffith 's supervision. 60 Subsequently he commissioned an investigation and
report on areas which held most promise and on the class of mill it was most desirable to 
erect. His commissioner, W . 0 . Hodgkinson, declined to recommend on the latter but 
recommended, on the basis of an exhaustive if somewhat discursive report which closely 
examined likely areas from Mackay northward, that the l50,000 be spent on two mills near 
Mackay and, provided the white labour condition was adopted, a further mill in the Mossman 
River area.6 1  In the event the two former (the North Eton and Racecourse mills) were
constructed. Griffith officially opened the first at the end of 1887 by feeding into the rollers 
about a dozen sticks of cane followed by a bottle of champagne;62 the Racecourse mill
commenced operations in 1889 .  
The early years of operation were not happy ones. Conflict between shareholders and directors 
of the North }�ton mill led to an investigation in 1890 which showed that the mills had been 
58 Ibid, pp. 1 442 , 1462. 
59 The Courier claimed, perhaps not altogether objectively, that Griffith was forcing the measure on reluctant
followers and the scheme was •not liked by the bulk of Ministerial supporters " .  (BC 9/9/85, p. 3 also 
4/1 1/85, p. 3) 
60 Papers Respecting Establishment of Central Mills, QVP 1885 I, p. 1 1 5711'.
61 Report on Central Sugar Mills, Q VP 1886 II p. 3ff.
62 BC 4/1 /88, p. 6. 
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established before sufficient cane was being grown by farmers to justify their operation; 
consequently cane had been purchased by the directors from plantations in violation of the 
white labour condition under which the loans had been granted to the mills. Farmers had also 
experienced difficulty in transporting cane to the mills. By the end of 1889 no payments of 
interest had been made to the government.63 By the end of 189 1  the two mills, which had
borrowed l25,000 and £21 ,000 respectively, owed .£28,515 and l21 ,632.64 Cowley, as minister
of lands expressed confidence in the system, however, and with the rapid increase in the 
number of small farmers supplying the mills the finances of the mills showed steady 
improvement from that point. 65 By the end of 1893 the Racecourse Mill had reduced its debt
to .ll 7 ,490 and North Eton had paid off all its arrears. 66
A major extension of the central mill system was heralded in 1893 when Mcilwraith passed the 
Sugar Works Guarantee Act. This measure provided for the government to guarantee the 
debentures issued by companies formed to build and operate a central mill . As security the 
government would take a first mortgage over both the mill and associated works, and the land 
of the shareholders who were to supply the mill with cane; that is, over the whole operation as 
a going concern. An amending act in 1895 provided for the treasury itself to take up the 
debentures (rather than merely guaranteeing them) the government thereby taking on a real
rather than merely contingent liability. This act also limited the amount which could be 
advanced for this purpose to £500,000. 
When the principal act was passed, there was little opposition and Mcilwraith felt no need to 
defend its principle in any detail. The experience of 1892 and 1893 seemed to have indicated 
63 Report on Central Sugar Mill System, Q VP 1890 III, p. 847ft'. As it transpired, the Articles of Association
had not been altered from their original form in order to prohibit the mills purchasing cane grown by 
coloured labour so no legal breach had been made. 
64 BC 16/1/92, p. 4 .
65 BC 12/1/92, p. 6.
66 BC 13/1 1 /93, p. 6.
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the financial viability of the existing central mills and developments in the industry - the 
subdivision of the large estates and advances in mill technology - indicated that the future of 
the industry lay in a system of larger central mills. Such a system, moreover, promised a 
greater amount of 'settlement' and 'development' (the essence of which was a larger
population supported directly and indirectly by the industry) and a gradual, if not sudden,
lessening of the dependence on coloured labour - goals which found almost universal support as 
general principles. To those associated with the plantation system the measure promised the 
easier and more profitable subdivision and sale of their land to small farmers. 
The essential role of the government under the 1893 act was to establish the terms and 
conditions which in general would ensure the financial viability of a proposed central mill and 
thus safeguard both the shareholders ' interests and the government's position as guarantor: in 
other words to provide the legal and economic framework necessary for success which might, 
in an unregulated situation, not be achieved . Mcilwraith 's primary concern when speaking to 
the bill was thus with the prudential aspects of the policy. In the course of time it was 
anticipated by Mcilwraith that central mills would be built and operated "by capitalists " 
(though with what relation to cane-growers was not clear) but in the short term the
establishment of the system needed the guiding hand of government. 67
The change introduced in the 1 895 act was made for what were subsequently termed " reasons 
of state" .  68 It could, so it was argued, be damaging to the credit of the colony to have
undefined contingent liabilities "floating about in London 11 • The improvement in the state of 
the public finances had now allowed the borrowing necessary to permit the creation of these 
liabilities (by expenditure from the loan fund ) and, Nelson argued , it was better to borrow
67 QPD 70, 3/10/93, pp. 939-40. 
68 Report by Dr. Maxwell jsee below] upon Central Mills, QPP 1904, p. 1 132.
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money at 31h per cent and have a clearly defined liability on this basis than a contingent 
liability for debentures at 5 per cent as would be the case under the original act. 69
Under the 1 893 act, as amended, the "500,000 was advanced from the loan fund to establish
eleven central mills. The amount of advances varied from about £20,000 to £65,000, most of
them made between 1 895 and 1 897 with smaller additional amounts in following years. The 
financial performance of the mills was poor. By 1900 arrears of interest and redemption 
totalled, respectively, about .£45,000 and t80,000. Indeed only one of the mills had made any
payment towards redemption and total interest payments actually made came to only about 
l.37,000.70
The Philp government's response to this situation was remarkably sanguine. Indeed Philp 
attempted to amend the act to provide a further L150,000 primarily to permit the
construction of an additional two central mills in North Queensland arguing that such works 
could not be expected to pay their way in the early years of the operation and that in the long 
run the government would " in nearly every case " get all their money back. In any case the 
policy had served to create a considerable amount of settlement. The fact that all mills were 
"thriving centres of population 11 was regarded as more important than narrow short-term 
financial considerations. 71 Despite some concern about the liberality with which the sugar
industry was being treated a bill to provide additional funds, and as well to increase the time 
for repayment of advances from the original fifteen to twenty-eight years, passed all stages 
only to have Royal assent withheld because of a clause inserted (with the approval of the
premier) explicitly prohibiting the employment of coloured labour by any mill to which money
was advanced under the act. 
69 QPD 73, 3/9/95, pp. 801-4. 
70 Statistics under 'The Sugar Works Guarantee Act of 1893' - Return to an Order, QPP 1 900 II, p. 913fl.
71 QPD 85, 13/1 1 /oo, PP· 181 1-2. 
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A further measure of assistance to the sugar industry by the Philp government came with the 
appointment in 1900 of Dr Walter Maxwell as sugar expert at the handsome salary of .t3 ,000
per year. Low prices and the increasingly apparent problem of soil deterioration during the 
second half of the 1890s had led to a realisation that greater concern should be shown for 
productive efficiency. Largely through the efforts of Chataway, minister for agriculture, who 
had a close involvement with the sugar industry, Maxwell was brought to Queensland for a 
visit in 1899 and then persuaded to take up a position in the colony as Director of the 
proposed bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations the following year. The purpose and function 
of the Bureau (established by a separate act in 1900) was declared to be experimentation and
technical education; it was thus seen as a specialist arm of the Department of Agriculture, 
only extending a principle already accepted . In a departure, however, the Bureau was to be 
funded half by the government and half by sugar planters, farmers and manufacturers 
(through a per ton levy on cane crushed ) , an aspect which was widely criticised by industry
members and representatives as unfair. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company whose research 
and development activities had been widely diffused and had considerably benefited the 
industry in general felt particularly badly done by. 72 The policy was, however, a significant if
somewhat arbitrary acknowledgement of the mixture of private and social benefits flowing 
from such expenditure. 
Maxwell had an impressive scientific background with expenence m Europe, Louisiana and ,  
most recently, Hawaii where he  was reputed to  have increased the yield of  sugar from three to 
five tons per acre - a piece of information which just about everyone seemed to know and 
quote about him even if they knew nothing else. After taking up his post, however, Maxwell 's 
scientific and t.echnical work was increasingly interrupted as Philp called on him to assist in 
72 Letter by W.F:. Knox, General Manager, BC 1 1 / 1 1 /00, p. 6; BC 12/1 1/00, p. 4.
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other policy matters, particularly in reference to the commonwealth government 's moves to 
end the use of coloured labour in the industry (see chapter 3) . Shortly after Philp 's defeat he
was also called upon to investigate and report on the circumstances of the central mills as part 
of Kidston 's at.tempt to restore balance in the public finances. 
Maxwell 's report, made in early 1 904, not only confirmed the financial plight of many of the 
mills but also identified the reasons for their difficulties and raised several issues about the 
whole policy. Firstly the general direction of mills had been, he argued, " inexperienced and 
incompetent, and the management technically crude" .  The directorates, consisting of farmers, 
had been inexperienced and shown a lack of appreciation of their corporate responsibilities. 
Conflicts had often occurred, in some cases as a result of attempts to make policy (for example
with respect to the construction of tramways) serve personal ends. A further and fundamental
problem, according to Maxwell, was that the mills had been supplied with insufficient cane and 
were thus operating below capacity. This was due partly to the inappropriate siting of some 
mills and partly to the failure of many land-owning shareholders actually to produce cane 
from the land� which had been part of the whole proposal and which were mortgaged to the 
government. 73 Indeed, as Maxwell elaborated in a subsequent report, there had been a good
deal of 'land -booming' in connection with central mill proposals. The effect of the 
construction of a mill particularly in an area which had previously had no, or only poor , access 
to a mill was immediately to boost the value of land in its vicinity. It was clearly in the 
interests of landowners to have a mill built in their area and many were prepared to mortgage 
their land in order to see it done. But it had appeared many landowners simply wanted to 
take the betterment in the land without actually engaging in sugar production . There was, 
moreover, an added problem in that much of the land in many instances was unsuitable for 
73 Report by Dr. Maxwell upon Central Mills, QPP 1904, p. 1 1 25ff. 
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cane production at all .  Of a total of 120,000 acres involved Maxwell estimated that only 
20,000 acres had been cultivated; a further 42,000 acres was suitable for cane but had not been 
cleared, while the remainder, just on one-half, was unsuitable for cane production. This 
situation clearly jeopardised the viability of the mills and at the same time undermined the 
security of the government's financial interest.74
Maxwell 's recommendations for action in his 1 904 report were accepted by Kidston and led to 
six mills being placed in possession of the treasurer as mortgagee under the management and 
control of Maxwell as Comptroller of a Bureau of Central Sugar Mills. Four of these were 
eventually foreclosed on by the treasurer (the ownership and control of two being handed back 
to the original companies when satisfactory arrangements were made). At this stage the 
government accepted that the security provided by the mills themselves was sufficient and 
agreed that landowners would have mortgages released and their lands returned to them free 
of all encumbrance. This was effected by a further amending act in 1 908. Under Maxwell 's 
direction the mills improved their financial performance, only one (the Nerang Central Mill) 
deteriorating into what became by the end of the period under consideration a hopeless 
situation. The mills which had remained under (or been restored to) the ownership and 
control of the original companies operated satisfactorily, generally meeting the interest and 
redemption payments required of them. 
With the expansion of the industry during the 1 900s, there was increasing pressure for the 
government to advance further money for central mills. Indeed, as noted above, such requests 
had been made to the Philp government in the late 1890s and would have been granted 
(despite the plight of the existing mills at this time) had not assent been withheld from the 
facilitating legislation. After 1 901 , however, the policies of the commonwealth government 
74 Report upon the Central Sugar Mills, QPP 1905 II, p. 698.
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with respect to the sugar industry materially influenced the Queensland government's attitude 
towards its financial involvement in the industry; and, especially towards the end of the 
period, other policies pursued with respect to the industry were also related very largely to 
commonwealth policy. 
In 1 902 and 1 903 Philp rejected repeated requests for a loan for a central mill at the Johnstone 
River (one of those provided for in the aborted 1 900 bill) on the grounds that sugar could not 
be grown with white labour alone in northern regions (as it would have to be, as a result of 
commonwealth legislation, after 1 906). As suggested in chapter 3 Philp probably accepted 
that the substitution of white for black labour was, in general, possible but felt that it would 
take time and be relatively more difficult in the north . To make his point he referred the 
matter to Barton inviting the commonwealth to guarantee loans for two central mills in the 
north as an indication of their faith in the basis of their own policy.  Barton declined the 
75request. 
The incoming Morgan government was equally concerned about the effect of commonwealth 
policies on the industry and their effect on the viability of the central mill system. In response 
to further requests regarding a Johnstone River mill Morgan argued simply that 11 No 
Government could seriously consider the question of putting /40,000 or 40,000 into a sugar 
mill under the present circumstances " .76 In 1 904 he appealed to the prime minister to extend
for a further five years the period during which the bonus on white-grown sugar would be paid. 
The bonus was in effect paid out of the fund created by the excise on manufactured sugar as 
part of the fiscal machinery developed in conjunction with the commonwealth 's Pacific Island 
Labourers Act as an incentive to use white labour by compensating growers for its higher 
75 Correspondence between Philp and Barton, BC 13/8/02, p. 7. 
76 BC 8/10/04, p. 5 ; 31/ 10/04, p. 5. 
77cost. 
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It was now generally accepted that the sugar industry , even in the north, would continue to 
exist on the basis of white labour only; the issue was how the industry could accommodate 
itself to the altered conditions. "There is no hope [wrote Morgan) that within the next two 
years [the industry) will be so firmly established as a white labour industry as to be able 
without the bonus to pay the wages which white labour has a right to expect for such work 11 • 78
Both Morgan and Kidston emphasised the state of suspense and uncertainty in the industry 
and the prospect of a good deal of land going out of sugar cultivation unless the bonus were 
renewed. 
The bonus was in fact extended (until the end of 1 9 12) and indeed increased under the 
commonwealth 's Sugar Bounty Act of 1905 which set the rate of excise and bounty at [ 4 and
/.3 per ton respectively (compared to /3 and /2 under previous arrangements) . Payment of 
the bonus was made conditional, however, on the payment to labour of the " standard rate" of 
wages in the relevant district, a provision which created much confusion and ill-will. It led 
eventually to the commonwealth minister for trade and customs setting minimum rates 
necessary to ensure payment of the bounty, though his expressed preference was to have the 
policy operated on the basis of a fixed and recognised standard agreed to by employers and 
employees.79 A further amending act ( in 19 10) removed the time limit for continued payment
of the bounty but provided no guarantee of its continuation after 19 13 .  The commonwealth 's 
1905 act thus provided a greater degree of security for the industry in so far as it extended the 
bonus but on the other hand it introduced an element of uncertainty in respect of the wages 
77 Alan Birch, 'The implementation of the White Australia policy in the Queensland Sugar industry 1901- 12 ' , 
Aultralian Journal of Politica and Hiatory, 1 1 ,  2, 1965, pp. 204-5 . 
78 BC 6/ 1 1 /04, p. 10. 
79 Report of interview with Austin Chapman, BC 20/7 /08, p. 5 . 
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question. 
Throughout this time the Queensland government 's position was that, as Kidston put it in 
1907 , " the whole of the sugar trade was at the mercy of the Federal Government" who, 
because they controlled the fiscal policy, " could ruin [the industry] within three months " .80
Deputation after deputation requesting a loan for the proposed Johnstone River mill was told 
by Kidston that, in view of the uncertainty of commonwealth policies, the Queensland 
government did not feel able to commit money to the industry. A delegation in 1 908 (the 
sixth since the Morgan-Kidston government came into power) with a further specific proposal 
for the mill appeared to elicit from Kidston a promise to reward their persistence and grant a 
loan of l45,000. Only days later, however, the delegation was informed that " the Cabinet, 
after consulting the controller, is of opinion that it is inadvisable, in the present unstable 
conditions to enter into negotiations with regard to the establishment of any new central 
mills " .81 The role of Maxwell was fairly obvious in this decision .
Described by one member as " the greatest underground engineer in the public service" he had 
been widely criticised for what was perceived to be his unduly negative influence on the 
government with respect to a furtherance of the central mill policy . 82 There was widespread
feeling among both Labour and Philpites against Maxwell on account of his large salary and 
what many argued to be his meagre achievements as comptroller of central sugar mills as well 
as his negative influence concerning expansion of the system. He was defended by treasurer 
Airey but only in a lukewarm manner. Later in the month a motion was passed without 
dissent to the effect that Maxwell 's contract be not renewed after it expired later in the year .83
80 To deputation from Johnstone River, BC 8/8/07, p. 5.
81 BC 30/4/08, p. 5.
82 QPD 101 , 3/4 /08, p. 552ff. The context was the Supply debate on the allocation to the Bureau of Central
Mills. 
83 QPD 101 16/4/08, p. 963. 
Kidston reverted to his previous position and continued to assert that until " the fiscal 
conditions surrounding the industry " were changed it was simply not "good business to invest 
public money in the industry " .84 An increasing number of requests were being put before the 
government, however, and towards the end of the year Kidston was virtually forced to take 
some action. He appointed a commission to investigate the question of whether or not it was 
desirable for more central mills to be established and if so how many, where and under what 
conditions. The report affirmed the need for more mills. It acknowledged, but was quite 
sanguine about, commonwealth government policy and argued, somewhat loosely, that the 
commonwealth government would be unlikely to do anything to prejudice an industry so 
important for development and defence. It recommended that a further three mills be 
established in 1913 and 19 14 .85
The Sugar Works Act passed in 1 9 1 1  provided the framework for the revival of the central 
mill policy .  The terms of the act were basically similar to the existing act though with rather 
stricter provisions regarding undertakings by applicants to grow cane and the valuation of 
land. An important new principle was that the ownership of a mill , after the advance from 
the government had been paid back, was to be vested in a company formed by persons 
according to the amount of 11 cane credits 11 they had received by virtue of cane delivered to the 
mill, thus emphasising the co-operative principle and further ensuring the viability of the mill. 
The problem of the susceptibility of the industry to commonwealth policy remained, however, 
and was mad(� particularly acute when the commonwealth minister for trade and customs 
announced that he had decided to accept, for the purpose of paying the bounty , the wage 
levels and conditions to be laid down by the Arbitration Court, pending which he would 
84 Kidston to deputation, BC 23/7 / 10, p. 5.
85 Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into certain questions relating to the Sugar Industry,
QPP 191 1 - 12, p. 1013ff. 
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accept either the district agreement or (if no such agreement existed) specified levels which
were generally thought to be grossly in excess of these prevailing. There followed a complex of 
negotiations between the state government and prime minister Fisher as a result of which 
Fisher agreed in principle to abolish the excise and bounty. As part of the agreement Denham 
agreed, firstly,. to prohibit all coloured labour from working in the industry and secondly, in 
order that the industry " should pay the white labourer the highest wage consistent with its 
prosperity" ,  to bring all sugar works under the industrial boards operating under the 
Industrial Peace Act. He indicated further that the millers had agreed to pass on the full 
benefits arising from the abolition of the excise to growers. 86
On the wage:� issue Denham subsequently agreed to accept, and enforce (via the state
industrial boards) , the recommendations made by the commonwealth Royal Commission
regarding wage levels and conditions of labour. He felt able to do this in the light of the 
commissioners ' recommendations that a fixed minimum price (£2 1 . lOs. per ton) be set for
sugar, which, he agreed ,  " makes it much more reasonable to fix rates of wages, and so forth" .  
I recognise this is an unusual interference with private enterprise, but we have a 
special set of circumstances to deal with , and, when it is remembered to what an 
enormous degree labour charges enter into the production of cane it can be seen at 
once that., unless the finished product has a settled value, not liable to b e  upset by 
oversea
8f roductions, it would practically be impossible to establish a price for fieldlabour. 
The following day he made his provisos for accepting the fixing of wage levels - the fixing of a 
minimum price for sugar and adequate tariff protection (both expressed only somewhat
indirectly in the words emphasised above) - more explicit.
86 Denham to Fhher, 5/9/12 ,  reproduced in BC 1 1/9/12 ,  p. 5.
87 Statement by Denham, BC 6/ 1 2/ 12 , p. 6, emphasis added. The agreement was communicated to Fisher on
6/1 2/1 2. 
Will you, by statute, fix minimum price at £21/10/-? If so it will be necessary for 
you to secure such power over tariff as will preclude foreign sugar being sold in 
Australia under that price . . . .  of supreme importance to be assured of such duty 
as will insure price adequate to meet such conditions as commission recommends in 
conducting the business. 88 
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Fisher, for his part, pressed through legislation to abolish the excise and bounty though 
promulgation was withheld until the state carried out its undertakings regarding coloured 
labour and wages. There then occurred something of an impasse. Fisher would not guarantee 
to provide the protection which Denham considered necessary to permit the acceptance of the 
prescribed wages and conditions. Denham confirmed that he was not prepared to go beyond 
his initial undertaking " to establish boards in connection with the industry to insure to white 
labour the best conditions possible consistent with the prosperity of the industry " .89 In any
case state legislation would have had to wait until the session later in the year. 
In the meantime Fisher 's Labour government was replaced by the Liberal government led by 
Joseph Cook. Cook was prepared to promulgate the legislation on the basis of wages and 
conditions being determined by the state wages boards though Denham was required to ensure 
that, until the boards could be established and the promise effected , the terms recommended 
by the Royal Commission be accepted. This was given legislative force through the Sugar 
Growers Employees Act of 1 9 1 3 . Denham's promise to prohibit the employment of coloured 
labour in the 'industry was effected by the Sugar Cultivation Act 1 9 13 ,  a rather sordid and 
devious piece of legislation . A further consequent piece of legislation, the Sugar Growers Act 
of 19 13 ,  was designed to ensure that sugar growers received (from millers) the full benefit of
the lifting of the excise. 
88 Denham to Fisher 6/ 12/12, see BC 22/1/ 13, p. 6.
89 Ibid.
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Thus was restored to Queensland a greater measure of control over the industry though the 
critical matter of protection from imports by way of the tariff remained in the hands of the 
commonwealth. Denham continued to press for a higher tariff and, with his acceptance of the 
regulation of wages within the industry by industrial boards he seemed to have been converted 
to a thoroughly regulationist position. While accepting the need for protection from imports 
Denham was, however, a somewhat reluctant accomplice in the regulation of wages. This had 
been an unavoidable means to the end of freeing the industry from the comprehensive 
commonwealth control which had followed from the Commonwealth 's Pacific Island Labourers 
Act and the ensuing bounty /excise policy. He also opposed a move on the part of the Liberal­
Country Party (a group within the ranks of government supporters) to extend the regulation
of the industry to control over the price paid by mills for cane to the canegrowers by proposed 
Sugar Cane Prices Boards. Recognising the logic of extending protection to the grower and 
ensuring for him, along with the labourers and the manufacturers a " fair deal " (as the
propenents of the measure explained it) he baulked at this further " step towards bureaucracy" 
after which, he argued, there was no logical barrier to the legislative control of " every instance 
in economic and industrial life 11 •
90 A Sugar Cane Prices Boards Bill was introduced privately
and passed its second reading as several Liberals showed their support, at least in this 
instance, for the sort of comprehensive protectionist measures which developed so markedly 
during this part of Australia's history. But, in the absence of Denham 's support, the bill was 
not further proceeded with . 
While the issues of fiscal policy in relation to the industry remained unresolved Kidston and 
Denham had resisted the considerable pressure exerted upon them to advance funds for the 
establishment of more central mills. Even after the commission had reported in 1 9 1 1  and the 
90 QPD 1 16, 6/1 1 / 13, pp. 2490 and 2496-500. 
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Sugar Works Act had established a more satisfactory framework in which the government 
could assist with establishing new mills Denham and Treasurer Barnes repeatedly declined to 
go ahead until policy matters were settled. At the end of 1 9 12 ,  as Denham appeared to have 
accepted Fisher 's terms for abolition of the excise and bounty, he argued to the Cairns 
Chamber of Commerce, which had accused him of unjustly withholding the funds for the 
recommended mills that "I see no grounds for believing that under the new conditions the 
industry will expand to the extent that at one time seemed highly probable . . . .  It would be 
unjust to the tax-payer for the State to lend hundreds of thousands of pounds to be spent in 
buildings, machinery, plant, and tramways while a reasonable doubt exists that under the 
prescribed contiions cane could be profitably grown for the new mills " .9 1  
There might l iave been an element of politically motivated perversity i n  this. For Denham 
gave the go-ahead after his settlement with Cook even though the wage levels and labour 
conditions of the Royal Commission were accepted (at least for the moment) and the tariff 
question was still unsettled. But the excise/bounty question had been settled to the benefit of 
growers, the 1 9 13 season was a good one, and the commonwealth government in power 
(however tenuously) was an ideologically more friendly one. Thus was resumed the central 
mills policy and work was commenced on the first government funded mill for nearly two 
decades. 
CONTROL OF RABBITS 
The principal form of assistance sought by and given to the pastoral industry, apart from that 
relating to the export of meat, related to the control of pests. The major pests affecting the 
91 BC 20/18/12 ,  p. 5 .  
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industry were marsupials, rabbits and, from the mid- 1890s, the tick. Of these, rabbits and 
their control raised the most interesting economic issues both because of the generality of the 
pest and the greater cost involved in controlling them. The question was complicated by a 
number of uncertainties. Discussions were characterised by widely varying claims and 
counter-claims as to the seriousness of the problem and the extent and rate of the rabbit 
incursion from the southern colonies. There was disagreement also about the efficiency of 
different control measures proposed: while disease-introduction was discussed from time to 
time it was generally recognised that fencing would have to be the principal form of control 
though views differed as to how extensive this would have to be. The consequent uncertainty 
about the extent - both geographic and economic - of the effect, and the cost and effectiveness 
of control measures, thus made it difficult to determine what measures should be taken, how 
the 'benefits ' of such measures would be distributed and how the costs of them should be 
borne. 
The problem Qrst came to the attention of the government in the early 1880s as the northward 
movement of :rabbits from the southern colonies was perceived. Two investigations of the 
likely threat to Queensland were commissioned by the Griffith government soon after it came 
to office: the second of these found that while there were no rabbits within 1 30 miles of the 
boundary of the colony, they were advancing northwards; it recommended that the western 
half of the Queensland-New South Wales border be fenced with netting. Accordingly in 1885 
the government proposed that alto0,000 be allocated as a special appropriation from current
revenue for such a purpose. Griffith argued that the cost ought to borne by general revenue 
rather than by those 'in the front line ' though he recognised the problem. Dutton was even 
more certain, seeing the work as " a  thoroughly national one" .92 Uncertainty was widely
92 QPD 47, 4/uiss, p. 1 424ff. 
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expressed on both sides of the House as to the effectiveness of the measure and the justice of 
making all pay for it; eventually only l50,000 was voted. 
By the end of 1888 with the aid of an additional vote of -l50,000, the boundary had been 
fenced as far east as Mungindi. The rabbits had beaten the fence, however, and in June 1 888 
a conference of representatives of Divisional Boards and boards set up under a series of 
Marsupial Boards Acts to control marsupials resolved to request the government to take 
further steps with respect to the rabbits. They proposed that crown tenants in infested 
country be required to fence their runs to form areas of 200 square miles and, in exchange, 
resumed areas be reincorporated into leasehold areas and the period of lease extended. It was 
further suggested that a board (along the lines of the Land Board) be established to administer 
the measure, necessary funds being raised by an assessment on all stock in the colony. 93
Mcilwraith subsequently met a deputation from the conference ready to receive the proposals, 
but was rather surprised to find that they asked only for much less radical action in regard to 
extension of the border fence and investigation into disease - proposals to which Mcilwraith 
readily agreed . 94 The proposals were not in fact pressed as the severity of the problem had 
eased with the continuing drought. By the end of the year Black as minister for lands was 
suggesting that enough had been done, at least for the time being, and that no further action 
was intended in the immediate future. 95
With improvement in the seasons the problem worsened and in 189 1 the coalition government 
established a system of Rabbit Boards in infested districts along the lines of existing marsupial 
boards. The boards, elected by large stock-owners, were empowered to make property owners 
93 Reports of conference BC 23, 25/6/88, p. 6. Similar recommendations had also been put by the Under­
Secretary of the Lands Department in his Annual Report for 1887. ( Q VP 1888 III, p. 307)
94 Report of deputation BC 27 /6/88, p. 6. 
95 QPD 65, 1 1 / 10/88, p. 691 ;  12/10/88, p. 624ff.
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undertake fencing under their superv1s1on and to destroy rabbits within the boundaries of 
fences. The operation of the boards was f uncled by a minimum assessment of ls. per 20 cattle 
or 100 sheep within the infested districts. Netting was to be supplied free of charge by the 
government up to an amount equal to that raised by the assessment. Thus the responsibility 
for controlling rabbits within the boundary fence (on which, by this stage over i130,000 had 
been spent) was placed jointly on run holders and stock owners within infested districts and 
public revenue , with stock owners paying the larger amount depending on the amount of new 
fencing they were required to do. 
Pressure was maintained on the government, however, to grant concessions to the pastoralists 
in return for the obligations placed upon them. The Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, in 
recognition of the dependence of city business on the pastoral industry, resolved that resumed 
portions be re··incorporated in leasehold areas and extension of tenure be granted in order to 
provide the security on which money could be borrowed to undertake fencing. Following a 
public meeting these views were put to Griffith, perhaps a little too earnestly: " If the 
Government would not do anything, as a pastoralist if he found the danger too much to cope 
with, he would get all he could out of the country, and when he could get no more he would 
throw it up and let the Government take it with the rabbits upon it " ,  said former treasurer 
John Donaldson. Griffith remained unmoved, declaring himself " not at all favourable" to the 
idea of granting extended tenure, particularly " under the influence of a scare " .96  Within two
weeks, however,  a bill was introduced to grant a seven year extension of tenure on leases of 
land within 100 miles of the southern and western boundaries on condition that lessees erected 
96 BC 13/10/92, p. 4; and report of deputation 17 / 10/92, p. 6.
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and maintained rabbit-proof fences around their runs. Griffith 's view that " It is not the 
function of the Government to undertake the work which can be better done by private 
persons 11 97 is attributable partly to the fact that the government had already erected the 
border fence, the parlous state of the public finances and to his general change of mood in the 
early '90s about the role and obligations of government. Nevertheless he agreed that the 
" country should bear some of the burden 11 and that the measure was an attempt to "hold an 
even hand " and to "strike a fair bargain " between the public generally and Crown tenants.98 
The debate continued, however, as to the relative responsibilities of land-holders and stock-
owners within infested areas, those elsewhere in the colony and the public generally for 
measures to eradicate rabbits. In 1 894  a further conference resolved that the matter should be 
'nationalised ' to a greater extent. They proposed the creation of a central rabbit board to 
take financial responsibility for the maintenance of the border fence and to provide assistance 
to district boards for the destruction of rabbits. The board was to be funded partly by a 
contribution from consolidated revenue of l5 per mile of the boundary fence and partly by a 
levy on stock in the colony outside existing rabbit board districts. 
Under the scheme the burden was thus to fall primarily on stockowners in the infested area, 
but also on stockowners in the rest of the colony and the general taxpayer. Nelson agreed. 
"There is no doubt it is a national business . . .  .It improves the value of the national estate all 
over the colony" ,  he said to a deputation from the conference.99 The proposals were almost 
immediately incorporated in a bill to amend the 1891  Rabbit Boards Act but met with 
widespread opposition. The levy on stockowners outside existing rabbit districts was thrown 
out at the committee stage; the central board was retained, its activities to be funded by a 
97 QPD 68, 2/1 1 /92, p. 17 10. 
98 Ibid. , pp. 17 10- 1 .  The bill became the Pastoral Leases Extension Act of 1892. 
99 BC 20/9/94, p.  3. 
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£10,000 per annum grant from general revenue, but there remained quite clear divisions of 
opinion as to the extent of the responsibilities of stockowners generally and the colony as a 
100whole. 
A further amending act was passed in 1895 and a consolidating act in the following year the 
main effect of which was to make wire netting available for runholders to affix to boundary 
fences on very liberal terms thus adding to the general subsidy paid to runholders. But some 
boards found themselves unable to cope financially with the task in hand particularly as 
leaseholders who came under the Pastoral Leases Extension Act no longer had to pay 
assessments. In addition pastoralists were complaining increasingly about finding themselves 
with a growing number of rabbits that they had taxed themselves to fence in on their land! 
Pressure was thus maintained on the government to transfer the cost of controlling the rabbit 
even further on to the colony generally. This was fairly well resisted. In response to a motion 
from the member for Balonne in 1898 that the question of rabbit destruction " should - to a 
much greater extent than applies at present - be made a national undertaking " ,  Foxton, as 
lands minister, pointed out that the government had, since the campaign against the rabbits 
started , spent over .l360,000 compared to about .£270,000 raised through Rabbit Board 
assessments. He rejected the proposal implicit in the motion to extend the tax to all 
stockowners iI1 the colony (partly no doubt because he was aware from previous experience
that parliament would be unlikely to accept it) and by implication declared the apportionment
of the cost of rabbit control between stockowners in infested areas and taxpayers generally as 
f . 101air. 
100 QPD 72, 23/ 10/94, p. 999ff. and p. 12 1 4ff.
101 QPD 79, 12/10/98. p. 626ff. The ,l360,000 which the government had spent was made up primarily by
the cost of the border fence and wire netting provided to both district boards and direct to lessees. 
Philp was no more forthcoming two years later when he met a deputation from a conference of 
rabbit board representatives. The "guiding principle of the conference " ,  they told him, "had 
been the nationalisation of the rabbit tax " .  The deputation asked not only that stock outside 
the rabbit board districts be assessed but that the boards be endowed out of consolidated 
revenue at the rate of /,2 for every it collected. (This compared to an effective endowment of
8s. for every /.1 under the existing system whereby the government supplied the boards with 
netting. )  Philp expressed no view and promised nothing; no action followed. 
Rabbit numbers were substantially reduced by the great drought though after the return of 
good seasons they again rose quickly and the issue of control and destruction once more 
became a live one. Despite continuing expressions of concern agitation for changes to the 
policy and fn�nk admissions by successive ministers for lands that 'a better' system was 
needed, the legislative framework remained substantially unchanged at the end of the period 
under review. The system of boards established under the 1896 act was merely extended by a 
series of acts which, towards the end (from 1909 to 1 9 12) became annual rituals where more
comprehensive measures were promised for the following year. Eventually a new act was 
passed in 1 9  la but this introduced only relatively minor changes and in effect extended the 
existing system. 
Lands minister Tolmie when introducing the bill seemed at something of a loss as to what 
general principles the measure did in fact enshrine, reflecting the sort of helplessness that 
seems to have been felt by his predecessors in government who had seemed almost paralysed 
by the issue. There were indeed several problems and uncertainties - physical , organisational 
and economic. The severity of the rabbit problem fluctuated in an unexplained way both over 
time and geographic area, and there were disagreements over basic questions such as the 
effectiveness of poisoning as a destruction measure and the mesh-dimension of wire netting 
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necessary to prevent the rabbits getting through. The appropriate size, and the effectiveness, 
of local boards was also continually debated . This was tackled when an amendment effected 
in the 1 906 act gave the minister the power to direct an owner to destroy rabbits in 
recognition of the difficulties of local boards in enforcing such orders. But the basic problem of 
determining how the costs of fencing and poisoning should be apportioned remained amid 
continual debate about the extent and distribution of the benefits from rabbit control 
measures. The reduction in the revenue-raising powers of boards following the substantial 
reduction in stock numbers after the drought served to exacerbate the situation - the W arrego 
Board in fact collapsed financially as a result of over-spending in relation to its revenue-raising 
capacity and was taken over by the government in 1901 . 1 02 There were also an increasing 
number of anomalies such as those arising where grazing farms had been established on land 
resumed inside the rabbit-proofed boundary of a station holding where the original lessee was 
compelled to keep the rabbit fence intact while the grazing farmer who had selected inside was 
103free from any such trouble and expense. 
A post-drought deputation of pastoral lessees to Morgan and his lands minister Bell proposed 
a new system of raising money: a 10 per cent tax on the rent paid by all Crown tenants to be 
subsidised by a 20 per cent contribution by the government from all Crown rents. This drew, 
in a rather fumbling response, the non-committal promise of " friendly consideration; always 
remembering that the interests of the public and not any one section shall be uppermost . . .
What they desired was in a sense the nationalisation of the pest and he would point out that 
the efforts made this far had been a national item, though not to such an extent as some of 
them perhaps wished, or perhaps as it ought to have been. . . . [But] he wanted them to 
102 Annual Report of the Lands Department 1901 ,  QPP 1902 III, p. 19.
103 BC 20/4/04, p. 4.  
understand distinctly that they were not going to be rushed in the matter " .  104
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Subsequently Bell was subjected to criticism for ordering the Central Rabbit Board to cease 
that part of its activities concerned with the poisoning of rabbits. Bell had argued that " the 
spasmodic poisoning of isolated colonies" of rabbits was ineffective and wasteful. More 
generally he was accused of allowing the rabbit question to lapse into a " state of drift "  . 106
His successors did little to rescue it from this state, understandably perhaps given the 
difficulties in formulating policy. The prevailing feeling for the whole period was probably 
best expressed by Bell in his remark to a deputation in 1 907: "He could only hope that they 
would wake up some fine morning and find that some way of overcoming the trouble had been 
. i on discovered " . 
MINING 
In the case of mining there were, by contrast with other primary industries, few policies of any 
significance implemented (or even seriously canvassed) in order to assist the industry. The
sentiments of Griffith expressed in a speech in 1885 were echoed by, and reflected in the 
relative inaction of, subsequent governments over the next three decades: " I  wish it were 
practicable for the Government to do something to encourage the mining industries, but I do 
not know anything more difficult than to formulate a scheme by which the individual men 
engaged in them will be benefited " . 107
104 BC 12/5/04, p. 2. 
105 BC 20/8/07, p. 3. 
106 BC 10/4/07, p. 5. 
107 BC 27 /2/85, p. 6. Also speech by Philp at Mt Morgan (when minister for mines) denying the ability of
governments to assist or promote mining activities, except in the provision of improved railway 
communication - see below. (BC 3/4/95, p. 5) 
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In his first year in office Griffith increased the amount allocated for grants in aid of 
prospecting to stimulate the search for gold and other minerals but prospecting parties aided 
by such grants had few significant successes. These grants were maintained throughout the 
period though at low levels even after the early 1900s when it was obvious that gold 
production was declining and the industry was coming increasingly to depend on other 
minerals. 
From 1885 provision was also made for the granting of loans in aid of deep-sinking. This 
followed a motion by J .M. Macrossan the previous year where he argued that the major 
goldfields had probably been discovered, that surface prospecting was yielding smaller and 
smaller return:� and, accordingly, that increasing efforts would be necessary to obtain gold at 
deeper levels. Macrossan had initially argued for a system of rewards for miners who obtained 
gold from specified depths; he did so on the grounds that other forms of assistance would be 
inappropriate in a free trade context and lead to requests for similar assistance with 
production from other industries. Griffith, less worried by sur:h principles, opted for a system 
of loans to accommodate the misgivings expressed by some Liberals that the reward system 
advocated by Macrossan would only benefit the capitalist with sufficient funds to undertake 
deep mining and thus be akin to "greasing a fat pig" . 108 
As Macrossan argued, however, it was inevitable that capitalists would come increasingly to 
control mining. The collapse of the boom of the 1880s resulted in a severe check to 
investment in mining, particularly that from overseas. While a measure of economic recovery 
occurred after 1894 practically no foreign money found its way into the industry, a matter 
which the Under Secretary of the Mines Department thought worthy of special note in his 
Annual Report for 1896 . 109 A move by Labour 's Herbert Hardacre in 1894 to introduce what 
108 QPD 44, 5/12/84, p. 1716ff. 
109 QPD 1897 IV, p. 6. 
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was in effect a tax on mineral rents (put forward in his Royalty on Minerals Bill) was savaged 
by the government particularly for its disincentive effect on foreign investment. Hardacre 
argued that the measure was intended in part at least as a means of providing funds to aid the 
industry by providing schools of mines and other forms of assistance (though these were not 
clearly spelt out). But Barlow, speaking for the government, saw it merely as a measure to 
redistribute the larger incomes made from mining and one which he argued would deter 
foreign investment, his general attitude to which was incidentally made clear: " Is it not better 
that employment should be given to people, even though dividends may be taken out of the 
country, than that the land should be left undeveloped 11 ? 1 10
Shortly after, a Royal Commission was established to review the laws relating to mining and 
to consider " the best mode in which assistance can be rendered to develop the mineral 
resources of the colony" .  It was concerned particularly with the question of foreign capital 
and the way in which existing laws relating to mining served to discourage investment from 
overseas; among its many recommendations were several aimed at encouraging (or at least 
reducing some of the alleged disincentives to) foreign capital . The size and security of tenure 
of mineral leases and the conditions regarding employment of labour on leases were singled out 
for particular attention although it was agreed that the way in which the laws in question had 
in fact been administered had caused no problem in practice. The commission also 
recommended that a bureau of mining information be established in London to provide 
objective information about Queensland mining ventures to potential investors in order that a 
repetition of the more dubious propositions put before British investors in both Queensland 
and other colonies, with their harmful publicity and deterrent effects, could be avoided. 
1 10 QPD 72, 8/ 1 1 /94, p. 1 1938'.; Barlow's statement, p. 1 195. 
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In the consolidating mining act passed in 1898 some of these recommendations were taken up: 
the area of mining leases was doubled , penalties for non-compliance with regulations reduced 
and labour conditions liberalised, measures which were designed explicitly to make investment 
in Queensland mining ventures more attractive to overseas capital . 1 1 1  Exhibitions of minerals
at the Greater Britain Exhibition in 1899 and at the Glasgow Exhibition in 1 901  were also 
aimed particularly at publicising Queensland mining and attracting foreign investors. 1 12 These
attempts were, however, paralleled by a growing sentiment, particularly from Labour, against 
foreign capital , a sentiment which gained somewhat unexpected support from the Courier 
which warned against an " undue rush for foreign investments" :  There was, it argued: " a  
germ of reasonableness at the bottom of [Labour] discontent, that it were much better for 
Queensland to own the mines and receive the full profit of them, than to work them for 
outside owners and receive the workers ' wages only " . 1 13
In the event the question ceased to be a policy issue in the 1900s. The establishment of new 
ventures, particularly in base metal mining, required considerable amounts of capital . But 
with returning general prosperity the steady increase in local savings together with renewed 
interest by southern and British investors met the needs for investment funds and the issue 
was not one with which the government felt a need to be concerned. 
Of more enduring significance was the policy initiated by Philp to improve railway 
communication to mining areas. As early as 1895 he had identified this as the chief means by 
which governments could assist the development of mining. 1 1 4  As treasurer, minister for mines
and railways, and premier in subsequent years he was responsible for a number of government 
1 1 1  Philp, QPD 79, 19/10/98, p. 802ff. 
1 1 2  QPD 84, 30/R/OO, p. 594. Annual Report of the Under Secretary for Mines 1899, Q VP 1900 II, p. 1 50.
1 13 BC 18/8/97, p. 4 .
1 1 4 Speech at Mt Morgan, BC 3/4/95, p. 5.
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lines to serve mining areas. More controversially, he initiated the policy of permitting private 
railway construction by mining companies (see chapter 4). The Morgan-Kidston-Denham 
governments continued this policy in a modified form and in 1 9 10 the improvement of railway 
communication was still cited as the chief means of assistance for mining, though by now it 
was seen as " relief" in the context of the low price of industrial metals and an industry in a 
considerable measure of economic difficulty. 1 1 5 
There were some other policies pursued during the period though not with any vigour. The 
provision for loans in aid of deep-sinking, mentioned earlier, was abandoned in 1889 in favour 
of the allocation of funds to the purchase and operation of a diamond drill . This was used to 
assist miners sinking deep shafts at Gympie and Croydon but with marked lack of success and 
no further funds were allocated after 1893.  Loans in aid of deep-sinking were resumed only 
after 1908. This followed a deputation of members of parliament representing mining districts 
to Kidston asking for a considerably increased amount to be provided to assist in the 
development of the mining industry. Kidston was guarded in his response, making clear his 
view that money would only be allocated 11 if there was a reasonable business prospect of 
getting a return from it 11 •
1 16 
As a result of the initiative of a private member provision was also made, under the Mining 
Machinery Advances Act passed in 1 906, for a system of low-interest government loans to be 
made for the purpose of acquiring machinery either to carry on mining operations or to treat 
ores; but the government showed considerably less enthusiasm for the measure than for the 
comparable measure applied to agriculture. 1 17 
1 1 5 Financial Statement, QPD 105 , 1 7 /8/10, p. 469; the view was still shared by Philp, QPD 109, 13/10/ 1 1 ,  p. 
1 545. 
1 1 6 Report of deputation, BC 1 2/5/08, p. 5 . 
11 7 QPD 93, 1 / l ��/04, p. 1061ff.; QPD 97, 13/9/06, p. 740ff. 
- 901 
Paralleling th{: debate about assistance to agriculture even more closely was discussion about 
schools of mines and mineralogical lecturers. Griffith declared his intention of establishing 
three schools in different centres in the mid- 1880s though the policy was changed to the less 
grandiose one of appointing itinerant lecturers. A School of Mines Act was passed in 1 894 
though it required a contribution from the local community to supplement the government's 
allocation and was not taken advantage of for some years. There were differences of opinion 
over the function that schools of mines would serve (somewhat similar to those in the case of
schools of agriculture) and - in the year that the agricultural college was actually opened at
Gatton - the case for schools of mines was put back by the mining Royal Commission's 
ambivalence towards the concept and its expressed preference for a scheme of scholarships to 
permit a smaller number of youths to get a more thorough general education relevant to the 
science and practice of mining. 1 18 A school was eventually opened under the terms of the 1894
act at Charters Towers in 1901, however, offering courses in mining and metallurgy. The 
Queensland Mining Journal was initiated in the Mines Department in the same year as the 
Agricultural Journal but while the department was considered in some ways to parallel the 
Agriculture Department it was never regarded as having the same sort of role that the latter 
did in promoting its particular sphere of industry. 
A further recurring policy issue related to mining on private property. Following a Supreme 
Court decision in the early 1 890s which asserted the right of the Crown to minerals on 
freehold land the government was repeatedly called upon to define the terms on which mining 
on private property could be undertaken. This was not done comprehensively until a Mining 
on Private Land Act was passed in 1 909. The act, it was argued, would " infuse a considerable 
amount of vigour into mining operations" though Labour criticised it for placing too many 
1 18 Report, QPP 1897 IV, p. 216. 
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restrictions in the way of prospectors and miners seeking minerals on freehold land. 1 19 In any 
case the measure can best be seen as an unavoidable (and long delayed) clarification of the 
situation rather than one specifically to encourage mining. 
Overall it is difficult to discern any major policy to encourage mining pursued with any 
commitment by any government during the period - save perhaps Philp 's support for both 
public and private railways to improve access to mining areas especially in north Queensland. 
The most significant (and very nearly only) major government figure during the period to 
identify particularly with mining was Philp, but apart from his railway initiatives, he 
advocated no other specific policies. His support for private railways was indeed a policy in 
support of private enterprise rather than government involvement. If mining ever rated a 
mention in election manifestos it was in the most general of terms. Kidston 's 1 907 policy,  for 
example, where he foreshadowed bold development initiatives, was a typical example: 
"Queensland has great undeveloped mineral resources, and it is desirable to have our mining 
laws thoroughly revised so that every possible encouragement will be given to bona-fide 
investors . . . .  those who are prepared to undertake the development of our mineral resources 
should be given every reasonable and proper facility for doing so" . 1 20
To a large extent the lack of government involvement was due to the nature of mining as an 
industry. There simply was not a great deal that governments could do to promote economic 
activity in this area short of becoming directly involved themselves. Furthermore, mining -
particularly compared to agriculture was not seen to provide as secure and permanent base 
for settlement and small-scale private enterprise and thus warrant the same measure of 
interest and support by government. 
1 19 QPD 104, 9/ 1 1/09, p. 1 2 1 .  
120 BC 1 1 /2/07, p .  6.
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It is only at the end of the period that the attitude of the government towards the search for, 
and future exploitation of, oil suspected to exist in the vicinity of Roma provides a contrast to 
the general non-interventionist approach and an interesting footnote to this review of mining 
policy .  So important was this matter considered to be Denham committed the government to 
prosecute a " ciiligent and vigilant inquiry " and active search for oil and, moreover, reserved 
for the government the right to control all production in the future. 1 2 1
PROTECTION 
Until the late 1880s, while protectionist sentiments were often expressed in more or less precise 
terms, customH tariffs were used primarily for revenue purposes and no other devices were used 
to protect a specific industry or group of industries. Members of parliament held widely 
ranging views on protection as a general policy though few held clearly definable positions. 
Views on protection cut right across party lines. Mcilwraith readily proclaimed protectionist 
leanings without having taken any specific action when in government to give effect to them; 
Morehead on t.he other hand was a thorough-going free-trader. Agricultural Liberals such as 
Groom and Kates were advocates of protection for agricultural industries. Griffith 's views 
(until the late 1 880s) were difficult to pin down while Dickson, Liberal treasurer after 1883,
was a declared (if not dogmatic) advocate of free trade. Griffith indeed tended to dismiss the
whole issue: " I  do not know whether it makes any difference whether a man calls himself a 
protectionist or not . . . . I think the distinction between a freetrader and a protectionist is of 
very little importance in Queensland . . .  " ,  he averred in 1885. The context was a debate on 
proposed increases in customs duties on machinery and timber which, according to Dickson, 
were framed solely with a view to obtaining revenue: the shifting ground on which views were 
121 QPD 1 1 1 ,  31 /7 / 1 2, p. 529; also Denham's election manifesto, BC 29/3/13, p. 8.
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formed was shown, however, by Dickson 's approving, if vague, reference to the protective 
effects of the measure and Mcilwraith 's criticism of the mcrease on the basis of the anti-
protectionist argument that it would handicap other indigenous industries. 1 22
In 1886,  as economic conditions deteriorated, pressure for protectionist policies came from a 
new source: employees. Deputations of ironworkers and of unemployed mechanics received 
fairly non-committal responses from Griffith, however, who spoke about "justice to the general 
taxpayer " and " the dangers of protecting one trade at the expense of others " . 123 The member
for Maryborough also pressed, in a parliamentary motion, for protection to be given by way of 
preference to locally manufactured locomotives and rolling stock for railways and iron-work 
for bridges. Explicitly avoiding the general question of "protection versus free-trade" on the 
ground that he was not advocating "protection all round " ,  he nonetheless brought forward all 
the standard arguments for protection. Dickson responded with the conventional arguments 
against protection and " distinctly disavow(ed) " policies whereby " the whole nation should be 
taxed for the aggrandisement of the few" ;  though he was prepared to countenance such 
preference if it involved only a " moderate " increase in cost! Griffith concurred. 124
By the following year, after the resignation of Dickson who confessed that he had 11 at times 
felt myself to be a clog upon the Premier [who had evinced] a great desire to enter upon the 
mazy question of protection " ,  Griffith did just what his former colleague had suspected. " I  
have no  sympathy whatever" ,  h e  declared, "with those people who worship the fetich of 
buying in the cheapest market " .  Showing himself to be fully aware of the arguments in favour 
of free trade as opposed to protection he argued, however, that they would hold only if " the 
world were one vast brotherhood, and there was no difference of interests . . . .  But we must 
122 QPD 46, 25/8/85, p. 379 , pp. 425-6; Griffith's statement, p. 436. 
123 BC 7 /8/86, p. 5 ; 26/1 1 /86, p. 5 . 
124 QPD 49, 1 2/8/86, p. 344ff. 
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look at things as they really are. We are in the first place a nation - then a part of a nation 
with separate fiscal arrangements; and what we have to do is in the first place to look after 
125ourselves 11 • 
Towards the end of 1887 the government gave contracts for the manufacture of seventy-five 
locomotives to two firms in Brisbane and Ipswich at prices above these of British tenderers. 
The decision followed the sharply increased need for rolling stock as the middle years of the 
1880s saw a doubling of the mileage of railway open and existing stock was deteriorating 
rapidly at the same time. But, as the acquisition of new locomotives from overseas involved a 
considerable lag and the difference between the price of the successful local tenderers and 
overseas tenderers was only of the order of six and a half per cent, the decision hardly 
represented a protectionist policy. Few tree traders (including Dickson) were unhappy with
the decision ; reflecting this view even the staunchly anti-protectionist Courier approved,  
regarding " the encouragement of local manufacturers in this direction [as) a matter apart 
altogether from the shibboleths of either free trade or protection 11 • 126
In the closing months of 1 887 and in early 1888, however, Griffith developed his general pro-
protection views more fully. To an audience on a ministerial visit to north Queensland (where
protection was viewed with suspicion as a policy to advantage the southern portion of the 
colony) Griffith suggested that " the tariff might be made to serve a purpose other than merely 
obtaining revenue and it might be made to contribute considerably to the development of the 
internal resources of the country. He would not give them a lecture on this subject now, but 
h d d d h h t II 1 27 E l" . t ey woul un erstan w at e mean . . . . ar 1er, m a speech at Warwick, he had
125 QPD 52, 1 1 /8/87, p. 262. 
1 26 BC 7 / 1 2/87 , p. 4; 1 4/12/87, p. 4 . A.L. Lougheed, 'The provision of railway rolling stock and the
Queensland engineering industry, 1881-1914 ', Working Paper No. 42, Dept. of Economics, University of 
Queensland, July 1983, pp. 5-6, 2 1 .  
1 27 Speech at Cooktown, BC 24/1 2/87, p .  9 .
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suggested that the tariff " could be improved in the direction of assisting the industries of the 
Colony " ,  adding, possibly for the benefit of his audience, " notably that of agriculture" . 128
Protection of a fairly comprehensive nature was in fact made part of Griffith 's policy in the 
1 888 election : "I am of the opinion that the time has come for a revision of the Customs 
tariff, imposing increased burdens on the importation of goods, whether natural products or 
manufactured goods, that can be produced in the colony" .  The tariff could, in other words, be 
used to enlarge the market for the products of both agricultural and manufacturing industries 
in a complementary way. As Griffith put it: 
It is . . . an essential part of any comprehensive policy for the settlement of 
Queensland to induce the creation of an industrial population within the colony, 
who will, while consuming the products of the agricultural settlers, themselves be 
producers of the commodities required by the latter. 
The role of inneased tariffs on agricultural products themselves was to guarantee that market 
to local farmt:rs. The Courier, not unfairly, referred to this foray of Griffith into policy 
analysis as "misty and ambiguous" .  Griffith himself made no bones about its pragmatic 
nature. 
I have always been unable to follow those who imagine that the so-called rules of 
political economy constitute an exact science, true at all times and applicable in all 
places. I maintain on the contrary that the varying circumstances of each country 
must determine what course of action should be followed, and that fiscal policy
l . . h" h . " t  bl h . f h . 1 29 a one is wise w 1c is sm a e to t e circumstances o t e nation. 
Consistent with his long-held (if never-elaborated ) protectionist position Mcilwraith also
128 BC 13/8/87, p. 5.
1 29 Griffith's statements from his election manifesto, BC 8/3/88, p. 2, emphasis added; see also his speech at
Warwick BC 9/2/88, p. 6; and BC 8/3/88, p. 4. Griffith was subsequently to describe this as an " opportunist"
position though probably regretted the label as his opponents, predictably, had a good deal of fun with it. 
( QPD 55, 13/9/88, p. 283ff.) . .  FE
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declared himself in favour of protection in 1888.  There was thus, ostensibly, nothing between 
the parties although that was largely because of the generality with which 'protection' was 
advocated .  But Mcilwraith was less concerned about 'settlement' and more interested to 
promote manufacturing for its own sake, though it was probably in a moment of exaggeration 
that he declared to one audience that it was " the aim of his life to make the colony a great 
manufacturing country 11 •
130 A comprehensive revision of customs duties was made by 
Mcilwraith in 1 888 with increases being made to the tariff on a wide range of agricultural and 
manufactured goods. Mcilwraith was curiously wary about pressing protectionist arguments, 
however, and claimed that the tariff was mainly a revenue tariff made necessary by the 
difficult financial situation bequeathed to him by the Liberals. As several members, 
particularly representatives of southern farmers, pressed for increases in tariffs on certain 
items, on occasions he even showed some concern, feeling it necessary to warn that 
"protectionists may overreach themselves by having too high protective duties" . 131  There was 
indeed considerable opposition to the increases among government supporters particularly 
from city merchants and businessmen, pastoralists and northern members who saw the tariff 
as inherently biased against the north ; this was muted, however, by the obvious need for 
revenue. 
Further increases were made in 1 892 when Griffith was premier and Mcilwraith treasurer. The 
principal moti ve was again ,  as Mcilwraith admitted, to raise additional revenue in order to 
restore balance in the public finances. Indeed by this time the more vociferous protection 
lobby, as represented by the Queensland Protection League, was causing him to adopt a yet 
more cautious, and even negative, attitude towards protection as a general policy .  Not the 
130 Speech at Bundanba, BC 16/4/88, p. 5. 
131  QPD 55,  25/9/88, p.  4 1 1 .  
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least of his difficulties was the way in which it was identified with the labour movement and 
socialism. 132 But Mcilwraith was also unable to resist scoring the points associated with the
protective effect of higher tariffs, and added: "I have kept constantly in view the object of 
encouraging the industries of the colony " . 1 33 Inevitably, however, the game of identifying
losers as well as beneficiaries started and the debate soon got bogged down in the complexities 
and ambiguities of the free trade versus protection argument, forcing both Mcilwraith and 
Griffith to defend the protectionism represented in the changes more strenuously, one suspects, 
than they might have intended initially. Griffith 's defence of a substantial duty on flour 
(which met with widespread criticism) as a measure primarily to encourage farming and 
settlement and turn Queensland into a wheat exporter, rather than a tax for revenue purposes, 
even though it was not inconsistent with his earlier stated views, rang a little hollow in the 
context. 134 In any case it cannot be argued that the measures in 1 888 or 1 892 were primarily
protectionist in intent. The extent of their protectionist effect was used as added justification 
for their introduction, but the main motive was simply to raise more revenue in difficult 
financial circumstances. To suggest, as does Lewis, that the late 1880s and early 1890s marks 
the " transition from free trade to protection " is clearly overstating the case. 135
In 1896 reductions were made in tariffs. Nelson had foreshadowed these in his election 
manifesto earl ier in the year following the improvement in the state of public finances. 1 36
These were effected by enlarging the 'free list ' (goods not subject to duty) in the case of those 
items used as inputs in domestic industries. Thus the measure was presented as one which 
would assist the colony 's industries (both primary and secondary) without interfering with 
132 For example his replies to deputations from the QPL, BC 9/9/91 ,  p. 5; 27 /7 /92, p. 6.
133 QPD 68, 1 8/8/92, p. 1013. 
134 Ibid., pp. 1 132-3. 
135 Glen Lewis, 'The tariff, laissez-faire, and federation in colonial Queensland, Queen&land Heritage, 2, 9, 1973,
p. 1 5.
136 BC 25/2/96, p. 2 . 
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those which relied on tariff protection, and hence one which was neutral between the general 
policies of free trade and protection. 137 Of course the matter was not as simple as this for
goods which were used as inputs in the producing industries of the colony and those whose 
colonial producers were benefiting from existing tariffs were not mutually exclusive. The 
measure can , however, be seen as a step backward from protectionism consistent with the 
broad anti-protectionist sentiments of Nelson and Philp. 
Protectionism was pressed in other forms in the 1890s but without marked success. As in the 
1880s both manufacturers and representatives of labour continued to ask the government to 
specify local manufacture of ironwork and machinery required for public works. The requests 
elicited equivocal responses and no action. 1 38 There was also a strong move on the part of the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the Iron Trades Council and the Queensland Protection 
League to have the government require that machinery for sugar mills built under the 1893 
Sugar Works Guarantee Act be manufactured in the colony, even though most such machinery 
was already subject to a 25 per cent import duty .  After some early non-committal and 
ambiguous responses by members of the government to these requests (the standard way of
dealing with the issue) , Nelson and Philp made it clear they would have nothing to do with it,
an action possibly prompted in part by the strength of the Courier 's opposition to the 
proposal . Philp, then minister for works, declared himself unwilling to "help one industry and 
cripple another " . 139
The fact that during the 1890s nearly all the substantial requirements of railway rolling stock 
were purchased from local engineering firms appears to contradict this general policy . In at 
137 QPD 75, 19/8/96, p. 583. 
138 For example, reports of deputations BC 15/3/94, p. 5 ; 30/4/99, p. 6. 
139 BC 17 /5/95, p. 5 ; Statements by ministers, BC 19/4/95, p. 6; 24/4/95 , p. 5 ; 8/6/95, p. 7;  and 23/5/95, p.
6. Philp QPD 73, 1 2/7 /95, p. 208ff. 
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least some cases local locomotives cost about 13 per cent more than comparable imports, 
though the generality of the cost disadvantages is not clear. 140 That this policy was virtually
unquestioned by the strong body of people who held to free trade principles (including the
Courier whose views on the question were uncompromising) suggests, however, that the policy
may have been based on motives other than classical 'infant industry ' protectionism.  
Tariffs on agri cultural produce were widely advocated by representatives of farming districts 
but met with strong opposition on traditional grounds. Increasingly, concessional railway 
changes came to be seen as a surrogate for tariff protection and the two policies came to be 
widely spoken of in the one breath. Griffith had agreed to such concessional rates for 
agricultural produce in the 1880s (before control was passed , nominally at least, to the
commissioners under the 1888 Railways Act) . In the late 1880s there was increasing pressure,
especially from Darling Downs farmers, for further concessions in railway charges. But it 
received little sympathy, particularly in view of the poor returns shown by the railways during 
this period and the fact that agricultural produce was already carried at low rates anyway. 
While Griffith may have been regarded as to some extent encouraging this back in the 1880s, 
his coalition government of the 1890s was much less sympathetic. It initiated a review of 
railway tariffs by the commissioners and approved their recommendations for substantial 
increases, part icularly for agricultural produce, to take effect at the beginning of 189 1 .  There 
followed a vigorous campaign by Darling Downs farmers both within parliament and through 
numerous public meetings and deputations to ministers for the rates to be reduced, a 
campaign that was frequently couched in the more general terms of protection . The sort of 
arguments brought to bear were well summarised by William Allan , member for Cunningham, 
in a statement which also indicates how the whole dilemma was related to, and followed from, 
140 Lougheed, 'The provision of railway rolling stock' ,  pp. 17 ,  2 1 .  
land policies which ,  in the name of settlement, had put farmers into uneconomic situations: 
We are sending out of the country nearly ll ,000,000 annually for food which can be 
very well grown here, and it is absolutely necessary if we wish that to be grown in 
the country - not only sufficient for ourselves, but also sufficient to export - that we 
should more or less foster the industry . It is not well to smother an industry that is 
to keep us in food and settle people on the land . . .  .I spoke to a Northern member 
[about how it was no longer economic to send hay and chaff to market by railway) , 
and he said 'that is absurd; why don't they turn it into sheep ' .  I wonder how an 
eighty-acre or a 1 60-acre farmer could turn it into sheep. What we want is cheap 
railway carriage or protection . . . .  The farming industry is like a child crawling; 
you cannot expect it to walk upright from its birth. It wants fostering and leading 
the same as a little child until it gets growth and strength. 141 
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But the coalition government was generally unsympathetic and effectively rebuffed the claims, 
arguing that the increase had been general and agricultural produce was still subject to 
cheaper rates; the railways had to be made to yield a larger revenue (if only in the interests of 
the colony's future credibility as a borrower) and, looking at it from the 'broad point of the 
colony' (a term frequently used) ,  it would not be fair to make further concessions. To a 
deputation in 1894 Nelson explicitly declared himself " not prepared to make the railways 
discharge the function of the custom-house " . 142 But the political campaign of the farmers
(during which a Railway Tariff League and a Farmers Protection Association were formed) 
was relentless , and concessions (mostly fairly minor) were granted from time to time, 
particularly as improving railway finances made it easier to respond to political pressure. By 
1895 (when significant reductions for agricultural produce were made as part of a more modest 
general decrease) rates were roughly back to where they were at the beginning of the 
decade. 143 Thrreafter the issue of railway rates did not again arise in the context of arguments
about assistance to or protection of agriculture. A more detailed analysis of railway tariff 
141 QPD 64, 28/7 /91 ,  p. 358. 
142 BC 9/4/94, p. 6; see also the response of Unmack as minister for railways to motions, ibid, p. 370 ff., and
QPD 61, 27 /7 /92. pp. 813-4; and Nelson to a deputation BC 22/3/94, p. 6.
143 For details, BC 1 1 /2/91 , p. 5 ; 28/5/92, p. 6; 1 5/1 2/93, p. 4; 13/4/94, p. 4; and 23/6/95, p. 5. 
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policy would be necessary to determine what this implied about the effective protection (if 
any) given to �-�griculture in this form. 
After federation, tariff policy was moved off the Queensland government's agenda and the 
whole question of protection is largely absent from economic policy discussion during the 
remainder of the period (save in the special case of sugar). Agriculture was prosperous. 
Manufacturing remained concentrated in industries in which it had a high degree of 'natural ' 
protection and,  while suffering a decline in the immediate post-federation period, developed 
quite strongly after the mid- 1900s. There was occasional pressure from representatives of 
labour and/ or manufacturers for protection by way of preference for locally manufactured 
goods, particularly of the engineering and metal-working industries, but this elicited no 
positive response. The government continued to purchase virtually all railway rolling stock 
within the colony (or, especially after 1908, have it made in the Government Workshops). But 
this sector of manufacturing had become highly efficient and prices were comparable to those 
of overseas producers, so protection was not here an issue. 1 44 The Labour Party was
increasingly focusing its attention on the development of state enterprises rather than the 
protection of private industry but proposals along those lines were also rejected . Kidston, for 
example, showed no interest in a 1906 proposal (put forward in a formal parliamentary 
motion) for the establishment of a government ironworks. In a response which reflected his 
general attitude towards government and industry and which no doubt pushed him one step 
further away from many of his Labour colleagues he asked: 
If the case was so clear as my hon. colleague makes out, why is it that private 
capital has not rushed in? . . .  There is plenty of capital available for profitable 
enterpris(! ,  and yet capitalists have not noted the great bonanza that is lying here 
awaiting them. If this project is so absolutely certain . . .  then all he has to do is 
fl d. t 1 45 oat a syn 1ca e. 
144 Lougheed, 'The provision of railway rolling stock', pp. 17, 22-4. 
145 QPD 98, 18/10/06, p. 1 222. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the three decades under review government became increasingly involved in the operation of 
Queensland's major industries. This involvement consisted mainly of measures to assist the 
development cf agriculture. Apart from the flirtation with protectionist policies in the late 
1880s there was no serious attempt to provide any particular assistance to manufacturing. 
Nor was very much done to assist to the mining industry, despite a more willing attitude on 
the part of governments to aid its development. Financial aid was granted to prospecting and 
mining activities but at low levels; the system of low-interest loans for the purchase of mining 
machinery introduced in 1906 was not even a government-sponsored measure. More typically 
'assistance ' to mining took the form of clearing the track for private enterprise by reducing 
impediments to easy and profitable investment (through amendments to the general mining 
act and removal of uncertainties regarding mining on private property) and permitting private 
investment in railway communication to mining areas. Involvement in the pastoral industry 
was confined to the policy (of temporary duration) to encourage meat exports and to the 
control of rabbits. 
Assistance to agricultural industries was, by contrast more substantial and diverse. On a 
general level, measures to improve educational facilities and provide information and advice to 
farmers were initiated early in the period. As the dairy industry in particular came to rely 
increasingly on exports attempts were made also to improve overseas shipping facilities. 
Financial assifltance was provided (ambiguously) by concessional railway tariffs and, after 
1900, through the facilities for 'cheap money ' offered by the Agricultural Bank. Specific 
assistance was provided to the sugar industry through sponsorship of central mills; the 
Queensland government also became involved in the fiscal arrangements of the commonwealth 
government initiated consequent to federation and the policy to exclude coloured labour, 
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though this has to be regarded as something of a special case. To aid the development of 
dairy exports controls were established over the quality of dairy produce (a form of assistance 
implying an element of coercion ) ; and assistance was provided (albeit as a somewhat incidental 
part of the policy to encourage meat exports) for the construction of works to process dairy 
products and (temporarily) in the form of a bonus on butter exports. 
The emphasis on agriculture was a consequence of two factors. One of these was a reflection 
of the long-standing view that 'development' in its fullest sense required a larger population 
and closer settlement for which the expansion of agriculture was an essential pre-requisite. 
This merged m some cases with the pursuit of more specific social or political goals. For 
example, the central mills policy, in its initial stage, was intended primarily to provide the 
restructuring of the sugar industry away from the plantation system and its use of servile 
labour towards what Griffith perceived as a more socially desirable structure based on small 
independent farmers. Other measures were also underpinned to some extent by the view that 
the expansion of agricultural industries constituted a socially desirable form of development: 
the provision of credit facilities through an Agricultural Bank was seen, to an increasing 
extent, in this light - even, indeed, to be a sort of 'reward ' for struggling pioneer settlers. In 
the closing years of the period reviewed, measures implemented as a result of pressure form 
the Country Party group within the government (such as assistance for co-operative 
agricultural production and the extension of the scope of the Agricultural Bank) also reflected 
pursuit of sectional interests rather than economic development as such. But more 
importantly agriculture was seen to constitute a new engine of economic expansion and growth 
to replace the pastoral industry; measures to assist agriculture were thus seen mainly in this 
light. 
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The notable frature of measures thus regarded is that they attempted to support and accord 
with economic forces rather than counter them. Indeed this is characteristic of industry policy 
in general and it explains why much that was advocated in political debate was not done or 
done very cautiously. To an increasing extent governments, in order to enhance economic 
expansion, undertook functions which could not be performed privately: the central mills 
policy from the 1890s has to be seen primarily as an attempt to enable the industry (by then
largely restructured) to develop more rapidly through the utilisation of facilities essential to
the efficient processing of cane but unlikely to be initiated solely by private enterprise; the 
measures effected by the Meat and Dairy Product Encouragement Act and the Dairy Produce 
Act were nec�ssary (in different ways) to permit the successful export of meat and dairy
produce but could not be taken privately ; and the control of rabbits, necessary if 
Queensland's leading industry was not to be retarded, was a 'national ' question which private 
enterprise cou]d not alone handle. But there was a marked reluctance to condone anything in 
the nature of 'artificial ' arrangements. Such reluctance was over-ridden by circumstances in 
the special case of the sugar industry , though in the resolution of the complex circumstances 
created in the 1 900s Denham declined to enter fully into industry regulation by resisting the 
strong move to control cane prices. Protection was never embraced as a policy, either through 
the tariff or through other measures giving preferential treatment to local producers. 
(Whether prot.ection was effectively granted , especially to agricultural industries, through
'concessional ' railway rates remains unclear. ) Private pressure at different times for assistance
to individual industries in the form of a subsidy was rejected and,  in the 1900s, there was a 
rejection of Labour proposals for the establishment of public enterprises. The principle of 
export bonuses paid from general revenue was also rejected, with the minor exception of 
bonuses on chilled meat exports to other Australian colonies paid briefly in the late 1890s. 
Bonuses on butter exports were paid for a short time from part of the fund created by the tax 
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on stock under the Meat and Dairy Produce Encouragement Act (and indeed involved some 
minor cross-subsidisation by non-dairy producers) but this measure stemmed somewhat 
incidentally from the principal aim of the act. There was never any intention (despite some 
pressure) for bonuses to be paid from general revenue. And while the act in its original form 
was based wholly on the principle of bonuses it was only ever intended to finance bonuses on 
an intra-industry basis (that is from the levy on stock) .  
Indeed few measures were intended to draw on general revenue. The only continuing claims 
established were those associated with the operations of. the Agriculture and Mines 
Departments , but even here there were instances where supplementary funding was expected 
from the relevant industry (the Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations and the provision for 
Schools of Mines). The system of inspection of meat and dairy produce was also made at least 
partly self-funding through the system of registration fees. In the case of central sugar mills 
the government's role was initially to be simply the guarantor for private cane-growers 
establishing mills under the terms and conditions which were deemed necessary to ensure 
financial viabil ity .  As the policy was implemented (after the 1895 amendment to the principal 
act) the government 's financial commitment was more direct but not intended to be any 
greater. In the event the safeguards were insufficient and the more direct involvement of the 
government through the Bureau of Central Sugar Mills that followed in the 1900s was 
undertaken only to protect public funds committed. Further support for central mills was 
withheld during the time of uncertainty regarding the fiscal arrangements affecting the 
industry. It was resumed, when the viability of the industry was considered assured, with 
government playing the same limited role as under the former act but in the context of stricter 
controls as to the conditions under which mills could be established in order to ensure their 
viability and the security of public funds advanced. A considerable amount of public revenue 
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was committed to rabbit control measures, though from the 1890s there was a continuing 
concern to make those more directly benefited pay an appropriate share of the cost and limit 
the commitment of public funds to the 'national ' benefit resulting, difficult though this was to 
define. 
Thus, while policy to promote economic development by assisting specific industries was 
constituted by a diverse set of measures, successive governments held back from doing much 
that was advocated and in fact being done elsewhere. Policies implemented reflected an 
unwillingness to use the administrative and financial powers of government beyond those 
necessary to support private enterprise in a way consistent with 'business principles ' .  
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CHAPTER 6 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 1 883- 1 9 1 4: OVERVIEW 
Over the three decades prior to the First World War the role of government in the process of 
economic development continued to revolve primarily around the three key elements of 
'colonial socialism '. But the period was characterised also by some new initiatives taken to 
encourage and assist the development of Queensland's industries. The nature of these 
initiatives and the particular policies adopted with respect to the management of land, the 
encouragement; of immigration and the construction of railways evolved at the hands of 
different governments and reflected the political attitudes and ideological dispositions of those 
governments. At the same time they represented responses to what were perceived as the 
dictates of circumstances and often determined broad ideological positions; indeed, they were 
an important factor in determining political alignments. The characteristics of development 
policy as a whole over the period thus have to be understood in terms of the inter-relationship 
between ideology, politics and the changing economic environment. 
The policies of the Griffith government (in power from 1883 to 1888) were a clear reflection of
the Liberal ethos. While in favour of 'development' ,  Liberals were concerned with its 
implications for the nature of society and social relationships. The 1883 election threw clearly 
into focus the constrast between the principles underlying Liberal policy, represented by the 
ideas of Griffith as undisputed Liberal leader, and those of the conservatives as promulgated 
by Mcilwraith . The election was fought principally over two specific issues, both relating to 
schemes of Mcilwraith which sought to promote economic development. The first of these was 
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the proposal for a transcontinental railway on the land-grant principle; the second was the 
scheme to import Indian 'coolie ' labourers to augment the limited supply of Melanesian labour 
- for the plantations of the rapidly expanding sugar industry. Both of these policies were 
characteristic of Mcilwraith 's outlook and style. As a man who has been described as a 
" capitalist extraordinary 11 and the 11 Jay Gould of Australia 11 , Mcilwraith sought wealth above 
all else. 1 The ultimate measure of success and achievement was monetary. Such men are often
uninterested in, indeed contemptuous of, the activities of governments, seeing them largely as 
regulators and inhibitors of personal and, by extension, national achievement. For 
Mcilwraith, however, involvement in public life, while on occasions seen as the means to the 
end of personal achievement and profit, more typically represented the logical extension of his 
activities on to a larger stage whereby he sought the same goals for the nation as he sought for 
himself. It thus provided a larger outlet for his entrepreneurial activities. National progress 
was defined, however, in the same terms as those in which he defined personal success. These 
were economic rather than social . If Mcilwraith consciously cared about social values or goals 
they were equated with, or encompassed within, economic achievement. 
By contrast, Griffith sought a form of development whose direction would be less concentrated 
in the hands of the large entrepreneurs and whose fruits more equally shared among members 
of society. He was consistently critical of Mcilwraith 's narrow focus on the creation of wealth 
without regard to the nature of the society in which it occurred, complaining despairingly on 
one occasion that " The hon. gentleman 's vision is coloured yellow . He sees everything through 
a yellow medium 11 • 2 In the 1870s and early 1880s these views were reflected, for example, by
Griffith 's efforts as Attorney-General to restrain the economic and political power of the 
1 D.B. Waterson, 'Thomas Mcllwraith: a colonial entrepreneur ', in D.J. Murphy and R.B. Joyce (eds.) ,
Queenaland Political Portraita 1859-1 952, University of Queenland Press, 1978, p. 1 2 1 .  
2 QPD 39, 3/7 /83, p .  86.
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squatters by curbing the practice of 'dummying' and enforcing the provisions of the land act in 
favour of these genuinely wishing to settle on the land. And it was in order to encourage the 
immigration of independent capitalists of moderate means rather than merely a labouring 
class to serve the needs of the large and powerful entrepreneurs that he introduced the 'bounty 
scheme' into the 1 882 Immigration Act. In 1883, Griffith therefore opposed Mcilwraith 's 
schemes on the grounds of the social and political costs associated with them. The spectre of 
'powerful corporations exercising a preponderating control over our internal affairs ' was raised 
in connection with land-grant railways while the introduction of Indian 'coolies' would, he 
claimed, alter the whole social and political fabric of society. More generally , Griffith drew 
the contrast between the conservatives as a party of exploiters who sought an increase in 
economic wealth regardless of the
1 
social consequences and the Liberals who sought a form of 
economic development which accorded with the interests of all people and the colony in the 
broad sense. Thus, he was reported as saying: 
He did not consider it the business of the Government of the country to be always 
making big commercial bargains. . . . What he complained of about the great 
schemes of the Premier was the small number of people who were to get any benefit 
from them . . . .
We were not here simply to look after ourselves, to get rich, and then go away . . . .
We were entrusted with an enormous territory, not merely for ourselves, but for 
ourselves and posterity . . . .  their main duty was to see upon what lines the vast 
estate entrust�d to us could be best administered for the benefit of posterity . 
3
Aware, however, that his opposition to policies such as the transcontinental railway led to 
charges that he was uninterested in economic progress, unimaginative and unwilling to do 
anything new or bold, Griffith presented a comprehensive and positive program for economic 
development which was compatible with his social goals. The three main elements of colonial 
socialism were to be pursued in a distinctive, and inter-related, way .  
3 Speeches at North Brisbane and Mackay, BC 9/5/83, p .  5, 19/6/83, p .  2 .
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The linch-pin of the policy was a greatly expanded program of railway construction. Along 
with Mcilwraith, Griffith acknowledged that improved transport and communication facilities 
were an essential requirement for the fuller development of the colony 's resources. Under 
Liberal policy, however, this was to be undertaken wholly by the government using borrowed 
funds. To justify and finance such a program, increased population, settlement, production 
and revenue was to be provided by complementary land and immigration policies. Land was 
to be resumed from pastoral leases and made available for closer settlement not only, as 
hitherto, in small areas intended for agricultural use but also, and primarily , in medium-sized 
blocks for use as 'grazing farms' :  this would create a new and more viable yeomanry . General 
application of the leasehold principle was to provide for cheap and easy entry to rural industry 
by 'men of moderate means ' .  While pastoralists were to be forced to yield part of their land 
to provide for grazing farms, they were, at the same time, to be offered in exchange a more 
secure tenure on retained land. Such consideration would add to the already strong argument 
for an increase in rents charged to pastoralists. Land revenue thus augmented was to be the 
principal source of funds to cover the increased cost of borrowing to finance railway 
construction. The people to undertake the development envisaged were to come partly from 
the southern colonies, attracted by the opportunities which the land and railway policies 
created, but mainly through an active immigration program directed at attracting small 
capitalists from overseas. As Griffith summed it up: "Utilize the land, get a fair rental , and 
bring in the people at the rate of thirty to forty thousand per annum and we should have the 
whole question of borrowing money and public works solved at once " .4 
In contrast to Mcilwraith 's policies Griffith 's development strategy involved elements of an 
adversary relationship between producing interests and government. Existing pastoral 
4 Speech at North Brisbane, BC 1 1 /8/83, p. 3.
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producers were to be required to yield part of their land, albeit with the compensation of a 
better tenure on the part they retained, and to pay a higher rent. The proposed application of 
the leasehold principle was also, in part, an assertion of the community 's right to maintain 
control over land; the retention of the control of railways by government was a similar 
assertion of collective over private interests, though in neither of these instances were existing 
interests affected (except in so far as the 'pre-emptive right' of squatters to purchase a portion 
of their land was effectively withdrawn). Attempts to alter the form of development were, 
however, seen to be quite compatible with - indeed a stimulus to - continuing development and 
the policy trinity was put forward as a means to a high rate of economic expansion. Such was 
not so clearly the case with the other leading issue. Griffith 's declared intentions not only to 
decline to allow the use of 'coolie' labour but also to end the use of Melanesian labour clearly 
conflicted with existing private interests in a way which appeared inimical to development. 
Indeed Griffith's stand on the question represented the explicit assertion of social-political 
goals over economic considerations. At the same time it was claimed that in the longer term 
the sugar industry could continue to develop and prosper on the more wholesome basis of 
small farmers and their families working their own farms. For the interim Griffith promised 
planters the assistance of the government in securing alternative labour to allow the industry 
to continue on its present basis . 
The path to this set of policies had been for Griffith a tortuous one. In the previous decade, 
for example, he had supported then abandoned the notion of railway reserves as a system for 
financing railway construction and had also supported Mcilwraith 's Railway Companies 
Preliminary Act in 1 880 which allowed the government to enter into negotiations with 
syndicates in regard to land-grant railways. He had similarly changed his views considerably 
on the coloured labour question,  the Indian 'coolie ' issue having served to harden his attitude 
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towards Melanesians. In the case of land policy, while never an advocate of the more extreme 
form of agrarian liberalism which envisaged development principally in terms of agriculture, 
he came (under the particular influence of Charles Dutton ) to see the more intensive use of
land for pastoral purposes as the key to both greater settlement and the increased revenue 
necessary to fund railway investment. But having arrived at the policies underlying his ' 1883 
program' Griffith wasted no time in implementing them after his election. 
The land and railway policies were executed through the 1884 land act and the i lOm. loan
was passed in the same year. Immigration was maintained at an historically high rate. And, 
true to his promise, Griffith also initiated measures to recruit labour from Europe for the 
sugar industry. In different ways, however, all these policies and the Liberal blueprint for 
what was con�idered a socially more desirable form of development were soon to be stamped 
with failure. The substantial increase in railway investment facilitated by the .£10m. loan
was quickly followed by a sharp decline in railway finances as the increase in working expenses
and interest outran the increase in revenue generated. As a result the railways constituted an 
increasing drain on public revenue. The drought in the mid- 1880s was partly to blame. More 
significant waB the failure of immigration and land policies to bring about the anticipated 
settlement and increased production on which the large program of expenditure on railways 
had been premised. The sort of immigrants Griffith had hoped to attract did not come. These 
from overseas, in particular, were staying in the towns and cities, seeking employment rather 
than land. Immigration from southern colonies was not great. Thus, the rate of selection, 
particularly of the grazing farms which had been such an important element in the land policy, 
was well below expectations. 
The financial consequences of this were considerable, particularly as selection under the 1884 
act was based on the leasehold principle (as a result of which rents were lower than they would
have been had land been selected by conditional purchase) . More seriously, the foreshadowed
increase in pastoral rents also failed to eventuate. These had been acknowledged as necessary 
to cover the increased charge on revenue resulting, at least in the short term, from the 
expanded program of railway construction .  
While the policies were not without a certain basis of economic and financial logic, the logic 
did not work out in practice, a result in large part of inadequate recognition of the economic 
and financial realities and constraints. Whether it was ever reasonable to ·have expected a 
sufficient flow of suitable immigrants to sustain the rate of settlement and the increased 
production and railway and land selection revenue implicit in the program is a matter of some 
doubt. An increase in pastoral rents appeared to be clearly justified; but so strong was. the 
case considered to be, the politically delicate task of securing such an increase was transferred 
to a semi-judicial board, without specific guidelines being laid down. And,  in the large 
program of railway construction, a very casual attitude was adopted towards the economic 
and financial implications of expenditure: as Miles plotted his grand scheme of railway 
construction involving the expenditure of nearly as much money as had already been spent on 
railways in the colony, he showed remarkably little concern with even the most basic 
calculation of costs and benefits. The upshot was that a portion of the expenditure yielded 
extremely poor returns, especially in the case of branch lines which generally generated 
insufficient revenue to c;over even working expenses. The view of development was a 
teleological one and in the case of railways in particular, where railways were to encourage and 
shape settlement and development as well as merely to serve it, policy was to a large extent, 
inevitably, a matter of faith. As it happened , however, the pieces of the scheme simply failed 
to fall into place. 
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Griffith 's plan to assist planters to recruit labourers from Europe was part of this view of 
development. It also failed because the economic and financial implications of the proposal -
rooted as it was in social-political considerations - were not adequately thought through. If 
Griffith had £Ver believed that the planters would have accepted higher-priced European 
labour, by 1884, as the industry was in considerable trouble, it is difficult to see how he could 
have imagined his scheme to work unless it provided planters with an alternative supply of 
labour at a cost below the level of wages prevailing in the colony. Yet he refused to accede to 
the recruitment of labour on the terms acceptable to the planters and the scheme simply came 
to naught. It was in this context that he moved to initiate the central sugar mill system and 
thus encourage the development of the industry on a small-farm basis. The policy represented 
a major step in government involvement in industry. Stemming as it did from the goal of 
operating the need to use coloured labour it was, however, essentially a social rather than 
economic policy, whose essential aim was to alter the form of development. 
Apart from the central mills policy the Griffith government initiated two other forms of 
intervention in industry affecting development, though neither had been part of the 
government 's declared policy program. The first was the provision of assistance to 
agricultural industries generally through the establishment of the Department of Agriculture. 
There is nothing to suggest, however, that this represented a radically new assertion of the 
importance of agriculture in development. 5 Indeed with his land policy Griffith had moved
Liberal policy away from the traditional emphasis on agriculture as the key to development. 
But public sponsorship of agricultural research and education was becoming increasingly 
common m Europe, America and other Australasian colonies. Under considerable pressure 
5 Nor can the establishment of the department be seen, as Fitzgerald implies, primarily as a response to the 
misfortunes of the sugar industry, still dominated by planters. (Ross Fitzgerald, From the Dreaming to  1 915: 
A Hiatory of Queenaland, University of Queensland Press, I 982, p. 1 86) 
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from within the Liberal party, many of whose members still saw agriculture as the principal 
basis for settlement, and in the face of the lack of success of his grazing farms, Griffith 
relented ;  though he evinced no particular enthusiasm for the measure and appeared to put 
little effort int.o defining the functions of the department he created. The other policy was 
implemented in reaction to the advance of the rabbit from New South Wales. The decision to 
finance construction of a rabbit-proof border fence from public revenue was virtually forced 
upon Griffith. While the 'benefits ' of the expenditure would clearly, in the short term, be 
conferred primarily on pastoralists in border areas, the larger and longer-term benefits (or
costs of inaction) were potentially so large and generalised that there was little option but to
act and make the matter a 'national ' one. Neither of these policies, therefore, represented a 
distinctive pol icy initiative of the Griffith government, though both were to form the basis of a 
continuing involvement of government in the process of economic development. 
By the time of the 1888 election these policies had barely been implemented and the central 
mill policy had not yet come into operation . Accordingly the Griffith government stood on the 
record of its policies which had been put forward in the 1 883 program. Griffith continued to 
emphasise the Liberal concern with the social aspects of economic development and the welfare 
of the colony in general , a position he contrasted with his opponents' willingness to have " the 
policy of a country subordinated to the money-making proclivities of a class " .  6 While virtually
ignoring their financial implications, Griffith defended his policies, and particularly his land 
policy, as appropriate mechanisms for development of the colony. 
Mcilwraith stood largely on his record of sound economic and financial management 
contrasting his belief in sound business principles with his opponents ' disregard of the 
consequences of their social theories and the Liberals ' record in 'wrecking the Treasury ' .  His 
6 Manifesto, BC 8/3/88, p. 2 .
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statement of policy consisted largely of an attack on the financial record of the Griffith 
government and in particular its land policy which had " ignorantly destroy [ed] one of our best 
sources of revenue" by "putting into practice the crude theories of men who had proved 
themselves so utterly incompetent to judge the effect that practice would have on either the 
people or the department of the State " .7 He presented no alternative land policy, however,
other than to suggest that the sale of some land by auction would be necessary to restore 
balance to the public finances. Nor did he present any clear policies on other important issues 
such as borrowing and expenditure on public works. A bold affirmation of his continuing 
support for land-grant railways was quickly renounced . Similarly an ominous silence on the 
question of Melanesian labour (his manifesto having pointedly made reference only to 'coolies' ) 
was clarified only by a poll-eve declaration of his opposition to all coloured labour. 
The whole campaign in fact lacked focus and on specific policy matters (economic and other) it 
was difficult t.o identify the differences of principle which separated the two leaders. The 
conversion of Griffith at the end of 1887 to the policy of protection , a policy which Mcilwraith 
had long espoused , blurred the distinction between their positions even more. "Queensland 
seems to be in the unenviable position of possessing parties without distinct principles, and 
personal intrigues without any consistent policies " ,  concluded the Melbourne A rgus.8
Mcilwraith 's resumption of the premiership after his win in the election was thus followed by a 
move towards protectionism but no other significant change in the thrust of economic policy . 
The aims and purpose of the comprehensive revision of customs tariffs which characterised 
Mcllwraith 's first budget were, however, ambiguous and the measure can hardly be said to 
represent a clear step towards a protectionist policy. The ambiguity of purpose was no doubt 
7 Manifesto, BC 1 4/3/88, p. 3.
8 Reprinted in BC 2 1/3/88, p. 6. 
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due in large part to the number of free-traders and northerners in his party (and government) 
who were opposed to protection as such but prepared to accept the need for increased tariffs 
for revenue purposes. 
The new government (particularly after Morehead took over in 1889) could have been expected 
to reject and amend policies which infringed 'business principles ' ,  but the increasing instability 
of the government, the divergent views of its members and Morehead 's l imitations as a 
political leader militated against coherent action. Black 's amendment of the land act in 1889 
made some minor alterations and,  in order to increase public revenue, provided for a greater 
amount of land to be sold at auction. None of the fundamental principles of land policy was 
changed, however,  nor was any desire to do so articulated. The amendment to the railways 
act made by Nelson in 1888 which, among other things, placed the railways under the control 
of commissioners and required them to report on the economic and financial prospects of 
proposed new lines was a reflection of the more commercially-oriented view that greater 
discipline was needed in decision-making about railway investment. But little was said ,  or 
done, about the appropriate aggregate level of borrowing and expenditure on railways, though 
to a large extent this was because the government was locked into a program of expenditure 
on work in progress to which it had been committed by the actions of the Griffith government. 
With the mild recovery in 1888-89 a more expansive attitude was taken on the question of 
immigration but as recovery turned to recession a policy of restriction was once again adopted. 
Black was una hie to change the policy with respect to coloured labour, despite the revival of 
the issue and lengthy parliamentary discussion following the Royal Commission into the sugar 
industry in 1 889 and even though he had spoken publicly in favour of black labour and argued 
for its continuation. Significantly , and perhaps surprisingly given his own personal interest as 
a planter, neither did he appear to seek any alternative solution to the labour problem (as 
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Griffith at least had done) . Nor did he do anything further to encourage the central mill
system which he had supported when Griffith originally proposed it, though the highly 
qualified success of the two mills already established hardly supported any such action. On 
the other hand, Black 's personal involvement and enthusiasm gave a major fillip to the work 
of the Department of Agriculture during these years not only to aid the sugar industry but 
also through measures such as the establishment of travelling dairies to promote and aid the 
dairying industry . 
The coalition between Griffith and Mcilwraith in 1890 had no clear ideological basis and no 
obvious implic.ations for policy .  Mcllwraith 's break from the previous government did not 
stem from disagreement over any fundamental policy issue. His accommodation to Liberal 
policies on coloured labour and land-grant railways in 1 888 had been based on political 
pragmatism rather than conviction of principle and at the time was treated with contempt by 
the Liberal leader. 9 Griffith had continued to defend his policies, the only major shift coming
with his embrace of protection; though this was an issue that cut across party lines anyway. 
Indeed there are indications that during this time Griffith 's liberalism in some respects was 
becoming more radicaI. 10  The growing strength and militancy of the labour movement was,
however, squeezing the Liberals' ideological and political position. At the same time 
Mcilwraith probably saw himself as far from Morehead as Griffith: he had never wholly 
identified with the conservatism of the squatters and had always been prepared to sanction, 
indeed promote, action on the part of government to bring about change and development 
even if his proposals were often seen by Liberals to have benefits skewed rather in favour of 
g QPD 65, 1 6/8/88, p. 18. 
10 R.B. Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffeth, University of Queensland Press, 1984 , pp. 1 60- 1 .  
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the entrepreneurial class. And Griffith and Mcilwraith simply stood out in the political 
instability of 1889 and 1890 as strong individuals and effective political leaders. Each retained 
substantial personal support. Their particular strengths - the legal and administrative skills 
of Griffith and the business talents of Mcilwraith - were each respected by the other and seen 
by others as complementary. As one observer put it, the two men were " a  host in themselves: 
one abounding in ideas, the other possessing infinite capacity for formulating, advocating, and 
carrying them out" . 1 1 
That profound ideological shifts - essentially on the part of Griffith - were implied by the 
coalition soon, however, became obvious. The views expressed by the former Liberal leader 
during the two and a half years of his second premiership represent a move towards a more 
hard-headed liberalism which recognised that economic and financial realities had to prevail 
over desired goals or at least dictate the extent to which they could be achieved . Two factors 
influenced this shift: firstly the altered economic and financial circumstances facing him at the 
beginning of the 1890s and, in this light, the manifest lack of success, in economic and 
financial term� , of his major policy initiatives of the 1880s; and secondly the rise of Labour as 
a political forc:e which took up some of the issues with which Griffith had identified himself 
(particularly in relation to the terms and conditions of employment) and pursued them not as
benevolent, paternalistic and moderate liberal reformers, but as more ardent seekers of 
immediate improvements for those directly involved. 
In early 1892 Griffith was reviewing his own intellectual history . In a speech at Mary borough, 
a week before the opening of the parliamentary session in 1892 where he was to reverse some 
of his previous policies, he declared himself "proud to have been a Liberal " ,  a member of the 
party which " represented the greatest progress, and desired to do the best for the people 
1 1 BC 29/ 1/92, p. 4. 
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generally " .  "He might even have been a Radical " ,  he was reported as saying, but then 
conceded "Perhaps he had gone a little too far in that direction 11 • 1 2  A month earlier he  had
admitted that: "Sometimes he had been led away . . .  by being too hopeful of bringing about 
an altered condition of things . . . . He had made mistakes the greatest of which was in 
thinking that he was able to bring about a great deal in a limited time" . 13 These views were
expressed largely in relation to his attempts (embodied indirectly in his tentative moves to 
regulate hours and wages) to improve the lot of the working man. But this was only part of a 
more general ideological conversion which extended to a larger rejection of policies which 
interfered with 'economic law' .  
This ideological change on Griffith 's part brought him in line with an emerging consensus on 
the part of most political figures (other than representatives of Labour and the radical 
Liberals) which underpinned the fusion of the old conservative and Liberal parties and the 
realignment of politics at this time. In turn it was based on a consensus as to the nature of 
the economic difficulties of the time and the implications for the role of government in 
economic activ ity. Griffith, Mcilwraith and other leading figures in non-radical politics and in 
business, were putting forward very similar views which were echoed by (and often, it seems, 
echoing) those of the business oriented press. 
This view, in essence, was that the economic system had been distorted in the 1880s by the 
actions of government. The principal evil had been what the Courier was pleased to call 'the 
great loan industry ' .  Large-scale public expenditure, particularly on railways, following the 
£10m. loan had created a " fictitious prosperity " .  The high rate of public expenditure had 
also been a major factor in encouraging private investment of a speculative nature. Both had 
12 BC 21 /3/92, p. 6 .  
13 Speech at Bundaberg, BC 20/5/92, p. 6 .  
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had the effect of " artificially " inflating values, including that of labour, making it harder for 
"natural industries " to compete and prosper. And both had been undertaken to a large degree 
" recklessly " and without due regard to proper economic and financial criteria. As one 
parliamentarian, prominent in business circles, said in a speech to the Chamber of Commerce 
which typified the consensus: " Nearly all our troubles have arisen from excessive borrowings 
and unwise expenditure. The fictitious values and spurious prosperity thereby created led to 
our financial disasters " .  At the same time it was agreed that government policies of the 1880s, 
particularly those which emphasised social goals, had attempted to "set economic laws at 
defiance" and adversely affected the production of real wealth. " Instead of encouraging the 
production of wealth, they have hampered, discouraged, and crippled our greatest producing 
industries by legislative enactments " . 14
If followed that what had to be done was to re-focus attention on ' real ' production, that is, 
production from the 'natural industries ' .  As Nelson (Mcllwraith 's treasurer in 1893) put it in 
his Financial Statement: " It is upon its products that a colony like Queensland exists . . . .  it 
is to the still further expansion and the producing capabilities of the colony that we must look 
if we desire a return to prosperity " . 1 5  And in Griffith 's own words, " although of late the
colony, by this expenditure of loan money, had been able to cut a dash , it was time this was 
put a stop to. To borrow more money would only intensify the evil, and therefore they must 
turn to agricu] ture " . 1 6
14  Speech by W. Forrest, B C  20/7 /93, p .  6. 
15 QPD 70, 25/7 /93, p. 248. 
16 Speech at BUlldaberg, BC 20/7 /�2, p. 5. Griffith was emphasising here the need to re-focus on production
by the colony1s primary industries as distinct from production arising from loan-financed expenditure. His 
specific reference to "agriculture "  was probably more a reflection of the growing significance of agriculture 
particularly sugar (which was especially significant in the district in which he happened to be speaking) in the
context of the mounting problems of the pastoral industry rather than an indication of any particular pre­
occupation with agriculture of the sort associated with Darling Downs Liberals such as Kates and Groom; also 
BC 4/1 /92, p. 4; 16/ 1/92, p. 4; Auatralaaian Insurance and Banking Record, 18/4/93, pp. 279-80. 
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Reflecting these views (as well as the context of economic depression and financial crisis) the
major economic policy decisions of the early 1890s thus modified or repudiated the policies of 
the 1880s which had run counter to economic and financial realities and focused anew on 
measures to stimulate or aid the development of industries on which economic prosperity was 
seen to depend. 
The policy of not selling large amounts of land at auction, so tenaciously adhered to during 
the 1880s, was abandoned, albeit with some reluctance, in the face of sheer financial necessity. 
The introduction of unconditional selection of agricultural land was also aimed at increasing 
land revenue and infringed the non-alienation principle: it was introduced with less reluctance 
in the context of a marked change in Griffith's views on the ability of governments to influence 
the nature of land use. The severe curtailment of expenditure on public works, especially 
railways, was a measure largely forced on the government by the need to curb the increasing 
burden of interest which the declining profitability of the railways had imposed upon the 
public finances, and, more acutely, by the failure of the 1891 loan . The principle of land-grant 
railways was re-introduced, therefore, largely because it was seen as the only means by which 
railway construction (still seen as essential to development) could be continued in the short
term; but the decision also reflected explicit acceptance of the principle, in so far as any such 
scheme, necessarily based on profit-making principles, would ensure efficiency in land use and 
railway investment. 
The agreement to permit the resumption of the importation of Melanesian labour for the sugar 
industry - an issue that seemed to have been firmly settled represents a further significant 
reversal in policy. The final attempt by Griffith after he returned to power to provide an 
alternative supply had found him tangled in a situation where not only economic realities but 
the competing goals of the labour movement were working against him and the experience was 
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an important catalyst in his general change of outlook. Once more the measure was 
undertaken with a degree of reluctance but in acceptance of the need to accede to, rather than 
override, economic imperatives in the interests of development. 
Furthermore there was no attempt on Griffith 's part to pursue the protectionism to which he 
had been converted; on the contrary his support for the increases in railway charges 
introduced by the commissioners in 1891  and rejection of pressure especially from farmers for 
concessions - concessions which were seen as a surrogate for protection of agricultural 
industries - indicate also an attitude of economic rationalism. Mcilwraith 's position on this 
issue remained ambiguous as it had been in the 1880s. 
And the two important new policy initiatives of the 1890s clearly reflected the more typically 
Mcllwraithian view of the role of government: to act in concert with industry in the interests 
of both industry and the colony in general . The first of these was the response to the problem 
of the build-up in stock numbers following a run of good seasons. To aid in the profitable 
disposal of this stock by encouraging the production and export of frozen meat and, 
incidentally, to assist in the development of the nascent dairy produce export industry, 
Mcilwraith carried his measure to provide assistance with the production of these commodities 
after the search for a way of assisting private enterprise to develop an export trade had been 
initiated by Griffith in the previous year. Mcilwraith was also responsible for the greatly 
expanded role of government in assisting the development of central sugar mills. As initiated 
by Griffith in the 'eighties the policy had been aimed as much at solving the labour question 
(and thus regarded primarily as a social policy) as promoting the development of the industry .
In the early 'nineties, as the restructuring of the industry away from the plantation system 
towards small farming was occurring, the policy was more particularly an economic one: to 
improve the efficiency and profitability of the industry . 
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Quite early in the piece the Courier had already perceived that " the political empiricism of 
1884 has become unfashionable, and those who had unconsciously sinned against economic law 
were now ready to repent " . 1 7  By the end of the 'Griffilwraith ' period the same journal
observed that "our politicians have been the subject of a conservative reaction" to the policies 
of the previous decade and now saw their first duty " to promote the well being of the great 
industries of the colony " . 1 8  The critical change was in Griffith's views. These were always
susceptible to modification - a fact Griffith never denied and indeed defended quite strongly -
and the economic and political circumstances of the early 1890s presented substantial cause for 
introspection. Mcilwraith must take some of the credit also; the view of one observer, that he 
had " effected the complete change of his old opponent" was a widely held one. 19 Far from
making him " almost an anachronism " as Dignan suggests, the period in some ways 
represented Mcilwraith 's triumph. 20
The succeeding members of the continuous ministry, while representing a diverse set of views, 
were united essentially in their desire to defend the principles of free enterprise and private 
property against the strongly reformist measures advocated by the Labour Party. Nelson, 
premier from 1894 to 1898 ,  shared Mcilwraith 's view that economic and social progress 
stemmed essentially from the efforts of individuals seeking the most profitable use of the 
colony 's resources. In his 1896 election manifesto, for example, he spoke admiringly of the 
colony 's "heritage of individual freedom, by which every man, according to his ability and 
17 BC 6/8/91 ,  p. 4.
18 BC 19/10/93, p.  4 .
19 A ustralasian Insurance and Banking Record, 18/4/92 , pp. 249-50. 
20 Audralian Dictionary of Biography, vol. 5, p. 164. Coghlan's view, noted by Dignan, that "Griffith's peculiar
type of liberalism dearly dominated" also fails to acknowledge the extent to which Mcllwraith's views, or at 
least his viewpoint, shaped that liberalism. (T.A. Coghlan, L abour and Industry in A ustralia, vol. 4, Oxford 
University Press, 19 18, p. 1 893.) 
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conduct, has the right to carve out a career for himself" . Wise government, he continued, was 
that " directed towards removing all legal and social impediments to individual effort and 
progress" .2 1  Thus, as he declared in a speech just after he became premier, " they simply
wanted to carry on in as quiet way as possible, and to work the affairs of the colony in a 
business like way . . . .  He insisted upon hard work as the only means of restoring the colony 
to the high road of prosperity " .  22 The Courier approvingly represented his views in the
following terms: 
The people are themselves much mightier than the Parliament, which is only an 
instrument of their own fashioning . . . . the people have richer sources of strength 
in their own self-reliance and industry and hopefulness and progressiveness than in 
Government and Parliament. Only in a limited degree can the Government and 
Parliament either make or mar the people's fortunes . . . .  Sir Hugh Nelson and all 
or most of his colleagues are men who note the vast difference between what is 
attempted and what is achieved by legislation.23
Nelson 's succf·ssor, Thomas Byrnes, was a man of recognised liberal views, but he had 
virtually no interest in matters economic, or at least showed no ability to come to grips with 
them. Beyond perfunctory obeisance the general notion of 'development ' and whatever means 
to it seemed appropriate he had little to say .  A declared belief in a "broad and generous 
Liberalism 11 was given substance only in the form of the advocacy of " the State doing what it 
legitimately could to the aid of industry , to the aid of order, and to the aid of intellectual and 
moral development" . 24 When translated into views on specific policy issues, so far as Byrnes
confronted these, his position appeared to amount to no more than an opportunistic populism. 
His influence on policy was negligible. 
21 BC 25/2/96, p. 2 .  
22 Speech at Townsville, B C  1 /5/94, p .  5. 
23 BC 1 7 /6/96, p. 4. 
24 Speech at Warwick, BC 23/6/98, p. 6. 
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Dickson, a member of the government from 1 897 until 1901 and premier for a short time after 
Byrnes's death, also had well-established liberal credentials although his experience in the 
Griffith government of the 'eighties appears to have imbued in him a scepticism about the 
wisdom of government policies which attempted to change economic institutions too suddenly, 
or sought goals beyond those economically and financially feasible. In 1892,  from outside 
politics he had called for the re-introduction of Melanesian labour; after his re-election he was 
given to delivering little homilies in parliament which, while more moderately expressed, could 
have came from Morehead. At the same time, while acknowledging economic and financial 
constraints, he was a consistent advocate of more active policies to promote immigration and 
the construction of railways. 
The longest-serving member of the continuous government was Robert Philp . A member of 
the ministry since 1 895 and premier from 1899 to 1903 he was essentially a conservative 
pragmatist. On the relatively rare occasions one can find statements of general principles 
Philp emphasised the importance of free enterprise and the limitations of government in the 
whole process of development. His manifesto for the 1 902 election, for example, ranged rather 
pointlessly over a number of issues but the policy of the government was "summed up " in a 
way which clearly reflected his general view: "To make this State the home of prosperous and 
contented people of the European race, and a portion of Australia where every member of that 
race, whatever may be his position , will be as free to live his own life and work out his own 
destiny, so long as he conforms to the law " .  25 Later in the year Philp confirmed that he
proposed " no revolutionary measures, he wanted to leave the people free to come and spend 
money as they choose. That was the only way to get the country out of its troubles " .  26 As the
25 BC 4/2/02 ,  p. 6. 
26 Speech at Mai·yborough BC 3/7 /02, p. 6.
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economic and financial situation deteriorated, however, such a position led to charges of 
political Micawberism. "One searches in vain for indications of definite political principles or 
of any clear policy which is being pursued in the administration of public affairs " ,  declared the 
Courier. 27 Philp responded only by reasserting his view that government had relatively little
role to play in development, indeed observing on one occasion that "the people might do a 
little more sometimes for themselves. There has been too much leaning on the Government in 
the past . . .  and more independence and self reliance was looked for " .  28
The view that governments could only act within the constraints dictated by economic 
circumstances, embodied in the 'conservative reaction ' of the 'nineties, thus prevailed. While 
the period was not without some new initiatives by government to foster the process of 
development, policy in general reflected this view. 
Railway policy, for example, was characterised by caution in the expenditure of borrowed 
money and a two fold search: on the one hand for ways of ensuring that public funds were 
spent in the most efficient manner and, on the other, for alternative principles on which 
railways could be constructed but the government 's commitment minimised or insulated from 
the sort of effects which had followed the bout of railway building initiated by the Liberals in 
the 1880s. While Philp tended towards a more expansive approach, Nelson and Dickson acted 
as restraining forces on the revival of expenditure of loan funds on railway investment. Both 
pressed the view that railway proposals should be more carefully assessed in terms of their 
economic and financial implications. Dickson indeed attempted to institute procedures for 
such assessment by way of a parliamentary standing committee. Nelson 's main contribution 
to railway policy was the introduction of the guarantee principle as a device to ease the 
27 BC 2/3/03, p. 4 .  
28  Speech at Normanton, BC 1 6/5/03, p .  6.
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pressure on the government to build unprofitable railways and to insulate the public finances 
from the const!quences of any such undertakings by placing the burden more precisely on the 
individuals who benefited. Dickson 's approach was rather more positive: he advocated the 
principle of ' light lines' as a means of providing more mileage of railway at the same cost. 
Philp pursued the idea of having local authorities construct and operate (and take the financial 
responsibility for) local railways/tramways and, at the same time, encouraged the construction
and operation of railways by private capital . As it happened, Dickson 's parliamentary 
committee did not come into being and few railways were actually constructed under the 
various alternative principles pursued. But the attitude they reflected pervaded rai lway policy 
nevertheless: while the decision-making process underlying most railway investment during 
these years was basically unchanged, expenditure was undertaken at a lower level and with a 
deal more regard to its economic and financial implications. 
The prevailing attitude towards immigration was also cautious and conservative. Successive 
ministers remained concerned about the capacity of a still-weak economy to absorb more 
people and unwilling to force the pace of development by encouraging immigrants. Dickson 
stood apart as a strong advocate of resuming an active immigration policy as a means of 
stimulating economic activity.  Nelson 's restraining influence prevailed, however, until late in 
the decade. In the context of a stronger economic recovery and his own greater influence 
Dickson then initiated a resumption of assisted immigration . But as the drought worsened 
and economic conditions deteriorated the program was stopped . 
Land policy is less simply characterised. The policy of selling land by auction , the subject of 
such acrimony between the Liberals and conservatives in the second half of the 1880s and a 
matter on which Griffith was forced to compromise in 189 1 ,  was eschewed as the public 
finances were restored to balance. As financial problems recurred at the beginning of the 
1900s, however, Philp had to resort to the expedient once more. Pastoral tenants were treated 
benignly. Despite the widespread feeling that pastoral rents were still lower than appropriate 
no action was taken to increase them; though the practical difficulties of interfering with Land 
Board decisions and the problems of the pastoral industry (exacerbated at the end of the
decade by drought) hardly provided an easy context. The significant concessions with respect
to the term of leases granted to pastoral lessees by Philp in 1900 and 1902 appeared to treat 
pastoralists very generously. But these were no more than circumstances warranted and were 
granted by Philp only with a measure of reluctance. The 1897 land act was essentially a 
consolidating measure, but it made some not insignificant amendments to the terms and 
conditions under which settlement could proceed. The reduction of the period of grazing farm 
leases and the introduction of the tender system for allocating grazing selections (the latter
measure ensuring that a 'full ' rent was received for the use of land in this form ) reflected what
was at best an unencouraging attitude of conservatives, especially those with a squatting 
background, to the class of men who were taking over large areas of former runs. By contrast, 
the restoration of the conditional purchase principle for agricultural selections on very easy 
terms (and the reformalisation of the agricultural homestead concept) indicated a willingness
to sacrifice (potential) revenue in order to encourage settlement on small areas of land . This
measure reflected not only the conservative preference for agriculturally-based closer 
settlement but also the fact that with the development and increasing prosperity of agriculture 
such settlement was becoming more viable economically and indeed an important determinant 
of the rate o: economic development. This also goes some way towards explaining the 
superficially surprising introduction, in the first year of Nelson 's premiership , of the provision 
for the repurchase of large freehold estates in order that they could be made available for 
closer (agricultural) settlement. While Nelson had previously argued cogently against the
policy as one which constituted an unwarranted interference with market forces and exposed 
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the government to financial loss, the fall in land prices and the development of agriculture 
made the sponsorship of the sale of the large estates for closer settlement more likely to be an 
economically and financially sound proposition. 
The remaining years of the continuous government were also marked by a number of new 
initiatives on the part of government to assist those industries, particularly agriculture, which 
promised to constitute a new force for economic expansion as the pastoral industry took stock. 
The provision of certain forms of general assistance to private enterprise was embraced by 
even the more conservative-minded ministers. Thus it was during Nelson 's term as premier 
that the Agricultural College was established and the role and status of Department of 
Agriculture enhanced with a separate minister being appointed to oversee the extension of its 
activities. And it was under Philp that the Bureau of Sugar Experiment Stations was created, 
and a sugar ex:pert employed, to provide assistance specifically to the · sugar industry. But 
throughout there was a distinct reluctance to provide assistance to industries in a way that 
interfered with the operation of market forces. Nelson 's caution in 1896  that government help 
to private enterprise should remain "within sound principles of political economy " sounded the 
keynote. 29 Thus, for example, pressure for an Agricultural Bank to provide credit to farmers
on concessional terms was resisted for several years. When the government was eventually 
forced to yield and establish the bank its function was confined to providing loans for 
investment in fixed improvements: the notion of the bank as a general provider of 'cheap 
money for farmers ' was rejected (although there were indications that the government had
resigned itself to the inevitability of such a policy in the future) . Nor did the unavoidable
involvement of the government in the control of rabbits imply any special concessions: indeed 
policy was characterised by a resistance to pressure to 'nationalise ' the rabbit question beyond 
29 Manifesto, BC 25/2/96, p. 2. 
the extent warranted by the public benefit from the control measures. Individual producers 
were forced to undertake a share of the cost of control measures commensurate with the 
benefits they were deemed to derive. Pleas for special assistance or concession met with little 
sympathy. Farmers campaigning in the mid-1890s for higher tariffs and reductions in railway 
rates were told bluntly to solve their problems by reducing costs of production , or, as the 
Courier paraphrased Nelson's response to their requests, " to seek profits in their paddocks, 
and not in another addition to the household bill, or another raid upon the public revenue" .30
Nelson made it clear to them that if they were looking for concessions to bolster their 
uneconomic enterprises he was "not on the job " . 31 The campaign to require machinery for the 
co-operative sugar mills to be manufactured in the colony also received little sympathy from 
ministers. Nelson was happy enough to carry through the measure initiated by Mcilwraith to 
encourage the export of meat and dairy produce. But he showed no interest in using the funds 
raised under the legislation for further forms of assistance to these industries once the specific 
aims of the act had been realised , despite considerable pressure on him to do so. Mcilwraith 's 
other major initiative - the extension of assistance to central sugar mills - was also 
implemented hy his successors and at the end of the decade Philp displayed a remarkably 
sanguine attitude to the financial difficulties of many of the mills built under the act and was 
uncharacteristically liberal in his willingness to provide further funds to extend the central 
mill system. These attitudes were exceptional, however, and stand in contrast to the 
conservatism of industry policy in general . 
The government formed m 1 903 under Morgan 's leadership was of a distinctly liberal 
30 BC 23/3/94, p. 4. 
31  Report of dep11tation, BC 9/4/94, p. 6.
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persuasion. Morgan himself had a solid record as an independent liberal who was closely 
identified with agricultural interests and the Darling Downs in particular. He had been a 
long-time advocate of government action to assist the development of agriculture and promote 
agriculturally-based closer settlement. In parliament during the 'nineties he had been most 
prominent in the campaign to reduce railway rates on agricultural produce and in his 
advocacy of support for the Department of Agriculture. Bell and Denham (appointed 
respectively as lands and agriculture ministers) were also men of broadly liberal disposition 
who supported the view that governments· should actively promote and assist the small rural 
entrepreneur and agricultural industries in the cause of settlement and development. Of the 
two labour men, Kidston was the most forceful and influential . Identified most �losely with 
the pursuit of reforms more particularly affecting the working man, with respect to workmen's 
compensation and other terms and conditions of employment, he also had been a strong 
supporter of policies which encouraged a form of development benefiting the 'small man ' .  ' His 
views, however, were acknowledged to be 'moderate ' and he accepted moderation as the key to 
obtaining the political power necessary to effect reforms. His broad political outlook was 
noted by Morgan in early 1 903 in the following terms: "Mr Kidston evidently . . .  is quite 
prepared to go at least halfway to meet men of liberal tendencies who have hitherto held aloof 
from those in whose council extreme views have been permitted to predominate " .32 Thus, for 
example, he accepted the extension of the pastoral leases granted by Philp in 1 902 as a 
measure made necessary by the drought; and while opposing strongly Philp 's policy of 
allowing the construction of private railways he had publicly suggested a 'half-way ' solution 
which would make use of private capital without giving it the control and influence which he 
considered Philp 's measures implied. 
32 Quoted in B. A. Knox, 'The Honourable Sir Arthur Morgan Kt: his public life and work' {B.A. thesis,
University of Queensland, 1956), p. 79. 
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The government had come to power, however, with what was seen as a primarily 
administrative purpose: to restore financial balance after Philp had presided over a series of 
annual deficits which had accumulated to over one million pounds. As Denham put it: " The 
mission , the object, the raison d 'etre that the Morgan Government came into existence [sic] 
was to adjust the finances " ;  and as he expressed it in early 1 904, " in the present condition of 
affairs administration was of greater importance than legislation " .  33 Through a number of 
financial measures - the cessation of borrowing, retrenchment and reforms in the public 
service, pressure on local and statutory authorities to fulfil their responsibilities with respect 
to borrowed funds, and the sale of Crown lands - and aided materially by increases in revenue 
associated with the return of good seasons and general economic recovery - Kidston , as 
treasurer, fulfilled this mission and was able to show a small surplus at the end of 1 904-05. 
But with respect to its role in relation to economic development in the larger sense the 
government had no specific charter nor indeed any defined policies. The record of the 
Morgan-Kidston government thus emerged from the broad liberal consensus of its members 
and the economic and financial constraints of the period. 
The decision to stop borrowing and, accordingly, cut expenditure from the loan fund, posed 
obvious problems in the formulation of a railway policy. Morgan found himself with an even 
more pressing need than his predecessors for some alternative method of financing railway 
investment. The somewhat convoluted attempts to 'make land pay for the railways' through 
the betterment principle foundered on the difficulty of securing betterment from existing land 
owners. The policy of applying the proceeds of sales of land by auction to the construction of 
railways was toyed with . But (as economic conditions improved ) it was eventually accepted
that railway construction would have to be financed primarily by borrowing. The adoption of 
33 Speeches at Indooroopilly, BC 28/7 /04, p. 6 and Toowoomba, BC 28/ 1/04, p. 4. 
the guarantee principle, to be applied to all future railways, however, represented the 
consummation of the search for principles over the previous decade and was intended to 
introduce a much stronger element of financial discipline into loan expenditure. At the same 
time it was accepted that in some circumstances private capital could appropriately be 
permitted to he used for railway investment (though the terms on which this was accepted
were rather less favourable to investors than those of the Philp government) .
On the question of immigration Morgan and Kidston remained cautious. The modest 
measures they took to encourage immigrants were directed only to those who might take up 
land and themselves immediately become producers. With general unemployment a problem 
(though a gradually diminishing one) until 1905 they were not prepared to risk increasing the
supply of labour beyond the requirements determined fundamentally by the primary 
industries. 
The existing framework of land policy was considered adequate to allow for closer settlement 
to proceed, tht� only significant amendment made being in regard to repurchase policy. In the 
early part of the government's term the existing policy was worked though with a certain 
amount of caution. This stemmed partly from the more general concern at this time with 
financial prudence (the financial implications of the policy were still in some question as a
result of the arrears position of selectors on some estates) but more importantly because of the
increasing amount of private subdivision of the large estates that was taking place 
independently. The attempt to introduce a land monopoly tax in 1905 was a bid to hasten 
this process while raising revenue at the same time. The failure to carry this measure, 
together with t,he increasing demand for land, then led the government to revise the legislative 
framework for repurchase, providing in particular for the compulsory resumption of land. 
This measure was underpinned by a more strong-minded approach to the rights and 
responsibilites of government in pursuing the public interest. 
Predictably , further measures were taken to assist agricultural industries. The scope of 
operations of the Agricultural Bank was enlarged; the Dairy Produce Act was passed to 
regulate methods of production in order to enhance the opportunities for export; some other 
initiatives were taken to assist with the marketing of agricultural exports; and the work of the 
Department ot Agriculture was extended. In the peculiar circumstances of the sugar industry 
a very cautious attitude was adopted, however, and further assistance in the development of 
the central mill system was withheld pending resolution of the fiscal arrangements associated 
with commonwealth policy. 
Indeed policy in general typically reflected the sort of discipline more conventionally associated 
with conservatives who were now cast in the role of 'wreckers of the treasury ' that only a 
decade or so previously Mcilwraith had identified with the Liberal governments of the 1870s 
and 1880s. Kidston 's policy towards central sugar mills in fact made Philp 's position look 
comparatively liberal as did the decisive action to stop borrowing. On other issues, such as 
the sale of Crown lands and the private construction of railways there was a high degree of 
compromise. Thus, policy during the period showed strong elements of continuity. Had the 
conservatives �1urvived politically the policies pursued during these years might not have been 
very different. Some of the Morgan-Kidston measures were in train before Philp resigned: for 
example, the origins of the application of the betterment principle to railway construction can 
be found during Philp 's time; and more generally the search for alternative mechanisms of 
railway construction is essentially a continuation of policy in the 1890s. Denham's initiatives 
to assist agriculture under the umbrella of the department contrast with those of his 
immediate predecessor but are not qualitatively different from those of former ministers such 
as Thynne and. Chataway. The conservatives' policy put forward at the election held in 1904 
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was in fact fundamentally similar to that of Morgan and many of the government 's measures 
during these years received the general support of the opposition. 
Only three measures stand out as bold liberal initiatives: the attempts to levy a general land 
betterment tax and the land monopoly tax and the more expansive and assertive policy with 
respect to the purchase of freehold estates for closer settlement purposes. The tax measures 
were as much general revenue as development measures, the first of which was dropped fairly 
readily and the second not pursued after it was defeated in the Legislative Council .  By the 
end of 1 906 the third constituted the only evidence of a new liberalism in development policy. 
When Kidston had assumed the premiership at the beginning of 1 906 he had explicitly 
affirmed that 11 The policy of the Cabinet remained the same . . The Goverment were 
satisfied with their policy . . .  11 • 34 In his famous Rockhampton manifesto delivered in February
1 907 , however , he foreshadowed the considerably more energetic pursuit by government of 
material progress under the motto 11 gang (go] forward 11 • The policy was clearly rooted in the
strong recovery evident in all the rural industries with the return of good seasons and the 
strong demand for land boosted by the influx of migrants from southern states. "My idea 11 , 
Kidston was reported as saying just before the policy was put forward,  " is that the rational 
policy for Queensland in the next three years is one of industrial development. My belief is 
that we are on the edge of a period of phenomenal development in Queensland, and it is our 
business to foster it in every way possible " .35
The principal elements of the policy were the familiar ones of promoting immigration, building 
railways and settling the land, now to be pursued with renewed vigour. The policy was, in 
broad outline, little different to that put forward in 1 907 by Philp, a fact both leaders readily 
34 Speech at Rockhampton, BC 2/2/06, p. 5. 
35 BC 22/1 /07, p. 5 . 
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acknowledged, and it was the accepted basis on which the Kidston and Philp parties merged in 
1908. Indeed it established the terms in which policy was pursued right up to 19 14. When 
Denham assumed the premiership on Kidston 's retirement he also declared that " the policy he 
had to lay before them was a continuation of the Rockhampton policy "36 and at the 1912
election he  affirmed his commitment to policies to  foster this " trinity of  hope and progress" .37
The most obvious outcome of the 'Rockhampton policy ' was the huge program of railway 
construction undertaken from 1908 onwards. In the casual ,  even reckless, manner in which 
decisions about railway investment and expenditure of loan funds were undertaken the railway 
policy during this period was in some ways reminiscent of the 1880s. There was, however, a 
fundamental difference. Not only was expenditure undertaken in the context of sustained 
economic prosperity and the significantly improved financial performance of the railways but 
also within the guarantee provisions of the 1 906 Railways Act. These effectively transferred 
(the majority of) any net costs of railway investment on to the private individuals who 
benefited from it, the expenditure in the first place being subject to their sanction. If the 
result was to allow (even encourage) individuals to expose themselves (and ultimately the 
government) to the risk of financial miscalculation the maintenance of the policy (and its 
confirmation right at the end of the period) nonetheless reflected the view that governments 
should keep their actions within the limits imposed by economic forces and their financial 
implications. 
This attitude was clearly reflected also in the policy pursued with respect to immigration. At 
the same tim� that he had promised a 'bold and liberal ' immigration policy Kidston had 
warned that he would not encourage, or condone, a rate of immigration above that which 
36 BC 18/2/ 1 1 ,  p. 6. 
37 BC 29/3/ 1 2, p. 8. 
could be absorbed without either creating unemployment or forcing down wages. In 
recognition of the fact that, in the short term at least, the majority of immigrants sought 
employment (rather than going straight on to the land ) immigration policy throughout the
period from 1907 to 1914  thus sought to match the demand for labour created by development 
but to avoid sponsoring an increase in population which ran ahead of it. 
Land policy during the 1 900s was seen very largely in terms of administering the existing 
legislation which was considered to provide an appropriate framework within which settlement 
could proceed. The strong demand for land in the context of prosperity in both pastoral and 
agricultural industries eased the pressure on governments to sacrifice revenue in order to 
achieve settlement. The abolition of the tender system for grazing selections did imply such a 
sacrifice in order to encourage bona fide settlers. But on the other hand, there was a 
hardening of a ttitudes towards allowing selection of small areas of land at very low prices as 
agricultural homesteads (the apparently contradictory introduction of the 'free homestead'
tenure being merely a piece of political pragmatism which was not taken seriously) . The
repurchase pol icy,  strengthened by the 1906 Closer Settlement Act, was pursued but only in a 
limited and cautious way as the government, by and large, was content to see the more 
intensive utilisation of land brought about through the forces of the market. 
The original 'Rockhampton policy ' included no reference to any particular form of assistance 
to specific industries to enhance the process of development. And, indeed, new initiatives in 
this area are almost entirely absent from the record of the Kidston-Denham governments. 
Loan funds were made available at the very end of the period to permit construction of 
additional central sugar mills but only after resolution of the commonwealth 's fiscal policies 
affecting the industry had clarified the future prospects of sugar-growing as an industry to the 
satisfaction of the government. While several other measures to assist agricultural industries 
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(including an amendment to the Agricultural Bank Act which allowed the bank to extend its
operations) were implemented, they can be attributed in large part to pressure from the
Country Party group influential within the Liberal Party after 1909: in these cases the 
policies were directed as much at aiding sectional interests as hastening the pace of 
development overall. 
If Kidston 's motto - and even more so his elaboration of it in 1909 to "go forward,  whate 'er 
betides "38 - suggests a fundamental shift in attitudes towards the role of government in
economic devdopment the reality is thus somewhat different. There is in fact a strong 
element of continuity with the 'conservative reaction ' of the 1890s which reflected , not a lesser 
commitment i.o economic expa�sion as a goal nor a repudiation of the vital role which
government had in the process of development, but an acceptance of the limits and constraints 
which economic forces imposed on that role, and of the need to apply the same canons of 
financial discipline on the activities of government which private enterprise had perforce to 
accept. After 1 903, and even after the middle of the decade when sustained and rapid 
economic expansion removed the economic and financial pressures which had applied since 
1890, the samt:: attitude prevailed. During this time new and significant policy initiatives were 
undertaken to effect changes in the terms and conditions under which labour was employed 
and in the manner in which the fruits of development were distributed. Thus, in what 
constitutes a �eparate set of developments, a range of measures was implemented relating to 
the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes, the setting of wages, workmen 's 
compensation, accommodation for workers in the pastoral and sugar industries, conditions of 
work in factories and shops and the provision of old age pensions. But the thrust of policy 
with respect to the actual process of economic expansion was to accommodate rather than 
38 Speech at Howard, BC 2 1 /7 /09, p. 6.
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supersede the fundamental determinants of development. In part this was a legacy of 
attitudes and policies which had developed during the 1890s. In part, also, it reflected the fact 
that development in these years was not only very rapid but, involving as it did the more 
intensive use of land and closer settlement, conformed to the liberal goal of a more widely 
diffused participation in the business of development. Liberals could thus unite with 
conservatives content to support and assist privately-directed development. 
The decades prior to the First World War have been characterised in Australian history as 
ones where the powers of government were used to an increasing extent to influence the nature 
of economic activity and the manner in which the fruits of such activity were shared among 
the people.39 The period after 1901 has been identified particularly as that in which such
developments occurred; though the 1890s has long been recognised as the decade when 
n governments began to intervene in economic affairs to a greater extent than had ever before 
40been attempted" .  
Historians have focused mainly on attempts to make the outcome of economic relationships 
more consistent with a distribution of income which accorded with notions of 'fairness ' and 
'justice ' - words which run as a litany through the public debates of the period. Prominent 
among these attempts were the legislative responses to the efforts of organised labour to gain 
for itself a larger share of the income it produced. These efforts began in earnest in the 
frantic, though increasingly fragile, economic expansion of the 1880s and gathered strength in 
the 1 890s as prosperity gave way to depression and then stagnation. As prosperity returned 
39 'The People Make Laws' is indeed the sub-title of Volume Five of Manning Clark's A Hiatory of A uatralia,
Melbourne University Press, 1981 .  
40 G. Greenwood (ed.), Auatralia: a Social and Political Hiatory, Angus and Robertson, 1956, p. 173, and
generally pp. 173·80. 
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the pressure to seek a large slice of the economic cake eased but the potential to do so through 
means evolved in the context of the 1890s was enhanced; labour also increased its political 
influence and t.he formation of the commonwealth provided a medium through which the goal 
of a minimum 'standard of living ' for all wage-earners could more effectively be pursued. The 
new province for law and order was thus carved out and the principle of wage-fixation adopted 
whereby, as Shann put it, " the wage-earners' share in production (was interpreted] as a
sacrosanct family maintenance" .  4 1
Other forms of  social amelioration were also developed during these decades: regulation of 
other terms and conditions under which labour worked, facilitation of co-operative land 
settlement specifically to help the unemployed, and forms of social payment to assist the aged 
and the destitute. The strengthening of efforts to prohibit immigration by non-European 
peoples can also be seen as part of this trend of invoking the powers of government in order to 
achieve an ideal society. 
As noted, attention has been directed primarily at these policies. But efforts by governments 
to increase the size of the national product - to quicken the pace of development rather than 
merely influence the manner in which it was distributed among different groups or the social 
consequences of the way in which output was produced - are equally a phenomenon of the 
period under review. Indeed some of the key elements of such efforts (here described as
development policy) were a leading characteristic of Australian political economy for much of
the nineteenth century as colonial governments assumed responsibility for augmenting the 
population and capital stock of Australia and, as landlords of much of its area, sought to 
expand its productive capabilities.42 Thus in the decades prior to 1914  the role of government
41 Edward Shann, An Economic Hiatory of Auatralia, Cambridge University Press, 1930, p. 376.
42 N.G. Butlin, 'Colonial Socialism in Australia, 1860- 1900', in Hugh G.J. Aitken (ed.), The State and
Economic Growth, Social Science Research Council, 1969; and N.G. Butlin et al., GotJernment and Capitaliam: 
Public and PritJate Choice in Twentieth Century Auatralia, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, esp. pp. 13-28, 49-73. 
- 959 
in encouraging immigrants, in borrowing and undertaking investment particularly in transport 
and communications facilities and in supervising land use reflects a degree of continuity with 
past policy. There were, however, some additions to the agenda of development policy as, in 
the context of changes in the basis of economic expansion and growth following the end of the 
pastoral boom, governments perceived the need for pub�ic measures to aid this re-orientation, 
measures not deemed necessary in the earlier phase of development. To a large extent this 
involved the provision of assistance to new industries to enable them to expand. 
In the case of the former set of policies the economic implications of efforts directed essentially 
at social improvement (that is for the size of the economic cake and its expansion over time) 
were very largely dismissed. Australia, it was acknowledged (if implicitly) was one of the 
wealthiest countries in the -world whose resources and potential appeared to ensure future 
economic prosperity.  The economic costs of creating a society based on the concepts of 
fairness and justice (albeit that these concepts were applied only within the society to the 
extent that certain peoples were deliberately excluded) could, to the extent they were 
acknowledged, be ignored. 
This pursuit of ideals in disregard of their economic implications soon became a phenomenon 
which was seen by contemporary observers to characterise Australian public policy. 
Australians, remarked Hancock in 1930, were not " disposed to submit to the necessities [of the 
market] . . . .  They have insisted that their Governments must struggle to soften them or elude 
them or master them . . . .  What the economists call 'law'  they call anarchy. The law which 
they understand is the positive law of the State - the democratic State which seeks social 
justice " .43 Hancock's focus was on the 1920s but these attitudes are clearly reflected also in
the policies of the pre-war decades. 
43 W.K. Hancock, Auatralia. Jacaranda, 1964, p. 67. 
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The category of policy directed at the more specifically economic end of development has 
received relatively little attention from historians. The reviews by Butlin and Pincus 44
emphasise the manner in which decisions about development were also influenced by the 
pursuit of what may be termed 'social ' goals (though in practice, more often than not, these 
merely reflected particular private interests and pressures). The consequence, it is suggested, 
(explicitly with respect to capital formation but implicitly with respect to other policies) is 
that public economic decision-making was thereby exposed to (and suffered from) 
" miscalculation and misallocation " .  45
Closer to the period under review observers such as Hancock were highly critical of the way in 
which the influence of governments over the processes of production was increasingly 
characterised by " the confusion of politics and business " .46 The policy of protection
epitomised the phenomenon. As a 'policy of plenty ' it was based on notions, however 
imprecisely articulated, of stimulating the development of new industries (and thus additional 
sources of income) in the country and of 'retaining money sent out of the_ country ' in payment
for imports. Increasingly, however, protection was embraced as a means of levelling the 
wealth created by the great primary industries and of providing the means by which a high 
average standard of living could be assured, while at the same time promoting those industries 
consistent with a more sophisticated and 'civilised' society. In addition it was seen to provide 
means to defend the nation against any foreign pretenders to the vast natural resources of 
which Australians found themselves in possession. Indeed, as Hancock put it, the policy was 
" interwoven with almost every strand of democratic nationalism " .47 But the 'confusion ' was
identified also in respect of government ownership and management of resources ( 'state 
44 see footnote 42. 
45 Butlin et al., p. 22 and paaaim.
46 Hancock, p. 109.
47 Ibid., p. 7 1 .  
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socialism' as Hancock termed it) where " the pleasures of democracy" had won out over 
11 business principles" .  48 These observations were also made with particular ref erenee to the
1920s where the pursuit of development became particularly entangled with political goals.49
But, again ,  this characteristic of policy was clearly traced to, and identified in, the pre-war 
decades. 
This conclusion has been drawn largely on the basis of analysis of policies of the 
commonwealth and the states of Victoria and New South Wales. The present study of 
development policy in Queensland confirms that the ' confusion' of business and politics was 
also characteristic of the northern colony /state. Here too material advancement was defined 
and sought in terms of liberal social principles. At the same time the recognition of economic 
realities and of the need to pursue social goals within them is a persistently recurring theme. 
This phenomenon is most clearly evident in the period after 1890, in contrast to the trend of 
social policy and despite the fact that new forms of intervention in economic activity 
appeared. 
No simple and consistent pattern emerges. Contradictions and ambiguities abound. Thus in 
the case of land the policy of the 1880s was a clear example of the embodiment of a social 
goal in a more rational economic framework . On the other hand, in the case of policy with 
respect to European immigration, the restrictive attitude initiated in the 1880s, confirmed in 
the 1890s, and not really shaken in the 1900s, may be seen as reflecting the dominance of the 
desire to protect the interests of a section of society at the expense of aggregate economic 
expansion,  as much as representing a rational economic response to economic circumstances. 
48 Ibid., p. 1 07.
49 This is the case particularly in the first half or two-thirds of the decade; in the latter part of the period 
concern as to the economic rationality of development policies was expressed with increasing frequency, that 
of academics such as Hancock and Shann reinforcing others including the then prime minister (see W.H.
Richmond, 'S.M. Bruce and Australian economic policy 1923-9', Awfralicm Economic Hidory Review, XXIII, 2,
September 1 983, pp. 238-57) .
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Nevertheless the 1 890s, due largely to the influence of economic depression and stagnation, 
clearly marked a 'conservative reaction '  in policy, involving an affirmation of the need for 
economic and financial discipline and 'rationality' .  That this attitude was maintained in the 
1900s in the context of a return to economic prosperity and much progressive social legislation 
is one of the more interesting aspects of the period's history. 
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Report from the Evidence taken before the Joint Committee of the two Houses . . .  to 
inquire, consider, and report what steps can be taken to place on a successful basis the 
industry of Meat Exportation. ( 1896 N) 
Arrears of interest, etc . ,  due by certain Mills under 'The Sugar Works Guarantee Acts, 
1 893  to 1895 ' - Return to an Order. ( 1899 II) 
Statistics under 'The Sugar Works Guarantee Act of 1893 '  - Return to an Order. ( 1 900 
II) 
Report upon some Factors relating to the Cane Sugar Industry of Australia, by Dr. 
Walter Maxwell .  ( 1 901  N) 
Report by Dr. Maxwell upon Central Mills. ( 1904) 
Bonus for Sugar-Cane Cultivated and Harvested by White Labour (Correspondence 
between Chief Se�retary and Commonwealth Government regarding extension of period] . 
( 1 904-05 II) 
Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into certain questions relating to 
the Sugar Industry. ( 1 9 1 1- 12  III) 
Correspondence between the Chief Secretary of Queensland and the Prime Minister of 
the Commonwealth respecting the erection of more Central Sugar Mills . ( 1 9 12  III) 
Report of the Royal Commission appointed to Inquire into the Meat Industry of 
Queensland. ( 1 9 1 3  II) 
Gold and Mineral Fields: 
Reports of the Department of Mines, 1883 to 1 9 14 .  
Returns in accordance with 'The Mining Machinery Advances Act of 1 906' ,  1 907 to 1 9 14 .  
Report of  the Royal Commissioners Appointed to  Inquire into and Report upon the Laws 
relating to Mining for Gold and Other Minerals. ( 1 897 N) 
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Finance: 
Tables Relating to the Colonial Treasurer's Financial Statement for the years 1884-85 to 
19 14-15 .  
Auditor-General 's Reports, selected years. 
Loan Estimates and Proposals, selected years. 
Statistical: 
Statistics of the Colony of Queensland, selected years. 
Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 1883 to 1914. 
Comprehensive reference was made to the Governor 's speeches at the opening of 
parliamentary sessions; the Financial Statements of treasurers and debates thereon; 
Ministerial Statements; debates on all relevant bills (whether or not enacted) at all stages, 
including committee; debates on all individual railway proposals; and debates on relevant 
parliamentary motions and on the address-in-reply. Most attention was given to speeches and 
statements of ministers and other leading political figures; selective reference to those of other 
members provided useful additional information. 
Queensland Government Gazette, 1883 to 1914. 
NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS 
Australian Insurance  and Banking Record, 1883- 19 14. 
Brisbane Courier, 1883-19 14. 
This was a major source, used primarily to obtain statements of view by government ministers 
on development policy issues and measures. Particular attention was paid to speeches made 
on ministerial tours, at events such as show or railway openings and at political meetings, 
especially as elections approached. Statements made to deputations on the whole range of­
policy issues discussed and to newspaper reporters on specific matters were also a source of 
ministerial views and analysis. Items and articles by the journal itself, including several major 
pieces on leading issues, also provided information on policies as did the leading articles, 
though the latter obviously reflected a particular viewpoint. 
PRIVATE PAPERS 
Samuel Griffith (Dixson and Mitchell Libraries): 
Correspondence 1883- 1893 (mainly letters to Griffith) (MSQ 185-188 ) .
Publications by Griffith: 
'Wealth and Want', Brisbane 1889. (pamphlet) 
'The Distribution of Wealth' ,  The Centennial Magazine, vol. 1, no. 12 ,  July 1889, 
pp. 833-42. 
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'The Coloured Labour Question in Australia', The Antipodean, 1893 ,  pp. 1 3- 17 .  
Thomas Mcilwraith (John Oxley Library): 
Selected items of correspondence relating to politics and policy matters. (OM64-19) 
James Dickson (John Oxley Library): 
Diaries 1899 and 1 900. (OM67-13) 
Robert Philp (John Oxley Library) :  
Correspondence etc. relating to politics. (OM65-32 , Series 1 and 2) 
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